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The thesis explores international donors’ promotion of civil society in post-
Soviet Kyrgyzstan since the mid 2000s with a particular focus on how policy 
changes in the promotion of civil society have influenced Kyrgyz non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and their relations with the state. The thesis is based on ten-
months field research, which involved ninety semi-structured interviews with 
nineteen donors, forty-seven NGOs, six community based organisations, and three 
representatives of local authorities, together with two small-scale surveys with 
twenty-five NGO employees and thirty-three NGO leaders. The key finding is that 
donors’ focus on civil society promotion in Kyrgyzstan has decreased since the mid 
2000s rather their agenda now aims at state capacity-building. Donors’ more limited 
funding to NGOs is targeted toward the promotion of NGOs’ advocacy role and the 
encouragement of collaborative relations between NGOs and the state. These 
findings indicate a shift from donors’ civil society promotion in the 1990s where the 
key stress was on building civil society in Kyrgyzstan from scratch. Consequently, 
the thesis discusses the return of the state to donor agenda and the interaction 
between the state, donors, and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan.  
These changes have impacted the NGOs sector in Kyrgyzstan. The research 
has revealed that, as a result of these changes, NGOs are becoming more professional 
and formal. The thesis argues that reduced donor funding has resulted in a stronger 
competition among NGOs for funds, while increased interaction with the state 
institutions has also placed pressure on NGOs to become more professional and to 
increase their institutional capacity. The thesis suggests that relations between the 
state and NGOs are characterised by apparently contradictory elements in which both 
cooperation and counterbalance feature. Notwithstanding the prevailing trend toward 
NGO professionalisation and formalisation, the thesis argues that NGOs also display 
other features such as voluntarism, philanthropy, and constituency responsiveness. 
Consequently, the thesis makes a contribution to the literature on civil society in 
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This thesis explores donors’1 civil society promotion in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan since the mid 2000s. Kyrgyzstan’s experience of civil society building is 
exceptionally interesting and an important case to understand and assess donors’ civil 
society promotion in the former Soviet Union. Kyrgyzstan appeared to have all the 
ingredients to build a democratic and civil society after gaining independence in 
1991. Its government welcomed the establishment of a lively civil society and 
demonstrated a commitment to promote democracy unique in authoritarian Central 
Asia. Donors invested an enormous amount of funding into the emergence of Kyrgyz 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which represented civil society for donors 
in the 1990s. However, Kyrgyzstan’s civil society building endeavour has 
encountered numerous difficulties and has failed to bring about expected outcomes.  
The case of Kyrgyzstan is a clear illustration of donors’ difficulty in civil 
society building and, consequently, democracy promotion in the former Soviet Union 
and beyond it. Therefore, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the literature on 
development started arguing that the state, in developing countries such as 
Kyrgyzstan, should be strengthened in order to promote development. In the 1990s, 
the state was in the background of neo-liberal policies of donors. In other words, by 
the early 2000s, donors were re-examining their development agenda and making 
changes to it. In this regard, the thesis focuses on the changes in donor promotion of 
civil society since the mid 2000s and their implications for NGOs, the state, and 
relations between these actors in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.    
 
 
Civil society as a panacea for development in Kyrgyzstan?  
 
 After independence in 1991, President Akaev2 claimed that Kyrgyzstan 
needed a lively civil society to build democracy (Anderson, 2000). His words 
                                                 
1 I define donors as international governmental and non-governmental development agencies. 
Examples include the United States Agency for International Development, the UK Department for 
International Development, Mercy Corps, National Democratic Institute. See chapter 3 for further 
discussion.  
2 Akaev is the first President of the Kyrgyz Republic.  
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resounded in the first constitution which grandly declared in its preamble that 
Kyrgyzstan would build a democratic and civil society3. For the international 
community, newly independent Kyrgyzstan became a nascent “island of democracy” 
in Central Asia (Anderson, 1997). In Huskey’s words “Kyrgyzstan captured the 
imagination of the West” (1997a: 667), especially during the euphoria from the 
triumph of civil society over totalitarian state in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s 
(Seligman, 1992).  
This tremendous enthusiasm about civil society brought it to the centre of 
neo-liberal policies (Wimpelmann, 2006) and democracy promotion programmes 
(Carothers, 1997) of donors in the 1990s. Notwithstanding a great diversity of 
definitions of civil society, in the development milieu, civil society was reduced to 
NGOs for the most part (Ottaway 2005, Van Rooy and Robinson 1998). Donors 
regarded NGOs as service providers, promoters of democracy and a liberal economy, 
and as counterbalance to the state. In fact, the state was ignored (Van Rooy and 
Robinson, 1998). 
In Kyrgyzstan, donors rushed to provide millions of dollars to promote civil 
society. The 1990s, as Kyrgyz NGOs say, was a period of a “grant rain”. Two large 
donors, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and UK Department 
for International Development (DFID), had programmes specifically focused on 
promotion of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan and building their capacity. The World Bank, the 
European Commission (EC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
Soros Foundation also supported NGOs by providing funding and training. All in all, 
Kyrgyzstan received an enormous amount of funding from the international 
community to promote development. In 1995 alone, Kyrgyzstan received a $21.3 
million loan from International Monitory Fund (IMF) and a $550 million loan from 
the World Bank (Olcott, 1996: 101).  
  
                                                 
3 Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic adopted in 1993.  
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Kyrgyz NGOs: outsiders or insiders?  
 
 As a result of this significant donor support, NGOs began to emerge in 
Kyrgyzstan like mushrooms after the rain. Their number has grown rapidly year by 
year. In 1993, there were just 611 NGOs (Shishkaraeva, et al 2006). In 2008, this 
number reached 11,035 (Kaipov, 2008). Kyrgyzstan has become a country with the 
highest NGO density in Central Asia (Garbutt and Heap, 2002). This has earned the 
NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan an image of the most vibrant civil society in the region 
(Howell and Pearce, 2002). Similarly, for donors, the dynamic growth of NGOs has 
served as an indicator of civil society development (Howell and Pearce, 2002; Roy, 
2002).  
 The quality of NGOs, however, has been far less impressive than their 
quantity. NGOs in Kyrgyzstan have encountered various criticisms since their 
genesis. They have been criticised for being opportunistic. The rapid growth of 
NGOs has been connected to their hunt for abundant donor funding (Giffen et al., 
2005; Petric, 2005). “Grant-eaters” has become their sobriquet among the public. 
According to Ruffin (1999), NGOs lacked key principles such as voluntarism, 
philanthropy, and sustainability. In this regard, Petric (2005) and Roy (2002) argued 
that NGOs became professional organisations financially dependent on donors rather 
than independent voluntary associations. At the same time, Mininni (1998) claimed 
that NGOs suffered from a weak organisational capacity, especially in terms of 
financial and human resources management. A key criticism has been that NGOs 
have failed to reach out to local communities, who they were supposed to represent, 
because of their urban characteristic, highly educated staff, and donor dependence 
(Roy, 2002; Earle, 2005; Petric, 2005).  
 
 
Fickle state: from civil society promotion  to its curtailment  
 
The government led by Akaev was initially democratically inspired. Akaev 
welcomed civil society promotion. As stated above, it was proclaimed in the 
constitution that Kyrgyzstan strived to be a democratic and civil society.  However, 
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Akaev’s government gradually grew authoritarian. Akaev used different and, 
sometimes, unconstitutional techniques to expand his power. For example, during his 
rule, the constitution was amended four times in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2003 to 
increase central power (www.state.gov; www.osce.org). Regular amendments to the 
constitution undermined its meaning and credibility. Moreover, the economic 
situation in Kyrgyzstan did not improve under Akaev’s rule. In fact, Kyrgyzstan sank 
into foreign debt and became, as Pertic (2005) called it, a “global protectorate”. 
Similarly, Aksartova (2005) argued that, after independence, Kyrgyzstan had 
replaced Moscow subsidies with Western ones. It is worth noting that Kyrgyzstan 
was one of the poorest Soviet countries and heavily depended on Russia under Soviet 
rule. Consequently, it inherited a poor economy from the Soviet Union (Abazov, 
1999). On the whole, Kyrgyzstan is a small, landlocked country with relatively 
limited natural resources and poor transportation links (Olcott, 1996; Huskey, 1997). 
Akaev’s image as a liberal democracy promoter was completely destroyed 
when he became a president for a third term by violating the constitution which 
stipulated that the president could serve only for two consecutive terms4. Akaev 
received permission from the constitutional court to run for presidency based on the 
fact that his first term should not be counted since it commenced in 1990 when 
Kyrgyzstan was still in the Soviet Union (Akcali, 2005). Further, the 2005 
parliamentary elections were the worst during Akaev’s presidency. According to the 
report of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on these 
elections (www.osce.org,c), their shortcomings included vote-buying, de-registration 
of candidates, pressuring media, mistrust of candidates and voters in electoral and 
judicial institutions. As a result, the 2005 parliament came to include the President 
and his proponents’ family members. Akaev’s daughter, son, and sister-in-law are 
the most vivid examples. Some commentators  suggested that, by enlisting his family 
members, Akaev had wanted to hold on to power despite declaring that he would not 
run for the forth term of presidency (Saidazimova, 2005). Such outcomes of the 
elections, particularly many constitutional violations, and the fact that the opposition 
was sidelined led to massive public protests. On 24 March 2005, a large crowd of 
                                                 
4 Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic amended in 1996.  
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protesters occupied the main government building in Bishkek. Akaev fled to 
Moscow; while his government collapsed (www.osce.org, c).  
The new government was headed by Bakiev who led the opposition 
movement during the revolution. Bakiev had a promising start and engaged with 
NGOs. He declared that he would not abuse power and, specifically, would not 
employ any of his family members (Andersen, 2010). For people, the new 
government was a renewed hope for better future. However, Bakiev failed to deliver 
on his promises. Bakiev’s government suppressed civil society and elements of vital 
attributes of democracy such as right to assembly, and freedom of speech. The 2007 
constitution no longer stated that Kyrgyzstan would build a democratic and civil 
society5. Further, the government made an attempt to exert control over NGOs’ 
activities and funding (www.state.gov, 2008). Mass media cracked down and the 
government repressed religious freedom as well. Members of the political opposition 
also encountered state harassment including imprisonment and life threats 
(http://kg.akipress.org). As a result, Kyrgyzstan was downgraded from “partly free” 
to “not free” by Freedom House in 2009 (Marat, 2009). Most importantly, Bakiev in 
early 2010 announced that democracy based on human rights and elections was not 
appropriate for Kyrgyzstan (Pannier and Heil, 2010). Within five years of Bakiev’s 
rule, Kyrgyzstan encountered increased corruption, a hydro-energy crisis, and 
increased organised crime (Marat, 2008b). The life of people worsened dramatically 
with the increase in prices. Furthermore, Bakiev surpassed Akaev in appointing his 
family members to government positions. His six brothers and two sons held key 
positions in the government (Reeves, 2010). 
 The rapid deterioration of living standards and state suppression of political 
and other freedoms prompted protests against the government of Bakiev. In April 
2010, the opposition planned to hold “people’s gatherings” (kurultai) in each 
provincial center of Kyrgyzstan. However, the reaction of the government to the first 
gathering in Talas on 6 April 2010 was violent with the involvement of military 
forces. This provoked more anger in people and escalated into a violent clash 
between people and the government forces in Bishkek on 7 April 2010. After a day-
long fight, which took the lives of more than 80 people and left hundreds wounded, 
                                                 
5 Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic amended in 2007. 
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Bakiev fled the capital and his government collapsed. The opposition formed the 
interim government led by a female leader, Roza Orunbaeva, which was legitimised 
in a referendum in June 20106.  
 
  
Research questions and aims  
 
 The case of Kyrgyzstan shows that donor efforts to promote a liberal civil 
society throughout the 1990s and early 2000s did not produce the desired results. 
Donor programmes on civil society invested generously in the emergence of NGOs 
and in strengthening their capacity. As a result, a large number of NGOs emerged in 
Kyrgyzstan. However, according to the literature, they failed to meet the key 
expectation of donors: to establish a link with local communities and represent and 
promote their interests. Conversely, NGOs grew dependent on donors. The Kyrgyz 
state had a liberal start by striving to build a democratic and civil society. However, 
it gradually turned authoritarian and abused democratic mechanisms. Interestingly, 
the government in Kyrgyzstan also grew dependent on financial support from the 
international community.     
 Disappointed with the promotion of civil society, the literature on 
development (Zaidi, 1999; Fukuyama, 2004) suggested reconsidering development 
strategies, for example, by strengthening the state. Meanwhile, the literature on civil 
society in Central Asia (Earle, 2005; Giffen et al., 2005) indicated that donors started 
working with community-based organisations (CBOs) in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Consequently, by the early 2000s, it is evident that donors were re-examining 
their development agenda and making changes to it. It should also be noted that, 
since the early 2000s, Kyrgyzstan has gained geopolitical importance and has 
become even more important for some donors such as the US, the European Union, 
                                                 
6 I closely observed the situation in Kyrgyzstan during these protests which included daily reading of news, personal 
conversations with friends and relatives in Kyrgyzstan, participation in different online discussions, and others. Since I have 
collected too much information about this, I have decided to give a number of reference in the footnote: Reeves, M. 2010. 
‘Breaking Point: Why the Kyrgyz Lost Their Patience.’ Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/madeleine-
reeves/breaking-point-why-kyrgyz-lost-their-patience; Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty. 2010. ‘Kyrgyz Interim Leaders Try 
To Impose Order After Unrest.’ Available at: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyz_Interim_Leaders_Try_To_Impose_Order_After_Unrest/2018733.html; Levy, C.J. 2010b. 
‘Kyrgyzstan President Says He Will Not Step Down.’ Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/world/asia/09bishkek.html; Dale, I. 2010. ‘Logic Behind The Kyrgyz Chaos.’ Available 
at: http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2622 and many others.  
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and Russia. Kyrgyzstan has hosted an American airbase for the “war against terror” 
in Afghanistan. There is also a Russian airbase set up for regional security purposes. 
In light of this, the research had three key questions:  
 
1) what kind of changes have donors made in their civil society activities7 since 
the mid 2000s? 
2) why have donors made these changes? 
3) what are the implications of these changes for Kyrgyz NGOs, the Kyrgyz 
state, and relations between the two?  
 
The thesis also has two aims. First of all, by exploring changes in donors’ 
civil society promotion, the thesis seeks to understand the current activities of donors 
from a theoretical perspective. In the 1990s, donors promoted a liberal civil society 
mainly in the form of NGOs (Edwards, 2004). Following donors’ disappointment 
with civil society and possible shift to other actors suggested by the literature, it is 
essential to draw out whether a new theoretical stance informs the new orientation 
among donors.  
Secondly, the thesis aims to contribute to the debate on the replication of 
western liberal civil society in the non-Western context (Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001; 
Hann and Dunn, 1996). The mismatch between the promotion of civil society and 
actual results has triggered a debate with regard to (a) whether it is possible to 
replicate civil society in its Western form in the non-Western context and (b) whether 
non-Western societies can have their own civil society. There are two positions 
providing answers to these questions. The first position is universalistic which 
implies that a Western liberal model of civil society can be applied cross-culturally 
(Gellner, 1994). The second position is relativistic which recognises that non-
Western societies can have different and often incomparable social and political 
systems. Therefore, civil society needs to conform to the cultural specificities of each 
society (Hann and Dunn, 1996:18). 
                                                 
7 The phrase ‘civil society activities’ is translated from Russia ‘deyatelnost po grajdanskomu 
obshestvu’. This implies a broader interaction between donors and NGOs which goes beyond merely 
provision of funding by donors to NGOs.  For examples, it might include informal meetings between 




 Outline of the thesis   
The thesis consists of seven chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 aims to set 
forth a conceptual framework for the thesis and to put the research in context by 
reviewing three bodies of civil society literature on: a) classical and contemporary 
theories of civil society, b) civil society in donor development agenda, and c) civil 
society in the non-Western context. Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of civil 
society promotion in Kyrgyzstan since 1991. In this regard, it discusses donor 
activities on civil society from 1991 to the mid 2000s, the development of the NGO 
sector, and the interaction between NGOs and the state. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
methodology of the research by providing a critical description of the research 
implementation process: research design, data collection, data analysis, and 
reflection.  
Chapter 4 presents research findings about the current civil society activities 
of donors in Kyrgyzstan with a particular stress on the changes that have taken place 
in these activities since the mid 2000s. Therefore, this chapter answers two research 
questions: what kind of changes have donors made in their civil society activities 
since the mid 2000s? and why have donors made these changes?  
Chapter 5 looks at the influence that the changes in civil society activities of 
donors have had on NGOs in Kyrgyzstan which is the focus of my third research 
question: what implications the changes in donor civil society activities have had on 
Kyrgyz NGOs? 
Chapter 6 explores if changes in civil society activities of donors have 
influenced the state and the state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan. As a result, the 
chapter answers the last research question: what implications the changes in donor 
civil society activities have had on the state and the state-NGO relations? It should be 
highlighted that the thesis looks at Bakiev’s government since the research was 
conducted in 2007-2008 when Bakiev was in power.  
Chapter 7 presents research findings that shed light on aspects of the NGO 
sector in Kyrgyzstan such as voluntarism, philanthropy, and constituency 
responsiveness. It also discusses the prospect for the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan 
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based on the arguments of the previous chapters. The conclusion highlights the main 
arguments of the thesis, outlines the contribution of the thesis to the literature and 















































Civil society: from western social and political thought to 
development aid strategies 
 
 
 In this chapter, I present a conceptual framework for my thesis and put my 
research in context. To do this, I review three bodies of civil society literature. In the 
first section, I examine classical and contemporary theories of civil society from the 
liberal and communitarian perspectives. In the second section, I discuss the literature 
on civil society in donor development agendas to explore why and how donors have 
applied this concept in their activities up to the mid 2000s. In the third section, I give 
an account of how civil society has developed in the non-Western context and what 
outcomes the efforts of donors on civil society promotion have brought about.  
 
Theories of civil society: liberal and communitarian traditions 
 
    Notwithstanding a widespread use of the concept of civil society, it is not an 
easy task to agree on one definition due to their diversity and complexity. While its 
origins can be traced back to the times of Cicerone (Kumar, 1993: 376), the real rise 
of civil society as a centre of an intellectual and political discussion came about 
when a social order of a community was challenged by the progress of a market 
economy (Howell and Pearce, 2001). This issue was central in various classical 
theories of civil society expounded by thinkers of the past including Locke and 
Hegel. Since a recent revival of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 
1980s, the diversity of its theories has further been amplified with works of 
contemporary theorists, such as Gellner, Hall, and Taylor (Kumar, 1993). The 
various sets of civil society definitions within the western thought, nonetheless, can 





Liberal tradition  
 
From a historical perspective, the liberal understanding of civil society is 
expounded clearly in the work of Locke. His vision of civil society revolves around a 
main flaw of the state of nature, which is a lack of impartial judges. According to 
Locke, only civil society can resolve this inconvenience of the state of nature by 
providing equal and independent people with a legitimate political authority, which 
takes over a function of making impartial judgement on their conflicts (Dunn, 
2001:50-55). Put differently, Locke considered civil society as a legitimate political 
order, where people who have learned to discipline their conduct, the civilised, could 
co-exist as a community. In other words, it was a contrast to the state of nature 
(Khilnani, 2001:18-19). Christianity is a central element in Locke’s vision of civil 
society. It holds a community together by providing it with a shared culture. Civil 
society is built upon it to maintain community life (ibid). The Christian creed that all 
people are equal before God is the basis in Locke’s work. Locke asserted that people 
were “equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions…; all servants of one sovereign master” (Dunn, 2001:44).  
According to Locke, there is no distinction between civil and political 
societies. In fact, civil society is a synonym for the legitimate political order. This is 
because Locke did not consider the state in modern post-Hobbesian form “of a 
coercively effective monopoly claimant to the power to coerce legitimately” (Dunn, 
2001:55). For Locke, the government is derived from the people and represented 
different groups within society (Khilnani, 2001:18-19). This means that society 
comes before the government and could “recover its freedom of action” if the 
government violated its trust (Taylor, 2006:92). Locke asserted that trust was a basis 
of the relationship between society and the government and between people in 
general (Dunn, 2001). Although he did not make an explicit distinction between the 
state and civil society, Locke laid the ground for such a distinction since he 
distinguished two actors (cf. Cohen and Arato, 1995), where one of them existed 
against another (Kaviraj, 2001: 293). 
When Christianity was no longer a sufficient response to the problem of the 
community, theorists of the commercial society, such as David Hume, Adam 
Ferguson and Adam Smith, offered a new approach, a secular one. A crucial point in 
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their civil society was that relationships between people were based on trade, need, 
and more importantly, on private sentiments. The latter ones not only made a 
distinction between market exchange and private relationships but they also 
introduced voluntariness and choice in relationships. People were freed from pre-
commercial kin-bond and patron-client relations. They could enter into relationships 
with anyone they sympathised with (Khilnani, 2001:21-22). As a result, strangers 
were not enemies any more. A community of indifferent citizens emerged. Such a 
transformation of people took society from barbarity and rudeness to politeness and 
polish. This led to a social, economic and moral order in the community – “being the 
products of the unintended collective outcome of private action” (ibid).  
Taylor (2006: 95) placed special emphasis on two features of civil society of 
the scholars of the commercial society. The first feature is that these philosophers 
introduced a notion of public opinion as “something that has been elaborated in 
debate and discussion and is recognised by everyone as something held in common”. 
Most importantly, it was formed by society not by a political structure or a church as 
it was done before. The second feature is that a notion of civilisation was introduced. 
The concept meant “pacification, enlightenment, technical development, arts and 
sciences, and polished mores”, which led people of modern Europe to distinguish 
themselves from other nations or their predecessors based on civility (Taylor, 
2006:96).  
The history of British civil society can excellently illustrate these aspects of 
civil society presented by the scholars of the commercial society. During the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries public opinion and civility in Britain were 
produced in coffee houses. People with different social statuses and political 
outlooks came together in coffee houses to listen to political news, read newspapers, 
and discuss political events both at home and abroad. This resulted in the creation of 
public opinion. Most importantly, coffee houses offered “a social space for public 
criticism of the state” (Habermas in Pincus, 1995: 808). Furthermore, coffee houses 
also produced civility by attracting “most civil” and “most intelligent”, who diffused 
norms of their conduct and manner; as is stated in Pincus’ work “they could not but 
civilise our manners, enlarge our understandings, refine our language, teach us a 
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generous confidence and handsome mode of address” (Coffee Houses Vindicated in 
Pincus, 1995:176).   
Furthermore, the notion of public in Britain also concerned associations. In 
the eighteenth century, British associations became more public oriented and 
underwent key changes. In the period of 1780 – 1820, the associations increased their 
transparency and openness. They started to relate to “their members and to a wider 
public through annual general meetings, printed annual reports, audited accounts and 
published subscription lists” (Morris, 1998: 298). Most importantly, they began 
publishing their activities in the newspapers. Moreover, their membership became 
less exclusive. Potential members were supposed to pay a subscription fee and agree 
to follow the rules. This means that access to the associations was through “the cash 
economy and choice rather than through processes of nomination” (Morris, 1998: 
298). 
The importance of associations to civil society was discussed extensively by 
Tocqueville, whose work on democracy in America made a great contribution to the 
development of the civil society theories. He distinguished two types of associations: 
political and civil. Political associations aim at debating politics in a peaceful manner 
and achieving a consensus jointly (Tocqueville, 2005). They include local self-
government, juries, parties (Kumar, 1993:381). Civil associations are concerned with 
private and economic interests of people and include churches, moral crusades, 
schools, literary and scientific societies, newspapers and publishers, professional and 
commercial organisations, organisations for leisure and recreation (Kumar, 
1993:381). For Tocqueville, political associations constitute a political society and 
civil associations constitute a civil society (Kumar, 1993:381; Bryant 1995:146).  
Most importantly, Tocqueville asserted that people should have a right and 
skills to assemble. According to him, the significance of political associations in 
teaching people the skills of getting together in an association is enormous. He 
asserted that people of “all conditions, minds, and ages”, who came together in 
political associations, not only debated politics but also learned what it meant to 
associate and how to do that. After learning the principles of association, people 
transfer their new skill to the civil aspects of their lives for numerous different 
purposes. For this reason, Tocqueville claimed that political associations were “great 
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free schools to which all citizens come to be taught the general theory of association” 
(Tocqueville, 2005:113-115).  
At the same time, Tocqueville argued that civil associations laid the basis for 
a debate in political associations by being a platform for the formation and exchange 
of people’s outlook: “It is there that feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart 
enlarged, and the understanding developed” (Tocqueville in Kumar, 1993:381). In 
other words, while political associations generate the sense of and skills of 
association, civil associations form and renew the viewpoints of people. Therefore, 
political and civil associations are the conditions for each other’s existence and 
operation. Finally, for Tocqueville, associations are the loci of democracy, are “the 
mother of all sciences” (Tocqueville, 2005:111). They enable a society to self-rule 
itself and provide a check on the government, while their multiplicity and diversity 
prevent a majority from dominating in the society. These are the factors that, Taylor 
pointed out, make democracy work (2006:98). 
In the contemporary discourse, “Ernest Gellner’s work on civil society is one 
of the clearest expositions of the liberal position” (Howell and Pearce, 2001:19). 
Gellner (1994:32) believed that a modern, standard definition of civil society as a 
cluster of NGOs standing against the state to prevent its domination had pitfalls, 
which could undermine the very sense of civil society. According to him, central 
authoritarianism was not always the chief oppressor. He claimed that there was 
another kind of oppression by referring to communities of the pre-modern times. The 
key point of his argument is that a social structure of communities, which was 
organised based on kin bonds, oppressed individuals. There was a certain place and 
role for each person in the community, which did not depend on the individual’s will. 
Disobedience of community rules was punished. Therefore, Gellner argued that civil 
society had to guard individuals not only from central authoritarianism but also from 
communalism, as he puts it from the “tyranny of kings” and the “tyranny of cousins 
and rituals” (Gellner, 1994:7).  
For example, individuals in Kyrgyzstan have been under dominance and 
tutelage of either communalism or central authoritarianism throughout history. 
Around the seventeenth century, the Kyrgyz society had a particular political and 
administrative structure. A family leading a nomadic life was its basis. Each family 
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belonged to a certain clan which then made up a larger tribal confederation. Each 
such confederation had its own territory which consisted of pastures. Further, it was 
ruled by an aristocratic leader whose status was determined by the number of cattle 
he owned. When the dominant family in power did not produce a proper candidate 
for leadership, communities would look for eligible people for the post of a leader 
from other leading families (Anderson, 1999: 2). This can be identified as the form 
of societal organisation that Gellner (1994) referred to as communalism because 
individuals are tied to their families which are further part of the larger clan and 
tribe. In other words, individuals could not lead their life without their family, clan, 
or tribe.   
During the Soviet time, the communist state in Kyrgyzstan as well as in other 
former communist countries repelled civil society due to the Marxist ideology that 
they followed. According to Marxism, civil society is a deceitful and misleading 
concept since it is used to maintain and even reinforce a clandestine and malign 
domination in the society8 (Gellner, 1994). The practical implementation of Marxism 
in the former communist countries brought about “the near-total fusion of the 
political, ideological, and economic hierarchies” (Gellner, 1994:5). Any independent 
civic initiative was abolished. It was not possible to set up even a philatelic club 
without political supervision (Gellner, 1994).  
Giffen and her colleagues (2005) stated that, although public associations 
existed in Central Asia during the Soviet period, their nature differed from what is 
known under the liberal conception of associations. These institutions came into 
existence as a result of either state encouragement or state permission and 
supervision. Their agenda did not transcend beyond an ideology of the Communist 
Party. In fact, trade unions, co-operatives, different foundations with millions of 
members throughout the Soviet Union served as an additional means for the 
government to promote Soviet ideas. It was not possible for Soviet people to come 
together in associations independently from the state (Giffen et al., 2005). The 
                                                 
8  Within Marxism civil society, as an institutional pluralism which opposes and balances the state as 
well as receives protection from it, is fraudulent. This is because a clandestine and malign domination 
present in the society uses civil society to maintain and even reinforce itself. Therefore, civil society is 
a deceitful and misleading concept. Further, Marxist theory claims that both the state protecting civil 
society and civil society counterbalancing the state are unnecessary when exploitation is eradicated. 
Once the division in the society, which requires the creation of the state, is overcome; there is no need 
for the state. Consequently, there is no need for civil society to counterbalance it (Gellner, 1994). 
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fundraising methods of Soviet public associations included either government 
subsidies or a membership contribution. As far as the latter is concerned, members 
were forced to buy stamps as their contribution. It was typical for a Soviet person to 
be a member of a public association, buy its stamps, and not to know anything about 
its activities (Kasybekov, 1999). For instance, the Red Cross was one of the largest 
foundations in the Soviet Union. Although it had a branch in each Soviet republic; its 
management was based in Moscow in the Ministry of Health. The majority of 
population were “members” of the Red Cross through their work place or school. All 
of them were supposed to buy stamps for their membership card. These funds were 
used for the social support activities of the Red Cross such as providing home care 
for those who needed help and emergency assistance for victims of natural disasters 
(Giffen et al., 2005: 94).  
To avoid the “tyranny of kings” and the “tyranny of cousins and rituals”, 
according to Gellner (1994), civil society should consist of modular men, who are 
free from kin bonds and rituals and can express their ideas and pursue their interests 
freely. Gellner believed that the modular man must be taught certain moral and 
intellectual qualities such as a capacity of “undertaking and honouring, deeply 
internalising, commitments and obligations by a single and sober act” (Gellner, 1994: 
104). Further, he went on that there should be cultural homogeneity for the 
modularity of men. This means that individuals should have the shared 
communication symbols which Gellner referred to as culture. According to him, each 
individual should be replaceable so that a vacant slot could be filled by any 
individual or group. However, this does not imply that individuals should be 
identical. Conversely, they should be different for the sake of development. As a 
result, Gellner claimed that the homogenous culture allowed individuals to be 
modular and to change their social identity within a flexible social structure. 
However, it also limits their employability, effective participation and citizenship 
and makes them nationalists to protect their culture (Gellner, 1994:43-44). 
Another key contemporary thinker, John Hall (1995), developed his 
conception of civil society around the same idea as Gellner, that is, the freedom of 
individuals. He defined civil society by referring to an agrarian civilisation. 
According to him, agrarian civilisation is not civil society notwithstanding the fact 
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that it cannot penetrate thoughts of different pastoral tribes and peasant communities. 
For Hall, civil society is self-organisation of the society by means of different 
associations. Like Gellner, Hall said that individuals should be unconfined from 
kinship ties and rituals. They should be able to join and leave any association 
voluntarily to pursue their needs and interests. Moreover, they should be able to join 
voluntary associations as many as they want. Furthermore, Hall claimed that civil 
society was also about a civilised interaction of the state and society and has to do 
with modernity, where such a state-society interaction is necessary. Hall drew his 
view of state – society relations from the eighteenth century England, “in which state 
and society interacted continuously, with state capacity being increased by the ability 
to work through notables who accepted this because they trusted an institution – their 
institution – that they could control” (Hall, 1995:16). 
It is obvious that the classical and contemporary liberal understandings of 
civil society have both similarities and differences. One of the examples that 
demonstrate this is the interaction between the state and society within different 
works. For example, Locke did not distinguish civil and political societies. In fact, 
civil society is a legitimate political order for him. The government derives from the 
society, represents its different groups, and is based on trust. However, what is 
important to note in Locke’s work is that there is an implicit acknowledgement of the 
fact that the state and society are two different bodies (Kaviraj, 2001). In the 
meantime, Gellner made a clear distinction between the state and society. The latter 
have to check on the former so that it does not inhibit the freedoms and rights of 
individuals. This results in more balancing relations between the state and society. 
Hall was more sympathetic with Locke rather than Gellner saying that the state and 
society should interact based on trust rather than counterbalance each other.  
To conclude the liberal tradition can be summarised as follows. The freedom 
and interests of individuals are at the heart of the tradition. Every individual is 
autonomous and needs driven. There is also an idea of moral egalitarianism (Cohen 
and Arato, 1995:8) which is expressed differently in various works. For example, in 
Locke’s work, it results from Christianity preaching equality of people before God; 
while, in Gellner’s work, it results from modularity of man. The central point is that 
the freedom and interests of individuals should be guarded, be it from the state of 
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nature lacking impartial judges, central authoritarianism, or communalism. For this, 
individuals should be able to interact with each other and come together in 
associations voluntarily and in a civilised way. This also ensures the institutional and 
ideological pluralism (Gellner, 1994).Consequently, civil society within the liberal 
model can be understood as a society where individuals can obtain and exercise their 
freedom as well as pursue their interests of different kinds.   
Furthermore, in the liberal tradition, the state is seen from two perspectives. It 
is an order-keeper as well as a potential threat against monopolising power and truth.  
As an order-keeper the state provides individuals with rules to pursue their activities 
freely and to maintain their interaction in a civilised way (Kaviraj, 2001:292). At the 
same time, liberals asserted that the state still had a tendency to extend its power 
beyond its limits (Gellner, 1994). Therefore, individuals through different 
associations need to check on the state in order to prevent its dominance and 
encroachment on their lives. As a result, the state is both essential and needs to be 
limited (Kaviraj, 2001:292).  
 
 
Communitarian tradition  
 
Hegel is known as an eminent communitarian. Along with his liberal 
predecessors, he discussed the repercussions of the rise of the market economy on 
the social order of the community (Khilnani, 2001:23). By critiquing the liberal 
understanding of civil society, Hegel developed an alternative vision of the concept. 
He refused to believe that an autonomous and unregulated economy could have only 
benign effects (Taylor, 2006:97). He also could not accept self-interest as the basis of 
social organisation (Femia, 2001:134). Therefore, the central element in Hegel’s 
variant of civil society is that the interaction between people is premised on more 
than just self-interest. The individuals interact with each other because of solidarity 
and their will to live as a community (ibid).  
For Hegel, an individual cannot achieve his ends without referring to others. 
When he refers to others, his ends become universal. Therefore, the achievement of 
his ends satisfies not only his welfare but that of others too. Thus, he turns from an 
individual unit to a social whole (Kumar, 1993:378; Jones, 2001:123). Owing to 
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educational power of civil society institutions, the individual comes to understand 
that “he wills his ends only in willing universal ends” (Kumar, 1993:378). The 
universal ends find their ultimate destination in the state. In this way, the society 
becomes politically organised (Taylor, 2006:97). In other words, Hegel’s civil 
society is a space where the individuals achieve their welfare collectively. This 
means that the welfare of one individual depends on the welfare of others, that is to 
say, on civil society. Therefore, according to Hegel, civil society becomes a 
“universal family” by “drawing people to itself and requiring them to owe everything 
to it and to do everything by its means” (Hegel in Jones, 2001:123).  
For Hegel, civil society lies between the state and family (Kaviraj, 2001). He 
institutionalises civil society in the form of different corporations, “which are 
concerned with social, religious, professional and recreational life” (Kumar, 
1993:379). He asserted that their key function was to educate and represent their 
members. Trade unions and professional associations are the main corporations. 
These are legally organised bodies “with powers to determine the recruitment of new 
entrants, to enforce standards of work, and to organise the welfare of their members” 
(Jones, 2001:124). Other civil society institutions include “the whole range of public 
institutions such as courts, welfare agencies and educational establishments” (Kumar, 
1993:379).  
The most salient feature of Hegel’s civil society is a relationship between the 
state and civil society. Hegel made a clear distinction between these actors (Kaviraj, 
2001:300). Nevertheless, the state and civil society are interdependent and 
complement each other. The state is not just a “convenient partner” for individuals to 
achieve their needs but it is a token of their “deep inner need to identify with social 
whole” (Femia, 2001:134). Further, the state is a force that keeps civil society away 
from destruction by incorporating corporations and associations of civil society into 
itself (Taylor, 2006:97) and supervising them (Jones, 2001:124). In other words, civil 
society cannot self-regulate; therefore, it needs the state to do so for it. In the 
meantime, according to Taylor, the variety of civil society institutions makes the 
distribution of power along the political system possible. This ensures that “the 
undifferentiated homogeneity of the general-will state, which Hegel thought must 
lead inevitably to tyranny and terror” is avoided (Taylor, 2006:98).   
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Hegel’s vision of the state-civil society relationship can be found empirically 
but from a historical perspective in the relationship between these actors in Britain in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to Morton (1998), British civil 
society in the nineteenth century was enshrined by the state in order to exist as a 
form of social structure. This means that the state provided civil society with a legal 
framework and preconditions for its existence and operation. Morton made a special 
stress on the role of the local government which was “the guardian of civil society 
and the protector of the civic virtue of the voluntary organisation” (Morton, 1998: 
354). Morris (1998) gave more insights on this issue by looking at the relationship 
between the state and civil society in the 1750s and the 1850s. According to him, 
these actors interacted rather than opposed each other. In fact, Morris (1998) asserted 
that civil society failed in places where associations were underdeveloped and 
traditions of local government were poorly established.   
 Hegel’s understanding of civil society is echoed in works of Gramsci 
particularly with regard to the motivation of people’s actions. Gramsci developed his 
conception of civil society as a response to the question of why capitalism did not 
fall as Marx and his followers predicted. He rejected Marx’s idea which reduced civil 
society to a mere economic sphere and stated that capitalism makes people 
egocentric. Gramsci did not consider capitalism as an ethics-free place. His idea is 
that the exploitative exchange relationships between the classes are “underpinned by 
a complex of moral injunctions that make this relationships seem right and proper to 
all parties in the exchange” (Femia, 2001:139). Gramsci agreed with Marx that one 
class has hegemony over society. Thus, he asserted that the hegemony was 
manufactured and maintained in civil society through so-called private organisations 
(Kumar 1993:383).  
 According to Gramsci, people are not driven just by their basic needs but also 
by their values notwithstanding the fact that they might be biased due to such factors 
as class and others (Femia, 2001:139). Therefore, the superior class spreads its values 
through different private institutions to maintain its power (Kumar, 1993:383). As a 
result, for Gramsci, civil society is a place where “the values are established, 
debated, contested and changed”. It is a necessary instrument for the ruling class 
along with “ownership of the means of production and capture of the apparatus of the 
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state” to ensure its dominance in the society. It is also a space, which any new class 
striving to overthrow the old one has to capture (Kumar, 1993:384). Therefore, for 
Gramsci, civil society can be found in the superstructure - the state – which is a 
combination of political and civil societies (Femia, 2001:139).  
As their precursors, contemporary communitarians also assert that civil 
society should be based on values and strive for common good. For example, Walzer 
(1998:16) asserted that civil society was a space, where people can freely associate 
and communicate with each other, form and reform groups of all sorts, “not for the 
sake of any particular formation – family, tribe, nation, religion, commune, 
brotherhood or sisterhood, interest group or ideological movement – but for the sake 
of sociability itself”. This is because people are by nature social beings first rather 
than political or economic beings (ibid:16). For Walzer, associations are important 
because they produce civility, which makes democratic politics possible (ibid: 24).  
Further, Walzer (1998) claimed, as Hegel did, that the state not only framed 
civil society but also occupied the space in it. “It fixes the boundary conditions and 
the basic rules of all associational activity. It compels association members to think 
about a common good, beyond their own conceptions of the good life” (ibid: 24). 
Civil society without the state engenders “unequal power relationships”. Only the 
state can challenge this flaw of civil society. Furthermore, the state has to foster the 
roughly equal and widely dispersed capabilities that sustain the associational 
networks (ibid: 24).     
An interaction of the state and civil society is further elaborated in Taylor’s 
conception of civil society. Taylor (2006) asserted that civil society was a politically 
organised society, where a key principle is self-rule. Unlike the liberal scholars, 
particularly, Gellner and Hall, Taylor did not regard civil society as autonomous 
associations existing free of the state. For Taylor, civil society is about distribution of 
power throughout society from independent associations to the state. That is to say in 
Taylor’s (2006:98) own words “different associations would be agents of power on 
different levels, which in the end find their place in the state and self-rule”.      
To sum up, in essence, both classical and contemporary theories within the 
communitarian tradition focus on the same issue as the ones within the liberal 
approach, which is freedom and interests of individuals since the former has 
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developed upon criticism against the latter. In others words, civil society within the 
communitarian model can also be defined as a society where individuals obtain and 
exercise their freedom as well as pursue their different interests; however, their 
motivation is different from the one in the liberal approach. Here individuals interact 
with each other because of a sense of community and sociability rather than self-
interest and need. The common good is a central feature. Moreover, they can achieve 
their interests and needs through achieving common interests and needs. 
In most cases, this leads to understanding the liberal and communitarian 
approaches as opposing each other: an individual-centred approach (liberal) versus a 
community-centred approach (communitarian). However, the difference between the 
approaches should be put rather differently, that is, a needs-driven individual (liberal) 
versus a value-driven individual (communitarian). This is because the communitarian 
tradition does not aim to suppress individuals for the sake of the common good. In 
fact, it aims at liberating individuals. Therefore, the communitarian tradition as the 
liberal one stresses on the importance of voluntary and choice-based membership in 
associations (Walzer, 1998; Taylor, 2006).  
Furthermore, in the communitarian tradition, the state is not a mere order-
keeper and framework for civil society. The state and civil society are 
complementary elements of each other. Therefore, the state not only frames civil 
society but also guides it to the common good and shares power with it. Furthermore, 
the state is a necessary condition for the existence of civil society since it keeps it 
away from self-destruction. In other words, in the communitarian tradition, the state 
has a more extensive role. In fact, the state and civil society are interdependent parts 
of the whole body.      
 
 
Conceptualisation of civil society within the thesis   
 
Based on the preceding discussion of the liberal and communitarian traditions 
of civil society, the thesis defines civil society as a society where, through a free and 
civilised interaction and communication, individuals obtain and exercise their 
freedom as well as pursue their interests. However, it clearly emphasises that, in each 
of the traditions, individuals and the state have different positions. In the liberal 
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tradition, an individual is interest and needs-driven; while, in the communitarian one, 
he/she is driven by value of the common good and sociability. Furthermore, in the 
liberal tradition, the state and civil society provide a check on each other. The former 
provides a frame for the latter to have a free and civilised interaction; meanwhile, the 
latter counterbalances the former so that it does not over exceed its power. In other 
words, the state and civil society are clearly demarcated actors with explicit functions 
towards each other. In the communitarian approach, the state and civil society are 
complementary. The state not only frames civil society but also leads it towards the 
common good by encompassing civil society in itself (see Table 1).   
 
 





Individuals  Needs-driven  Value-driven  
 
The state  
 
Frames civil society by 
providing rules for a civilised 
interaction between 
individuals   
 
Frames, mentors, and encompasses 
civil society and guides it to the 
common good.  
 
 
Notwithstanding these key differences, both traditions need the same three 
factors for their respective successful operation. The first factor is voluntarism. As 
stated elsewhere, in both traditions, it is important since it signifies that an individual 
is truly free from either suppression or tutelage coming from the state and/or 
community (Gellner, 1994; Taylor, 2006).  
The second factor is civility. Both traditions suggest that individuals should 
posses a sense of civility. The notion of civility was introduced by the thinkers of the 
commercial society, which implied that individuals, particularly strangers, interacted 
with each other voluntarily and based on polished manners. In the contemporary 
discourse, the meaning of civility is expanded to mean presence of and toleration for 
social diversity (Hall, 1995), that is, a multiplicity of ways of living, working, and 
associating (Bryant, 1995:145). Civility is claimed to be crucial for democracy to 
work (Walzer, 1998).  
The third factor is associations. Civil society within both traditions is 
institutionalised by means of associations. Their availability is crucial since they are 
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a clear sign of individuals’ freedom both from the state and community and a key 
vehicle for individuals to pursue their needs. Further, associations are strongly 
interconnected with voluntarism and civility, which act as mechanisms to filter 
associations with benign and malicious goals.  
Associations are also connected with urbanism.  Tonnies considered civil 
society, Gesellschaft, as a city phenomenon. He contrasted Gesellschaft with 
Gemeinschaft, which is a rural life guided by folkways and mores. Its main trait is a 
bond of “blood”, a physical relation and expresses itself in deeds and words 
(Tonnies, 2005:154). What is important to note is that, according to Tonnies, the 
relationships between individuals taking place in Gesellschaft are not possible in 
Gemeinschaft since the latter does not have conditions for individual autonomy to 
exist. Religious and community groups of Gemeinschaft can suppress individual 
autonomy by requiring compulsory membership and commitment (Kaviraj, 2001).  
This issue is further elaborated by Wirth (1938), who argued that cities 
produce a new form of social relations. According to him, in cities, individuals 
become emancipated from the traditional basis of social solidarity existing in rural 
areas such as kinship and family (ibid: 80). Consequently, individuals become 
flexible and freed from communalism, that is to say, they become modular in 
Gellner’s words. As a result, they are free to pursue their vocational, educational, 
religious, recreational, and political interests.  
However, at the same time, Wirth (1938) noted that individuals remained 
powerless to pursue their goals on their own. Therefore, according to their interests, 
people come together into different voluntary organisations to pursue their interests 
and have their interests represented. Consequently, a great number of different 
voluntary associations emerge. Most importantly, individuals can join a number of 
voluntary associations in accordance with their various interests rising from different 
aspects of their life. As Hall (1995) stressed, multiple memberships are crucial for 
civil society. In other words, voluntary associations in cities enable individuals to 
pursue their interests and meet their needs such as economic, political, educational, 
cultural or other. However, according to Wirth (1938:77), if an individual wants to 
take part in the social, political, and economic life of the city, “he must subordinate 
some of his personality to the demands of the larger community and in that measure 
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immerse themselves in mass movements”. This is congruent with Hegel’s assertion 
that civil society institutionalised in the form of corporations and associations draws 
people to itself because they can achieve their goals only through achieving common 
goals (Jones, 2001).     
 
 
Civil society and the state: donor development policies in the 1990s   
 
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, donors became extremely enthusiastic 
about using civil society in their activities to tackle social, political, and economic 
problems in the developing countries. As Hawthorn (2001:269) pointed out, civil 
society was considered as “the best option for the South”. A mainstream strategy in 
global politics was criticising the state and moving activities from the public sector to 
civil society and private market (Fukuyama, 2004). In general, at that time, the idea 
of the state domination in the societal organisation was challenged. In Eastern 
Europe, particularly in Poland, civil society could resist the totalitarian communist 
party (Seligman, 1992). The Soviet Union began falling apart. This undermined the 
belief that the state could deliver all the solutions. Western countries also 
encountered negative consequences of the welfare state’s excessive intervention 
(Edwards, 2004). In other words, there was a global disenchantment with the state 
and a widespread discontent with its extensive power.  
Consequently, the international aid community led by IMF and the World 
Bank premised their aid delivery strategies on neo-liberal economic policies which 
were agreed in a Washington consensus in the 1980s (Fritz and Menocal, 2006; 
Wimpelmann, 2006). According to these policies, aid-recipient countries were 
supposed to reduce the size and reach of the state. In the meantime, civil society was 
encouraged to develop (Fritz and Menocal, 2006). For example, the state owned 
enterprises were greatly exposed to privatisation in the former Soviet Union after 
1991. Kyrgyzstan received particular support from the international organisations. 
For instance, IMF assisted the Kyrgyz state to carry out its economic policies based 
on shock therapy. In fact, privatisation and market liberalisation were the key aspects 
of IMF’s suggestions (Anderson, 1997). As a result, state assets were privatised. 
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Market prices were deregulated (Gleason, 1997). Meanwhile, large donors such 
USAID, DFID, the World Bank, and the United Nations (UN) agencies had 
programmes focusing on promotion of liberal civil society in the early 1990s 
(Adamson, 2002; Aksartova, 2005; Giffen et al., 2005).   
Donors defined civil society as a space where different voluntary, not-for-
profit associations and organisations, such as NGOs, labour unions, and political 
parties could operate (Van Rooy and Robinson, 1998) between the state, market, and 
family (Edwards 2004). Put differently, for donors, civil society was an associational 
realm (Edwards 2004), which eventually became a synonymous for “the third sector” 
(Van Rooy 2002). In practice, civil society was reduced to NGOs (Howell and 
Pearce, 2001; Van Rooy, 2002) mainly for financial and monitoring purposes 
(Ottaway, 2005).  
Further, donors assigned a number of roles to civil society. First of all, civil 
society was regarded as a service provider which could surpass the state. Donors 
deliberately channelled their funds through NGOs because they considered NGOs 
more effective and economic rather than the state and its institutions (Van Rooy and 
Robinson, 1998; Fritz and Menocal, 2006; Rakner et al., 2007). For example, the 
percentage of aid coming from countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development through NGOs increased from 0.7% in 1975 to 3.6% in 
1985 and to at least 5% in 1993–94, totalling $2.3 billion (Edwards and Hulme, 
1996: 962 in Ebrahim, 2001: 95). On the whole, the state was avoided. In fact, NGOs 
replaced the state in some aspects (Edwards, 2004).  
Secondly, for donors, civil society was crucial in promoting a liberal 
economy. Donors found it difficult to promote a liberal economy in the developing 
countries because they did not have a key precondition for it, which was economic 
individuals interested in “opening markets and curbing government” (Van Rooy and 
Robinson, 1998:39). In this regard, donors considered social capital diffused by the 
associational life as the best way to create this precondition (Van Rooy and 
Robinson, 1998:39). Availability of social ties was thought essential for individuals 
to “function effectively in modern economies where the demand of exchange grows 
increasingly complex” (Edwards, 2004:15). Drawing on Tocqueville’s work on the 
American associational life and voluntarism, donors believed that associations 
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diffusing social capital would ensure an accountable system of governance. This, in 
turn, would result in sustainable economic and social development (Van Rooy and 
Robinson, 1998). Therefore, civil society was supposed to nurture the social values, 
networks, and institutions that underpin successful market economies including trust 
and cooperation (Edwards, 2004:13).  
Thirdly, donors asserted that civil society promoted democracy. The process 
of neo-liberal economic policies coincided with the third wave of democratisation 
that took place throughout the world in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. As a 
result, democracy promotion became a top priority in foreign policies and 
development programmes of donor countries. A wide range of activities on 
democracy promotion were launched (Rakner et al., 2007) where, as Carothers 
(1997) noted, civil society was a fundamental component. According to donors, civil 
society, to be precise NGOs, contributed to democracy by representing different 
groups in the society and influencing the state to have democratic policies and 
institutions (Van Rooy and Robinson, 1998). For donors, NGOs could either 
represent or reach out to vulnerable groups in society, such as the poor, more reliably 
than the state. As a result, NGOs gave an opportunity even to the most marginalised 
groups to express their interests. Consequently, NGOs could promote better, 
equitable policies (Van Rooy and Robinson, 1998). Therefore, civil society was also 
regarded as a counterbalance to the state.  
The above makes it clear that donors’ civil society promotion in the 1980-
1990s adhered to the liberal model of civil society, particularly to the liberal view of 
state-civil society relations. As the conceptual framework has stated in the previous 
section, in the liberal tradition, the state has a limited role, which is reduced to 
administrating justice in the society and being a framework for civil society. In the 
meantime, civil society is an autonomous, self-regulating actor and acts as a balance 
to the state. Clearly, donors aimed to create an autonomous civil society, which 
would function on its own, self-serve itself by providing different services, and 
counterbalance the state and make it more democratic by representing voices of 
different people. In the meantime, the size and role of the state was reduced. 
Moreover, in order to promote the liberal economy, donors connected the emergence 
and operation of economic individuals, who are interested in opening markets, with 
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civil society (Van Rooy and Robinson, 1998). In other words, donors needed needs-
driven individuals who are the key aspect of liberal civil society, according to the 
discussion in the previous section.  
 
Liberal civil society in the non-Western context: NGO expansion   
 
The preceding discussion has indicated that donors have their efforts to 
promote the liberal civil society in the non-Western countries from the late 1980s to 
the early 2000s. However, the outcome of these efforts has taken a different shape. 
The former communist states are one of the examples of this. As mentioned 
elsewhere in this chapter, these states used to repel civil society before their 
independence in the early 1990s due to the Marxist ideology that they adhered to. 
Any associations that existed during the Soviet time were under the supervision of 
the state and promoted the state ideology. Their membership was far from being 
voluntary (Giffen et al., 2005). Therefore, the argument in the literature, which states 
that donors promoted the liberal civil society in post-Soviet Central Asian countries 
from scratch, has some grounds (Roy, 2002; Giffen et al., 2005).  
It should be highlighted that donors promoted only NGOs in the former 
communist countries under their civil society banner because of a general tendency 
among donors to reduce civil society to NGOs. Consequently, there was a 
proliferation of NGOs in the post-communist region. About 100,000 independent 
associations such as environmental, human rights, and women emerged by the mid 
1990s (Starr, 1998). For instance, in Kyrgyzstan, in the course of 1993 – 2002, the 
number of NGOs reached from 611 to 7,630 (Ubysheva and Pogojev, 2006; 
Shishkaraeva et al., 2006 respectively). They have also become part of the social and 
political context in Kyrgyzstan (Anderson, 2002). This can be considered as a great 
breakthrough given that there were not any independent associations before the 
independence.   
However, NGOs in the former communist block have had a number of 
weaknesses. Some NGOs have been criticised for failing to establish strong links 
with their societies. For example, Mendelson and Glenn (2002) stated that, in Russia, 
Hungary, and Poland, a number of women’s groups became isolated from their 
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constituency, who they were supposed to represent, and from the state, who they 
asserted to influence. In fact, they grew closer to their donors and international 
partners, whom they depended on financially. In other words, although the former 
communist countries have acquired a new local NGO sector, its relationship with 
their perceived supporters, the state, and between each other has been very weak 
(Mendelson and Glenn, 2002). Furthermore, some NGOs have been blamed for 
being opportunistic. For example, NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, as stated in the introduction, 
has been called “grant eaters” because of their donor funding oriented nature. Howell 
(2000) neatly summarised that dependence of NGOs in this region as well as other 
developing countries on donor funding raised doubts about their sustainability, 
autonomy, and self-definition.  
In fact, NGOs in other parts of the developing world faced the same criticism 
as NGOs in the former communist countries. For example, according to Chatterjee 
(2001), civil society in India is represented by modern associations. They were 
established by the Indian nationalist elite during colonial modernity. In fact, these 
elite aimed at replicating the forms and the substance of western modernity in their 
society for their anti-colonial struggle. As a result, associations emerged in India; but 
they were the domain of the elite rather than of the actual “public” because the latter 
could not meet the standards required by civil society. Moreover, the role of 
associations towards the public has been “one of pedagogy rather than of free 
association” (Chatterjee, 2001:174). 
According to Zaidi (1999) and Mercer (2002), who extensively reviewed the 
literature on NGOs in the developing world, the main criticism is that NGOs could 
not benefit their perceived constituency because they grew dependent on donors and 
started to orient their focuses more on their funders than on their target group. 
Moreover, they asserted that NGO projects were usually small scale and had an 
impact on a limited number of people. Further, supposedly participatory and 
democratic work strategies of NGOs have been questioned since they are elite and 
urban based institutions staffed with paid professionals. Decisions within NGOs are 
taken top down and by staff. As a result, these are not in tune with democratic and 
participatory methods. The cost-effectiveness of NGOs over the public sector has 
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also been argued. In fact, it has been asserted that this claim has been made without 
empirical support. These criticisms are not the end. In fact, it goes on and on:  
 
 
NGOs have been called “`opportunistic' (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Uphoff, 1993), `corrupt' 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1995), `elitist' (Fowler, 1991; Samad, 1993), `yuppie-ized' (Najam, 
1996; Samad, 1993; Bebbington and Farrington, 1993; Meyer, 1995), becoming mere fronts 




Based on the above, it is obvious that NGOs could not meet donor 
expectations. Their failure, however, is partially attributed to donors themselves. It 
has been argued that donors applied an erroneous method to promote civil society. 
According to Carothers (1997), donors used one blueprint of liberal democracy, 
which included civil society, in all the countries they worked in. In the same vein, 
Howell (2000) stated that donors had used a universalistic approach to civil society 
promotion. Drawing on sixteen case studies looking at donor civil society activities 
in the former communist region, Mendelson and Glenn (2002) asserted that the 
democracy blueprint of donors had not resulted in the desirable outcomes because it 
did not take into account the local context.  
Howell (2000) criticised donors for reducing civil society to NGOs and 
ignoring other civil society actors that could have brought social change better than 
NGOs. The review of theories of civil society in the first section has shown that it is 
a complex term and cannot be easily narrowed down to NGOs. In the same vein, 
Jenkins (2001) showed inconsistency in the way USAID used civil society in its 
activities. Further, the literature suggested that donor methods of work and their 
funding requirements to NGOs had made NGOs in the developing countries 
professionalise and institutionalise (Ebrahim, 2001; Markowitz and Tice, 2002). For 
example, in Central Asia, donors found it more convenient to work with English and 
Russian speaking NGOs, as a result of which NGOs came to be filled with educated 
people (Howell, 2000).       
The mismatch between donors’ promotion of civil society and its actual 
results has brought about two debates in the literature. The first one asks whether it is 
possible to replicate a liberal form of civil society dominant in the West in the non-
Western world or whether non-Western societies can have their own civil society. In 
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this regard, some argued that a western liberal model of civil society could be applied 
cross-culturally (Gellner, 1994). Meanwhile, others asserted that non-Western 
societies could have different and often incomparable social and political systems. 
Therefore, they can have their own civil society (Hann and Dunn, 1996:18). In the 
same line, Kaviraj (2001) suggested to followers of civil society that they must look 
for ideas bearing some resemblance to their ideas in cultural traditions of the non-
Western world, and “begin to build arguments from some intelligible points of 
connection, rather than from the moral outside” (2001:323).  
The second debate argues what role of the state should be in the development. 
Zaidi (1999) stated that the failure of NGOs had proved that they were an 
incompatible alternative to the state. According to him, “the only alternative to state 
failure is the state itself” (1999: 270). Therefore, he claimed that the state should be 
brought back to the development.  
 
 
Conclusion   
 
In this chapter, I have sought to construct my conceptual framework and to 
place my thesis in context by reviewing three bodies of civil society literature. In the 
first section, I have reviewed the classical and contemporary theories of civil society 
from the perspective of the liberal and communitarian traditions to conceptualise 
civil society for my thesis. As a result, I define civil society as a society where 
individuals have and exercise their freedom and pursue their different interests. I 
explicitly acknowledge that the liberal and communitarian traditions have different 
views on how and why individuals do this. In the liberal tradition, individuals act and 
interact with each other based on their own interests and needs; while in the 
communitarian approach, individuals are driven by the common good and a sense of 
sociability. They still pursue their interests and needs but they are able to achieve 
them only through achieving common interests and needs.    
Further, I clearly distinguish that the role of the state is also different in these 
traditions. In the liberal approach, the state is supposed to keep order and provide 
individuals with rules for their interaction. Therefore, it frames civil society. At the 
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same time, civil society counterbalances the state so that it does not monopolise 
power. In other words, the state and civil society are two elements that exist 
separately but provide a check on each other. In the communitarian tradition, the 
state and civil society complement each other, where the former not only frames but 
also encompasses the latter. This is because civil society is not a separate actor; on 
the contrary, it finds its final destination in the state. Moreover, it depends on the 
state since only the state saves it from self-destruction.  
Finally, I have identified three key factors that both traditions need for their 
respective operation: voluntarism, associations, and civility. Civil society in both 
schools is institutionalised in the form of associations which should be based on 
voluntarism and civility. Furthermore, I have connected associations with urbanism. 
This is because, in urban areas, people become free from their traditional social 
networks such as family, kinship, and community, which exist in rural areas. As a 
result, individuals gain freedom to pursue their interests and needs; however, at the 
same time, they become powerless to do this on their own. Therefore, they create 
voluntary associations, which are various, numerous and concerned with a certain 
aspect of individuals’ lives. 
In the second section, I have shown that, from the 1980s to the mid 1990s, 
civil society was a central element in donor agendas which aimed to promote the 
neo-liberal economic policies and democracy. Donors conceptualised civil society as 
the associational realm between the state, market, and family consisting of 
associations with a voluntary membership. However, in practice, they reduced civil 
society to NGOs because of their organisational capacity to deal with finance. NGOs 
were seen as key service providers, promoters of democracy and a liberal economy, 
and a counterbalance to the state. In fact, the state was avoided and reduced. 
Therefore, from the theoretical perspective, donors promoted a liberal model of civil 
society.  
In the third section, I have discussed civil society in the non-Western world 
based on the example of the former communist countries. The discussion has 
suggested that donors promoted the liberal civil society in the region almost from 
scratch. To do this, donors used the same strategies as everywhere in the developing 
world. They used one blueprint of democracy promotion without taking into account 
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local specifics. This means that, in the former communist countries, civil society was 
reduced to NGOs too. Consequently, there was a proliferation of NGOs which could 
be regarded as a remarkable achievement. However, NGOs in the former communist 
countries encountered a number of criticisms. Above all, they were blamed for 
failing to establish a link with their societies. As a result, they could not represent 
their constituency properly. I have also demonstrated that, in other non-Western 
countries, NGOs faced the same criticism. They were condemned for being elitist, 
opportunistic, corrupt, and undemocratic. On the whole, I have concluded that NGOs 
failed to meet donor expectations.             
Based on these discussions, I have pointed out two debates in the literature: 
1) civil society in the Western and non-Western worlds and 2) NGOs or the state. 
With regard to the first debate, it is argued whether non-Western countries can build 
a liberal civil society or whether civil society needs to conform to the cultural 
specificities of each society. In the meantime, the second debate focuses on whether 
the state is needed in the development. These debates underline the importance of the 
thesis since it presents findings about donors’ policies and promotion of civil society 
and how these changes are influencing NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the thesis 
contributes to the debates. Moreover, the thesis seeks to explore whether donor civil 

























Donors’ NGO experiment in Akaev’s “island of democracy” 
 
 
 This chapter specifically focuses on donors’ promotion of civil society in 
Kyrgyzstan from its independence in 1991 to the mid 2000s and what outcomes these 
activities brought about. It aims to further elaborate the arguments and debates in 
civil society literature identified in the previous chapter by illustrating the case of 
civil society promotion in Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, in the first section, I discuss 
why and how donors promoted civil society in Kyrgyzstan from the early 1990s to 
the mid 2000s. In the second section, I look at what influence donor activities on 
civil society have had on the development of the Kyrgyz NGO sector. In the third 
section, I review the state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan.        
 
 
Donors’ “grant rain”: the “Golden age of NGOs”   
 
During the 1990s, especially in the early years, civil society was an important 
element in the development agenda of donors in Kyrgyzstan as everywhere else. As 
discussed in chapter 1, this was directly connected with the neo-liberal economic 
policies and democracy promotion agenda which donors were implementing 
worldwide at that time. Consequently, civil society was crucial for donors in 
democratising the former communist countries and helping them transfer to liberal 
economy. Reviews of literature on civil society aid in Kyrgyzstan (Adamson, 2002; 
Aksartova, 2005; Giffen et al., 2005; Shishkaraeva et al., 2006) suggest that six 
specific donors were of particular significance in the promotion of civil society: 
USAID, DFID, EC, the World Bank, UNDP, and the Soros Foundation.    
The United States was a key donor in the promotion of civil society in 
Kyrgyzstan. USAID has been the main US assistance provider. Since setting up an 
office in Kyrgyzstan in 1993, USAID has worked on supporting the Kyrgyz NGO 
sector within its democracy promotion agenda (http://centralasia.usaid.gov). In 1994, 
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it started funding a programme solely aimed at encouraging the emergence of NGOs 
in Kyrgyzstan. The programme was implemented by Counterpart Consortium 
(hereafter Counterpart), an international NGO from the USA, because USAID 
normally works through contractors9.  
Within this programme, Counterpart provided emergent NGOs with three 
types of support: financial (seed grants), technical (trainings) and informational so 
that they could get established, acquire management skills, learn fundraising, and 
gain other useful skills to run their organisations. In 2000, Counterpart furthered its 
activities by establishing a network of civil society support centres (CSSCs) 
throughout Kyrgyzstan with two aims: 1) to localise its activities and 2) to provide 
technical and informational support to NGOs in the periphery. As a result, eleven 
CSSCs were formed in seven provinces of Kyrgyzstan. In 2004, Counterpart 
mounted another programme focused on strengthening CSSCs and local NGOs in 
terms of their transparency, accountability, professionalism, sustainability, and 
engagement in advocacy (Satarov, 2005)10.    
 Further, USAID has funded two other international NGOs, the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Eurasia Foundation, whose activities also 
covered civil society in Kyrgyzstan. Both of these organisations are not-for-profit 
and were formed in the USA. They have also had an office in Kyrgyzstan since the 
1990s. Their activities, however, did not focus as exclusively on civil society as 
Counterpart. They have had other goals such as the development of media and 
political parties in the case of NDI and improving higher education and labour 
migrations in that of the Eurasia Foundation (www.ndi.org and www.ef-ca.org, 
respectively).   
Since 1996, NDI has provided small grants and technical assistance to 
Kyrgyz NGOs (www.ndi.org). It has given out around 20 grants annually. The 
amount of each grant has been approximately $1,50011 (Interview with a 
                                                 
9 In comparison with other donors, for implementation of its programmes USAID normally employs a 
contractor or a grantee through a call for proposals. This is because USAID wants to ensure that 
experts in the field are involved (Interview with a representative of USAID in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 
15 February 2008). 
10 This information comes from a Counterpart Consortium’s brochure. It was provided by a former 
employee of Counterpart in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 for my Master’s dissertation (Jailobaeva, 2005). E-
copy is available. 
11 The funding amounts are indicated in US dollars in the thesis.  
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representative of NDI in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 1 November 2007). As for the Eurasia 
Foundation, from 1996 to 2009 it provided $299,813.36 to Kyrgyz NGOs in the form 
of 14 grants which addressed different issues on civil society such as the provision of 
capacity-building support, the  improvement of the NGO-government collaboration 
and  increasing the role of civil society organisations in the political and social arena 
(www.ef-ca.org). 
There is one more programme financed by the US government which also 
promotes and supports civil society. It is called a “Democracy Commission Small 
Grants Programme” and it is carried out by the US embassy in Kyrgyzstan. Since 
1995, within this programme, the US embassy has given out grants to Kyrgyz NGOs 
to work on a wide range of issues related to democracy such as the promotion of civil 
society, the free flow of information and the rule of law. NGOs can get a grant of up 
to $24,000. However, on average, grants are around $2,000 – $5,000 (Interview with 
a representative of US embassy in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 31 October 2007, and a 
Democracy Commission brochure).  
It is evident from the above that US assistance considerably focused on the 
development of civil society, to be precise of NGOs, in Kyrgyzstan. Although civil 
society was a component of their democracy promotion agenda, the US agencies 
directed their efforts to creating civil society organisations in a liberal sense (i.e. 
NGOs) by providing them with capacity-building support and grants. Some US 
agencies also worked on other aspects of civil society such as increasing the role of 
civil society organisations in the political and social context and supported their 
projects rather than their institutions.  
However, it is difficult to calculate the amount of funding that the above US 
agencies spent on NGOs because there are no consistent data12. Furthermore, as 
Aksartova (2005:95) stated, “different elements of democracy and civil society 
assistance are inter-related and mutually reinforcing”. Nonetheless, according to 
Azpuru and his colleagues (2008), on the whole up to 2003, civil society received 
most of the US democracy assistance. In Eurasia, civil society received half of the 
democracy assistance. It is also known that, since its operation in Kyrgyzstan, 
USAID has spent nearly $400 million on its programmes (http://centralasia.usaid.gov).  
                                                 
12 Unfortunately, I could not find consistent data on the extent of civil society support funding on the 
websites of the US development agencies discussed in this section.    
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 The UK development agenda shifted to civil society after the cold war 
(Howell, 2000). In 1992, the UK Parliament formed the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy to promote democracy in the developing world and the former Soviet 
Union (Carothers, 1997). In 1999, DFID developed a civil society strategy (Howell 
2000). In Kyrgyzstan DFID has been working since 1997 with a particular focus on 
civil society. It had a regional civil society support programme in 2002-2006. The 
programme aimed at building capacity of Kyrgyz NGOs and was implemented 
through the International NGO Training and Research Center (INTRAC) (Interviews 
with representatives of DFID and INTRAC Bishkek, 15 November 2007). DFID’s 
programme, like that of USAID, provided technical and informational support to 
NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. However, it was relatively small-scale in comparison with 
USAID’s programme. For example, DFID did not have any networks of civil society 
support centres as USAID did.          
The EC started providing assistance to the former Soviet countries in 1993 
through a TACIS programme. Although the key aim of TASIC has been economic 
development (Sodupe and Benito, 1998), it also gave attention to civil society. For 
the EC, civil society was an alternative to the central authority in service provision. 
For this reason, within TACIS, capacity-building support was provided to NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan to strengthen them institutionally so that they could deliver services 
properly (European Community, 2007a). Consequently, the EC offered NGOs 
training on organisational management, strategic development, and other issues 
(Shishkaraeva et al., 2006). Civil society was also supported within a democracy 
programme of TACIS called the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (European Community, 2007b)13.  Since 1994, $238,053 (333,275) has been 
provided to NGOs to address democratic issues such as elections and human rights.  
Civil society has been important for the World Bank too. It has several 
programmes that provide grants to NGOs. The Social Development Civil Society 
Fund Programme is the most prominent one. It was launched in Central Asia in the 
mid 1990s. The aim of the programme is “to make development more inclusive and 
equitable by providing funds for activities that support the civic engagement of 
marginalised and vulnerable groups” (http://web.worldbank, c). Therefore, the World 
                                                 
13 After 2007 it was changed to the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (European 
Community, 2007b).   
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Bank supports those grants that seek to strengthen voices of excluded groups such as 
women, youth, and ethnic groups in the decision-making. The maximum grant for 
each project is $4,000. In the period of 1996-2009, the programme provided more 
than 134 grants to Kyrgyz NGOs by spending $370,000 in total 
(http://web.worldbank, c). On the whole, in the 1990s, civil society was of great 
significance in the World Bank’s agenda because it regarded the role of the state and 
market as ineffective. Therefore, the World Bank encouraged its staff to involve and 
consult with NGOs in policy-making. In all resident offices, civil society officers 
were appointed (Howell, 2000).    
UNDP has been working with civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan since 
its arrival in 1993. At the beginning of the 1990s, UNDP was among the donors who 
provided capacity-building support to NGOs (Shishkaraeva et al., 2006). By the end 
of the decade, the focus of UNDP activity had shifted towards CBOs. NGOs have 
been involved to provide services for UNDP such as research and training (Interview 
with a representative of UNDP, Bishkek, 13 November 2007). In addition, different 
programmes of UNDP provide grants for NGOs to carry out projects in specified 
fields (Interview with representatives of UNDP and UNV, Bishkek, 13 November 
2007 and 19 November 2007 respectively).        
The Soros Foundation (hereafter Soros) made a considerable contribution to 
the development of the Kyrgyz NGO sector. Its activities were launched in 
Kyrgyzstan in 1993. Its founder is the Open Society Institute created by George 
Soros. The main mission of Soros has been assisting Kyrgyzstan to build an open 
society which would be based on freedom and pluralism of opinions in all spheres of 
life, the rule of law, and equal participation of all members of the society in the 
development (www.soros.kg).  
The activities of Soros have been framed by the belief that education and 
knowledge result in change and enlightenment (Aksartova, 2005). George Soros, the 
key founder of the Soros Foundation, was greatly influenced by Karl Popper’s work 
“The Open Society and Its enemies” (www.soros.org)14. In Soros’s philosophy, 
NGOs were “bulwarks of both civil and open society” (Aksartova, 2005:103). 
                                                 
14 George Soros and Ernest Gellner, who worked in the Central European University in Prague funded 
by Soros, were influenced by Karl Popper and shared the same philosophical commitment to an open 
society.   
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Therefore, his foundation was very active in supporting NGOs (Shishkaraeva et al., 
2006).  
Soros had an NGO support programme in Kyrgyzstan at least as early as 
1997, according to annual reports available on its website (www.soros.kg). It is 
evident from these reports that the programme grants were given out to NGOs so that 
they could build their capacity, acquire equipment and furniture, and conduct 
trainings on different issues. In addition to this programme, other programmes of 
Soros focusing on women, human rights, and other issues have also supported NGOs 
– but only those working in their specific filed (Interview with representatives of 
Soros, 14 November 2007, Bishkek).  
 
 
“Mushrooms after the rain” effect: the NGO boom   
 
 The previous section has shown that, by the mid 1990s, there was 
considerable donor support focused on the promotion of NGOs. Such significant 
funding opportunities and technical support have contributed the development of the 
Kyrgyz NGO sector. The relevant literature suggested various chronologies of the 
NGO sector’s development. For example, based on their research15, Shishkaraeva 
and her colleagues (2006) identified three developmental stages of NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan. The first stage covers the years from 1985 to 1994 when civic initiatives 
rose in response to difficulties that resulted from the crisis and subsequent demise of 
the Soviet Union. The authors emphasised that arrival of donors in Kyrgyzstan in the 
early 1990s was an important element in this stage and a prelude for the second one. 
During 1995-1999, in the second stage, Shishkaraeva and her colleagues (2006) 
claimed that there had been a proliferation of NGOs due to financial and technical 
support of donors. These authors also said that, from 1999 to 2004, which is the third 
stage in their chronology, NGOs had become mature and started to influence 
decision-making and political processes in Kyrgyzstan.       
                                                 
15 Shishkaraeva and her colleagues (2006) had a question about periodisation of the NGO 
development in the research which explored the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan.  
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Drawing on a number of INTRAC research projects on civil society in 
Central Asia and workshops with local specialists and researchers in the field, Giffen 
and her colleagues (2005) also suggested three stages of NGO development in 
Kyrgyzstan. The first stage in their chronology lastes from 1991 to 1997. It is 
characterised by the emergence of public associations in Kyrgyzstan and the arrival 
of donors and international NGOs promoting civil society such as Soros, UNDP, 
Counterpart, and INTRAC. According to these authors, the second stage began in 
1998 when NGOs realised that they needed to become involved in advocacy and 
lobbying. The authors did not clearly delineate features of the third stage, which 
covers the early 2000s, since they were debated among INTRAC affiliated 
researchers and specialists. Some of them asserted that only the “fittest” NGOs were 
surviving. Others claimed that pro-active NGOs had emerged after an initial 
proliferation of NGOs which happened in response to external funding. The third 
group stated that interaction between NGOs and the state had increased since the 
early 2000s.  
Both chronologies show the development of the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan 
but from different perspectives. However, for the purpose of the present thesis, 
neither is sufficient. Since the thesis explores changes in donors’ civil society 
promotion and their influence on the NGO sector, it is more appropriate to identify 
developmental stages of NGOs since the launch of donors’ civil society activities in 
Kyrgyzstan. As a result, I divide the nineteen years of NGO development in 
Kyrgyzstan into three stages.  
The period from 1991 to 1994 makes up the first stage when donors started to 
launch their civil society activities in Kyrgyzstan and NGOs began to emerge.   
The years between 1995 and 2005, when the height of donors’ civil society 
promotion came about, are subsumed under the second stage of the NGO 
development. As described in the preceding section, donors focused on civil society 
building and provided technical, financial, and informational support to NGOs 
during this time. As a result, there was a proliferation of NGOs during this stage. 
Table 2 shows that, each year since 1995, the NGO sector increased at least by 8.3 
%, the figure for in 1996-1997, while its growth reached 32.9% in 2002-2003. 
According to table 3, in the course of 1993 - 2002, the number of NGOs grew from 
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611 to 7,630. By April 2006, there were 8,284 registered NGOs (Ubysheva and 
Pogojev, 2006).  
 
Table 2  
 
Years (the 1990s)  Growth %   Years (the 2000s)  Growth %  
Up to 1995 3.5%  2000-2001 21.1% 
1996-1997 8.3%  2002-2003 32.9% 






    
The development of the NGO sector since 2006 to the present can be 
identified as a third stage when donors started reconsidering their policies. Research 
findings presented throughout the thesis will provide insights into this stage of the 
NGO development in Kyrgyzstan.  
All in all, since their emergence, NGOs have been involved in the social, 
economic, and political lives of the Kyrgyz society (Adamson, 2002). In the 1990s, 
particularly in the early years, NGOs sought to address social and economic hardship 
that newly independent Kyrgyzstan endured after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Giffen et al., 2005). They were predominantly engaged in humanitarian work. By 
the end of the decade, NGOs broadened the spectrum of their activities by working 
with communities and the state and on the international level. At present, NGOs 
work in different fields including human rights, gender, ethnic harmony, poverty 
reduction, and ecology (Shishkaraeva et al., 2006). According to Aksartova (2005), 
NGOs have played a significant role in terms of training provision.    
 










Osh  Batken 
Total 
number 
1993 298 55 36 20 27 60 99 16 611 
1994 365 70 49 24 28 68 110 17 731 
1995 475 95 56 29 35 82 139 23 934 
1996 586 238 118 63 86 168 251 40 1550 
1997 821 287 146 78 106 212 312 48 2010 
1998 1036 369 199 106 164 289 461 98 2722 
1999 1280 422 299 125 230 562 741 158 3817 
2000 1065 519 365 183 269 672 878 178 4669 
2001 1953 798 454 264 359 844 1109 280 6058 
2002 2341 992 660 357 429 1113 1407 331 7630 
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Quantity versus quality: NGOs as voluntary initiatives, professional 
organisations or non-governmental “individuals”?   
In spite of their impressive growth as well as useful activities, the NGO 
sector in Kyrgyzstan has been criticised for an array of weaknesses. First and 
foremost, the large number of NGOs was considered as misleading since only a 
small part of the NGO sector is actually active (Ubysheva and Pogojev, 2006). It was 
argued that a substantial fraction of NGOs came into existence to take advantage of 
donor grants. Straight after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan 
encountered a severe economic crisis which resulted in the dramatic deterioration of 
life standards. Many people in the public sector were left without regular income. 
Other sectors experienced massive unemployment. Poverty became widespread 
(Anderson, 1997; Olcott, 1996). Therefore, Aksartova (2005) and Adamson (2002) 
noted that generous grants from donors16 were very tempting for local population to 
use for personal gain to ensure their own economic security rather than for public 
benefit. As Adamson (2002:193) put it, “everything from computer equipment to 
school textbooks and donated heating oil” went to the black market.  
Moreover, procedures to get donor funding, especially the seed grants given 
out to individuals interested in establishing an NGO, were simple. People did not 
have to do anything complicated except for putting together a proposal indicating 
their interest in forming an NGO and proposing a couple of activities17. Further, it is 
suggested that since donors equated the growth of NGOs to the growth of civil 
society (Howell and Pearce, 2002), they were uncritically supportive of all initiatives 
coming from people to establish an NGO. Consequently, one can conclude that the 
rapid growth of the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan was a mixed result of the poor 
economic situation, abundant donor funding, easy procedures to get them, and desire 
of donors for the formation of NGOs in the name of civil society building.  
Large donor grants have also had another effect on the NGO sector. Because 
of the economic prospects in an NGO, educated and qualified people such as 
                                                 
16 For instance, individual donor grants of US agencies were very large (around $15,000) when they 
just arrived in Kyrgyzstan (Adamson, 2002).  
17 I base this comment on my own ethnographic experience and an interview with an NGO held on 26 
February 2008 in Bishkek.   
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academics and other intellectuals, who lost their jobs or were poorly paid after the 
break up of the Soviet Union or were poorly paid, found employment with an NGO 
more financially secure.  As a result, NGOs in Kyrgyzstan came to be staffed by 
highly educated, urban based intelligent people (Roy, 2002; Aksartova, 2005). This 
tendency was reinforced by donor work conditions and requirements. When donors 
arrived in Kyrgyzstan, they had little knowledge of local situation including local 
languages. Therefore, they needed people who knew languages, particularly English 
and Russian, to work with (Howell, 2000; Aksartova, 2005).  
Moreover, donor projects required people in NGOs to have or to develop 
specific skills such as report writing and dealing with finance. For these reasons, 
according to Roy (2002), NGOs had to have people speaking languages with 
“bureaucratic” competence and who understood what donors wanted. As a result, 
NGOs in Kyrgyzstan began to be considered more as professional organisations 
where staff was well paid (Roy, 2002; Petric, 2005). In fact, Aksartova (2005) 
suggested that, in the West, employment in an NGO was not regarded as high in 
status terms as academics or doctors. However, in Kyrgyzstan, employment in an 
NGO was regarded as superior to these professions.  
Some scholars argued that employment of educated and skilled people in 
NGOs had had a number of implications. According to Aksartova (2005) and Petric 
(2005), the high salaries and other benefits in NGOs enticed public sector servants to 
give up their jobs and opt for the NGO work causing an internal “brain drain”. Roy 
(2002) also harshly discussed the external brain drain that NGOs had brought about. 
According to him, intellectuals, especially young people, working for NGOs had 
scarce opportunities to have a successful career in their own country. This is because 
all prospective employment opportunities, especially in the public sector, were 
inaccessible for them since they lacked proper solidarity networks18. Therefore, he 
claimed, in order to succeed professionally, particularly in the NGO world or UN, 
NGO employees had to leave by such means as getting a scholarship to study in a 
                                                 
18 Roy (2002:127) has argued that Central Asia has a social fabric comprised of networks of people 
based on traditional patterns of solidarity groups: extended families, clans, neighbourhood clusters, 
and solidarity groups of varied sociological basis. Petric (2005:325) has also asserted that “solidarity 
networks are not only based on an identity/tribal membership but rest upon complex relations that link 
individuals through personal bonds (friendships, kinship ties, matrimonial alliances, professional 
bounds, etc.) of patronage”.  
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western country or even marrying a foreign colleague. Roy (2002:144) summarised 
that NGOs were “less likely to create a stable new generation of future cadres than to 
facilitate the thinning of the intellectual class within Central Asia”.  
 According to the literature, the concentration of intellectuals in the NGOs 
sector resulted in a failure to reach out to the local population, especially the poor. 
Petric (2005:326) suggested that people employed in NGOs had become a “new elite 
of ‘local experts’ closely related to international organisations and NGOs”. Similarly, 
Roy (2002:143) described NGOs as “a privileged class of employees who stand apart 
from local populace”. Moreover, he asserted that educated people in Central Asia 
usually had weak links with solidarity networks and groups, especially in rural areas. 
“Independent mindedness” of intellectuals attracted donors as right actors to promote 
a liberal type of civil society (Roy 2002). However, according to Roy (2002), this 
very fact undermined establishment of links between NGOs and communities since 
the former were disengaged from the solidarity networks.  
Aksartova (2005) provided an alternative explanation for the gap between 
NGOs and local communities. According to her, in order to get support from donors, 
NGOs followed donor funding requirements too closely much, which resulted in 
their alienation from their society:  
 
 
By learning how to make themselves recognizable to Western donors — how to look like an 
NGO, talk like an NGO, and behave like an NGO — local actors who form NGOs 
simultaneously make themselves illegible to their own societies, where almost no one outside 
the donor-NGO circle understands what the words for NGOs and civil society mean 
(Aksartova, 2005: 154). 
 
 
 For this reason, Aksartova (2005) argued that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan adapted 
the work style of donors. As a result, according to her, NGOs went through structural 
isomorphism by being forced by donors (powerful organisations) to imitate their own 
structure and relations (Meyer and Rowan, 1991:49 in Aksartova, 2005). Moreover, 
Aksartova asserted that NGOs also experienced coercive isomorphism “which 
involves “the direct and explicit imposition of organisational models on dependent 
organisations” as well as “more subtle and less explicit” pressures” (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991: 68 in Aksartova, 2005). However, it should be noted that Aksartova’s 
research did not focus on the professional and institutional capacity of NGOs.   
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On the whole, NGOs in Kyrgyzstan have heavily depended on donors 
financially. Petric (2005) reported that donors are the main source of funding for 
most NGOs. They do not obtain any financial support either from the Kyrgyz 
government or population. Such dependence of NGOs on donors has raised questions 
about the accountability of NGOs. According to Petric (2005), since they do not 
acquire anything locally, NGOs are not accountable either to their government or 
people apart from their donors. Furthermore, Petric (2005) argued that local NGOs 
were not as autonomous as they are believed to be because they were embedded into 
a complex web of relations between donors, international NGOs, and each other. 
Adamson (2002) and Roy (2002) suggested that financial dependence of NGOs on 
donors also pushed them to follow donor priorities rather than local needs. In the 
meantime, donor priorities have not always reflected local needs. As a result, NGOs 
tend to change their mission and goals regularly to match the donor agendas (Giffen 
et al., 2005; Shishkaraeva et al., 2006). According to Giffen and her colleagues 
(2005), this means that NGOs lack clear commitments to their target groups and 
specific fields of work. All in all, as Roy (2002) summarised it, NGOs had come to 
be regarded as a foreign funded artificial civil society.   
Contrary to the above image of extremely professional organisations with 
educated staff, NGOs have also been criticised, especially by local researchers and 
NGO specialists, for being institutionally weak. Shishkaraeva and her colleagues 
(2006) observed that the organisational operation of most NGOs was limited to the 
most essential and basic. They have primitive equipment and furniture as well as few 
staff. They do not practise financial planning. According to these authors, despite 
different capacity-building trainings that NGOs had, the quality of their project 
implementation still remains weak (ibid). Kasybekov (1999) criticised NGOs in a 
similar sense by stating that many NGOs lacked a board of directors and other 
organisational and management skills such as strategic planning, accounting, and 
self-evaluation.  
Moreover, Kasybekov (1999) noted that there was no clear separation in 
NGOs between policy and executive functions. As a result, NGO leaders have 
unrestricted power with no mechanism to ensure their accountability especially in 
terms of funding utilisation. Weak organisational operation, particularly in terms of 
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financial management, has led to poor NGO transparency and accountability hurting 
their image (Kasybekov 1999). Some authors argued that most NGOs were one 
person organisations, usually a charismatic leader, with very weak or absent 
infrastructure (Minnini, 1998; Shishkaraeva et al., 2006). As one of the aid 
specialists put it, NGOs are not non-governmental organisations but non-
governmental individuals19. Tiulegenov (2008:3) has claimed recently that NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan are “still one person endeavours”. Finally, Petric (2005: 326) criticised a 
recruitment process in NGOs by saying that it was not based on merit but rather on 
solidarity networks. Meanwhile, Marat (2005: 268) stated that the first wave of NGO 
establishment in Kyrgyzstan was based on a family principle when members of one 
family set up an NGO.       
However, it should be noted that the studies on Kyrgyz NGOs discussed in 
this section did not explore the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan from an organisational 
perspective by looking at their structure, administrative rules, leadership, 
membership, staff, and funding. The only exception is a survey of ACSSC which 
was conducted in 2006. It was a quantitative study aimed at investigating the 
institutional and financial sustainability of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, and their public 
relations, activities, and current needs. 469 NGOs identified through a snowballing 
method took part in the survey. The key strength and, at the same time, weakness of 
this survey is that it only provides statistical data in a basic way.  Moreover, during 
my research, I discovered that the list of NGOs identified active as a result of the 
survey included NGOs that did not exist any more. At the same time, it did not 
include a number of NGOs that I found to be active during my fieldwork. This means 
that the survey and results it produced have a number of shortcomings. This makes it 
possible to state that there is a gap in the literature. It lacks a study that explores the 
characteristics of the NGO sector, especially its professionalisation, based on a 
vigorous methodological approach.  
                                                 
19 This phrase was said by one of the OXFAM employees in the aid workshop in Edinburgh on 10 
September 2010.   
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The turbulent path of state-NGO relations: donors as a bridge 
 
 Chapter 1 has established that, in the 1990s, donors ascribed to NGOs the 
roles of service providers, democracy promoters, and counterbalances to the state 
within their neo-liberal policies and democracy promotion programmes. Meanwhile, 
the functions of the state were limited. The previous sections of this chapter have 
discussed how donors promoted NGOs in Kyrgyzstan and the stages of NGO 
development pointing out both strengths and weaknesses of NGOs. This section 
looks at the relations between the state and NGOs.   
   
Promising start: 1991 – 1999     
 
In the early 1990s, when NGOs were nascent in Kyrgyzstan, the state led by 
President Akaev was very supportive of civil society. His enthusiasm stemmed from 
his will to obtain support, especially financial, from the international community 
(Anderson, 1997; Gleason, 1997; Huskey, 1997a)20. Consequently, a legislative 
framework conducive to the emergence and operation of civil society was 
established. The Kyrgyz constitution of 1993 was a key document guaranteeing civic 
independent initiatives and freedoms. According to its Article 8, freedoms of all 
social organisations ought to be protected by the state21.  
Up to 1999, Kyrgyz NGOs functioned within a law on public associations 
introduced in 1990 (www.state.gov, 2000). The law was adopted during the last year 
of the Soviet Union and governed not-for-profit organisations which included trade 
                                                 
20 In comparison with other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan had a weak point of departure after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Like other former Soviet countries, Kyrgyzstan experienced “the rupture of inter-republican 
purchase and supply links and the loss of labour” (Huskey, 1997a: 666). However, it also inherited a weak 
economy from the Soviet Union. Osmonov (2008) has argued that, during the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan was 
behind other countries in terms of development and work efficiency. In the same vein, Abazov (1999) has 
asserted that Kyrgyzstan was one of the poorest Soviet countries and heavily depended on Russia. In addition, it 
was a small, landlocked country with relatively limited natural resources and poor transportation links (Olcott, 
1996; Huskey, 1997). For these reasons, newly independent Kyrgyzstan was unattractive to foreign investment 
but really depended on it to develop its economy. As a solution, President Akaev was convinced that economic 
and political reforms should be implemented to attract investment. He claimed that he would turn Kyrgyzstan into 
the “Switzerland of Central Asia” by making it a centre of trade, communication, and tourism (Olcott 1996:87; 
Huskey 1997a: 667). This aim shaped the political and economic policies of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan in the early 
1990s. 
21 Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic adopted in 1993. 
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unions, political parties, cultural associations, and charitable organisations. 
According to the law, a not-for-profit organisation was supposed to emerge on a 
voluntary basis. Upon registration it could own property, establish mass media, 
publish, and act as a juridical entity (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 1990). In 1999, a 
law on non-commercial organisations was adopted for NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. It 
separated NGOs from political parties, trade unions, and religious organisations. It 
also eased NGO registration requirements. For example, only three people are 
needed to register an NGO, while, registration of a political party requires ten people. 
The law also introduced a tax exemption for NGOs receiving grants (www.state.gov, 
2000). It was recognised by the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 
as one of the most liberal in the former Soviet Union (www.icnl.org, 1999). In other 
words, the attitude of the Kyrgyz government towards NGOs throughout the 1990s 
was positive and favourable.  
However, according to Kasybekov (1999), whose writing on the state-NGO 
relations in Kyrgyzstan is one of the earliest, there was no real or substantial 
cooperation between these actors, particularly on the national level, by 1999. The 
reason for this, he noted, was mistrust between the state and NGOs. In particular, the 
state was suspicious about NGOs due to their lack of accountability and transparency 
in them. However, Kasybekov (1999) claimed that there should be cooperation 
between these actors because “all parties – the NGOs, the government, and most 
importantly, the Kyrgyz population – would benefit from such cooperation” 
(Kasybekov, 1999: 72). He stated that NGOs had the potential to benefit different 
programmes through service and training provision. He referred to different 
examples of donor-funded projects where NGOs and the state were starting to 
cooperate and had a great prospect to do so. Particularly, he drew on a programme 
called “Employment Promotion Companies” funded both by the partner fund of the 
European Union and the Kyrgyz government.  
The example of Kasybekov (1999) highlighting the involvement of donors 
brings up a central issue in the state-NGO relationship in Kyrgyzstan. It is the role of 
donors in these state-NGO relations. Donors have played a key part in the emergence 
of any type of interaction between NGOs and the Kyrgyz state. Donor-funded 
programmes have been a platform for the relationship between the actors. Aksartova 
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(2005) argued that this was not a two way relationship between the state and NGOs 
but rather a three way relationship which also included donors. According to her, 
since NGOs lack local constituency and support, they derive their legitimacy from 
donors and seek patronage from them to influence the state.  
The state, on the other hand, is obliged to follow the requirements and norms 
of donors which include consultation with NGOs in order to obtain funding and 
support from them (Aksartova, 2005; Shishkaraeva et al., 2006). As mentioned 
elsewhere, being a poor country, Kyrgyzstan needs external funding. Shishkaraeva 
and her colleagues (2006) concluded that the state consulted with NGOs because it 
needed to include this among its numerous international commitments rather than 
because of a genuine interest in NGOs.  
By the late 1990s, NGOs became active in the spheres of civic education, 
election observation, and human rights. In 1998, the Forum of NGOs was established 
with the aim to observe elections and promote civic education. Its first activity was 
training 150 independent observers to monitor a referendum in several regions of 
Kyrgyzstan. A year later the Forum was registered as the “Coalition for Democracy 
and Civil Society” (hereafter the Coalition). In 1999, it held a large campaign on 
election observation for local councils. The campaign involved 130 NGOs and 2000 
citizens. This was an unprecedented activity in Kyrgyzstan. As a result of the 
campaign, 1,849 people were accredited as independent election observers. Building 
upon such activities and gained experience, the Coalition was engaged in different 
activities related to elections such as reforming the election code (Shishkaraeva et al., 
2006). Further, it also moved to offering “vigorous and critical assessments of the 
government's actions and public affairs generally” (www.freedomhouse.org).  
These types of activities gave a new twist to the attitude of the state towards 
NGOs and its perception of them. Aksartova (2005:193) observed that, “from the 
standpoint of the Kyrgyz officials, all disagreement with the state is political 
dissent”. Consequently, NGOs such as the Coalition started to be seen as part of the 
opposition. This meant that the nominal state promotion of civil society came to an 
end since it realised that civil society institutions could criticise it. On the whole, in 
the mid 1990s, Akaev opted to change his governance strategy in the direction of 
centralisation of power by initiating referenda to amend the constitution in 1994 and 
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1996 (Huskey, 1997b; Anderson, 1997). There were a number of issues with the 
referenda. For example, Gleason asserted (1997:100) that Akaev’s referendum in 
1994 to change the structure of the parliament was clearly illegal because 




Akaev’s authoritarian grip: 2000-2005   
 
Akaev’s emergent authoritarianism deepened in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s. Using the same technique of amending the constitution, Akaev managed to 
acquire public approval in another referendum to change the structure of the 
parliament in 1998. Consequently, the number of seats in the legislative assembly 
was increased from 35 to 60. 15 of them were allocated to political parties. Further, 
the number of seats in the assembly of people’s representative was decreased from 
70 to 45 (Abazov, 2003). In the 2000 parliamentary elections, mainly pro-Akaev 
parties and candidates were successful. Meanwhile, oppositional parties were 
suppressed. The elections also had such problems as government manipulation of 
results, voter intimidation by state institutions, falsification of ballots, and the 
curtailment of the media (www.osce.org; a). The OSCE report on the parliamentary 
elections (2000) claimed that these elections and the way they were managed had 
damaged Akaev’s image of democracy promoter and had clearly shown his dictator 
preference. 
In the early 2000s, the state under President Akaev started harassing and 
persecuting a small number of NGOs actively involved in human rights protection, 
civic education, and election observation. The Kyrgyz Committee on Human Rights 
(KCHR) was one of these NGOs. In 1999, the government revoked its registration, 
set up a new NGO under the same name, and demanded that the original KCHR hand 
over all their equipment and furniture to the new organisation. Consequently, the 
head of KCHR was forced to flee the country (www.state.gov, 2001; HRW, 2001). 
Although registration was returned to the KCHR, the NGO was continuously 
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harassed and persecuted throughout the remaining rule of Akaev (www.state.gov, 
2000-2004; HRW, 2001-2005).  
Furthermore, according to the reports of international organisations from 
2000 to 2005, a few NGO leaders, who criticised the state publicly, were either 
attacked or threatened. For example, the 2002 HRW Report stated that the head of 
the Coalition had been attacked outside of her house after criticising the state at a 
round table. In 2004, the head of a Civil Society Support NGO received threatening 
calls regarding her criticism of a government plan on a constitutional reform at a 
UNDP meeting. In the same year, state-owned and pro-government media outlets 
began publishing articles critical of local and foreign NGOs (www.state.gov, 2004). 
One of the criticisms was that NGOs intended to destabilise the situation in 
Kyrgyzstan (Beshimov, 2004).   
This said, however, according to different reports, Akaev’s government had 
better relations with NGOs dealing with social issues. For example, NGOs working 
on education enjoyed much more freedom and state support (Abazov, 2003). The 
Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan, which brought together several large public 
associations and cultural centres, was chosen by the Akaev government as a focal 
point of state interaction with civil society. The organisation was given the status of a 
“consultative and advisory organ under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic” 
(Abazov, 2003: www.freedomhouse.org). Furthermore, the government created so 
called governmental NGOs (GONGOs). For example, in 2000 an Association of 
NGOs was established. Local NGOs were encouraged to join it. The Association of 
NGOs was reported to have been inactive during the first year following its 
establishment (www.state.gov, 2001). It has not been mentioned in the reports since 
the mid 2000s. In 2004, Akaev’s government created an agency for relations with 
society to monitor and co-opt local NGOs (Huskey, 2005). 
In general, the reports suggest that, under the rule of Akaev, NGOs enjoyed 
much more freedom than the media and political opposition and were relatively 
better protected by legislation. The state interfered little in NGO activities, except for 
the cases of large human rights NGOs. Even in their cases state actions against them 
were not severe and did not involve heavy violence but rather they were restricted to 
detentions, short-term imprisonments, fines, and refusals of permission to hold a 
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protest event. This suggests that Akaev’s government still remained relatively liberal 
towards NGOs, particularly in comparison with other states in the region. 
 
 
New government, new hope?: 2005 – 2006  
 
After the March 2005 revolution the new government led by President Bakiev 
made efforts to work with NGOs but there was still some level of limitation. For 
example, the head of the original KCHR returned to Kyrgyzstan from his exile but 
his organisation could not recover its registration (www.state.gov, 2005). 
Nonetheless, most NGOs did not experience any problems with their registration. 
Moreover, the reports of international organisations asserted that a number of leading 
human rights NGOs were able to work independently (www.state.gov, 2006). 
Further, Bakiev appointed a few NGO leaders to government positions. For instance, 
Tursunbek Akun, who was previously a famous human rights activist, was appointed 
as chair of the State Commission on Human Rights (www.state.gov, 2005).         
However, the Bakiev government continued the harassment and persecution 
of active human rights NGOs. For example, in March 2006, one of the leading 
human rights NGOs in Jalalabad was tormented by the government. A legal action 
was brought against three employees of the NGO for allegedly using false 
information against the government (www.state.gov, 2006). In the early 2006, 
Kaipov, the new Minister of Justice, declared that all NGOs receiving foreign 
funding would be investigated due to their potential threat to national security and 
the development of the country. This initiative stemmed from a claim made by the 
National Security Services that NGOs might be working in the interest of foreign 
donors. Moreover, foreign NGOs, namely NDI, the International Republican Institute 
(IRI), and the International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES), were exposed to 
government scrutiny (www.state.gov, 2006).  
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Gaps and debates in the literature  
 
The available reports of different international organisations, namely HMW, 
Freedom House, and the US State Department, were very helpful in my construction 
of the above account of state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan from the early 1990s to 
2006. However, they have a number of omissions and contradictions. All the reports 
predominantly focus on popular, human rights NGOs; they do not provide any data 
on activities of other NGOs especially from the geographical periphery. Further, the 
reports overstress state harassment and persecution of NGOs. They do not report 
whether any positive interaction between the actors. In fact, the reports do not give 
details of how the interaction between the state and NGOs occurs in the first place.  
Furthermore, the reports do not provide a clear indication of whether NGOs 
can influence decision-making and the state. For example, US State Department 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices claim that each year a certain number of 
demonstrations happens in Kyrgyzstan. However, they do not provide information on 
whether NGOs take part in the demonstrations and what their role might be. The 
reports also give the impression that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan are clearly divided into 
GONGOs and NGOs. Moreover, the latter are presented as uniformly Western-
oriented and driven by Western values.  
 While the influence of NGOs on the government is not properly discussed in 
the reports of these international organisations, academic studies have very diverse 
views on this. Roy (2002) argued that the NGO sector neutralised potential political 
activism because intellectuals working in NGOs were drawn away from any political 
activity. Furthermore, he (2002: 144) claimed that NGOs did not either challenge 
“domestic elements of power” or address the real problems such as corruption and 
narcotics. In fact, according to Roy, they work where the government does not find 
any challenges. Therefore, he concluded that NGOs were not considered as “a threat 
to the status quo” (2002: 144).  
Along these lines also, Radnitz (2006) argued that NGOs had not participated 
in the March 2005 revolution in Kyrgyzstan. He asserted that the revolution was 
organised by political opposition based on the strength of extended family, solidarity 
groups, and localism in Kyrgyzstan. This was identified as a key difference between 
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the revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the ones in Georgia and Ukraine which were 
organised based on “a large urban population, a strong civil society, and a national-
level student movement” (Radnitz, 2006:133). In the meantime, Marat (2005), 
contrary to Radnitz, claimed that NGOs had participated in the revolution and could 
influence decision-making.  
Kyrgyz experts have been pessimistic about state-NGO relations in 
Kyrgyzstan. For example, Tretyakov (2007) claimed that the relations between the 
two actors were based on mutual accusation and criticism. In the same vein, Omarov 
(Garaushenko, 2007:28), a famous Kyrgyz political scientist, stated that the state was 
suspicious of NGOs. He also said that, since NGOs were financially dependent on 
donors, in the state’s eyes they were a source of foreign influence on the Kyrgyz 
population.  




In this chapter, I have reviewed civil society promotion of donors in 
Kyrgyzstan from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s with the purpose of further 
expounding the arguments in civil society literature based on the case of Kyrgyzstan. 
Consequently, in the first section, I have stated that, by the mid 1990s, there was 
considerable donor funding aimed at civil society promotion. I identified six key 
donors which worked on the promotion of civil society. It is worth pointing out that 
their civil society funding was specifically directed at building capacity of NGOs 
which were just emerging in Kyrgyzstan at that time. Nonetheless, donors differed 
from each other in terms of why and how they promoted civil society. The US 
agencies were the key actors in civil society promotion in Kyrgyzstan. They focused 
on creating NGOs and invested the most. DFID provided the same sort of support to 
NGOs in terms of capacity-building. However, in comparison with the USAID’s 
programme, the DFID one was launched late and on a smaller scale.  
The World Bank and Soros also had explicit programmes on civil society 
support. However, in contrast to USAID and DFID, these donors were not single-
mindedly concerned with capacity-building of NGOs but they also incorporated 
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other issues into their grants to NGOs. For example, for the World Bank, civil 
society organisations were supposed to include excluded groups in decision-making. 
Further, the engagement of these donors with civil society was different also from a 
philosophical standpoint. For Soros, NGOs were an integral part of an open society.  
Civil society support provided by the UNDP and the EC was less explicit. 
None of these organisations had a clear programme on civil society promotion. 
However, both of them provided capacity-building training to NGOs. They also 
incorporated NGOs into their programmes and provided grants to them for different 
issues, such as promotion of human rights in the case of the EC and community 
development in case of UNDP. In brief, the case of Kyrgyzstan demonstrates how 
donors’ promotion of civil society, was discussed in chapter 1, was put into practice. 
Firstly, donors restricted their concept of civil society in Kyrgyzstan to the work of 
NGOs. Secondly, donors assigned NGOs the role of a service provider alternative to 
the state (EC), a democracy promoter (DFID and USAID), and representative of 
vulnerable groups (the World Bank).  
In the second section, I have suggested that the enormous investment of 
donors in civil society enabled NGOs in Kyrgyzstan to develop rapidly, especially 
from the quantitative perspective. NGOs have also become involved in different 
aspects of societal life. However, in the third section, I have asserted that NGOs have 
faced criticisms which are, by and large, two-fold and contradictory. On the one 
hand, NGOs have been seen as donor driven, staffed with urban based educated 
people, and divorced from the local population. This has led to an image of NGOs as 
professional organisations without any links to their constituency. On the other hand, 
NGOs have been blamed for lacking proper organisational operation and 
management which has led to weak accountability and transparency. Consequently, 
NGOs have been called opportunistic, involuntary, and non-participatory. Most 
importantly, I have identified a gap in the literature on civil society in Kyrgyzstan. It 
lacks a study that researches professionalisation of Kyrgyz NGOs from an 
organisation perspective. 
In the fourth section, I have discussed the state-NGO relationships in 
Kyrgyzstan which have been multifaceted. In the early 1990s, the government led by 
President Akaev embraced the idea of civil society for three different reasons. 
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Firstly, the government needed political and financial support from the international 
community which could come only when their agenda was shared. Therefore, I have 
emphasised that donors have played an important role in bringing NGOs to the 
attention of the state and initiating an interaction between them through their funding 
policies. Secondly, the state also had to address a post-Soviet crisis in the country. 
Thirdly, it did not understand the real implications of emancipating independent civic 
organisations.  
With the development of the NGO sector and its activities, the attitude of the 
state towards NGOs became more attuned to the realities. Consequently, the 
relationships between the actors began to diversify. By the late 1990s and the early 
2000s, the government of Akaev learned that: a) NGOs could be involved in 
different social programmes and donors are favourable towards this; and b) the 
emancipation of NGOs had a boomerang effect which came back to the government 
in the form of criticism against its activities. As a result, the state’s attitude towards 
NGOs, especially towards the ones involved in human rights, civic education, and 
election observation, changed. A few NGOs were harassed and persecuted during 
Akaev’s rule. When Bakiev came to power, efforts were made to work with NGOs. 
However, it took a negative direction after a year. Nevertheless, there has not been 
major curtailment of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan and they have still remained relatively 
free.  
Finally, I would like to emphasise four points that are central for my thesis. 
My first point is that civil society was an important part of donor agendas in 
Kyrgyzstan. As in other parts of the developing world discussed in chapter 1, for 
donors civil society was a phenomenon that could promote democracy and 
development in Kyrgyzstan. Donors differed from each other in terms of why 
exactly, how, and to what extent they promoted civil society. Nonetheless, they had a 
commonality which was to encourage the emergence of a liberal civil society in 
Kyrgyzstan by providing capacity-building support to NGOs.  
My second point is that the extensive and diverse NGO sector was a new 
phenomenon for Kyrgyzstan which emerged after independence mainly because of 
donors. In chapter 1, I mentioned that, in the pre-Soviet era, the social organisation in 
Kyrgyzstan was formed around pastoral clans and tribes. It was, what Gellner called, 
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communalism or the “tyranny of cousins and rituals” (Gellner, 1994:7). During the 
Soviet time as stated in chapter 1, public associations in Kyrgyzstan were within the 
domain of the state and promoted the communist ideology. In Gellner’s words, it was 
central authoritarianism or the “tyranny of kings” (Gellner, 1994:7).  
My third point is that, according to the relevant literature, the NGO sector in 
Kyrgyzstan failed to meet the expectations of donors mainly because of their 
characteristic staffing. However, I problematised the professional image of NGOs by 
pointing out other criticisms against NGOs as institutionally and professionally 
weak. Therefore, I suggest that the literature has a gap indicating that NGO 
professionalisation in Kyrgyzstan is poorly explored. All in all, it is evident from the 
discussion in this chapter that the overall argument in the literature on civil society in 
Kyrgyzstan is that the NGO sector is an artificial civil society from outside injected 
by donors. As stated in chapter 1, it is argued that this has happened because donors 
used the same strategy for civil society promotion everywhere without taking into 
account local specifics. Furthermore, most criticisms against Kyrgyz NGOs are very 
similar to criticisms against NGOs around the developing world. As discussed in 
chapter 1, NGOs in other developing countries have also been condemned for being 
professional organisations with paid staff, lacking a link with their communities, and 
following donors rather than their constituencies (Zaidi, 1999; Mercer, 2002).    
  My final point is that the relations between NGOs and the state in Kyrgyzstan 
have been considered from two perspectives. Mainly, it has been stated in the 
literature that the state did not consider NGOs to be legitimate actors in the local 
context. Nonetheless, some authors suggested that NGOs became influential in 


















This chapter critically discusses the research methodology. The first section 
describes the research design. The second section expounds the data collection 
process. The third section explains the data analysis process. The fourth section 
reflects on some aspects of the research. Further, it is important to remind the 
research questions. The first and second chapters have demonstrated that the 
development strategy of donors based on civil society promotion did not bring about 
the desired outcomes in the 1990s. The case of Kyrgyzstan indicated that NGOs 
failed to represent the population, influence the state, and, therefore, promote 
democracy. In the meantime, the Kyrgyz state did not democratise properly. On the 
contrary, it grew authoritarian.  As stated in chapter 1, in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s, development strategies of donors started to be reconsidered. In this regard, 
this research explored the following: 1) what kind of changes have donors made in 
their civil society activities since the mid 2000s? 2) why have donors made these 
changes? 3) what are the implications of these changes for Kyrgyz NGOs, the 





To answer my research questions, I found it important to explore and 
understand actions, experiences, ideas, beliefs, and motivations of donors and NGOs 
in Kyrgyzstan as institutions and, most importantly, of people working in them. This 
was of particular important to study the NGO sector. It was actions of the 
individuals, who constituted these NGOs, based on their beliefs, ideas, experiences, 
and motivations which determined the development of their respective organisations 
and, then, of the NGO sector in general.  
Consequently, interpretive sociology, which is concerned with “culturally 
derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world” [italic in 
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original] (Crotty, 2003:67), became the epistemological stance of my research. The 
origin of the interpretivist approach is traced back to works of Max Weber (Crotty, 
2003; Gerth and Mills, 1946). According to Weber, social sciences should be 
concerned with understanding (Verstehen) (Crotty, 2003:67). In other words, human 
ideas, values, and beliefs should be understood since these are the forces that produce 
change. Consequently, for Weber, sociology should focus as much on social action 
as on structures (Giddens, 2005:18). In fact, an individual is the ultimate unit of 
Weber’s analysis:     
 
 
Interpretive sociology considers the individual and his action as the basic unit, as its ‘atom’ – 
if disputable comparison for once may be permitted. In this approach, the individual is also 
the upper limit and the sole carrier of meaningful conduct…. In general, for sociology, such 
concepts as ‘state’, ‘association’, ‘feudalism’, and the like designate certain categories of 
human interaction. Hence it is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to 
‘understandable’ action, that is without exception to the actions of participating men (Weber 
in Gerth and Mills, 1946: 55).            
 
 
At present, this interpretive approach addresses the same key issues as the 
ones in Weber’s thought. According to Blaikie (2000:115), the interpretive approach 
places “the meanings and interpretations, the motives and intentions, that people use 
in their everyday lives and that direct their behaviour” at the centre of social theory 
and research. Within this approach, a social researcher should grasp “everyday 
beliefs and practices, mundane and taken for granted” and articulate them to “provide 
an understanding of these actions” (Blaikie, 2000:115). In other words, I have found 
the interpretive approach to aptly represent my beliefs about the social world in 
general and to answer my research questions in particular, that is, from a perspective 
of social actors and their everyday beliefs and practices (Blaikie, 2000:115).   
Furthermore, I used a concept of ideal type. It is, as Crotty (2003:70) put it, a 
“principal diagnostic tool” of Weber and conceptually based on the social 
researcher’s imagination rather than on “an analysis of what is real” (Crotty, 
2003:70). As a result, it does not exist “but can serve as a useful model to guide the 
social inquirer in addressing real life cases and discerning where and to what extend 
the real deviates from the ideal” (Crotty, 2003:70). Most importantly, according to 
Weber, the ideal-type can be used to study social behaviour which is “rational goal-
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oriented”, that is, “the outcome of persons acting under a common motivation and 
choosing suitable means to the ends they have in view” (Crotty, 2003:70).  
 
Ideal types  
 
In my research I had three ideal types. The first one was within my 
conceptual framework. My research data revealed that donors’ civil society 
promotion in Kyrgyzstan, which was reduced to building capacity of NGOs, had 
developed differently. In chapter 1, civil society was conceptualised based on the 
idea of Gesellschaft, an urban phenomenon championing individual autonomy as a 
key prerequisite for civil society. A contrast to Gesellschaft is Gemeinschaft, a rural 
life prevailed with religious and community traditions (Tonnies, 2005; Kaviraj, 
2001).   
Consequently, civil society in Kyrgyzstan has been promoted in the form of 
Gesellschaft. In chapter 2, I discussed how donors wanted to create NGOs 
independent on local traditions and solidarity groups and networks. “Independent 
mindedness” of NGOs attracted donors (Roy, 2002). However, my research showed 
that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan had not necessarily been estranged from local traditions, 
groups, and networks. A number of cases suggested that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan had 
been built on religious traditions, solidarity networks, and local customs, that is to 
say, on Gemeinschaftian foundations. Therefore, I realised that there was a blurring 
of distinctions between the concepts of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft in the 
empirical material. 
As a result, I developed two traditions of civil society, liberal and 
communitarian, for my conceptual framework. Each of these traditions served as an 
ideal type to enable me to analyse my data based on them. They were presented 
earlier in chapter 1. It is worth recalling here what these civil society traditions 
imply. In the liberal tradition, an individual is interest and needs driven; while, in the 
communitarian one, he/she is driven by value of the common good and sociability. 
Furthermore, in the liberal approach, the state and civil society provide a check on 
each other. The state provides a frame for civil society to have a free and civilised 
interaction; meanwhile, the latter counterbalances the former so that it does not over 
 70 
exceed its power. In other words, the state and civil society are clearly demarcated 
actors with explicit functions towards each other. 
In the communitarian approach, the state and civil society are 
complementary. The state not only frames civil society but also encompasses it and 
leads it towards the common good. It is important to highlight that, within my 
research, these traditions were not rigid models but rather a set of guiding criteria to 
understand and interpret data as it showed that a number of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan and 
their relations with the state and their constituency display features of both traditions. 
The third ideal type was the one of professional and formal NGOs. Since I 
needed to explore what kind of impact the changes in donor policies had had on 
NGOs, I decided to approach answering this question from the perspective of NGO 
professionalisation. This is because a number of my first interviews with donors and 
civil society support NGOs indicated that NGO professionalisation might have been 
on the rise. Furthermore, I believed that collecting data on this would also enable me 
to give a more detailed account of the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan and, thus, fill the 
gap in the literature on civil society in Central Asia which has been outlined in 
chapter 2.      
I constructed the ideal type of a professional and formal NGO based on a 
resource mobilisation theory of McCarthy and Zald (1973). I unidentified this work 
as the most useful for my work because the American social movement organisations 
(SMOs) that these authors studied in the 1970s have, subsequently, turned into 
advocacy organisations through professionalisation. For example, Common Cause, 
which was given as an example of SMO professionalisation in McCarthy and Zald’s 
work, is now a large advocacy organisation aimed to “make voices of citizens heard 
in the political process and to hold their elected leaders accountable to the public 
interest” (www.commoncause.org).  
According to Aksartova (2005), in the 1990s, in Kyrgyzstan along with other 
former Soviet countries, American advocacy organisations were used as a model by 
the US, which was the largest donor working on civil society promotion in 
Kyrgyzstan as noted in chapter 2. In the meantime, Carothers (1997) asserted that 
other donors might have also used the same model of NGO promotion as that of the 
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US. Therefore, I considered that it was important to look at how the American SMOs 
professionalised and what their professionalisation implies.    
According to McCarthy and Zald (1973), in the 1960s, American SMOs 
started receiving funding from external sources: the government, foundations, 
churches, and business corporations. This funding was directed to institutional 
support of SMOs. As a consequence, a great number of “funded SMOs” came to 
existence. Further, McCarthy and Zald (1973) stated that the nature of SMOs’ 
membership and staff started to change. Substantial external funding made SMOs 
disconnect from their members since the former no longer need a contribution from 
the latter. Further, volunteer man-power of SMOs coming from their members came 
to be replaced with paid staff who were chosen based on their skills and experience. 
Consequently, a group of people emerged who could work in an SMO full-time and 
earn a respectable income. Most importantly, these new SMO professionals might 
not commit themselves to a single SMO since there were plenty positions in the 
social movement field for them. Therefore, they could move from one SMO to 
another (McCarthy and Zald, 1973).  
Based on these, McCarty and Zald (1973) put forward an argument stating 
that SMOs professionalised in order to secure external funding. This process both 
caused and was accompanied by changes in the nature of their staff and membership. 




(1) A leadership that devotes full time to the movement. 
(a) A large, proportion of resources originating outside the aggrieved group 
that the movement claims to represent. 
(2) A very small or nonexistent membership base or a paper membership 
(membership implies little more than allowing name to be used upon 
membership rolls.) 
(3) Attempts to impart the image of "speaking for a potential constituency". 




Along with professionalisation, McCarty and Zald (1973) noted, SMOs also 
experienced bureaucratisation of their structure and work procedures. Therefore, it is 
useful to recall, very briefly, a concept of bureaucracy. According to Weber, 
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bureaucracy is when an organisation has: 1) a hierarchy of authority, 2) written rules 
regulating the behaviour of officials, 3) full-time and paid staff who are hired based 
on merit and can build a career in the organisation, 4) a separation between 
organisational and personal lives of staff, and 5) material resources that do not 
belong to members of the organisation (Robbins, 1990:232). Staggenburg (1988:587-
588) suggested that, for SMOs, “formalisation” should be used rather than 
“bureaucratisation” because she has asserted that SMOs were not “as bureaucratic as 
established organisations such as corporations and government agencies”. Moreover, 
she went on that, in reality, this issue was more complex and, while, some SMOs 
became formalised, some of them never developed these features.  
Based on these, within my research, the ideal type of a professional NGO 
included the following elements: (1) a full-time, paid leader; (2) a large amount of 
funding coming from external sources; (3) a limited or nominal membership base; 
and (4) activities directed at the interests of a certain constituency. I also decided to 
use “formalisation” to explore bureaucratic elements in NGOs. Therefore, 
formalisation implied the presence of the following factors in an NGO (a) a 
hierarchical organisational structure, (b) written administrative and financial rules, 
(c) full-time and paid staff recruited based on merit and who separate their personal 
life from organisational one, and (d) material-technical resources. I should note that I 
also drew on my own analysis of over 45 NGOs in Kyrgyzstan.       
 
 
Research methods   
 
The interpretive stance of my research as well as its questions determined my 
research methods. From the outset of my research, the key data collection method 
was semi-structured interviewing because it is one of the main tools to learn the 
social accounts of research participants (Blaikie, 2000; Bryman, 2004). There were 
also other practical aspects to my choice. I was not sure if I could handle an open, 
unstructured interview, especially taking into account that my interviews would be in 
three languages, Russian, English, and Kyrgyz. Therefore, it was crucial for me that 
semi-structured interviewing allowed me to have an interview guide with questions 
prepared beforehand which kept me focused on the research subject. However, at the 
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same time, I could be flexible to ask probing and new questions that could emerge 
during an interview (Blaikie, 2000; Bryman, 2004). 
Documents were the second data collection tool. I decided to use them based 
on my previous experience in researching Scottish voluntary organisations for my 
master’s dissertation. Every time I interviewed a voluntary organisation, I was 
provided with a number of documents such as annual reports, leaflets, and brochures. 
Most importantly, I learned that documents could be a very important source of 
information (Jailobaeva, 2005). In addition, I took into account that documents 
presented naturally occurring data in contrast to generated data that interviewing 
produced (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  
In the course of my fieldwork, I had to employ two other methods of data 
collection. My initial research data indicated that I had needed to undertake some 
observation as well as to construct a social profile of NGO employees and leaders to 
further study research questions. In the second stage of my research, I observed the 
working environment of NGOs during and after the interview in order to learn their 
infrastructural context for my research focus on professionalisation and formalisation 
of NGOs. Bearing in mind that the role of a researcher in observation can be 
different (Blaikie, 2000; Bryman, 2003), I limited my role to observing and taking 
notes. This means that my observation did not imply participant observation, that is, 
a full immersion of the researcher “into the life of the people being studied” (Blaikie, 
2000:234).      
Furthermore, to collect data to construct social profiles of the NGO 
leadership and staff, I developed two self-administered questionnaires which had to 
be completed by NGOs leaders and staff (Blaikie, 2000). My purpose was to collect 
demographic data about NGOs which included age, gender, salary, and education. I 
was also interested in learning the perspective of NGOs’ workers on their motivation 
to work and their career prospects in their respective NGOs. Questions related to 
career motivation and prospects of NGO employees had a set of answers that they 





Data collection  
 
My fieldwork lasted from September 2007 to May 2008. I conducted it in two 
stages. The first stage took place from September to mid December 2007. On this 
stage, my key purpose was to explore what donors were doing in relation to civil 
society promotion and what kind of changes they have introduced to their activities 
on this. For this reason, I focused on interviewing donors and international NGOs 
(INGOs). I decided to interview the latter for the following reason. Although they did 
not have their own funding, they played an important role in development assistance 
in Kyrgyzstan. They were contracted by donors to implement their activities. 
Consequently, they were aware of the situation on civil society, and even any other 
issues, more than their funders. Further, I interviewed local civil society support 
NGOs in order to learn their account of donor activities on civil society promotion in 
Kyrgyzstan and to explore whether they had experienced any changes in working 
with donors.  
I made an initial data analysis within the second half of December 2007 and 
January 2008. The second stage of my fieldwork began in February 2008 and ended 
in May 2008. On this stage, I focused on further exploring my research questions, 
particularly in the light of preliminary findings discovered on the first stage of 
analysis. In other words, I concentrated on examining politicisation and 
professionalisation of NGOs and a nature of the state-NGO relations in the light of 
recent changes in donor policies and political environment in Kyrgyzstan. 





  I used a non-probability sampling method to select my research participants. I 
focused on those organisations and documents which would be the most relevant 
(Bryman, 2004:334) and informative (Neuman, 2003:213). Nonetheless, depending 
on a situation in the field, I used different sampling approaches within non-
probability sampling which are discussed below (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). When 
interviewing donors, I requested an interview either with a head of their civil society 
 75 
programme, if they had one, or a head of the organisation since these people were 
identified to be the most informative about their activities on civil society and in 
general. As far as NGOs are concerned, I requested an interview with their leaders 
for the same reason, as they were considered to be in the best position to provide 
information about their organisations and activities.   
  
 
Recruiting donors  
 
I drew my sample of donors based on a joint website of donors in 
Kyrgyzstan, www.donors.kg, and a state list of foreign embassies, international 
projects, foreign and international organisations22. The website was set up by a donor 
coordination council23 in Kyrgyzstan in the early 2000s (Interview with a coordinator 
of donor council, Bishkek, 2007). As of autumn 2007, it had seventeen donors 
mainly large bilateral and multilateral ones, such as the UN agencies, the European 
Commission, and USAID. The website provides information about the activities of 
these donors in Kyrgyzstan. In contrast to the website, the state list was much more 
extensive. It had information not only about large donors but also about embassies 
and INGOs.  
From this large number of donors, I selected purposefully the most 
informative ones (Blaikie, 2000). The main selection criterion was whether a donor 
has worked before or works now on civil society promotion. To do this, based on the 
website and the state list, I developed three tables of three types of donor funding 
agencies. The tables indicated donors’ main aims and funds that they have invested 
in Kyrgyzstan. The indication of the latter identified the weight donors have had in 
Kyrgyzstan. It should be noted that I also visited websites of these donors.   
The first type of donors (Table 4) was governmental development agencies of 
developed countries known as bilateral donors. I discovered eight such agencies. 
They were mainly from western countries. The exceptions were Japanese and 
                                                 
22 Letter of Ministry of Finance as of 27 April 2007, No 14-2-3/3672. 
23 The donor coordination was established in the early 2000s to ensure better coordination and 
harmonisation of donors activities in Kyrgyzstan. The founders were DFID, the World Bank and 
Swiss Coordination Office. However, since its establishment, the donor coordination group has 
expanded (Interview, DFID, Bishkek, 15 November 2007). 
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Turkish agencies. Apart from DFID and Swedish International Development 
Operation Agency (SIDA), which launched their programmes in Kyrgyzstan in 2000 
and 1998 respectively, all organisations have been working since the early 1990s. 
The largest donor is USAID which has provided $40024 million to Kyrgyzstan since 
1992.  The funding of other donors ranges from $12 to $248.01 million. In case of 
some donors, such as KfW Entwicklungsbank, a majority of their funding has been 
given as loans.   
All donors have had the development of economy as their priority. Other 
activities have ranged from poverty reduction to cultural development. Most 
importantly for my sampling, it was identified that only four donors focused on 
promoting civil society under democratic governance: USAID, DFID, the US 
Embassy, and SIDA. The first two donors used to have large civil society promotion 
programmes. In the meantime, the latter two donors had a small-scale project where 
one of the elements was supporting civil society. In this regard, I contacted all four 
organisations for an interview. I managed to interview two respective representatives 
from USAID, DFID, and the US embassy.         
                                                 








Key focus of activities Aid provided since launch  
1. GTZ (Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit -   
German Government-Owned 
Corporation for International 
Cooperation with Worldwide 
Operations) 
1994  Improving the economy 
 Developing agriculture  
 Promoting environmental activities 
 Providing technical support on health 
policy, statistics, and legislation   
$248.01 million (185.1 
million)25  
2. JICA (Japan International 
Cooperation Agency) 
1993  Reducing poverty   
 Promoting a market economy 
  
$18.19 million26   
3. KfW Entwicklungsbank  1993  Improving the health sector 
 Promoting economic reforms 
 Developing a market economy 
 Supporting agriculture and forestry   
In 1993-2004, $79.99 
(59.7) million: $37.52 
(28) million as grants and 




1998  Promoting democracy, human rights and 
private organisations  
 Reducing poverty  
 Promoting health and gender issues   
No required data. But, in 
2003 - 2006, assistance rose 
from $1.02 (SEK 7.4)27 
million per annum to 
approximately $4.83 (SEK 
35) million.  
5. Swiss Cooperation Office 
(SDC )  
1991  Improving good governance 
 Promoting security and conflict 
prevention 
 Improving macro-economic framework 
and conditions 
 Developing the private sector 
 Managing natural resources and 
infrastructure 
 Improving the health sector 
 Promoting gender equality and 
environmental protection  
$150 million to Central 
Asia in 1991-2001. 
Additional $38 million 
provided as credit. 
6. TICA 1992  Contributing to the economic, technical, 
social and cultural development  
$12 million in 1992-2004 
7. USAID  
 
1992  Promoting economic development, 
health and education, democracy and 
conflict mitigation.  
Within democracy programme:  
 Supporting different civil society 
organisations such as media institutions, 
NGOs, political parties.  
$400 million  
8. DFID 2000  Improving governance 
 Addressing issues of water and 
sanitation 
 Preventing HIV/AIDS 
$43.67 (£29.3) million28  
9. US embassy – Democracy 
Commission  
1995  Promoting the establishment of open 
and competitive political and economic 
systems  
 Assisting in the democratisation process 
No data available   
 
 
                                                 
25 The exchange rate as of 2 April 2010 was $1.34 for  1 (http://www.expedia.co.uk/pub/agent.dll)  
26 This is an approximate number calculated based on $1.07 million (101,141,938.8 Japanese Yen) for 2007 
(http://www.jica.go.jp/kyrgyz/english/activities/). This sum was multiplied by 17 which is the number of years 
that the JICA has worked in Kyrgyzstan.  The exchange rate as of May 2010 is 0.01 Yen for $1 
(http://www.expedia.co.uk/pub/agent.dll).     
27 The exchange rate as of 2 April 2010 was $1.38 for 1 Swedish kronor. 
(http://www.expedia.co.uk/pub/agent.dll).  
28 The exchange rate as of 2 April 2010 was $1.49 for £1 (http://www.expedia.co.uk/pub/agent.dll).  
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 The second type of donors (Table 5) was international development 
organisations – multilateral donors. I identified thirteen such agencies.  The first five 
organisations were international development banks and financial organisations. 
Their key focus has been on economic development. All of them have been working 
in Kyrgyzstan since the early-mid 1990s. Their funding has been provided both in 
the form of grants and loans. The largest amount of funding has come from the 
World Bank in the sum of $777 million. In terms of civil society promotion, only the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have had programmes on this 
and have worked with civil society organisations extensively. I contacted both banks. 
ADB refused to give me an interview. A representative from the World Bank agreed 
to answer my questions in written form due to their internal policy.  
 The second half of donor agencies in this category was international 
organisations. Most of them have been working since the early-mid 1990s. Each of 
them has had specific aims which range from development of the private sector to 
improvement of reproductive health. Their funding has been provided only in the 
form of grants. In contrast to the banks, it was difficult for me to find out how much 
these agencies have spent in Kyrgyzstan. Based on available data, the highest amount 
of funding is $315.48 million provided by EC over 1991 – 2006. UNDP’s budget for 
2005-2010 is $117.4 million. It is obvious that these amounts are much smaller than 
the largest ones coming from USAID and the World Bank. Furthermore, these 
donors, especially the UN agencies, fundraise from other multilateral and bilateral 
donors to supplement their own budget.  
For example, sources of the UNDP budget for 2005-2010 have been grant 
assistance ($58.7 million), core funding ($15.7 million) and external sources ($43 
million). Although almost all the international organisations have involved NGOs in 
their activities; only UNDP, OSCE, and EC have had civil society promotion as a 
component in their programmes. Consequently, I interviewed representatives from 
these organisations. In addition to these interviewees, I also interviewed a 
representative of the United Nations Volunteers which was not in the donor website. 
I interviewed a representative from this agency because he was involved in a new 
civil society board established for the UN agencies to ensure a better coordination 




Table 5 - Multilateral donors   
 
     
Donor Operating 
since 
Key focus of activities Aid provided since 
launch  
1. ADB  1994  Reducing poverty through pro-poor sustainable 
economic growth, inclusive social development, and 
promotion of good governance. 
$634 million  
2. The World Bank   1992  Improving economic management 
 Reducing corruption 
 Promoting good governance and achieving effective 
public administration 
 Building sustainable human and social capital through 
improved health and education outcomes  
 Ensuring environmental sustainability and natural 
resource management.  
The World Bank has a civil society fund programme.   
$777 million 
 
3. European Bank 
for Reconstruction 
and Development 
1993  Fostering the private sector 
 Strengthening of financial sector 
 Supporting critical infrastructure 
 Promoting a policy dialogue.  
$267.98 ( 200) million  
4. International 
Finance Corporation 
of the World Bank 
1996  Developing the financial sector, tourism and agriculture 
 Making mining investments in the country 
 Encouraging development of the private sector.  
$55.19   
5. International 
Monetary Fund   
1992  Assisting in transition to a market economy 138.4 million SDR29 as 
credits and loans for 
1992 – 2003 
6.OSCE   1999  Preventing conflict and managing crisis 
 Promoting economic, environmental, human and 
political security and stability.  
Democratisation is a priority within a politico-military 
programme of OSCE. Its activities have focused on 
involvement of civil society in decision-making.  
No data available. But, in 
2005, budget was $3.222 
(2.4) million.   
7. EC  1991  Promoting development and cooperation between the 
regions  
 Providing technical assistance  
 Improving food security  
 Promoting democracy and human rights   
The EC provides grant mainly to non-profit organisations to 
carry out projects with the above domains.  
$315.48 ( 235.45) 
million for 1991 – 2006    
8. UNDP 1993  Assisting in achieving the national Millennium 
Development Goals through capacity-building, 
technical assistance and policy advice on poverty 
reduction, good governance, environmental 
sustainability, regional cooperation, and human 
security.  
UNDP works closely with civil society organisations under 
its democratic governance programme.  
No data available. But, 
UNDP’s budget for 
2005-2010 is $117.4 
million.  




1994  Supporting: mother and child health and nutrition, clean 
water and sanitation, quality basic education for all 
children, and protection of children from violence and 
exploitation.  
No data available. But, 
UNICEF’s budget for 
2005-2010 is $8,562 
million.  
10. United Nations 
Family Planning 
Association 
1994  Improving reproductive health, population 
development, and sustainable development 
No data available. But, 
UNFPA’s budget for 
2005-2009 is 4.6 million.  
11. The UN 
Refugee Agency 
1996  Ensuring protection and welfare of refugees of all 
nationalities.  
 
US $6.73 million for 
1996 - 2006 
12. World Health 
Organisation 
1993  Assisting in improving the public health 
 Reducing health inequalities by strengthening health 
systems, increasing access to basic health services, and 
improving the quality of care 
No data available. But 
major project’s budget 
for 2000-2010 is $2.9 
million  
                                                 





1996  Providing assistance in managing emergency and post-
emergency operations 
 Assisting in dealing with return migrants and preventing 
human trafficking 
 Establishing technical cooperation on labour migration 
and migration management 
No data available   
 
 
 Foreign private foundations were the third type of donors (Table 6). I 
identified two key foundations in Kyrgyzstan working on civil society: the Soros 
Foundation (hereafter Soros) and the AKDN. Soros has been working in Kyrgyzstan 
since 1993. Its main aim has been to promote an open and civil society based on 
transparency and openness. Its activities are diverse ranging from human rights 
protection to promotion of culture. Soros has invested $60 million in Kyrgyzstan 
since 1993. Most importantly, it has focused on civil society promotion by running 
an NGO support programme since the mid 1990s.  
 AKDN started its programmes in Kyrgyzstan in 2002. Its actives are also 
diverse with the same range as Soros’s ones. Nevertheless, it stresses more on rural 
community development. I discovered that AKDN also had a specific programme on 
civil society promotion. It was launched in 2006. In terms of AKDN’s funding, I 
could not find the exact amount of its funding to Kyrgyzstan. Available data suggest 
that its annual budget for 25 countries, where it works, is $450 million. 
Consequently, in average, it is $18 million per country. As a result, I interviewed 
representatives from Soros and AKDN.        
 
 




Key focus of activities Aid provided 
1. Soros Foundation 
Kyrgyzstan 
1993  Promoting human rights and freedoms 
 Developing civil society 
 Promoting public policy standards and 
formats 
 Increasing effectiveness of state 
administration and local government via 
involvement of civil society in 
governance processes. 
Over $60 million  
2. AKDN  2002  Supporting: economic development, 
culture preservation, rural development, 
health and education improvement, civil 
society, and others.  
No specific data. But, the 
annual budget of the AKDN 
for all 25 countries where it 




Recruiting international NGOs   
 
To draw a sample of INGOs, I used mainly the state list of foreign embassies, 
international projects, foreign and international organisations. I learned that a large 
number of INGOs worked in Kyrgyzstan on different areas such as civil society, 
elections, and health. Therefore, I purposefully shortlisted eleven INGOs which 
focused on civil society promotion (Table 7) (Blaikie, 2000). To acquire more 
detailed information about these NGOs for my table, which aimed to identify their 
key mission and funding, I visited their websites. Since it was impossible to find the 
amount of their projects’ funding in Kyrgyzstan, I decided to indicate in the table 
their key funders. 
Most INGOs have worked in Kyrgyzstan since the mid 1990s. All of INGOs 
in my table have had an element of civil society building, support of civil society 
organisations, and promotion of civic participation. All of them also have received 
funding from USAID at some point. For seven organisations, USAID has been the 
key and, sometimes, only funder. Other donors of INGOs have included National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED), the US Department State, DFID, SIDA, UNDP, 
the World Bank, and Soros.  
I interviewed eight of eleven NGOs in my list. I did not interview three of 
them: Internews, Urban Institute, and International Research and Exchanges Board 
(IREX). Internews did not reply to my request for an interview. I did not interview 
Urban Institute because after learning more about its activities and interviews with 
donors, it became clear that this NGO had another focus. A representative of IREX 
said that they did not have activities on civil society promotion in Kyrgyzstan and 
directed me to other local NGOs.   
 
 
Table 7 - International NGOs  
 
International NGO Operating 
since 
Key focus of activities Key funders  
1. Mercy corps  1994  Providing financial services and 
business advice 
 Improving education and vocational 
opportunities for youth 
 Establishing a framework for equitable 
and broad-based economic progress.  
USAID  
2. INTRAC  1994  Providing flexible services to civil DFID, ECCA     
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society organisations such as training, 
consultation, information, and research.  
3. ICNL 1997  Assisting in developing a legal and 
fiscal framework conducive to 
development of the NGO sector. 
USAID  
4. NDI  1996  Providing small grants and technical 
assistance to Kyrgyz NGOs ‘to improve 
their advocacy skills, to promote active 
civic participation, and to strengthen 
their organisational capacity’ 
(www.ndi.org). 
NED, USAID, the US 
Department of State. Other 
funders include DFID, 
SIDA, UNDP, World Bank, 
OSI. 
5. Academy for Educational 
Development  
Early 2000s  Improving education, health, civil 
society and economic development 
 Developing communities 
 Addressing problems of youth.  
USAID 
6. International Foundation 
for Electoral System  
1994  Promoting civil society development, 
civic education, and political party 
development 
 Providing technical election 
assistance.  
USAID 
Other funders include 
DFID, OSCE, and EC.  
7. Eurasia Foundation of 
Central Asia 
1993  Mobilisation of public and private 
resources 
 Strengthening communities 
 Helping citizens to take an active part in 
building their future.  
USAID  
8. International Republican 
Institute  
2004  Strengthening political parties.  USAID and NED  
9. Representation of 
Internews Network in the KR 
1995  Supporting and developing local media 
to encourage pluralism of opinions and 
to deliver true ad balanced information.  
No data available  
10. IREX Early 1990s  Providing leadership and innovative 
programmes to improve the quality of 
education 
 Strengthening independent media 
 Promoting pluralistic civil society 
development. 
USAID, US Department of 
State, EC, British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office.  
11. Urban Institute No data  Implementing programmes on 
decentralisation, capacity-building of 
local authorities, democratic and 
effective management in associations of 
property owners.  
USAID 
 
Further, I had two more interviews based on snowball sampling, that is, 
expanding a sample by inquiring about further research participants from the ones 
already interviewed (Bryman, 2004). The first interview was with a representative of 
a donor coordination council to learn more about donor coordination in Kyrgyzstan. 
The second one was with a former employee of Save the Children, an INGO. I was 
recommended to interview her by one of the INGOs since she was involved in their 




Recruiting local NGOs 
 
To select NGOs for interviewing, I started with a database of the Association 
of Civil Society Support Centres (ACSSC) which is a local NGO aimed at supporting 
civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan (www.acssc.kg). The database of 441 active 
NGOs was a result of the survey that ACSSC conducted in 2006 to explore the NGO 
sector in Kyrgyzstan30 (Ubysheva and Pogojev, 2006). For the time being this 
database is the one providing information on active NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. The survey 
also identified that NGOs were mostly located in Bishkek and Osh, the two large 
cities in Kyrgyzstan.  
These cities represent the northern and southern parts of Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek 
is located in the northern oblast31 of Chui that borders on Kazakhstan. Osh is a centre 
of Osh oblast situated in the south and part of the Fergana valley that is shared with 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the constitution, both cities are recognised to be of 
national importance32. There has always been an informal division between northern 
and southern Kyrgyzstan, which has come to the fore in social and political life since 
the mid 2000s. The differences between these regions are manifested in their 
language dialects, elements of culture, religiosity, and standard of life. For example, 
Bishkek is the most developed region in Kyrgyzstan and an economic, political, 
cultural, and social centre, while in Osh the level of development is, according to 
Barataliev et al (2010), average. 
Crucially, the regions have different ethnic compositions. In Bishkek, the 
official population is 856,100. Almost half the population is of a Slavic origin (33. 
2% - Russians and 11.2 % - Ukraine), while Kyrgyz are 52.2 % (Barataliev et al 
                                                 
30 In 2006, ACSSC conducted a survey to identify how many active NGOs existed in Kyrgyzstan, to 
learn the level of their organisational development, to assess their interaction with other actors (other 
NGOs, donors, the state, and business), to explore their programme activities, and to discover their 
needs and problems (Ubysheva and Pogojev, 2006: 21). ACSSC used a snowballing method to recruit 
NGOs. The criteria of its sampling were whether an NGO: 1) has  operated not less than two years; 2)  
has not less than 2 staff members; 3) has implemented not less than three projects; and 4) is currently 
implementing not less than one project. As a result of this survey, ACSSC found 514 active NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan. However, only 469 of them agreed to participate in the survey. At the end of the research, 
ACSSC produced a database of 441 NGOs on CD (Ubysheva and Pogojev, 2006: 25). 
31 Oblast is an administrative unit in Kyrgyzstan. The administrative structure of the government is 
divided into oblast (province), raion (region), and ayil okmotu (local authority).   
32 Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 8, Point 3.  
 84 
2010). Osh officially has 243,200 people. In the whole of the Osh oblast, 64.2 % are 
Kyrgyz, 31.1% are Uzbeks, and 1.1% are Russians. The remaining part of population 
both in Bishkek and Osh are of other ethnicities (Barataliev et al 2010). The location 
and ethnic composition of these cities determine their culture. For example, Osh is 
known to be more traditional and religious due to the influence of the Uzbek 
minority and neighbouring Uzbekistan. 
Taking into account these differences as well as the fact that most NGOs 
concentrate in these cities, I decided to interview NGOs from Bishkek and Osh. The 
differences between these cities were important in my research and in drawing 
conclusions. By interviewing Bishkek and Osh NGOs, I intended to gain a fuller and 
clearer picture of the NGOs sector in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, in comparison with 
other studies (e.g. Aksartova 2005, Petric 2005) that focused mainly on the northern 
region, my research provided greater insights into the NGO sector by covering 
Bishkek and Osh as representatives of northern and southern Kyrgyzstan. As a 
consequence, I indicate the location of NGOs throughout the dissertation, although 
the names of the NGOs themselves are withheld for ethical considerations discussed 
in a later section.  
In addition to city NGOs, I was interested in interviewing a few NGOs from 
rural areas.  I wanted to make my sample of NGOs as diverse as I could in order to 
be able to cover the whole NGO sector. Therefore, I used a criterion based, 
maximum variation sampling method. This implies that the sample units “are chosen 
because they have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed 
exploration and understanding of the central themes and puzzles which the researcher 
wishes to study” and differ from each other (Patton 2002 in Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 
78-79). According to the NGO database of ACSSC, there were 53 NGOs in Bishkek. 
I divided them into ten categories based on their missions and activities as shown in 




Table 8 – Categorisation of NGOs   
 
Category Number of NGOs 
1. Civil society promotion  9 
2. Disabled (invalids) 5 
3. Humans Rights Defenders 4 
4. Population well being (education, social issues, 
poverty reduction, ecology, conflict prevention)  
7 
5. Women 8 
6. Old people 2 
7. Health 4 
8. Children 7 
9. Young People 8 
10. Occupational associations  8 
   
Since my primary interest was on the promotion of civil society in 
Kyrgyzstan, the first category of NGOs on civil society promotion was of particular 
importance to me. I contacted all nine NGOs in this category with a request for an 
interview. Only six NGOs agreed to be interviewed. During the interviews, I learned 
that five of these NGOs definitely had civil society support in their mission and 
implemented activities on this. However, a representative of the sixth NGO was very 
surprised to learn that they were listed as a civil society support NGO in the database 
since their main mission was different. Nevertheless, during the interview, it became 
clear that they did support NGOs informally to help new and young NGOs to get on 
their feet. From the remaining nine categories, I interviewed 14 NGOs. My sample 
included at least one NGO from each category. Recruitment of NGOs depended on 
the number of NGOs in the category and their agreement to and availability for an 
interview. In addition to these NGOs, I interviewed an NGO expert from one of the 
local NGOs, who is also a lecturer in non-for-profit management at the Management 
Academy under the President. I decided to interview him after hearing his 
presentation on the state-civil society interaction at the American University of 
Central Asia where he touched upon issues that my research was looking at.   
When interviewing NGOs in Osh, I had to make the best use of available time 
and funds. The ACSSC database was not helpful since there was a technical problem 
with it. It did not filter NGOs in accordance with their location except for those in 
Bishkek. Therefore, I had to draw my sample based on mixed sampling methods. 
Seven NGOs were selected because they could be easily accessed, that is, through a 
convenience sampling method (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:80). These were the most 
 86 
active NGOs in Osh which I found out about through my personal networks in 
international organisations in Osh. The remaining six NGOs were chosen based on a 
working AKDN’s database of NGOs in southern Kyrgyzstan33 which they work 
with. 61 of 136 NGOs in the database were from Osh. I selected 17 NGOs based on 
the same categories that I used to sample NGOs in Bishkek. I consulted a 
representative of the AKDN with regard to activities of NGOs in the database. Out of 
17 NGOs in my sample I could arrange interviews only with six of them within the 
period that I could stay in Osh. As a result, I had interviews with 13 NGOs in Osh. I 
also interviewed two representatives from one of the INGOs in Osh.  
The size of my research budget considerably determined my sampling of 
NGOs from rural areas. Since I could not afford extensive travelling costs, I decided 
to select NGOs from locations close to Bishkek and Osh. As in the case of Osh, the 
ACSSC database was unhelpful in selection of rural NGOs for the same technical 
reason that I could not filter organisations by area. It would have been too time 
consuming for me to find out the location of each village in the database to identify 
which of them were located close to Bishkek. For this reason, I chose two towns that 
I knew were definitely located close to Bishkek: Kant from Issyk-Ata district and 
Karabalta from Jaiyl district. I tried to contact all 12 NGOs in these locations (7 and 
5 respectively) from the ACSSC database since the number was small and I assumed 
that I would not be able to contact all of them. As a result, I could interview only two 
NGOs from Kant. The rest including the ones from Karabalta were either unavailable 
or unreachable by phone.  
To recruit more NGOs, I had to use a snowball sampling method (Bryman 
2004). I asked NGOs working on civil society support from Bishkek that I 
interviewed to put me in touch with rural NGOs which they work with and were 
located close to Bishkek. As a result, one of the CSS NGOs provided me with a list 
of 15 NGOs meeting my geographical requirements. Out of this number I managed 
to interview five NGOs, the ones which I could reach over the phone, from the 
following areas: Vasilievka and Karl-Marx villages from Alamedin district, Nijne-
Chuisk village from Sokuluk district. Based on this, it is evident that, within my 
                                                 
33 This includes Osh, Jalalabat, and Batken provinces.  
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research, availability and quality of communication services in villages has become 
an unexpected criterion for the selection of rural NGOs which was out of my control.    
After interviews with NGOs in Osh and from villages, I had four more 
interviews in Bishkek. Two of them were with two NGOs working on women’s 
issues and community development respectively. I interviewed them to clarify some 
of the issues that I came across with in the course of my fieldwork. I also had follow-
up interviews with representatives of an INGO and a local CSS NGO in Bishkek, 
which I had already interviewed in the first stage of my research, since I had a 
number of specific questions to them in relation to the NGO-state relationships in 
Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, since politicisation of NGOs was a recurring statement on 
the interviews with donors, INGOs, and NGO, I interviewed NGOs identified by my 
interviewees as politicised. By asking to name supposedly politicised NGOs, I came 
up with a list of eight NGOs. All of them were based in Bishkek. I contacted all and 
managed to interview representatives of only three NGOs.  
 
 
Interview guides  
 
I had separate interview guides for donors, INGOs, and local NGOs. Each of 
them had certain objectives and consisted of several sections with formulated 
questions (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The interview guide for donors had six 
objectives (see Appendix 1). The most important ones were to explore their past and 
present civil society activities, their definition of civil society and their interaction 
with other actors (other donors, the state, NGOs, and CBOs). For example, in the 
first section exploring civil society activities of donors, I used questions such as: 
How do you promote civil society at present?  Have you had any changes in your 
approach to development of / working with civil society organisations, particularly 
NGOs, since the early 2000s? To explore donors’ definition of civil society, I asked 
my interviewees from donor agencies if they had a particular definition of civil 
society within their programmes and whether it had been changed recently. All in all, 
there were around 26 questions in the interview guide for donors. 
There were around 26 questions in the interview guide. Representatives of 
DFID and EC were interviewed twice. The second interview with them was based on 
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an individual interview guide. Questions were drawn upon the previous interview 
with them. I specifically focused on state building, good governance, and budget 
support to learn why and how these donors worked on these issues (see Appendix 2). 
Therefore, I asked questions such as: Is state capacity-building a priority in your 
programmes? Could you tell me what your organisation is doing on this in 
Kyrgyzstan? Do you provide budget support? In the 1990s, did you have the same 
priority – state capacity-building? 
Interview guides for INGOs aimed at learning about their interaction with 
donors and whether they had experienced any changes in donors’ civil society 
activities. As a result, my key questions sought to find out whether they had noticed 
any changes in the approach of donors to civil society promotion and working with 
NGOs since the early 2000s. I also explored how INGOs worked with local NGOs 
by asking specifically in what activities they involved local NGOs and what 
language they used in their work with them. Further, my interviews with INGOs 
aimed at learning if and how they worked with the state and community-based 
organisations. I also asked them about their mission, sources of funding, and 
activities (see Appendix 3).  
I should note that every interview with donors and with INGOs differed 
slightly from each other in relation to the whole set of questions that I asked. This is 
because I had some specific questions to each of them based on information that I 
had about them from their websites and other sources. In other words, I was flexible 
about rewording my questions and add new ones depending on the interview 
progress (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
The interview guide for local NGOs had two overarching aims: 1) exploring 
their perspective on changes in donors’ civil society activities, and 2) learning their 
development from an organisational perspective. There were 12 sections focusing on 
their establishment, funding, structure, activities, staff, relationships with the state, 
relationships with donors, understanding of civil society, interaction with other 
NGOs, interaction with target group/population, assessment of the NGO sector, and 
information about the leader. Each section had further detailed questions which 
ranged from 2 to 11 including probing questions (see Appendix 4). For example, the 
section on funding had 2 main questions and 6 probing questions as shown below:  
 89 
 
1. Where does your funding come from?  
 .  If there are several sources of funding, 
  1) What source does most of your funding come from?  
 B. If there are several sources of funding, but there is no the state and the private sector 
among them,  
  1) Have you tried to get funding from the state or the private sector?  
  2) If yes, what was the result? 
 C. If an NGO self-generates funding, how?    
2. Does your organisation have membership fees? 
 If yes, how much is it? 
 
The key section in the interview guide for local NGOs was on donors’ 
activities on civil society and consisted of six questions such as how they usually 
work with donors, if donors involve them in designing their projects, planning, 
monitoring and evaluating their activities, and whether, in their opinion, donors have 
had any changes in their approach to working with NGOs. I did not go beyond the 
interview guide. In fact, my concern was to have enough time to ask all the questions 
since there were so many.  
 
 
Interview contexts    
 
At the beginning of each interview, I introduced myself and explained my 
research aims and objectives. I also asked my interviewees for permission to record 
the interview and ensured confidentiality to the interviewees (Neuman, 2003; Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2003; Bryman, 2004). Most interviews were recorded. Two interviewees 
from one of the donors refused to be recorded because of their internal policy. I took 
notes during these interviews. One interviewee also from a donor agency provided 
her answers in a written form due to their internal policies. I held twenty six 
interviews with donors and INGOs in their premises. The exception was one donor. 
We had an interview outside of his office because I could not use my recording 
device in his office. The overall atmosphere during the interviews was formal. I 
conducted interviews with representatives of donors and INGOs in English and 
Russian.  
The interviews with most local NGOs both in Bishkek and Osh took place in 
their offices. This was a good opportunity for me to learn about their work 
environment and office infrastructure. However, with a number of NGOs without 
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offices and from villages, I had to conduct interviews in different places.  The choice 
of the place did not always depend on me. In some cases, it was an initiative of the 
interviewee to meet in a certain place. After a few interviews and problems that I 
encountered such as noises present in the surroundings and undefined terms between 
me and the interviewees for unplanned expenses, I managed to arrange space in one 
of the institutions in Bishkek for interviews where I held several interviews. I 
conducted interviews with most local NGOs in Russian, and with some rural NGOs 
in Kyrgyz. I asked some questions both in Russian and Kyrgyz so that it was totally 
clear to the interviewees what I meant. I recorded all interviews with NGOs with 
their oral consent. 
Interviews with donors varied in length considerably. Around a half of them 
lasted over 30 minutes but less than 50 minutes. The interviewees, who gave short 
interviews, were interviewed again. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the short 
length of interviews was not the only reason for the second interview but rather that I 
also needed more information. The interviews with INGOs had more or less the same 
length. The average length was 42 minutes. The interviews with local NGOs were 
the longest among three groups. They were an hour in average. Obviously, the length 
of interviews in three groups is different. It is connected with the length of interview 
guides.  
To conclude, I conducted 16 interviews with 10 donors, 13 interviews with 9 
INGOs as summarised in Table 9 (See Appendix 5). I also had 52 interviews with 47 
local NGOs: 28 were from Bishkek, 13 from Osh, and 6 from periphery (See 
Appendix 6).  
 
 
Table 9 - Donors and INGOs interviewed  
 
 Donors   International NGOs 
1 Aga-Khan Foundation 1 Mercy Corps  
2 US Embassy, Democracy Commission 2 INTRAC 
3 UNDP Democratic Governance Project 3 ICNL 
4 Soros Foundation – Kyrgyzstan 4 NDI 
5 The European Commission  5 AED 
6 DFID  6 IFES 
7 UNV 7 EFCA 
8 World Bank  8 IRI 
9 OSCE 9 ABA  
10 USAID   
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Self-administered questionnaires  
 
It became evident after the first stage of data collection that, to research 
professionalisation of NGOs, there was a need to construct social profiles of the 
NGO leadership and staff. For this purpose, I developed two self-administered 
questionnaires (Blaikie, 2000). The first one was for NGO leaders and focused on 
collecting mainly demographic data such as their age, gender, education, and salary 
range (see Appendix 7). The second questionnaire was for NGO employees and 
aimed at not only constructing their social profile but also at exploring their career 
motivation and prospects in the NGO sector (see Appendix 8). Both questionnaires 
had a statement on the top ensuring confidentiality and anonymity to respondents. I 
should also mention that my questionnaires had a demographic question asking 
ethnicity of NGO employees and leaders. I decided to include this question because 
very few works discuss an ethnic composition of NGOs. For example, the recent 
ASCCS survey (Ubysheva and Pogojev, 2006) omitted this question but rather 
focused on gender and education of NGO employees.  
33 NGO leaders and 25 NGO employees completed questionnaires. The 
respondents worked for the NGOs which I interviewed. After the interview usually 
with the NGO leader, I asked the interviewee and other NGO employees to fill in the 
questionnaires. Since some interviews with NGOs did not take place in their offices, 
their staff could not complete the questionnaire. Further, some NGO leaders could 
not complete the questionnaire either because of the inconvenient surroundings of the 
interview place. Some NGOs had many staff members. In such cases, depending on 
the number of staff, two or three were randomly requested to fill in the questionnaire.  
 
 
Documents and observation notes  
 
During my fieldwork, I also collected a number of documents such as reports, 
information leaflets, and others that I received from my interviewees either after the 
interview or via email. Table 10 provides a summary of the documents which I found 
the most relevant for my research. In addition to these, I downloaded a wide number 
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of documents in regards to activities of donors such as the UK White Paper on 
International Development 1997, the strategic plan of USAID and the US 
Department of State for 2007-2012.  
            
 
Table 10 – List of documents provided by interviewees  
 
No Document title  Source  
1 Definition of civil society (Report 2000) Mercy Corps 
2 Agenda of the specialist workshop on civil society in the Caucasus and Central Asia   Mercy Corps 
3 Minutes of a meeting of British Overseas NGOs for Development  Mercy Corps 
4 Active partnership between government and citizens: experiences from Kyrgyzstan  Mercy Corps 
5 DFID strategy on Central Asia , South Caucasus and Moldova Mercy Corps 
6 In search of harmony: repairing infrastructure and social relations in the Ferghana 
Valley (Article by Christie Bichel)  
Mercy Corps 
7 Civil society at Mercy Corps (A case study on the institutionalization of a concept) Mercy Corps 
8 The civil society and conflict management strategy  Mercy Corps 
9 Activity Matrix – European Neighbourhood working group (Excel file) Mercy Corps 
10 Introducing Mercy Corps’ Vision for Change (Word file)  Mercy Corps 
11 Give fish or a fishing rod? (Research report on self-help groups)  INTRAC  
12 INTRAC information brochure  INTRAC  
13 Contact details of NGOs - INTRAC partners  INTRAC  
14 Review of History of Establishment and Development of the NGO sector in the Kyrgyz 
Republic (book based on NGO research)  
Local CSS NGO   
15 NGO sector: figures and facts (Survey report)  Local CSS NGO 
16 Non-commercial rights (textbook)  ICNL  
17 Regulation of a legal status of non-commercial organisations in civil codes in different 
countries   
ICNL  
18 Brochure of the local NGO working on civil society    Local NGO     
19 Small grants programme (Brochure)  EC 
20  Micro-projects programme (Brochure)  EC 
21 EU assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2007 – 2013 (Powerpoint presentation)  EC 
22 Discussion of the bill on social contracting (Powerpoint presentation)   EC 
23 Draft bill on social contracting   EC 
24 Portrait of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan: opinions and reality (Book based on NGO research)  Soros – Foundation  
25 Donor-Civil society relationship (Research report)   Eurasia Foundation  
26 Informational brochure of the International Republican Institute  (IRI)  IRI 
27 Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll  IRI 
28 Report of Cardoso on UN and Civil society (English and Russian) UNV  
29 Concept Note for a Civil Society Advisory Board for the UN in Kyrgyzstan UNV  
30 Membership of the UN Civil Society Advisory Board UNV  
31 A book on CS-state relationship produced by the local NGO working on civil society    Local NGO  
32 ONTRAC 33 (INTRAC publication)  INTRAC 
33 Oxfam-Novib Research Project, Central Asia and Global Civil Society (Draft report) INTRAC 
34 AKDN Civil Society Programme Briefing note AKDN 
35 Brochure of the NGO NGO on property 
issues  
36 A leaflet of the NGO   HR NGO 
37 A leaflet of the NGO  NGO on conflict 
resolution 
38 A leaflet on a 16-day campaign against gender violence Women’s NGO 
39 A handout from a conference on women in politics  Women’s NGO 
40 A national action plan on gender equality in Kyrgyzstan Women’s NGO 
41 A leaflet on women in politics  Women’s NGO 
42 Democratic Commission Small Grant Programme (Leaflet)  US embassy  
 
 
Furthermore, I observed and took note of the work environment of NGOs. 
For this, I developed a form where I could write about the infrastructure and staff of 
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NGOs. I completed the form after interviews with NGOs. Some of my notes, 
particularly for strong NGOs, were short because information matched my form (see 
Table 11). However, my notes concerning weaker NGOs were much longer and 
more detailed (see Table 12). My notes on the working environment of NGOs were 
of particular use when I was writing about professionalisation and formalisation of 
NGOs. In fact, these notes enabled me to undertake an expanded classification of 
NGOs into professional and non-professional categories. 
 
 
Table 11 – Observation form (An example of strong NGOs)  
 
Name of an NGO: XXXX       
 
Premises:  It is located in the city centre in a flat. It looks like an ordinary project office with 
all equipment and furniture.   
  
Equipment: It has everything. I think even a car.  
 
Staff:   There were 3 staff members.  
 
Other comments: The leader was an educated lady and very open. It was very easy to communicate and 




Table 12 – Observation form (An example of weaker NGOs)  
 
Organisation: XXXX  
 
The interview was held in Bishkek although the interviewee was Issykata region. We did not have place 
for the interview. She could not come to a place I prepared. Instead I came to a place she said. Since we could not 
find a room in the building where she was, we had the interview in the corridor. All in all, the interview went 
well. The interviewee was a talkative lady. At the beginning, she asked how I had found their NGO. I said that I 
had taken information about them from the ACSSC database and that I had had a special sampling technique. I 
also said that I had interviewed NGOs from Bishkek and now wanted to interview NGOs from regions. She was 
OK with this. Then I explained her about my research and asked her permission to record the interview.  
After the interview, when she was filling in my form [the recording device was off], we talked …. She is 
doing this job because she did not have a job in her specialty. She also noted that she had initiated the NGO partly 
because there were no jobs. She lived in Bishkek before and, as far as I remember, she moved to XXXX since she 
received a house as a heritage. At the same time, she said that she was not interested in writing projects for 




Data analysis  
 
My aim was to analyse my data in two stages: 1) after the first stage of data 
collection and 2) after the completion of the fieldwork.  However, the process of data 
analysis turned out to be an ongoing process intertwining into data collection and 
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writing up (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  Below my data analysis is discussed in the 
order it was conducted since the purpose of each stage as well as techniques that I 
used on them differed.  
 
 
Stage one – preliminary analysis  
 
After the first stage of data collection, I conducted an initial data analysis 
from the mid December 2007 to January 2008. A deep and thorough analysis was not 
my purpose at that point; rather I aimed to identify the most salient findings and their 
implications for my further research actions. For my analysis at this stage, I used 
basic steps in the qualitative analysis suggested by Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 212). 
According to them, the qualitative data analysis involves: 1) data management when 
themes and concepts are generated from raw data; 2) making descriptive accounts 
after the themes and concepts are assigned to data and more abstract concepts are 
refined and distilled and 3) making explanatory accounts when data is assigned to 
refined abstract concepts. They also assert that themes and concepts can be used 
either in a cross-sectional “code and retrieve” or in situ, non-cross-sectional methods 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 203). 
First and foremost, I transcribed all 30 interviews conducted within the first 
stage of data collection with donors, INGOs, and local NGOs. The transcripts were 
verbatim but did not include pauses, inflections, and other elements of discourse 
since I was interested in the substantive meaning of the accounts rather than their 
structure. Then I developed central themes and concepts, that is to say, a list of codes 
based on my interview guides (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 221). The key codes 
included the civil society activities of the interviewed organisation; its definition of 
civil society; and its interaction with other actors.   
Each of the codes had sub codes whose number ranged from two to six. Some 
recurring ideas from the data were turned into codes or sub codes (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2003).  After developing the codes, I proceeded to applying them to the data. To do 
this, I created a thematic framework for each central code with its sub codes. I put 
relevant data from interview transcripts into the corresponding sub code in the 
framework as shown in the extract below (See Table 13) (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
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After coding, I developed their descriptive accounts. My aim was to look at each 
central code across all cases within each research population group and to refine 
categories further (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
 
 
Table 13 – E tract from a thematic framework: DONORS – 1. ACTIVITIES  
 
Name  1.1 
Project on civil society 
1.2 
Other projects 
involving civil society 
1.3 







The civil society 
programme of Aga 
Khan is administered 
from Geneva. There is a 
programme officer in 
Dushanbe for TJ, KR, 
and AF. The 
programme mainly 
works with CBOs, 
which are not registered 
as NGOs. the main goal 
is to develop a village 
how they want. This 
programme started in 
August 2006.  This is 
the first programme of 
Aga-Khan specifically 
targeting on civil 
society. … 
  
There is also a 




since 2003. It was an 
initiative of Aga-Khan 
Foundation but now it 
is registered as a local 





groups, handy craft 
groups and things like 
that. This is not a civil 
society programme. 
But, in fact, it is 
because it involves 
CBOs and works 
through them. 
No reduction in 
aid but a shift in 
aid. Most funds 
are going to 
governance. Less 




competitive to get 
a grant. There are 
a lot of qualified 
organisations 
now. It is difficult 




 In relation to documents, I reviewed twelve the most relevant ones and coded 
them as well. They were very helpful in putting interview data, especially the ones 
collected from donors, into a broader context. The outcome of my initial analysis was 
a description of initial findings in the form of a research progress report which was 




Stage two – final analysis  
 
The second stage of data analysis started after the completion of the 
fieldwork by transcribing interviews verbatim. I focused not only on data collected 
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on the second stage of my fieldwork; but also on the data of the previous 30 
interviews. As a result, it became challenging for me to manage the overwhelming 
amount of data, which included 90 interviews, self-administered questionnaires, 
documents, and observation notes. Therefore, I decided to use Atlas.ti (computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis software) to code data. 
In comparison with the codes of my initial analysis, which I drew from my 
interview guides, this time I allowed codes to emerge from the data based on the 
principles of grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998 in Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
Nonetheless, I still used some codes from my initial analysis. On the whole, the 
following themes - changes in donor activities, state-NGO relationships, and 
professionalisation and politicisation of NGOs - became central code families in 
Atlas.ti. Each of them has a number of sub codes both drawn from data and interview 
guides. The software was useful to sort, code, and retrieve data. I was also able to 
make some diagrams of codes and establish links between them. In other words, the 
software served as a helpful tool for me to organise and manage my interview data. 
However, data interpretation was still my responsibility and depended on my 
analytical skills (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).  
In relation to documents, I was very selective and chose only the most useful 
and relevant ones. After reviewing them, I coded the texts based on my interview 
coding list. Documents were very helpful to clarify and give more details on the facts 
that were discussed on the interviews. I analysed the self-administered questionnaires 
in Excel. I did not do a detailed statistical analysis because a number of 
questionnaires were small and their questions were mostly demographic since the 
aim was to construct social profile of the NGO leadership and staff. For this reason, 
it was a matter of summing up the answers in questionnaires.  
Notwithstanding the distinct stages of data analysis within my research, I 
believe that data collection, data analysis, and writing up were intertwined processes 
because of my field notes, field reports, and conference papers. My field-notes were 
extremely useful during my data collection and analysis. I took them throughout my 
research with two key purposes. The first one was to organise my research better and 
to monitor my research progress. The second one was to record my notes on research 
issues such as data collection details, methodology, and ethics. They served as an 
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arena for development of my thoughts. I kept a record of the most salient and striking 
findings, thoughts, and ideas straight after the interviews. Therefore, I was able to go 
back to them later on for further follow-up and reflection.  In retrospect, I can assert 
that I would have not reached my current ideas expressed in the thesis, if I had not 
had my field-notes. Field reports that I wrote for the SRC of the American University 
of Central Asia in the capacity of a visiting research fellow as well as a number of 
other conference papers based on early findings opened up potential ways of writing 
up my thesis. Further, they also indicated which aspects of the research needed more 
data. For example, after writing the field report on the state-NGO relations in 
Kyrgyzstan for the SRC, I conducted two interviews with NGO experts on this theme 
specifically aimed at exploring more because I identified which data I lacked.       
 
 
Reflections on the research    
 
In this section, I would like to reflect upon four specific aspects of my 
research. The first aspect is the abundance of research data and the reasons 
explaining why I collected so much data. At the outset of my research, one of the key 
questions was how many interviews I should conduct. A review of the literature on 
methodology revealed that interview data should be collected until it is saturated; 
that is to say, when data do not contribute new information or themes (Guest et al., 
2006). However, Guest and her colleagues aptly noted that, although the concept of 
saturation was useful at the conceptual level, “it provides little practical guidance for 
estimating sample sizes, prior to data collection, necessary for conducting quality 
research” (Guest et al., 2006:59). Therefore, based on their experiment with data 
saturation and variability, they suggest that the first twelve interviews saturate data.  
It was enlightening to know the number of interviews resulting in the 
saturation of data. However, I was still hesitant with regard to whether twelve 
interviews with each research population group (donors, INGOs, and local NGOs) 
would be sufficient for my research. For this reason, I decided to look at other works 
on the same issue and region to use them as a point of reference. The review of PhD 
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works on civil society in the former Soviet Union34 suggested that the researchers 
held from 60 to over 100 interviews. In addition to interviewing, they also used other 
data collection methods such as case studies and observation. As a result, my 
decision regarding the volume of data was based on the theoretical idea of saturation, 
practical aspects of the above PhD works, and my research progress.  
 The second aspect of my research to be reflected is ethics. As stated above, I 
tried to follow a standard ethical procedure by informing research participants about 
myself and my research aims and objectives, assuring confidentiality for 
interviewees, and asking my interviewees for permission to record (Neuman, 2003; 
Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Bryman, 2004). However, these all were done orally. This 
is because an oral tradition prevails in Kyrgyzstan. Further, being an insider and 
aware of social, cultural, and political nuances, I believed that I did not need to 
overstress on confidentiality and recording an interview since it could make people 
anxious, give a completely different impression about my research, inflict suspicion 
and, as a result, influence what they would tell me. Therefore, in each interview, I 
talked about myself and my research to a greater extent and briefly mentioned that 
information would be confidential and an interview would be recorded if they 
agreed.  My pre-research assessments of potential drawbacks in using a recorder 
turned out to be correct. Some interviewees talked more freely and open after I said 
that our interview was over and switched off the recorder. A few of them openly said 
“while your recorder is off, I will tell you ….” (Interview, 12 November 2007, 
Bishkek). 
Research ethics in the Central Asian region has also been discussed by Wall 
and Overton (2006). Based on their fieldwork assessing the adoption of new 
technologies in Uzbekistan in 2003, the authors have suggested that Western notion 
of research ethics cannot be fully applied in Uzbekistan where repression and Soviet 
type conspiracy still exist and create an environment of insecurity and fear. The 
authors have also asserted that Western ethics clash with local traditions. For 
example, permission for recording or signature was found inappropriate in their 
                                                 
34 Aksartova, S. 2005. Civil Society from Abroad: US Donors in the Former Soviet Union. PhD thesis. 
Princeton University. Fumagalli, M. 2005. The Dynamics of Uzbek Ethno-Political Mobilisation in 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. PhD thesis. University of Edinburgh. Stevens, D.J. 2005. Conceptual 
Travel Along the Silk Road: On Civil Society Aid in Uzbekistan. PhD thesis. School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London.   
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approach due to the region’s oral tradition. Consequently, the authors have argued 
that western ethics should be applied in accordance with a local context. Otherwise 
there is a danger of conducting ethical research unethically. My research experience 
is congruent with Wall and Overton’s (2003) one and supports that, in the context of 
countries like Central Asian ones, the Western research ethics should be applied by 
taking into account the local context and traditions.   
 Furthermore, the methods literature suggests researchers should inquire if 
their research participants would be interested in getting a report on the research 
findings (Blaikie, 2000; Neuman, 2003; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Bryman, 2004). I 
did not ask my research participants if they wanted anything from me because I was 
aware of practical obstacles that I would have in order to do this. I knew that I would 
write up my research findings in Edinburgh and in English. In the meantime, my 
interviewees are all in Kyrgyzstan and most of them do not speak English. Moreover, 
a number of NGOs, especially from villages, do not have email or other well-
established means of communication, such as post, through which I could 
communicate with them. Nonetheless, I did agree to send something to those 
interviewees who asked me to do so. These research participants were mainly from 
donor agencies and large NGOs. As a result, I have sent all donors a couple of field-
reports that I produced for the SRC of the American University of Central Asia 
where I was a visiting research fellow.  
The third aspect of my research reflection is confidentiality of my 
interviewees in my writing. I ensured confidentiality to all research participants by 
saying that their names will not be identified in my writings. However, 
confidentiality of the names of their organisations was not discussed. Therefore, this 
has become an issue for me when I was writing up. I could not contact all my 
interviewees due to the above mentioned problems with communication. As a result, 
after a long deliberation with a particular focus on the political and social context in 
Kyrgyzstan, I decided not to reveal the names of NGOs. This is because it seemed to 
me that disclosure of NGO names would entail easy identification of my 
interviewees. However, I do provide other information about NGOs such as which 
field they work in, where they are based, and when the interview was conducted. In 
relation to donors, I could not conceal their names because presentation of my 
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research findings would not make sense without proper referencing to an 
organisation. Moreover, I think that interviewees from donor agencies have better 
security prospects.    
The final aspect of my reflection is a slight change in my research focus. 
Initially, one of my research focuses was exploring CBOs. This was because the 
literature on civil society in Central Asia suggested that, in the context of 
Kyrgyzstan, donors started promoting CBOs as an element of local civil society 
which could reach out to people better (Earle, 2005; Giffen et al., 2005).  
Furthermore, there was an argument that Central Asia had a rich social fabric that 
could be used in the promotion of civil society (Roy, 2002). Therefore, my initial 
research proposal also had a question in relation to CBOs. However, after the first 
stage of my fieldwork, it became clear that donors’ shift to the state was stronger 
than their shift to CBOs. Consequently, I focused more on the shift to the state and 
how it had influenced their civil society activities. Nonetheless, during the second 
stage of my fieldwork, I interviewed a number of CBOs to explore what kind of role 
they played in donor activities. 
 While drawing a sample of CBOs, I used a convenience sampling method 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). That is I relied on my personal networks in INGOs and 
local NGOs to gain information and access to CBOs since they were flexible and 
unregistered institutions. As a result, I had two interviews arranged by a local NGO 
in Osh with members of CBOs from Tolokon and Jany Jol villages, Aravan district. 
On my way to Jany Jol village I “opportunistically took an advantage of unforeseen 
opportunities” and interviewed three representatives of local authorities of Tobo 
Korgan ayil okmotu35 (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:80). Further, I was also assisted by 
an INGO based in Osh. It put me in touch with five CBOs from Kyzyl Jyldyz and 
Kyla villages, Nooken district, Oktyabrskei, Lenin, and Kyrgyzstan villages, Suzak 
district in Jalalabat province. Consequently, I interviewed the leaders of seven CBOs 
(see Appendix 9). The interviews were unstructured. My questions for CBOs focused 
on how they were established, operated, and interacted with other actors such as the 
local authority, donors, population, and NGOs. I asked representatives of the local 
authorities how they worked with CBOs and about their functions in general. 
                                                 
35 This is the administrative cluster of villages which Jany Jol belonged to.  
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Interviews with CBO leaders took place either in their houses or at their 
workplace. In some interviews there were a few people around.  For example, in the 
interview with a member of the CBO from Suzak district, there was a representative 
from an NGO based in Jalalabat. In the middle of the interview when the interviewee 
started talking about their joint project with this NGO, its representative could not 
help intervening to give more details on the project. I considered it in a positive light 
since it gave me more accurate information. Nonetheless, I took into account that the 
presence of the representative of the NGO from Jalalabat could have restricted the 
willingness of the CBO leader to talk in a relaxed way. I had interviews with 
representatives of local authorities in their offices. I conducted interviews with CBOs 
and representatives of ayil okmotu in Kyrgyz. I recorded all interviews with the oral 
consent from the interviewees. The length of interviews was relatively short. On 
average, they lasted about 30 minutes.  
The final point of my research reflection is that my fieldwork discovered a 
number of interesting findings that might impact Kyrgyz NGOs, especially their 
future development. These findings are not discussed in the thesis because they were 
not its focus. However, I mention their significance when I discuss new research 
directions in chapter 7. One of these findings is emerging donors. During my 
fieldwork, some of my interviewees from donors said that countries such as Russia, 
China, Kazakhstan, and Iran were emerging as donors in Kyrgyzstan. According to 
the interviews with donors, the emerging donors work mainly on economic 
development and business promotion. They do not have classic development 
programmes as the western and international donors, discussed in this thesis, do. The 
emerging donors do not normally provide grants to NGOs either. However, one of 
my NGOs said that they had received funding from the Russian Embassy. Therefore, 







In this chapter, I critically discussed and reflected upon the methodology of 
my research. I would like to highlight that my data collection methods included 
semi-structured interviewing, document analysis, observation, and self-administered 
questionnaires. My research population were donors, international and local NGOs, 
CBOs and representatives of local authorities. The majority of my data comes from 
91 interviews with 10 donors, 9 INGOs, 47 local NGOs, 7 CBOs and 3 
representatives of local authorities. I analysed my data based on a cross-sectional 

























Chapter 4  
Donor disillusionment: the return of the state  
 
 
This chapter aims to answer two research questions: a) what kind of changes 
have donors made in their civil society activities since the mid 2000s and b) why 
have donors made these changes? Consequently, in the first section, I present my 
research findings about the changes in civil society activities of donors. In the second 
section, I put these changes in a broader context by looking at a shift in donor 
priorities towards state capacity-building. In the third section, I discuss why donors 
have made this shift. In the conclusion, I point out that the current civil society 
activities of donors as well as their focus on state capacity-building are different from 
their previous policies which focused on civil society promotion and limiting the 
state. Overall, in this chapter, I argue that the role and place of NGOs within the 
current civil society activities of donors is being shaped by their new priority on state 
capacity-building.  
 
Civil society promotion since the mid 2000s: the diminishing NGO role  
 
 One of my central research findings is that donors’ civil society promotion in 
Kyrgyzstan has encountered major changes since the mid 2000s. I present the 
findings about current donor activities on NGOs and civil society in four large 
themes. First of all, I suggest that donors withdrew funding for their civil society 
programmes aimed at building the capacity of NGOs. Now they support NGOs only 
in an advocacy role. Second, donors have reduced their funding to NGOs. I point out 
that this has made existing competition for donor funding among NGOs even 
stronger. Third, at present donors are promoting more collaboration between the state 
and NGOs. Consequently, I propose that the interaction between NGOs and the state 
is increasing. Finally, I also suggest that now donors are using NGOs to reform the 
state rather than to establish NGOs as a separate sphere from the state as it was the 
case in the 1990s. 
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Supporting NGOs in an advocacy role 
 
My research suggests that the donor emphasis on encouraging the emergence 
of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan by giving out “seed grants” and building their capacity has 
shifted since the mid 2000s. USAID and DFID, the key civil society promoters, 
closed down their programmes on building capacity of civil society organisations. 
They have shifted to promoting NGOs which can advocate changes and reforms state 
policies. However, these donors had different reasons for making this change. For 
USAID supporting NGOs in an advocacy role is a second step in the development of 
civil society in Kyrgyzstan. Having concluded that Kyrgyz civil society has become 
active and vibrant, in 2006, USAID decided to take their civil society support 
programme one step further by targeting their support at NGOs that advocate reform 
and change in state policies (Interview with a USAID representative, Bishkek, 15 
February 2008).  
As a result, in 2007, USAID subcontracted Pact, an international NGO, to 
carry out a programme on civic advocacy for reform and stability in Kyrgyzstan. The 
aim of the programme is to support advocacy campaigns of Kyrgyz civil society 
organisations in order to promote governance reforms (Interview with a USAID 
representative, Bishkek, 15 February 2008). In 2008, Pact supported advocacy 
campaigns on five themes. Three of them directly concerned the state and its 
institutions and policies. They aimed at increasing transparency of the activities of 
the Kyrgyz parliament, improving access to information held by the state institutions 
and self-governance institutions in Kyrgyzstan, and improving procedures for 
registering land transactions and a law on legal regulations of land registration issues 
(www.pact.kg).   
DFID also made a shift towards supporting civil society organisations 
advocating changes and reforms in state policies. However, in comparison with 
USAID, DFID did this for a different reason. An interviewee from DFID said that 
they had found it useless to build capacity of civil society institutions without a 
particular purpose. Their conclusion was that “capacity development for civil society 
has to be for a purpose”. As a result, they made their assistance to civil society more 
focused by supporting civil society organisations in influencing policy processes 
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such as budget allocation (Interview with a DFID representative, Bishkek, 12 
February 2008). 
It is clear that, in comparison with USAID, DFID’s answer with regard to 
why they have changed their civil society support strategy is negative. For DFID, it 
was improving their ineffective method of promoting civil society rather than 
furthering the development of civil society as was the case for USAID. An 
interviewee from INTRAC, an international NGO subcontracted by DFID to carry 
out its programme on building capacity of civil society organisations, gave more 
insights into possible reasons of why DFID stopped its programme. According to 
him, DFID possibly was disappointed with NGOs particularly with the fact that they 
“could not make social changes in society on a sufficient scale”. He also suggested 
that DFID might have realised that civil society was causing problems for local 
government by being too demanding of their rights (Interview with an INTRAC 
representative, Bishkek, 15 November 2007). In this regard, I propose that the 
INTRAC representative probably meant that civil society organisations were too 
opposing the state in accordance with the counterbalancing role that donors ascribed 
to them within their civil society promotion in the 1990s.  
DFID’s programme on public financial management can be one example 
illustrating how NGOs work within advocacy programmes of donors. The 
programme aims at strengthening “the way government manages public finance”. 
Within it, DFID works with the Ministry of Finance on allocating resources in the 
budget. Eleven NGOs are involved in this programme in order to “strengthen 
citizens’ engagement in the budget process”, to “make sure that citizens have their 
voice in the way in which budget is allocated” and “to hold government to account 
on how money is spent” both at central and local levels. Each of these organisations 
has its focus within a programme such as a certain part of the budget, a certain 
sector, or a certain location. For example, one of the NGOs focuses on a procurement 
procedure within a health sector (Interview with a DFID representative, Bishkek, 12 
February 2008).  
By and large, interviews with other donors also suggested that they no longer 
provide “seed grants” and capacity-building support to NGOs. Now they cover only 
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project expenses of NGOs. Moreover, NGO projects should focus on advocacy. As 
one of the NGO interviewees summarised it: 
 
Even if it [project] is in the field of healthcare, they [donors] try to include advocacy to 
reform the healthcare system (Interview with a head of an NGO, Bishkek, 26 October 2007).  
 
Some international NGOs, which have supported capacity-building of civil 
society, had to reconsider their capacity-building approach because the previous one 
proved to be ineffective. For example, NDI has taken an individual approach to 
working with local NGOs. They are now working only with two NGOs; while, 
before the mid 2000s, they used to work with twenty NGOs. They believe that they 
need to work with a small number of NGOs to have better results. Instead of 
providing only a grant, at present NDI also provides its grantees with technical 
support including training and consultation. Further, NDI is concentrating on 
developing an NGO as an organisation by involving its whole staff; before, they 
mainly focused on developing the leader of the NGO, which led to the collapse of the 
NGO when the leader left. This example shows that NDI decreased its number of 
grantees and opted for promoting quantity to quality (Interview with a representative 
of NDI, Bishkek, 1 November 2007). However, like other donors, their grants also 
aim at advocacy. 
 
 
Reduction in funding to NGOs  
 
According to my research, another key change in donors’ civil society 
promotion in Kyrgyzstan is the reduction in donor funding to NGOs. This finding is 
based on interviews with NGOs rather than statistical indicators. In fact, it was 
difficult to identify how much funding donors provide to NGOs both in the relevant 
literature and interviews. During interviews donor agencies could not provide an 
exact number of their grants to NGOs. Research of the Eurasia Foundation of Central 
Asia on the donor-NGO relationship in Kyrgyzstan (www.efcentralasia.org, 2008) 
has also shown incapability of donors to indicate the amount of funding which they 
have provided to NGOs. In the literature, only one article by Azpuru and his 
colleagues (2008) provides figures of worldwide US democracy assistance from 
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1990 to 2005. According to them, after 2003, civil society - the most funded 
component within US democracy assistance in the 1990s - was surpassed by 
governance. 
Both international and local NGOs noted that donor funding to NGOs had 
been reduced. Representatives of international NGOs, namely Soros, NDI, INTRAC, 
and the Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia, which have been involved in the 
promotion of civil society in Kyrgyzstan since the 1990s, noted that there was a trend 
towards reduction in funding to NGOs. For example, an interviewee from NDI said 
that there were fewer and fewer grant opportunities for NGOs, which she noticed 
while assembling a digest on grant opportunities for their NGO information centres. 
As a result of this, she suggested, soon it would become difficult for NGOs to get 
funding (Interview with a representative of NDI, Bishkek, 1 November 2007).  
Local NGOs working on civil society support made the same observations 
about the erosion of donor funding for NGOs. Some of them specified that donors 
stopped providing capacity-building grants to NGOs that covered expenses of NGOs 
for offices, staff, and running costs. Now only a few NGOs have these kinds of 
funds. All in all, there are no longer such grants available (Interview with the head of 
the NGO, Bishkek, 26 October 2007). An interviewee from the civil society support 
center in Osh assessed this situation as a critical period for the civil sector in 
Kyrgyzstan since NGOs might stop their activities because of the funding shortage 
(Interview with a representative of the NGO, Osh, 1 April 2008).  
Local NGOs specialising on other issues both from cities and villages also 
noted a reduction in donor funding to NGOs. One of the interviewees from Issyk-Ata 
region specifically stressed that donor funding reduced after 2005:  
 
I think yes it is [aid being reduced]. Because before the revolution I did not have an 
opportunity to go away even for a day. They [people] phoned me constantly, a lot of events, 
projects, invitations. For example, you could be gone to Issyk-Kul for a seminar for three 
days.  Your telephone would not stop (Interview with a head of the NGO from Issyk-Ata 
region, Bishkek, 17 March 2008). 
 
 
It is evident in the quote that there is a great contrast between activities of this NGO 
worker before and after 2005. Before 2005, she was very busy and involved in many 
activities that came to a halt after 2005. In fact, during the interview, it was revealed 
that this NGO had not had a project since 2006. As a result, based on the interview 
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data, I suggest that donor funding to NGOs has been reduced indeed despite a lack of 
statistical numbers.  
 
 
Promoting collaboration between the state and NGOs  
 
I identified from my research data that currently donors focus on the 
promotion of an effective and collaborative relationship between NGOs and the state. 
For example, DFID wants civil society to collaborate with the state effectively. This 
is clear from an answer of a DFID representative to a question of what he thinks civil 
society - state relationship should be like:      
 
We would like civil society to interact very effectively with the government both in terms of 
service delivery and advocacy.  Because sometimes civil society can access certain groups that 
government cannot.  HIV/AIDS is a good example.  Government is not very good at accessing 
drug users and commercial sex workers but civil society is.  So they work together effectively. 
And also in terms of advocacy: civil society has a very important role to advocate certain 
issues, to represent certain groups that otherwise would be excluded from society (Interview 
with a DFID representative, Bishkek, 12 February 2008). 
 
 
The part of the quote where the interviewee describes how the state and civil society 
can work together on HIV/AIDS indicates that the relationship between these actors 
is even seen as complementary because the state cannot access drug users and sex 
workers properly, while civil society can. However, the latter needs the former in 
order to have the needs and interests of the group met. In other words, the actors 
mutually complement each other.    
 An interview with a representative of the European Commission (EC) gives 
more insights to the idea of the complementary relationship between the state and 
civil society. According to the interviewee, the state and civil society have the same 
interests and work on the same field, that is, social problems. However, he goes on to 
say that one of them might lack something to carry out its activities effectively. For 
example, the state usually lacks funds and expertise. Therefore, the interviewee 
concluded that the state and civil society could work together by sharing with each 
other what they lack, differently put, by complementing each other (Interview with a 
representative of the EC, Bishkek, 13 February 2008). 
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The interviewee from USAID also expressed similar ideas about the 
collaboration between the state and civil society. First of all, a USAID interviewee 
was convinced that:   
 
civil society is supposed to be a partner to the government, …to help the government, …to do 
things that the government always cannot necessarily focus on itself. (Interview with a USAID 
representative, Bishkek, 15 February 2008).  
 
 
Based on this, he identified the role of civil society as a state partner which can be 
involved in different activities such as researching and polling. He also said that 
there had been such an interaction between the state and civil society in Kyrgyzstan 
recently. He referred to how Bakiev’s government approached civil society groups 
(around 100 representatives) and conducted round tables with them during a 
constitutional reform process in 2007. According to him, there has been an 
improvement in the state-NGO relationships in Kyrgyzstan (Interview with a USAID 
representative, Bishkek, 15 February 2008). In other words, USAID is in favour of 
collaboration and cooperation between the government and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan.   
In contrast to DFID, the EC, and USAID, which promote the state-civil 
society relationship as a component of their activities, the Aga-Khan and Soros 
Foundations have separate programmes aimed at improving the relationship of 
NGOs with the state. A programme of the Soros Foundation on NGO support 
focuses on developing approaches for NGOs to interact with the state. The 
Foundation supports initiatives which create a platform for the collaboration between 
the NGO sector and the state, where the former could have a representation and act 
as an equal partner in dialogue with the state. For example, in 2007, the Soros 
Foundation supported a national forum of NGOs, where the latter discussed their 
relationship with the state as one of the key issues of the sector (Interview with a 
representative of the Soros Foundation, Bishkek, 14 November 2007).   
 The Aga-Khan Foundation’s project focuses on improving and increasing the 
state-NGO collaboration. The project is carried out on the national level. Its main 
aim is to develop a state policy and mechanisms on the state-civil society 
collaboration since there are no such mechanisms right now. For this, the Foundation 
established a working group consisting of representatives of NGOs, trade unions and 
the government. This group is supposed to develop necessary policies and 
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mechanisms (Interview with a local NGO, which implements the project of the Aga-
Khan Foundation, Bishkek, 17 December 2007).       
    
 
Looking beyond “traditional NGOs”: Media, political parties, and CBOs  
 
My further research finding is that donors have been broadening their 
conception of civil society actors they work with and changing their definition of 
civil society since the mid 2000s. DFID and US aid agencies started working with 
the media. Their work with the media is framed by their global strategic documents: 
the DFID white paper 2006 on making governance work for the poor and the 
strategic plan of the US Department of State and USAID for 2007 – 2012. These 
agencies now stress the importance of media in promoting accountability and 
transparency in a political environment, in facilitating a public debate on different 
issues, particularly on the concerns of the poor and marginalised, and other aspects of 
democracy: 
 
Free, independent and plural media (radio, TV, newspapers, internet etc.) provide a critical 
check on state abuse of power or corruption; enable informed and inclusive public debate on 
issues of concern to people living in poverty; and give greater public recognition to the 
perspectives of marginalised citizens. Engaged citizens need information that allows them to 
exercise democratic choices (www.dfid.gov.uk, c).  
 
 
The way DFID and US agencies shape their activities on the media in 
Kyrgyzstan has depended on their assessment of the state of Kyrgyz media which 
varies between these donors. For USAID, the media in Kyrgyzstan is 
underdeveloped and has poor capacity. Therefore, USAID is supporting the media, 
be it a radio station or a television channel, in the same way it used to support NGOs 
in the 1990s, that is to say, by providing them with training on running their 
companies, such as management, finance, budgeting, and staffing. USAID is also 
giving out grants to the media companies for study tours, research, and the 
production of different programmes to promote freedom of speech and open press in 
Kyrgyzstan (Interview with a USAID representative, Bishkek, 15 February 2008). 
For the Democracy Commission of the US embassy, the media has become a priority 
too. In comparison with NGOs, which cannot receive any capacity-building support 
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from the Democracy Commission, media companies enjoy this opportunity 
(Interview with a representative of the US embassy, Bishkek, 31 October 2007).  
For DFID, the media in Kyrgyzstan, as in other Central Asia countries, is 
curtailed by the government. Therefore, it has trained media specialists to improve 
their professionalism. It has funded training for journalists, supported the state 
broadcasting channel, and involved media in the work of development organisations 
to put across their message. The DFID interviewee emphasised that since 2006, 
working with the media has been a great, new change for DFID as they moved 
beyond “traditional NGOs” (Interview with a DFID representative, Bishkek, 12 
February 2008). 
 Other donors also work with the media. According to a joint country support 
strategy (JCSS) of five donors36, the Kyrgyz government rejected the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative in February 2007 because of 
nascent nationalism and civil society’s disapproval (www.donors.kg, b). The JCSS 
suggests that this showed a lack of public trust in the international development 
agencies. Therefore, the JCSS highlights the need to improve the credibility of 
international development agencies through increasing communication with and 
awareness of the public about them. They argue that otherwise public scepticism 
might influence the work on reforms negatively. As a result, the JCSS calls donors to 
go beyond civil society and work effectively with the national media to improve 
communication with the public and the government (www.donors.kg, b). 
Furthermore, USAID began working with political parties. Their support to 
political parties has increased since the adoption of amendments in the constitution in 
2007, which introduced party-based elections to parliament. USAID believes that 
their assistance should focus on building the capacity of political parties because they 
are underdeveloped in Kyrgyzstan (Interview with a USAID representative, Bishkek, 
15 February 2008). Therefore, USAID supports any political party established in 
accordance with the Kyrgyz legislation. USAID is building capacity of political 
parties in the same way as it did with NGOs:  
 
                                                 
36 The joint country support strategy includes the World Bank, ADB, UNDP, DFID, and the European 
Commission.  
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So the work that we do with political parties is largely through NDI and IRI. ….. The training 
is on really relatively quite basic things. How you build the constituency, how you develop a platform, 
how you get that information about your platform out to voters so they know what you stand for as an 
organisation (Interview with a USAID representative, Bishkek, 15 February 2008). 
 
Supporting political parties is also explicitly stated in the US strategic plan as 
they are considered important for “a political competition since, in parties, people 
with similar ideas come together to represent interests of their members and 
constituency and to compete through electoral processes for the right to govern” (US 
Department of State and USAID, 2007).  
According to my research, donors also work with different types of 
community-based organisations (CBO) such as self-help groups and initiative 
groups. I suggest that, on the whole, a CBO is a group of people from the same 
locality, which can be either a village or even a street, who come together for social 
and/or economic development aims. Further, I propose that CBOs are more a product 
of donor projects rather than a home-grown institution. Therefore, their size, aims, 
composition, and even name depend on a donor project since each development 
agencies has its own approach to working with CBOs.  For example, some donors 
such as the Aga-Khan Foundation and UNDP work with CBOs directly. Other 
donors, particularly bilateral ones such as DFID and USAID, work with them 
through intermediaries which are usually international or local NGOs37.      
My research also identified that UNDP had played a crucial role in the 
emergence of CBOs in Kyrgyzstan. In the mid 1990s, within its poverty reduction 
programme, UNDP initiated forming CBOs in its pilot project villages. The aim was 
to reduce poverty by bringing rural people together into groups so that they would 
accumulate joint funding through a monthly contribution of each member, doing 
income-generating activities, and lending cash to group members. CBOs within the 
UNDP programme consist of 20-25 households from a certain area. A territory is a 
main criterion for the establishment of a CBO since it unifies people with the same 
needs. It can be a street or several streets. CBOs have a charter and can be registered 
                                                 
37 The key difference between NGOs and CBOs is that the former are registered with the Ministry of 
Justice; while, the latter tend to be informal.  
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with the local authority. UNDP has called CBOs jaamats38 in Kyrgyz. Within its 
poverty reduction programme, UNDP created 6000 CBOs in its pilot project sites 
throughout Kyrgyzstan. In addition, neighbouring villages created such CBOs. As a 
result, around 10000 CBOs emerged by the end of the UNDP programme. At 
present, UNDP has slightly changed their aim of work with CBOs. Now they want 
CBOs to work not only on poverty reduction but also on other aims of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) such as HIV/AIDS, maternal and infant 
mortality, and gender issues (Interview with a UNDP representative, 13 November 
2007, Bishkek).   
In 2001-2002, with the support of the development fund of Persian Gulf 
countries, UNDP created local development foundations in 19 pilot local authorities. 
Although the foundations are institutionally located within local authorities 
institutionally, they are independent and governed by the local population. Their 
main aim is to improve an economic status of population by giving out loans to 
people who have a business idea but do not have access to credits. However, the 
foundations do not give a loan directly to individuals. They give it to jaamats which 
make the final decision. Currently, the most successful of these foundations have 
increased the initial capital granted by UNDP (around 400000 soms – $8,510) up to a 
million soms ($21,300) and continue to function (Interview with a UNDP 
representative, 13 November 2007, Bishkek).    
Since 2005 the World Bank and DFID have contributed to the diffusion and 
popularisation of CBOs. These large donors have provided grants to the government 
of Kyrgyzstan to improve the social-economic situation of population in the rural 
areas. The Kyrgyz government together with representatives of NGOs and 
Associations of Municipalities set up the NGO ‘ARIS’ which implements all the 
projects. These projects have covered every single village in Kyrgyzstan39, where 
they created village and territorial investment committees on the basis of 
participation principles, that is inclusion of all groups of the community such as the 
elderly, young people, and women into decision-making (Interview with a 
representative of a local NGO, 14 May 2008, Bishkek).  
                                                 
38 Jaamat means a community in Kyrgyz 
39 This means that there is an overlap between donor projects in communities.  
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Furthermore, my findings show that there are more donor projects working 
with CBOs in the south than in the north. For example, USAID has a project on the 
economic development of communities only in the south. The interviewee from 
USAID said that they worked in the south because a problem over resources is tenser 
there than in the north (Interview with a representative of USAID,15 February 2008, 
Bishkek).  
To sum up so far, the involvement of media, political parties, and different 
types of CBOs by donors in their work indicates that they started broadening their 
perception of civil society and looking beyond NGOs, which were equated to civil 
society in the 1990s (e.g. Howell and Pearce, 2002). The interviewee from USAID 
said that they intentionally included political parties in their definition of civil 
society. This is because they consider that civil society in Kyrgyzstan is nascent and 
there is a fine line between different civic institutions such as NGOs and political 
parties. Therefore, they do not want to put limitations on the emergent civil society 
by excluding some of these institutions (Interview with a USAID representative, 
Bishkek, 15 February 2008). 
Some donors, such as the World Bank and the Aga-Khan Foundation, said 
that they were moving away from using the term ‘NGO’. Now they prefer to use the 
term ‘Civil Society Organisation’ to be inclusive. The new term includes not only 
“traditional NGOs”, which refers to registered not-for-profit organisations with 
developmental aims, but also other organisations, such as trade unions, grass-roots 
organisations, women’s groups, social movements, faith-based institutions, charitable 
organisations, universities, foundations, and professional associations (Email file 
from a World Bank representative, Bishkek,19 November 2007 and Interview with a 
representative of the Aga-Khan Foundation, Bishkek, 12 November 2007). 
However, some large donors such as DFID and the EC still need to restrict 
their work with civil society to NGOs because they have proper organisational 
capacity to carry out projects of these donors. Nonetheless, in theory a definition of 
civil society within programmes of these donors is broad. For example, for DFID, 
civil society includes “any form of citizens getting together for the greater good, 
which is not for profit and not party-political” (Interview with a DFID representative, 
Bishkek, 12 February 2008). They even have a manual, which conceptualises civil 
 115 
society and was developed with the involvement of renowned academics 
(www.dfid.gov.uk, a). However, in practice, when funds are involved, DFID is 
limited in who it can engage with. For accountability purposes, their partners from 
civil society should be formal entities (Interview with a DFID representative, 
Bishkek, 12 February 2008). These are usually NGOs in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
From NGOs to the state: Donors and state capacity-building    
 
The role and place of NGOs in donor activities described above are different 
from what was in the 1990s and the early 2000s. At that time, as discussed in chapter 
2, the donors’ focus was on promoting civil society in the form of NGOs. A 
significant amount of donor funding was spent on encouraging NGO emergence in 
Kyrgyzstan and building their capacity. However, this is not the case now. The 
preceding section has shown that NGOs are now much more limited in their funding 
from donors, being promoted only in an advocacy role, and encouraged to 
collaborate with the state. According to my research, these changes have been a 
result of a major change in donor overall policies. Interviews with donors revealed 
that now they premised their activities on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
which identified the state in aid recipient countries as a key actor in development 
(www.worldbank.org). Within it, the governments of recipient countries take a lead 
in the aid coordination and the development process. Their key responsibility is to 
develop a country development strategy in accordance with local priorities and to 
coordinate its implementation by involving donors and encouraging civil society and 
the private sector. Donors are supposed to align their activities with this document 
and provide budget support to the state (www.worldbank.org). By and large, the 
overall aim of the Paris Declaration is to support the states to form a functioning 
public sector (Fritz and Menocal, 2006), with sound institutions and policies. 
As part of the Paris Declaration, Kyrgyzstan has a country development 
strategy (CDS) which is a key developmental document. The CDS has four specific 
aims for the development of Kyrgyzstan: 1) an economic growth, 2) social 
development, 3) environment protection, and 4) combating corruption. The last aim 
covers not only tackling corruption but also improving poor governance, poor 
 116 
legislation, and the poor capacity of state institutions since these are cross-cutting 
issues for the first three aspects of the CDS. Therefore, combating corruption implies 
fighting against corruption along with improving governance, particularly in terms of 
building capacity of state institutions (http://webapps01.un.org). Notwithstanding 
that all donors interviewed signed the Paris Declaration, my research data identified 
that there were some differences between the activities of US aid agencies and 
European bilateral and multilateral donors.  
 
 
European bilateral and multilateral donors  
 
Key European bilateral and multilateral donors in Kyrgyzstan, namely the 
UN, DFID, the World Bank, the EC, ADB40, SIDA41, and GTZ42 have developed the 
JCSS as a response to the Paris Declaration. Within research, the first four donors out 
of seven were interviewed. The overview of the aims and objective of the JCSS 
revealed that they were aligned with that of the CDS and focus on:  
 
improving economic management consistent with strong and sustained pro poor growth; 
reducing corruption; improving governance, and achieving effective public administration; 
building sustainable human and social capital through improved health and education 
outcomes; and ensuring environmental sustainability and natural resource management 
(www.donors.kg, b).  
 
 
The above extract indicated that, as in the CDS, strengthening governance 
and improving public administration are central in the JCSS. All donor projects 
include a “good governance” component. In fact, in order to be launched and 
implemented, a project should demonstrate that it will have implications for overall 
governance. If a project fails to do this, the JCSS donors can refuse a request of the 
government for the project (www.donors.kg, b).  
According to the Paris Declaration, donors are supposed to provide budget 
support to a recipient government. It is considered one of the mechanisms to build 
capacity of the government by giving it responsibility to identify aid priorities and to 
                                                 
40 Asian Development Bank 
41 Swedish International Development Operation Agency 
42 Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit  (German Government-Owned Corporation for 
International Cooperation with Worldwide Operations) 
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use its institutions and policies to achieve them. In others words, donors provide 
funding to the government, who then makes a decision on which areas of 
development funding should be spent. This is called ‘general budget support’ 
(Williamson et al., 2008). In Kyrgyzstan, however, the JCSS donors provide ‘sector 
budget support’ which means funding only a ministry or a department in the 
government. This is provided when there are still problems with quality, 
transparency, and accountability of state institutions and policies, particularly 
financial ones (Williamson et al., 2008).  
According to the interviewees from DFID and the EC, the general budget 
support is not acceptable in Kyrgyzstan because the financial systems of the Kyrgyz 
government, including internal and external audit and financial management 
procedures, are weak. The Kyrgyz government is still too corrupt. Therefore, they 
provide sector budget support. Moreover, they put extra efforts to ensure that funds 
are spent appropriately (Interview with a DFID representative, Bishkek, 12 February 
2008 and interview with a representative of the European Commission, 13 February 
2008).  
My research shows that donors have divided government ministries and 
departments to work with amongst themselves. For example, the EC works with the 
Ministries of Agriculture, Labour, and Education (Interview with a representative of 
the EC, Bishkek, 13 February 2008). Meanwhile, DFID works with the Ministries of 
Finance and Health (Interview with a DFID representative, Bishkek, 12 February 
2008). Taking into account the fact that the Paris Declaration calls for better aid 
coordination, I suggest that donors are trying to avoid the duplication of their work 
with the government by engaging only with a certain state agency. Most importantly, 
the provision of funding to the government is not only a financial mechanism but 
also a tool to build their capacity. These donor interviewees noted that they provided 
technical support to the government on how to manage funds and achieve their goals. 
For instance, DFID assists staff of the Ministry of Health in learning how to manage 
their funds better (Interview with a DFID representative, Bishkek, 12 February 
2008). 
It is not known how much donors are providing to the state. However, I 
should mention that overall donor funding to Kyrgyzstan has increased. For example, 
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DFID increased its budget to Kyrgyzstan from $11,2 (£7) million in 2007 to $16 
(£10) million in 2010 (webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk). Taking into account the 
reduction in funding to NGOs and the sector budget support within the Paris 




US aid agencies 
   
Aid delivery strategies of the US government are different from that of the 
European bilateral and multilateral donors; although the US government also signed 
the Paris Declaration. First of all, the US aid agencies are not part of the JCSS in 
Kyrgyzstan. They have their own documents and mechanisms for aid delivery. A 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) programme is the most important one 
which was launched in January 2004 (before the Paris Declaration) to provide aid to 
developing countries. According to this programme, the USA can deliver 
development assistance only to those countries which are committed to good 
governance, economic freedom, and investing in their citizens. Eligibility of a 
recipient country is assessed by means of seventeen independent and transparent 
policy indicators and its policy performance. Those countries that pass all eligibility 
criteria receive a ‘compact’ grant which is large and lasts for five years. Those 
countries that succeed in meeting most of the criteria and show commitment to 
improve their policy performance receive a ‘threshold’ grant which is smaller. 
Kyrgyzstan receives this type of grant (www.mcc.gov).  
The MCC shares the principles of the Paris Declaration by promoting the 
country-led implementation of development. As the Paris Declaration, the MCC 
requires a recipient-country to develop their MCC proposal with the involvement of 
public in which priorities for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction 
should be identified. The MCC team only helps the recipient country to refine their 
programme. In Kyrgyzstan, the MCC proposal aims at supporting the government to 
fight corruption and improve the rule of law through judicial, law enforcement, 
criminal justice reforms (www.mcc.gov). It is evident that the Kyrgyz MCC proposal 
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has similar priorities with the CDS and JCSS, which is fighting corruption. On the 
whole, the US aid mechanism also assigns government as a key actor in development 
by giving it a role in identifying aid priorities.  
However, the MCC differs from the Paris Declaration in terms of its funding 
delivery mechanism. Countries receiving a compact grant establish their own 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) entity which manages and oversees 
implementation of their MCC proposal, administers contracts and procurements, and 
monitors budget expenditures. However, the MCC does not transfer funds to the 
government. It pays directly to the vendors43. Funds of countries receiving a 
threshold grant such as Kyrgyzstan are managed by other US government 
implementing partners (www.mcc.gov). In Kyrgyzstan the MCC funds, around $16 
million, are managed by USAID.  
In fact, according to my research, USAID is one of the largest aid agencies in 
Kyrgyzstan. The interview with a representative of USAID suggested that one of 
their key focuses now was provision of technical support to the Kyrgyz government 
in the form of training, expertise, and advice on different issues such as budgeting, 
structuring different state entities at various levels from the high up to local 
authorities depending on the government’s request. For example, currently USAID 
mainly works with the institutions of ayil okmotu (local authority) (Interview with a 
USAID representative, Bishkek, 15 February 2008). However, USAID does not 
provide any budget support. The abstinence of the US government from budget 
support can be explained with a quote of the interviewee from the US embassy who 
said that: 
 
The budget support was ineffective since accountability was lost through funds going from 
one bank to another (Interview with a representative of the US embassy, Bishkek, 27 
November 2007).   
  
 
I suggest that, in this quote, the interviewee meant that accountability cannot be 
ensured in financial transactions between only two actors (in this case the 
government and donors) and without engagement of the third actor such as NGOs.  
 
 
                                                 
43 By vendors, I mean contractors, e.g., for procurement.  
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State capacity-building: case of UNDP 
 
An illustration of how donors have been working with the state on building 
its capacity is a project of UNDP on democratic governance. The project has three 
components: a) parliament, b) public administration reform, and c) local self-
governance bodies, which include ayil okmotu and local kenesh (local council), and 
decentralisation. Here only the last component is discussed because it has been the 
main focus of donors since the early 2000s. Moreover, in 2007, a new law was 
adopted which changed the state budget from a four-tiered to two-tiered system. 
According to this, funding now goes straight from a national budget to the budget of 
local authorities bypassing the budgets of province and district administrations. 
However, many local authorities did not know how to manage these funds. As a 
result, the government requested donors to train aiyl okmotus on budgeting and other 
related issues. Donors have been working with local authorities since then (Interview 
with a UNDP representative, Bishkek, 13 November 2007). 
UNDP works with ayil okmotu on different levels. Firstly, it is engaged at the 
legislation level to ensure that ayil okmotus have a solid legislative basis for their 
activities. The UNDP team participates in different discussions about and attends 
parliament hearings on legal acts and laws on ayil okmotus and makes their 
suggestions. For example, UNDP proposed a national strategy on decentralisation of 
governance and development of local self-governance which was adopted by the 
Kyrgyz government in December 2002 (Interview with a UNDP representative, 
Bishkek, 13 November 2007) 
Secondly, UNDP is involved in promoting fiscal decentralisation in the light 
of the new law described earlier. It started working with ten pilot ayil okmotus by 
assisting them in forming their budgets, to administer taxes, to raise additional funds 
for their budgets, and to expand their tax ranges. These ayil okmotus have already 
shifted to the two-tiered budget and now directly work with the Ministry of Finance. 
Thirdly, UNDP works with ayil okmotus on strategic planning. Every year, the 
UNDP team takes a certain number of ayil okmotus and helps them develop a 
strategic plan for their development. UNDP provides technical support by training 
staff of ayil okmotus how to develop their strategic plan and facilitates the process of 
designing one (Interview with a UNDP representative, Bishkek, 13 November 2007).  
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Fourth, UNDP has started introducing an electronic ayil okmotu. At present, 
they are in the process of providing nine pilot ayil okmotus with computers, internet, 
and training so that they do all their work on computers. At present, most ayil 
okmotus write everything by hand and all information is kept in hard copy. UNDP 
also wants all internal work procedures of ayil okmotus to be transferred to a 
computer so that they could have a data base in an electronic form (Interview with a 
UNDP representative, Bishkek, 13 November 2007).   
UNDP also works on building the capacity of the local kenesh which are 
supposed to play a leading role in local self-governance. However, according to the 
UNDP interviewee, they do not currently fulfil this role because their members are 
either poorly trained for this or do not realise the importance of their job. The role of 
local keneshs will become even more important after the adoption of a bill on local 
keneshs. According to this bill, the aiyl okmotu should obey the local keneshs, which 
will set priorities for development. Therefore, UNDP has been training local keneshs 
all over the country. They designed five modules and have trained 2000 out of 6000 
members of local keneshs so far. They envisage the remaining members too 
(Interview with a UNDP representative, Bishkek, 13 November 2007).  
Based on the overview of the UNDP project on local self-governance bodies, 
I suggest two points. First, the case clearly shows that UNDP has been working on 
building the capacity of local self-governance institutions by training them and 
improving their infrastructure. The second point is that the UNDP’s experience 
indicates how weak local self – governance institutions in Kyrgyzstan are. This, in 
turn, means that the central government is also weak since it is unable to strengthen 
its local self-governance institutions. Such poor public administration highlights 
fragility of the Kyrgyz state.  
    
Discussion  
 
The shift of donors from civil society promotion to state capacity-building is 
not specific to Kyrgyzstan. I suggest that the latter focus of donors is embedded in a 
broader global context. Based on the review of the relevant literature and the reports 
and strategic documents of donors, I propose that state capacity-building came to the 
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forefront in development in the late 1990s and the early 2000s because of the three 
key factors. The main factor was that the reduction of the state and over-reliance on 
civil society within the neo-liberal policies and democracy promotion of donors in 
the 1980s-1990s failed to meet their expectations. Furthermore, economic success of 
East Asia shed some new light on the role of the state in development. Finally, 
fragile states came to be regarded as a threat to international security after 9/11. 
Therefore, the international community concluded that these states should be 
strengthened to improve international security. .  
 
 
Failure of democratisation in the developing world  
 
One of the key factors that brought back the state to development is the 
failure of the democratisation process. By the late 1990s the excitement about the 
‘third wave’ of democratisation was evaporating (Carothers, 2002). Zakaria (1997) 
asserted that there had been a rise of ‘illiberal democracies’ in developing countries 
by the late 1990s. These ‘illiberal democracies’ held elections but ignored and even 
violated other key aspects of constitutional liberalism such as the separation of 
powers, the rule of law, and protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, 
religion, and property. Their governments learned how to retain power with 
authoritarian features and, at the same time, have formal democratic institutions.  
These countries have been called “hybrid regimes” (Rakner et al., 2007). As 
Carothers (2002) put it, they have been caught in a “grey zone”. They have some 
attributes of democracy such as a limited political space for opposition and civil 
society, regular  elections, democratic constitutions. However, they suffer from 
serious democratic deficit including poor representation of citizens’ interests, low 
level of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by 
government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low public confidence 
in public institutions, and poor institutional performance by the state (Carothers, 
2002).  
Based on the earlier discussion of the post-Soviet state in Kyrgyzstan and its 
relations with NGOs, I suggest that Kyrgyzstan was a hybrid regime under Akaev 
and Bakievs’ rule. It had a constitution committed to building democracy. The 
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president and the parliament were elected by the public. The political opposition and 
civil society had relative freedom to carry out their activities. However, the 
constitution was changed frequently in the interest of the central power-holders. 
Elections had a number of problems such as fraud, buying votes, and interference of 
the government. State officials, particularly the president, abused power. In other 
words, the attributes of democracy were nominal in Kyrgyzstan.         
Further, Kahler (2007) echoed a widespread argument that civil society could 
not deliver on promises to promote democracy in developing countries. It turned out 
to be too weak to influence “recalcitrant state elites” (Kahler, 2007) and to promote 
democratic accountability (Rakner et al., 2007). NGOs displayed an array of 
deficiencies which were discussed in chapter 1 and 2. The most damaging 
shortcoming of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan and in other developing countries was that they 
could not establish a proper link with their constituencies. This totally undermined 
their role in democracy promotion since they failed to represent various groups in 
their societies. As a result, donors were disillusioned with NGOs. In fact, the 
discussion in the first section has shown that some donors in Kyrgyzstan did not hide 
their disappointment with NGOs.  
Moreover, they are now trying to go beyond NGOs and involve other non-
state actors such as political parties and the media which they think can bring about 
social change better. This finding updates the literature which used to state that 
donors worked only with NGOs in Kyrgyzstan (Howell and Pearce, 2002). Now 
donors are not limited to NGOs within their civil society work but try to go beyond 
them.      
 Further, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) argued that democratising countries 
were prone to conflicts. By looking at the statistical database, which is usually used 
to study democratic peace, these authors argued that democratising states inclined to 
conflicts more than established democracies and lasting autocracies. At the same 
time, they suggested that states, which changed to autocracy after their unsuccessful 
experiment with democratisation, also tended to have conflicts than those states 
which remained within the same political setting. Kyrgyzstan is an excellent example 
for this. It has been the most unstable country in Central Asia but also the most 
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liberal and democracy-oriented. It has gone through two so-called revolutions and an 
ethnic conflict embedded in a complicated social and political context.  
Mansfield and Snyder (1995) proposed that the international community 
should seek to minimise the risks of democratisation process and assist in smooth 
transitions rather than promoting democratisation. Zakaria (1997) made a suggestion 
along the same lines: the international community should support democracy where 
it emerged and encourage gradual establishment and consolidation of other aspects of 
constitutional liberalism without which democracy was dangerous. These arguments 
and suggestions brought about an argument of ‘democratic sequencing’. Carothers 
(2002) summarised this argument (which he opposes) as follows. ‘Democratic 
sequencing’ implies that democratisation is not always appropriate for countries 
unprepared for it; thus, before promoting democracy, there is need to achieve the rule 
of law and a well-functioning state.  
 
 
Economic success of East Asian countries  
 
The economic success of East Asia provided new insights into the role of the 
state in development. Research on the success of these countries showed that their 
developmental policies were contrary to neo-liberal economic policies of donors. In 
the late 1980s-1990s, the states of these countries intervened in labour, land, product, 
and financial markets. They also provided protection to nascent industries using trade 
policies (Wimpelmann, 2006). This suggested that even market-based economies 
require functioning, capable states in order to operate and to grow (Fritz and 
Menocal, 2006:3). Furthermore, in East Asian countries, states are expected by 
public to meet their basic needs and deliver essential social services (ibid).  
In the neo-liberal policies of donors, the delivery of social services suffered 
considerably since the policies provided little practical guidance except for 
outsourcing services to NGOs and public-private institutions. Meanwhile, in many 
developing countries, neither the private sector nor local NGOs had the proper 
capacity to provide services without relying on the state to play a sound coordinating 
and regulating role. Consequently, services deteriorated, which had a negative impact 
on the welfare, particularly of the poor (Fritz and Menocal, 2006). In Kyrgyzstan, as 
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stated in chapter 2, in the 1990s, NGOs were emergent and did not have proper 
institutional capacity (Minnini, 1998; Kasybekov, 1999). Moreover, they failed to 
reach out to the poor (Aksartova, 2005; Earle, 2005).   
Further research, which compared countries in East Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, revealed that the success of the former region had to do not only with state 
interventions but also with the quality of intervention. When the African states made 
an extensive intervention in the market, it did not result in any development; while 
the same activities undertaken by the East Asian states brought development. 
Therefore, a number of researchers suggested that: 
 
“what has mattered more [than the size of intervention] is the quality of state interventions 
[in the market], which again has depended on analytical capacity, on resource mobilisation 
by the state, on the politics of the state and on the balance of material interests driving that 
politics” (Rodrik, 2002: 11 in Fritz and Menocal, 2006:4).  
 
 
Although geography could play an indirect role; the key message from the East 
Asian experience was that institutions should be of good quality that could “provide 
dependable property rights, manage conflict, maintain law and order, and align 
economic incentives with social costs and benefits” (Rodrik, 2002: 11 in Fritz and 
Menocal, 2006:4).  
For example, the process of privatisation in the developing countries that took 
place under the neo-liberal economic policies was flawed because there was no 
proper state involvement in terms of legislation. For the most part, key economic 
sectors such as telecommunications, energy, and mining were privatised in haste 
lacking a transparent bidding process. This often resulted in the emergence of 
ineffective private monopolies rather than increased market competitiveness (Fritz 
and Menocal, 2006). For instance, Russia did not have a proper capacity to undertake 
privatisation process. They failed to ensure legislation for a transparent process of 
privatisation and to protect the rights of new shareholders. As a result, public 
resources were stolen by the so-called oligarchs. This resulted in delegitimisation of 
the post-communist Russian state in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse 
(Fukuyama, 2004:28). In the same vein, in Kyrgyzstan, during the privatisation 
process, state assets were appropriated by former Soviet bureaucrats because they 
still had control and networks (Anderson, 1997).  
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The connection between the economic growth and the quality of institutions 
emerging from the experience of the East Asian countries were also revealed by 
research on aid effectiveness done by the World Bank. According to them, aid was 
effective where quality institutions and policies were available (Wimpelmann, 2006). 
Kahler (2007) defined quality institutions, which he called “good” policy regimes, by 
(1) macroeconomic policies and (2) institutional measures of policies such as the 
strength of property rights, the absence of corruption, and quality of bureaucracy. 
The case of East Asia also showed that their success was due to a close 
relationship between the state and society. Based on this, Fritz and Menocal (2006:8) 
asserted that: 
 
“the state cannot be too insulated from society because it would then run the risk of 
becoming self-serving rather than responsive to demands and needs for further development. 
Thus, it must also be embedded in society, that is, ‘[connected to] a concrete set of social ties 
that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual 
negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies”.  
 
 
This type of relations between society and the state is more interconnected, where the 
state is imbedded in society and the latter has mechanisms to be involved in 
identifying the state goals and policies. It is different from that envisaged by neo-
liberal economic policies, within which society was self-serving. This is because, 
firstly, economic processes between individuals took place within a market without 
the intervention of the state, and, secondly, services, particularly social ones, were 
provided by civil society organisations and the private sector. Civil society also 
balanced the state, whose role was reduced to the provision and surveillance of 
practice of legislation.  
As a result, economists who pushed liberalisation and a minimal state came to 
the conclusion that “some of the most important variables affecting development are 
not economic but institutional and political in nature” (Fukuyama, 2004: 29). 
Therefore, Fukuyama (2004: 29) noted that there was need for a significant 
dimension of stateness for development to take place. The success of East Asian 
countries also suggested that not just any state institutions were needed but they 
should be quality state institutions with interconnected relations with society.  
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Fragile states as an impediment to international security, peace, and poverty 
reduction  
 
After the 9/11 attacks in the USA and the “war on terror” that followed, 
countries with ineffective, failed states have come to be seen as a threat to the 
international security (Fukuyama, 2004; Kahler, 2007). They have been considered 
incapable to meet the social and economic needs of their citizens properly, to ensure 
political stability, and to police their territories. This has resulted in different tensions 
among their people and social and political unrest which has been seen as a source of 
the threat to international security (Kahler, 2007). The government of the USA has 
been a particular advocate of this argument. For example, the Bush administration 
defined “non-democratic, fragile and poorly-governed states as the most significant 
threat to national security” (Cammack et al., 2006 in Rakner et al., 2007:2).  
Furthermore, the international community has realised that a strong state is 
needed to establish and promote peace in post-conflict zones. Their experience from 
providing humanitarian aid showed that, since states in post-conflict zones remained 
weak, conflicts resumed after some time. Therefore, the international community has 
concluded that it needes to invest in state capacity-building in fragile states in order 
to avert future conflicts and promote development (Kahler, 2007).   
The concept of a fragile state has also been applied to those countries where 
governments are weak in providing people with the basics of a decent life and 
fighting poverty which is a key global developmental priority in the MDGs 
(www.un.org). These states lost public trust in providing an “inclusive political, 
social, and economic order made predictable by rule of law” (Ghani et al., 2006: 
101). Their economies are dominated by illegality, informality, and criminality. 
Basic services are not provided properly. The essential infrastructure is dilapidated. 
The level of corruption is high and public assets are appropriated for private gain. 
Consequently, administrative control is weak and “the bureaucracy is seen as an 
instrument for abuse of power, in turn leading to a crisis in public finances – where 
both revenue and expenditure are unpredictable and budgeting becomes an exercise 
in emergency management” (Ghani et al., 2006: 101).  
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 The World Bank defines fragile states based on its Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and “the presence of UN or regional peace-building 
or peace mediation operations”. The CPIA rates countries using 16 criteria subsumed 
under four categories: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies 
for social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions. 
Countries rating 3.2 or lower on the CPIA scale and having peace keeping forces are 
identified as fragile states. These states have “weak institutional capacity, poor 
governance, political instability, and often ongoing violence or the legacy of past 
conflict, with potential spill-over effects on neighbouring countries” 
(www.web.worldbank.org,a). In 2006, the World Bank categorised 27 countries as 
fragile states including such countries as Nigeria, Cambodia, and Sudan 
(www.web.worldbank.org,a).         
Kyrgyzstan has most elements to fall into the category of fragile states. 
Kyrgyzstan’s corruption rate has been high. In 2008, Kyrgyzstan was on the 166th 
place out of 180 (the most corrupted) in a corruption report of Transparency 
International. In fact, its corruption rating has steadily increased since 2003 when it 
was on the 118th place (Lymar, 2008). In 2005, Kyrgyzstan received a rating of 3 in 
the CPIA of the World Bank, which is slightly higher than the threshold that the 
World Bank sets for fragile states (www.data.worldbank.org). This shows that 
economic management, structural policies, public sector management and 
institutions, and policies for social inclusion and equity are extremely weak in 
Kyrgyzstan.  
According to Ghani and his colleagues (2006:101), once these institutions are 
weak, governments fail to provide the population with the basics of a decent life. 
This delegitimises the state since it loses people’s trust. The April 2010 revolts in 
Kyrgyzstan were manifestation of people’s discontent with their living standards and 
mistrust of the state (Reeves, 2010). Moreover, the June conflict between Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz has put Kyrgyzstan into the category of the post-conflict zone. Although 
Kyrgyzstan does not have peace-keeping forces, it has all the other aspects to be 




State building as a new priority in donor policies   
 
As a response to the failures of neo-liberal policies and democracy promotion 
and in the light of new priorities (international security and poverty reduction), 
discussed in the three above sections, donor development policies have embraced the 
idea of state-building since the late 1990s and the early 2000s. The post-Washington 
consensus reconsidered the role of the state in development. It acknowledged the 
importance of the state and extended its role both in economy and social service 
provision. The 1997 World Development Report “The State in a Changing World” 
stated that “good government is a vital necessity for development” (Wimpelmann, 
2006:2).   
As a result, donors started to concentrate on building the capacity of states 
and involving them into development policies. The World Bank and other agencies 
such as DFID renamed their Low Income Countries under Stress with fragile states 
(Kahler, 2007). The USA government ceased overstressing on democracy promotion. 
Rather it shifted to helping governments of fragile states to improve their quality and 
effectiveness. As Brooks summarised it, when Obama came to power, “the U.S. is 
not about to begin another explicit crusade to spread democracy. But decent, 
effective and responsive government would be a start” (Brooks, 2008: 
www.nytimes.com). Consequently, the USA government launched a Millennium 
Challenge Account programme to measure effective governance in the developing 
countries in order to help those countries which are committed to development 
(Brooks, 2008).  
Further, the international community including donor and recipient countries 
reconsidered aid delivery mechanisms. In 2005, 61 bilateral and multilateral donors 
and 56 aid-recipient countries adopted the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. As 
stated in the second section, its central idea is the country ownership of development 
policies and encouragement of the government to be a focal point in the coordination 
of development (Fritz and Menocal, 2006). In other words, the governments in the 
developing countries have become a key actor in development. It is also 
government’s responsibility to encourage civil society’s participation in the 
development (www.worldbank.org). On the whole, with regard to civil society, the 
Paris Declaration provides limited guidelines on its role. Pratt (2006) stated that, 
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where it was mentioned in the new aid mechanism, civil society was seen as a sub-
contractor of local governments.  
The discussion on state capacity-building in Kyrgyzstan in this chapter has 
revealed that the state has indeed become a central actor in development. The Kyrgyz 
government receives sector budget support from donors. They also provide technical 
support to all the branches of the state as in the case of UNDP which works with the 
parliament, the government, and local self-governance bodies on their capacity-
building. Moreover, donors now use NGOs in order to improve the state and its 
policies by funding their advocacy-aimed projects. Donors are specifically interested 
in the collaboration and cooperation between the actors where the role of civil 
society is as a partner of and assistant to the state.  
With reference to the earlier discussion of the state-society relations, I explain 
the reasons of why donors are encouraging the state and NGOs to collaborate as 
follows. According to Fritz and Menocal (2006), the formation of the functioning 
public sector, which the Kyrgyz government and donors currently aim at, requires a 
state-society relation that would enable this process to take place. As mentioned 
earlier, based on the experience of the East Asian countries, the state-society 
relations are preferred to be interconnected when the state is embedded in society 
through social ties and society can be involved in identifying the state goals and 
policies (Fritz and Menocal, 2006). Furthermore, when looking at state-building from 
an international security perspective, it also implies nation-building, which is a 
product of state-society relations (www.dfid.gov.uk, c). Therefore, as Rakner and his 
colleagues (2007:39) put it, donors want the state and society to “work together in 
building a political system that is more responsive, accountable and broadly 
representative”. 
From a theoretical perspective, I suggest that this type of relationship between 
the state and civil society can be described as communitarian. As the conceptual 
framework in chapter 1 has set out, in the communitarian approach, the state is not a 
mere order-keeper and framework for civil society. The state and civil society are 
complementary elements of each other. The state not only frames civil society but 
also encompasses it and leads it to the common good. Furthermore, the state is a 
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necessary condition for the existence of civil society since it keeps it away from self-
destruction. 
The CDS in Kyrgyzstan under the Paris Declaration is a good example that can 
be described within this model. One of the key features of this document is that it 
calls for sharing power between the state and society both vertically and horizontally. 
Put differently, everyone is involved in doing their part. In Taylor’s words (2006), 
the power is distributed throughout the society, where different elements of the 
society from the state to independent associations play a role and share power to self-
rule. Moreover, the CDS is an institutionalised mechanism for the involvement of the 
public normally through civil society institutions in setting priorities and goals for 
the development and promoting it44.   
My research findings also suggested that donors promoted the state and its 
institutions not only because they wanted to, but also because they needed to. 
Particularly, the example of the Aga-Khan Foundation has shown that civil society 
institutions need the state in order to succeed in their initiatives. This corresponds to 
what Hegel (in Jones, 2001; Taylor, 2006) and Walzer (1998) claimed in their 
respective works that the state was necessary for the existence and operation of civil 
society. It also has a parallel with Morton’s work (1998) on the enshrinement of civil 
society in Britain in the nineteenth century, where local authorities facilitated the 
existence and operation of civil society by playing a mediating role between the 
central government and civil society. Moreover, the above discussion has indicated 




To conclude, this chapter has sought to answer two research questions: what 
kind of changes have donors made in their civil society activities since the mid 
2000s? and why have they made these changes? In this regard, based on my research 
data, I have identified that donors have made four main changes in their civil society 
activities. First of all, funding to NGOs, especially for their capacity-building, has 
                                                 
44 I should mention that the CDS mechanisms might have weaknesses in terms of involving the public 
into the development and implementation of its aims.  
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been reduced. Secondly, donors are promoting NGOs in an advocacy role. Thirdly, 
donors are promoting the collaboration between the state and NGOs. Lastly, donors 
are expanding their civil society definition and a list of CSOs they work with. They 
have shifted their attention to the media and political parties. They also work with 
CBOs. As a result, I argue that civil society activities of donors are different from 
those which were in the 1990s and the early 2000s in Kyrgyzstan. The key difference 
is that donors stopped promoting the emergence of NGOs and building their 
capacity.   
I have explained that the diminishing role of NGOs in the civil society 
activities of donors is connected to the return of the state to the development agenda. 
I have suggested that donors in Kyrgyzstan are concentrating on building the 
capacity of state institutions and improving public administration. My detailed 
review of the broader context has identified that the promotion of the state has gained 
prominence as a new priority because of the failure of democratisation and NGOs, 
the success of East Asian countries that undermined the neo-liberal policies of 
donors, and concerns over international security after 9/11 when weak states started 
to be considered a threat. I have suggested that Kyrgyzstan can be considered a 
fragile state taking into consideration its weak state, political instability, poor 
economy and recent ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan.    
 Finally, from a theoretical perspective, I have suggested that the approach of 
donors to development and work with civil society shifted from the liberal one, 
which dominated during the 1990s, to a communitarian one, in which the state is 
given a more prominent role. Further, I have described the type of collaboration 
donors are promoting between NGOs and the state as complementary, where the 
actors are meant to complement each other in certain activity such as social service 
delivery. This differs from what donors supported in the 1990s, when civil society 
was seen as the antithesis of the state, an alternative service provider, and a key 
counterbalance. Finally, I have shown that activities and strategies of donors are not 
homogenous. American donors do not provide aid to the state in the same way as 
European and international donors do. The key difference is that US agencies do not 
provide any type of budget support.  
 133 
It is evident that donors have made considerable changes in their civil society 
activities. Chapter 2 demonstrated that donors had played a significant role in the 
development of the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, changes in their civil 
society activities are bound to influence the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan and the 
impact of these changed priorities will be discussed in the following chapter.          
   









































NGO response: adapting to new donor strategies   
 
  
In this chapter, I discuss the influence of changes in donors’ civil society 
promotion on Kyrgyz NGOs which is the first focus of my third research question45. 
I have stated in the previous chapter that donors in Kyrgyzstan have made the 
following changes in their civil society activities: promoting NGOs in an advocacy 
role, reducing funding to NGOs, and promoting collaborative relations between the 
state and NGOs. To identify the influence of these changes on the Kyrgyz NGO 
sector, I start by discussing in the first section the influence that donors have had on 
NGOs from the beginning of their interaction in the early 1990s. The main idea that I 
put forward is that donors have influenced the way NGOs developed institutionally. I 
argue that NGOs have become professional and formal because of donor funding 
requirements and training. In the second section, I present research data on 
professional and institutional capacity of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. In the third section, I 
report research findings on the influence of the above changes in civil society 
activities of donors on NGOs. I suggest that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan are further 
professionalising and formalising. NGOs have to improve their professional and 
institutional capacity to overcome competition for donor funding, which has become 
tougher, and to be able to influence the state within their advocacy projects.  
 
 
Donors’ impact on NGO professionalisaion  
 
In this section, I suggest that donors have had a considerable impact on how 
NGOs have developed institutionally. Their programmes, particularly the ones 
focused on provision of capacity-building support to NGOs, have led NGOs to 
develop in a professional and formal way. The interviewee from USAID, a key donor 
in the promotion of civil society, said that they had taught people in Kyrgyzstan very 
                                                 
45 My third research question is What are the implications of these changes for Kyrgyz NGOs, the 
Kyrgyz state, and relations between the two? In this chapter, I will answer its first half.  
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basic things in relation to setting up and running an NGO, such as registering, 
developing a charter, and working out a budget (Interview, Bishkek, 15 February 
2008). The training included a wide range of issues of NGO organisation and 
operation starting from project design and ending with network development as 
described in table 14. This means that, from the beginning, NGOs have been 
encouraged to act as organisations with a charter, budget, and other organisational 
features. For this reason, Aksartova (2006:19) concluded that American donors, 
particularly USAID, encouraged the formation of professional NGOs by requiring 
NGOs to have: a) the legal status of a non-profit organisation, b) paid staff, c) 
fundraising activities, and d) a purpose which represents public interest.  
 
 
Table 14 – Training provided to NGOs by the Counterpart Consortium 
 
♦ NGO and Community 
♦ NGO Management 
♦ Project Design 
♦ Strategic Planning 
♦ Public Education through the Media 
♦ Success Story Writing   
♦ Association Development 
♦ Financial Management 
♦ Participatory Monitoring & Evaluation 
♦ Financial Sustainability 
♦ Team Building and Conflict Resolution  
♦ Human Resources Management 
♦ Newsletter Development 
♦ Financial Accountability 
 
♦ Social Partnership 
♦ NGO Governance 
♦ Constituency Building 
♦ Presentation Skills 
♦ Volunteer Management 
♦ Facilitation Skills 
♦ Adult Learning Methodology 
♦ Coalition Building 
♦ Participatory Community Appraisal and 
Community Action Plan Development 
♦ Microbusiness Basics 
♦ Network development 





Donors have also had requirements within their grant programmes that NGOs 
need to meet in order to obtain funding from them. Interviews with donors, namely 
the UN, the EC, and DFID46, revealed that they were mainly interested in the formal 
registration of an NGO, the availability of a bank account, financial procedures such 
as book keeping, auditing, and even a structure including a board of trustees. Other 
interview data and further exploration of different calls for proposals of donors 
suggested that other grant requirements of donors for NGOs included the availability 
                                                 
46 Interview with a representative of the UN in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 19 November 2007; interview 
with a representative of the European Commission, Bishkek, 14 November 2007; interview with a 
representative of DFID, Bishkek, 14 November 2007.  
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of project implementation experience, qualified staff, adequate expertise, language 
skills, and other organisational capacity. For example, a current advocacy 
programme of Pact, an international NGO financed by USAID, has the following 
requirements for NGOs in its call for proposals.    
 
Who can apply:  
Local non-governmental organisations registered in Kyrgyzstan which should:   
• have work experience in carrying out advocacy campaigns on a subject of the  
tender;  
• have at least one partner;  
• have its own representative [branch office] or of its partner in each province;  
• to be able to contribute at least 25 % of the whole amount of the project budget;  




This means that, in order for any NGO in Kyrgyzstan to acquire funding from 
donors, it should at least have a legal status, a bank account, and an organisational 
structure. Ideally, it should also have project implementation experience, qualified 
staff, adequate expertise, language skills, and partners. Interviews revealed that a 
majority of NGOs had a legal status (registration), a bank account, and an 
organisational structure. In fact, some NGO interviewees openly noted that they had 
to register their NGO, which used to exist as an initiative group, to be eligible for 
donor funding. A human right NGO from Bishkek is among these NGOs whose 
leader said:  
  
It was important to us to get registered back then. You might know that, without juridical 
registration, it is not possible to apply for grants. It is impossible to work based on the 
legislation. They would ask who we were, from which organisation. Therefore, we decided to 
get registered in 2003 (Interview, 12 March 2008, Bishkek).   
 
 
One of the vivid examples of a donor grant requirement is that of the staff 
employment procedures that NGOs must follow in their projects. A number of NGOs 
noted that, within their grant programmes, donors require them to employ competent 
staff to implement any project that they finance. Many NGOs echoed an NGO 
working on community development from Bishkek which explained the staff 
recruitment process as follows. First, they submit CVs of their candidates for 
positions in the proposed project. If donors are not happy with them, the NGO 
employs new people based on procedures ensuring that proper candidates are 
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employed (Interview, Bishkek, 4 March 2008). Drawing on these, I suggest that, 
through their NGO promotion training and grant requirements, donors have made 
NGOs take a form of formal organisations and share a certain set of organisational 
features (e.g. registration, bank account, structure, internal procedures). In other 
words, donor training and grant  requirements have caused coercive isomorphism to 
take place among NGOs, that is to say, under pressures coming from donors, upon 
whom NGOs depend, NGOs have grown isomorphic (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983:150). This idea was also discussed by Aksartova (2005) who argued that:           
 
The isomorphic pressure, experienced by post-Soviet NGOs, comes in the form of elaborate 
requirements for writing grant applications, budgetary plans, accounting reports, etc., that 
donors demand of their recipients. An NGO finds itself under the pressure to conform to 
donors’ expectations even before it obtains its first grant, because the process of writing a 
grant application already requires it to mold itself according to the terms set by the donors 
(Aksartova, 2005:158).  
 
 
Further, I propose that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan have also experienced mimetic 
isomorphism by imitating donors which they see as legitimate and successful from 
an organisational perspective (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:150). For example, an 
interview with the leader of a civil society support NGO from Bishkek indicated that 
they recruited staff in accordance with their rules which they copied from donors as 
described below:  
 
[Staff recruitment] happens absolutely in the same way as in the international organisations. 
This system is well developed in our organisation. There is transparency. First, we give an 
announcement. … After this, we receive CVs. Then we do short-listing. For short-listing, we 
involve, first of all, me as an executive director; secondly, a member of the management 
board…. We put pluses and minuses [on CVs] when short-listing by looking at a job 
description …. Obviously, we have a job description. Then interviews. The panel includes 3 
– 4 people: I certainly, someone from staff, 2 members of the management board. In our 
organisation, we have a document called ‘conflict of interests’ where the procedures are 
written that we should not hire relatives and so on. We do not have tribalism. We seek to 
work based on the international standards. Therefore, I think the process is open and 
transparent enough (Interview, Bishkek, 17 December 2007). 
 
 
Based on my personal experience of working in a donor agency in Bishkek, I can say 
that the staff employment process of this NGO is identical to the one with which I 
was employed, even down to such details as putting plus and minus symbols on CVs. 
It is obvious that, in the above quote, the interviewee stressed that they recruited their 
staff based on procedures used by international organisations. Therefore, she claims 
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that their recruitment process is transparent and without a conflict of interest. In other 
words, for NGOs, donors are a legitimate model of how an organisation should 
operate. Therefore, by imitating them, NGOs learn how to run their organisations, 
and, most importantly, have a better chance to achieve success with donors since 
they have obtained legitimacy in their eyes. They also come to serve as a model for 
other NGOs. NGO imitation of donors can be seen as an unintentional influence of 
donors on NGOs.  
Furthermore, the tendency of staff recruitment through merit based 
procedures among NGOs under explicit and implicit influence of donors seems to 
have caused normative isomorphism, that is, when organisations start sharing similar 
positions and a certain pool of professionals emerges to fill these positions – “almost 
interchangeable individuals who occupy similar positions across a range of 
organisations and possess a similarity of orientation and disposition” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983:152). Furthermore, people tend to move from one NGO to another for a 
position within a certain range, e.g. manager. Additionally, in some NGOs, their 
leaders can be employed by other NGOs as specialists on a certain field.   
For example, the heads of two rural NGOs working on refugees’ issues from 
Alamedin and Sokuluk districts are among these leaders. Based on a number of 
interviews with refugee NGOs, it was discovered that these leaders were not hired to 
work as a manager for their NGOs but rather that they were nominated by the 
members of their NGOs. Consequently, these NGO leaders were not professional 
outsiders but volunteers who were given responsibility to represent and support their 
members. However, my research data revealed that these NGO leaders benefited 
from experience and skills that they gained while running their respective NGOs. 
This enabled them to find jobs with other NGOs. Now they work for another NGO’s 
donor-funded project on establishing self-help groups. They receive a salary in the 
amount of 50-70 from the project (Interview, Bishkek, 14 March 2008). Based on 
this, it can be said that these leaders are earning a living through an NGO activity 
and, most importantly, are forging a career path. In other words, they have turned 
from voluntary NGO leaders into paid NGO specialists/workers.    
Similar positions in NGOs can have further implications on the organisational 
and professional rules as well as structure of the NGO sector in general. Due to such 
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similarities, it becomes easier for organisations to interact with each other, to attract 
career-oriented employees, to be recognised as legitimate and reputable, and to meet 
administrative requirements and eligibility criteria of grants and contracts (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), if there is a great 
number of trained professionals in a certain organisational field, organisations will 
compete with each other to attract these professionals. Therefore, prestige and 
resources will be of pivotal importance to organisations. This also contributes to 
further homogenisation of organisations since they will try to “provide the same 
benefits and services as their competitors” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:154). 
 
  
NGO professionalisation: facts and figures   
 
The main argument of the previous section has been that the way donors have 
worked with NGOs has made them professionalise and formalise. Moreover, chapter 
2 highlighted that there was a gap in the literature with regards to the professional 
characteristic of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. This section looks at the extent to which 
NGOs in Kyrgyzstan are professional and formal. Based on the ideal type of a 
professional and formal NGO that have been constructed in the methodology 
chapter, the section discusses leadership, membership, funding, an organisational 
structure, administrative and financial rules, staff, and technical-material basis of 
forty five NGOs47 that took part in the research. The availability of a full-time, paid 
leader, who has built a career in the NGO sector is a key criterion. The remaining 
aspects of professionalisation are considered in terms of whether they have 
contributed to professionalisation of Kyrgyz NGOs.   
Here it is also important to give a brief overview of different legal registration 
options that NGOs have according to the law on non-commercial organisations 
(NCOs) in Kyrgyzstan. According to this law, NGOs can be formed either as a 
                                                 
47 Although I interviewed 47 NGOs during my fieldwork as stated in the methodology chapter, in this 
chapter, I used interviews with 45 NGOs. Two NGOs were excluded because one of them was a 
branch of a large organisation that I also interviewed and the representative of the second one was 
interviewed in the capacity of an NGO export. Consequently, information was repeated in the first 
case, and, necessary information was insufficient in the second case.   
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public association, or a public foundation, or an institution48. The public association 
is a membership organisation which brings together citizens with common spiritual 
and other non-material interests on a voluntary basis. At least three people are 
needed to create one49. The public foundation is a non-membership organisation 
which pursues social, charitable, cultural, educational, and socially useful goals. It 
can be set up by one or more individuals and/or legal entities50. The institution is an 
organisation established by an owner to carry out managerial, socio-cultural, and 
other not-for-profit activities. It can be set up by one or more individuals and/or legal 
entities. The funding of the institution is supposed to be provided either fully or 





Twenty four of forty five NGOs in my sample were subsumed under a 
category of professional NGOs. In nineteen NGOs, managers were clearly separated 
from founders. Most importantly, it was their skills and experience that brought them 
to the position of a manager. Even some leaders did not go through a selection 
process for their position but rather were invited because of their skills and 
experience. My research data also suggested that most managers had worked in the 
NGO sector or a development project before taking up an employment with their 
current NGO. A vivid example is a manager of an NGO working on education. He 
has two high education diplomas. He started his career in one of the local NGOs. 
Then he had a job in the international NGO. A couple of years ago, he had an 
internship in the US through International Visitors Programme. A brief career 
biography of this manager posted on a website of the NGO states that, because of his 
broad experience in the NGO sector, he has knowledge in the field of civil society 
development, financial and managerial analysis of projects and programmes 
(Interview, Bishkek, 5 March 2008 and information from a web site of the NGO). In 
                                                 
48 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Non-Commercial Organisations (NCOs) as of 1998, Article 6, 
Chapter I. 
49 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs as of 1998, Article 20, Chapter II. 
50 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs as of 1998, Article 23, Chapter III. 
51 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs as of 1998, Articles 31, 33, Chapter IV. 
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other words, managers of these nineteen NGOs have built a career path in the NGO 
sector. 
Five of twenty four professional NGOs had full-time, paid managers; but, at 
the same time, these managers were either a founder or among the founders. 
However, for these managers, working for an NGO was not a voluntary job but 
rather a professional activity because they worked full-time and received a salary 
whilst being an NGO founder simultaneously. An example is a manager of a civil 
society support NGO from Bishkek. She founded the NGO in the early 1990s and 
has run it since then. The NGO has become one of the leading NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. 
Its staff consists of highly qualified specialists, who have professional education 
training from local, Russian and foreign educational centres, and wide work 
experience in the ‘third sector’. The manager has become not only an experienced 
NGO manager but also a civil society specialist. She has written a number of articles 
on the development of civil society in Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan for international 
journals. She is also a member of boards of other NGOs (Interview, Bishkek, 5 
November 2007 and information from a web site of the NGO). 
The leader of an environmental NGO from Bishkek has had the same career 
path and experience. She founded the NGO in 2002. Before setting it up, the 
manager graduated from the Ecological Department of the International University in 
Kyrgyzstan. Then she studied in Slovakia. She also had internships in many places 
including the USA and Russia. She stated that the ultimate goal of her NGO was to 
become professionals in the field of sustainable development, whose opinion would 
be valuable in society.  They also want to work not only in Kyrgyzstan but also in the 
neighbouring countries. They already have projects in Russia (Interview, Bishkek, 27 
November 2007). These two examples clearly show that these leaders regard an 
NGO activity not only as their vocation (something that they do for worthy causes) 
but also as their professional activity (something that they can and want to do 




Members    
 
The official registration of NGOs is central in discussing their membership. 
As has been outlined earlier, according to the law on non-commercial organisations, 
only NGOs registered as public associations are supposed to have a membership 
base. My research data revealed that fourteen of twenty four professional NGOs were 
registered as public associations. However, only ten of them have members. Five of 
ten NGOs said that their members were organisations which they supported and 
represented. The number of organisations in their membership varies from 6 to 209. 
For example, an NGO representing business firms has 48 organisations in its 
membership. Four of ten NGOs have asserted that their membership consists of 
individuals. Their number ranges between 30 and 50. The remaining NGOs did not 
specify their members but rather said they indicated their target group in general such 





My research data indicated that all twenty four professional NGOs received 
funding from donors. Thirteen of them depend completely upon donors. The 
remaining eleven NGOs have other sources of funding, which include owning and 
renting real estate, membership fees, selling services such as training and monitoring, 
social entrepreneurship, and donations from local and foreign business. However, 
only two of these NGOs said that income from other sources was sufficient to 
maintain their activities and organisation. One of these two NGOs is an association 
of business firms from. It has 48 member organisations. Its budget is constituted 
from membership fees that its members pay on an annual basis. It is just enough for 
the NGO to fulfil its mission, which is to represent interests of business firms. They 
do not have any extra funding for additional activities and even for additional staff. 
For example, the manager of the NGO has experienced problems with finding an 
assistant for a low salary that their budget can afford. Nevertheless, membership fees 
are enough to keep this organisation going and to carry out its mission. It also 
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occasionally received donor funding for additional activities. For example, it had 
funding from OSCE and trained potential young specialists for the firms (Interview, 
Bishkek, 25 February 2008).   
For the remaining nine of eleven NGOs, other sources of funding cover 
administrative costs and institutional development at best. For example, a civil 
society support NGO from Bishkek receives income from renting premises. 
However, these funds can only cover salaries of core staff which include the director, 
an accountant, an office-manager, security guards, and a cleaner. In the meantime, 
they are not sufficient to pay for any activities of the NGO. Consequently, the NGO 
needs to raise funds from donors for its activities (Interview, Bishkek, 17 December 
2007). For some NGOs, the income from other sources is even more limited and can 
hardly cover office expenses let alone salaries of staff. Another NGO from Bishkek 
working on civil society support complained that the income from selling their 
services such as training provision and others, their income could only cover 
communication expenses but not the salaries of trainers (Interview, Bishkek, 5 
November 2007). 
Few NGOs have noted that their membership fees are nominal. They echoed 
the interviewee from a refugee NGO from Bishkek who noted that their membership 
fees are symbolic; around 10 soms ($0.02). He also stressed that they could not 
demand a large membership fee from their members because they cannot afford such 
an amount at any rate (Interview, Bishkek, 29 November 2007). Based on the above, 
it is evident that, most professional NGOs heavily depend on donors notwithstanding 
the fact that eleven of them have other sources of funding in addition to donor grants. 
Only two organisations can exist independently and carry out their missions.  
 
 
Organisational structure  
 
The analysis of organisational structures of professional NGOs has shown 
that their structures correspond to the requirements of the law on non-commercial 
organisations. According to this law, in a public association, a general assembly 
consisting of all its members is a supreme body. Its main function is overseeing the 
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management and operation of the organisation52. The structure of a public foundation 
should consist of a board, which manages and represents the organisation, and a 
voluntary supervisory board, which oversees the overall activities of the 
organisation. These bodies are formed in accordance with a charter which is 
approved by the founder (s)53. The structure of an institution including governing 
bodies and their functions is determined by the owner54. 
As table 15 shows, most NGOs have bodies corresponding to the ones 
stipulated in the law on NCOs. It is evident that majority of NGOs registered as a 
public association have a general assembly and an executive body. NGOs with a 
status of a public foundation are even more similar to one another. The prevailing 
majority of them have a founder(s), a supervisory council, an executive director, and 
staff.  Therefore, a number of NGO interviewees described their structure as simple 
as did the leader of a human rights NGO from Osh:  
 
The structure of our organisation is simple as that of other public associations. We have 
general assembly, 27 members, then management, board. So the hierarchy is like this. It is a 
usual structure (Interview, 31 March 2008, Osh).  
 
 
By stating that their structure was “usual”, these NGOs meant that it was as 
that of other NGOs. There is only one NGO registered as an institution which has a 
supervisory council and an executive director. Most importantly, this means that all 
professional organisations despite their registration type have a body which is 
responsible for overseeing the overall direction of their activities. It is also evident 
that there is a hierarchy in professional NGOs.  
 
 
Table 15  
 
 Public Associations Membership Structure 
1 NGO working on refugees, Bishkek city 30 members 
(individuals) 
GA, MB, Staff 




GA, EB, Consultative 
Body, Staff 
3 NGO working on border issues, Osh city 27 members 
(individuals) 
GA, MB, EB, Staff 
                                                 
52 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs as of 1998, Article 20, Chapter II. 
53 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs as of 1998, Articles 26, 27, 28, Chapter III.  
54 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs as of 1998, Articles 31, 33, Chapter IV.  
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4 NGO working on HIV/AIDS, alcoholism, 
and other issues, Bishkek city   
Members available 
(individuals) 
CB, ED, Staff   




GA, BD, ED, Staff 





7 NGO working on civic education, 




GA, BD, P, ED, Staff 
8 NGO representing business firms, Bishkek 
city   
48 members 
(organizations) 
GA, Presidium, P, ED, 
Staff 




GA, MB, ED, Staff 
10 NGO working on women, poverty, and 
other social issues, Issyk-Ata region 
Village people 
(general) 
GA, MB, SB, ED, 
Staff 
11 NGO working on advocacy and civil 
society support, Bishkek city 
No members Founder, BD, ED, 
Staff 
12 NGO working on civil society support, 
Bishkek city 
No members GA, MB, ED, Staff 
13 NGO working on human rights, Bishkek 
city 
No members GA, Founders, CB, 
Staff 
14 NGO working on women's issues, Osh city   No members GA, Founders, ED, 
Staff 
 Public Foundations Membership Structure 
1 NGO working on HIV/AIDS prevention 
and other related issues, Osh city 
No members Founder, SC, ED, Staff 
2 NGO working on HIV/AIDS prevention 
and other related issues, Osh city 
No members Founders' council, SC, 
Coordinator, Staff 
3 NGO working on human rights, Bishkek 
city 
No members Founder, SC, ED, Staff 
4 NGOs working on rural development, 
Bishkek city   
No members Founder, SC, ED, Staff 
5 NGO working on elderly people, Bishkek 
city 
No members BD, ED, Staff 
6 NGO working on educational issues, 
Bishkek city 
No members Founder, SC, ED, Staff 
7 NGO working on environmental issues, 
Bishkek city 
No members Founder, SC, ED, Staff 
8 NGO working on conflict resolution, 
Bishkek city 
No members Founder, GA (all staff), 
MB, P, Staff    
9 NGO working on human rights, Bishkek 
city 
No members Founder, SC, ED, Staff 
 Institution   
1 NGO working on rural development, 
Bishkek city 
No members SC, ED 
 
GA - General Assembly (members), MB – Management Board, EB – Executive Body, ED – Executive Director, 




Administrative and financial rules  
 
In regards to administrative and financial regulations, my research suggested 
that NGOs in the professional category should at least follow their own charter 
developed in accordance with the law on non-commercial organisations since it 
stipulates that, regardless of their registration form, NGOs are meant to have a 
charter, which is a main document in their establishment and operation. The charter 
determines everything about an organisation including its activities, management, 
governing and controlling bodies, rights and responsibilities. Everyone engaged in an 
organisation is bound to comply with the charter55. For example, the NGO from 
Bishkek working on human rights has only the charter. All the other rules within this 
organisation are announced on the general meeting. However, they are not fixed on 
paper but rather passed on orally (Interview, Bishkek, 28 February, 2008). 
Nonetheless, most professional NGOs also have other internal regulations, 
particularly financial ones, in addition to the charter. My research indicated that the 
more experienced an NGO was, the more sophisticated its administrative and 
financial capacities were. For example, a women’s NGO, which has existed since 
1996, has organisational policies, which regulate internal relations between its 
employees, external relations with partners, and financial management (Interview, 
Bishkek, 19 March 2008). Data from self-administered questionnaires, which were 
completed by NGO employees within my research, revealed that twenty three out of 
twenty five respondents said that they had signed a contract and 16 said that they had 
been familiarised with their terms of reference when they started their employment 
with their respective NGOs. Although the survey included employees from all NGOs 
in my sample, the importance of these indicators is that NGOs have administrative 
practices and regulations, to which they adhere.  
 
                                                 
55 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs, Article 10, Chapter I.  
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Employment of staff and their remuneration   
 
My research showed that there were two wide-spread methods of staff 
recruitment among professional NGOs. The first method is employing people based 
on merit with a particular focus on their professional and educational background as 
well as personal characteristics. For example, a refugee NGO from Bishkek hires its 
staff exclusively by giving an advertisement in the public newspaper (Interview, 
Bishkek, 22 February 2008). The second method is recruiting among active 
volunteers as does a human-rights NGO from Bishkek. In this NGO, people who 
come to it as volunteers, become their employees later on when the NGO launches a 
new project (Interview, Bishkek, 28 February 2008).  
The self-administered questionnaires with NGO employees indicated that, out 
of twenty five respondents, seven were hired based on merit and eight on their 
volunteering experience in the NGO. Other answers included: “I was hired on 
recommendation of acquaintances” and “Establishment of an NGO was our joint 
initiative”. Further, the questionnaires have revealed that, employees of NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan receive a regular salary around the national average one which is 
$133.51 per month (www.for.kg)56. Seven out of twenty five NGO employees said 
that their monthly salary was up to 5,500 soms ($133.62); whilst the salaries of 
fourteen were more than 5,500 soms. Among NGO leaders, eight out of thirty three 
said that they received up to 5,500 soms ($133.62); twelve received from 5,501 to 
11,000 soms ($133.64 to $267.24); and four leaders received more than 11,001 soms.
 Finally, the data from self-administered questionnaires have shown that the 
NGO leaders are predominantly middle-aged, Kyrgyz, married and with university 
education. In relation to gender, leaders of urban NGOs are mainly female; while 
rural NGOs tend to be led by males. On the whole, the leaders of NGOs in my 
sample are balanced between genders. The NGO employees are mainly young, from 
                                                 
56 According to the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, the average salary in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2008 was 4,844.00 som (http://www.for.kg/ru/news/69105/). This is $133.51. The 
exchange rate of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz republic as of May 2008 (when the research was 
over) was 36.28 som for $1(http://www.nbkr.kg/DOC/18012010/000000000003605.xls).  
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18 to 35 years old, Kyrgyz, female, and with university education. The number of 
single and married employees is almost equal.  
 
 
Material and technical resources     
 
On the whole, professional NGOs have an adequate technical-material basis 
including an equipped and furnished office. As with the administrative and financial 
rules, the stronger the NGO is, the better its technical-material basis is. There are 
NGOs with abundant technical-material resources. For example, a NGO from 
Bishkek working on civil society support has a large office in the center of Bishkek. 
The office accommodates around ten staff members. It even has rooms for large 
meetings and gatherings. The office is nicely equipped and furnished57. There are 
also NGOs with minimal, essential technical-material resources such as the NGO 
from Bishkek representing business firms. It has a one-room office in the city center 
that can accommodate only two-three people. Its basic equipment and furniture is 
limited to a computer, tables, chairs, and a bookcase58. 
To sum up so far, slightly more than the half of NGOs in my sample were 
categorised as professional and formal. I have categorised the rest of the NGOs as 
non-professional. This will be discussed in a greater detail in chapter 7. However, at 
this point, it is necessary to note that a number of non-professional NGOs do 
resemble professional ones. They have an organisational structure, written office 
rules, and qualified staff, which are closely interconnected with their acquirement of 
project implementation experience, expertise, and other institutional capacity and 




                                                 
57 Observation notes taken after the interview on 5 November 2007, Bishkek. 
58 Observation notes, 25 February 2008, Bishkek.  
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NGO survival: further professionalisation   
 
The first section has shown that civil society activities and grant requirements 
of donors have made NGOs professional and formal. The overview of NGOs in the 
sample has revealed that slightly more than the half is professional and formal from 
an organisational perspective. Moreover, I have suggested that, even in the non-
professional category, there are NGOs which have features of professional NGOs 
such as an organisational structure and administrative rules. The discussions earlier 
have also made it clear that NGOs are dependent on donor funding. According to the 
resource dependency theory, when an external environment of organisations changes, 
particularly the amount of available resources, organisations either adapt to a new 
environment or cease functioning (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).  
Applying this theory to the Kyrgyz situation, one might anticipate that 
Kyrgyz NGOs are bound to experience considerable changes in the light of changes 
in civil society activities of donors. My research provided empirical support for this 
contention. In this section, I look at implications of the changes in donors’ civil 
society activities59 for NGOs in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
 
The trend towards further NGO professionalisation   
 
The key idea that my research data suggested is that the changes in civil 
society activities of donors were leading NGOs to further professionalisation and 
formalisation. Interviews with some donors and NGOs suggested that reduction in 
donor grants to the latter made the existing competition for donor funding among 
them fiercer. For example, one of the donor representatives stated that the last grant 
competition of their civil society programme was very strong (Interview, Bishkek, 12 
                                                 
59 In Chapter 4, I identified that the changes in donors’ civil society activities include reduction in 
donor funding to NGOs, especially to their capacity-building, promotion of NGOs in an advocacy 
role, and donors’ encouragement of collaborative relations between the state and NGOs. 
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November 2007). Moreover, a number of NGOs60 noted that donors have made their 
funding requirements stricter and have enhanced their control over the use of their 
grants. In this relation, the head of a civil society support NGO from Bishkek rightly 
observed that only competent NGOs with trained staff, proper skills, and experience 
can win the competition (Interview, Bishkek, 17 December 2008). In other words, a 
decreased pool of donor funding is compelling NGOs to meet donor requirements to 
be able to secure limited funding. As I have revealed earlier, donor requirements 
have resulted in professionalisation and formalisation of NGOs. Therefore, I suggest 
that NGOs are becoming even more professional and formal in order to meet donors’ 
toughened requirements to receive reduced funding from them. 
Furthermore, according to my research, the current donor promotion of 
NGOs in the advocacy role is also contributing to further NGO professionalisation 
and formalisation. The involvement of NGOs in advocacy has resulted in a closer 
interaction between them and the state institutions where the former seeks to 
influence the latter to undertake reforms in its policies.  However, to do this, 
interview data indicated that NGOs needed expertise in the field that they worked on 
and proper analytical skills to analyse state policies and to develop adequate 
recommendations and comments. NGOs lack these at present, for which they have 
been criticised, especially by state institutions. For example, a professional NGO 
from Osh faced such a criticism from the city administration. 
 
When we talked to the city administration, they said: “NGOs do not always have experts. For 
example, when we [the city administration] raise ecological issues at a round table, they 
[NGOs] can not always involve experts on ecology, who could explain professionally”. They 
[the city administration] said that people from different background come to the NGO sector 
and they are not always competent in issues that they raise. … For example, we are 
organising a public meeting on privatisation of the energy sector. We are sometimes blamed 
for holding public meetings without specialists on the energy sector, without an expert 
competent in the energy sector. In this case, they are right. They say that we need to have an 
expert evaluation. Moreover, the expert should be acknowledged on the level of our republic, 
whose opinion we can rely on and whose research we can believe so that it is not a biased 
perspective of the NGO (Interview, Osh, 1 April 2008). 
 
 
Furthermore, most interviewees from donor agencies and even from NGOs 
noted that NGOs needed to improve their professional and institutional capacity in 
order to enhance their legitimacy before the state so that it could trust their work and 
                                                 
60 For example, interviews with two Bishkek NGOs held on 1 November 2007 and 19 March 2008.  
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recommendations and consider them as an equal partner. Focus groups conducted 
with state representatives by the Aga-Khan Foundation within its research on the 
relationships between the state and civil society organisations (CSOs) in Kyrgyzstan 
revealed that one of the key complaints of the state institutions against CSOs was 
that they lacked professionalism, transparency, and accountability (Counterpart – 
Sheriktesh, 2007).  
These weaknesses have also been identified by NGOs on the national and 
regional forums of NGOs in 2007 (Interview, Bishkek, 7 May 2008). This clearly 
means that, to work with the state effectively, NGOs need to have adequate expertise 
in their field, analytical skills, and a competent institutional capacity to ensure their 
transparency and accountability. Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that it is not 
that the state requires NGOs to be professional but rather it is the level on which 
NGOs are involved in the interaction with the state and the role that they play require 
them to be professional.  
In other words, I argue that changes in donors’ civil society activities, which 
are the promotion of NGOs in an advocacy role and reduction in funding to NGOs, 
are requiring NGOs to strengthen their professional and institutional capacity, which 
is resulting in further professionalisation and formalisation of NGOs. This is because, 
firstly, the competition for donor funding has become tougher and demands NGOs to 
perform better from the professional and institutional perspectives. Secondly, the 
promotion of NGOs in advocacy has resulted in a closer relationship between the 
state and NGOs, where the latter is required to demonstrate knowledge, expertise, 
transparency, and accountability in their collaboration.  
The case of a women’s NGO from Bishkek demonstrates how NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan are further professionalising and formalising. The NGO has existed since 
the mid 1990s only on a voluntary basis with a main purpose of supporting regional 
women’s NGOs. The interviewee from this NGO said that they had experimented 
with an idea of voluntarism and had come to a conclusion that an organisation like 
theirs cannot exist on a voluntary basis because regional NGOs depend on their 
support and services. Most importantly, their work involves developing their 
[women’s NGOs] position and strategy conceptually and, as a result, requires great 
human resources, knowledge, expertise, and skills.  
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Consequently, they have volunteers, as the interviewee said, not housewives 
but women with high education, degrees with distinctions, and knowledge of several 
languages. For example, one of them used to work for a regional office of the Asian 
Development Bank in Thailand. However, the interviewee noted that they had been 
losing their volunteers because they could not employ them; meanwhile, all of them 
have families and need to earn living. The number of their volunteers has decreased 
from fifteen to four.  They cannot afford to lose any more volunteers because it takes 
time to train a new one. Moreover, it is difficult to find qualified people. Therefore, 
they started looking for funding to turn their volunteers into their staff. The 
interviewee admitted that fundraising was a very difficult task (Interview, Bishkek, 
16 May 2008). 
Furthermore, reduction in donor funding to NGOs is making them look for 
additional sources of funding to gain sustainability. A number of NGOs both from 
professional and non-professional categories said that they were thinking about self-
financing. Several NGOs noted that they wanted to develop social entrepreneurship 
in their organisation. For example, an NGO working on HIV/AIDS from Osh plans 
to set up a workshop to fix mobile phones. Their initiative has been supported by the 
World Bank (Interview, 2 April 2008, Osh). Meanwhile, a women’s NGO from 
Issyk-Ata district has already started social entrepreneurship activities. They have 
been growing plants on rented land and selling the crops to villagers. As a result, 
they not only raise funds for themselves but also give an opportunity to villagers to 
earn cash since they hire them to grow plants; and, in the end, they sell the crops to 
them on an agreed price (Interview, 19 March 2008, Bishkek).  The interviewee from 
a civil society support NGO said that, during their training, they encouraged NGOs 
to look at their organisations as social business since they believed that a work 
formula for NGOs was the same as for business: organisation – labour – client 
(Interview, 19 March 2008, Bishkek). This suggests that there is also a potential 
trend of commercialisation of NGOs in addition to their professionalisation and 
formalisation. However, the development of the former depends on the development 
of the latter since it requires professional and institutional skills.       
My research also revealed that professionalisation and formalisation was a 
concern for the NGO sector on a collective level as a result of their changing 
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environment.  Since 2005 NGOs have conducted regional and national NGO forums 
to discuss their strengths and weaknesses, their further development as the sector, 
and their relationship with the state and donors (ACSSC, 2007). In these forums, 
NGOs admitted their weaknesses such as having a poor public image and a lack of 
transparency and accountability, which undermines the trust of the state and the 
public in them. As a result, a couple of capacity-building projects have been 
launched. One of these projects is implemented by the ACSSC and funded by the 
Aga-Khan Foundation. Within it, the ACSSC developed a self-assessment tool which 
covers such aspects as strategic management and planning, management of human 
resources, service delivery, and public relations (www.acssc.kg). NGOs can use it to 
identify their strength and weaknesses (Interview, Bishkek, 12 November 2007). 
This is done in order to give a chance to NGOs to improve upon their identified 
weaknesses.  
 In addition, the ACSSC is also working on creating a certification process for 
NGOs. This implies developing certain standards that NGOs would use for their 
organisational operation. Any NGO can go though their certification process (i.e. an 
organisational audit) on a voluntary basis. If it meets the standards, it is awarded a 
certificate. If it fails, it will be provided with training recommendation to improve its 
weaknesses. It is believed that the certification process will help NGOs build their 
capacity. In addition, it will serve as a list of certified NGOs with which the 
government and business could get in touch with for prospective collaborations 
(Interview, Bishkek, 12 November 2007). This matches what McCarthy and Zald 
(1973) predicted with regard to SMOs. They asserted that the next step for 
professionalisation of SMOs would be an establishment of an association of SM 
organisers which would certify SM leaders. Although the NGO certification body 
described above is different, it can still be considered as a next stage in NGO 
professionalisation in Kyrgyzstan since it encourages NGOs to comply with certain 





Boundaries of NGO professionalisation  
 
Notwithstanding the trend towards further professionalisation and 
formalisation of NGOs, my research data showed that not all NGOs were actually 
able or had necessary support to professionalise and formalise. The interviews 
revealed that NGOs, which have managed to build up certain institutional and 
professional credibility including a certain level of experience, necessary skills and at 
least an adequate technical and material basis, stood a better chance of obtaining 
donor funding and are becoming more professional and formal. In the meantime, 
NGOs, which do not have the above listed assets, are behind this trend. Usually they 
are new and small NGOs. Many NGO interviewees echoed the head of a refugee 
NGO from Issyk-Ata, who said that it was very difficult for new and small NGOs 
since to obtain funding from donors they still needed to meet donors’ requirements 
such as availability of previous experience and skills (Interview, Bishkek, 14 March 
2008).    
Some of these NGOs have a very pessimistic mood. They expressed concern 
regarding a lack of funding. The only prospect that they see for themselves is closing 
down or turning into a commercial business. Interestingly, this problem concerns 
NGOs both in cities and villages. For example, a refugee NGO from Nijne-Chuisk 
has existed for several years, but has never managed to secure funding from donors. 
They have written eighteen project proposals. None of them was successful. The 
head of the NGO noted that they were so discouraged and they were ready to 
discontinue operation (Interview, Bishkek, 14 March 2008). A new NGO from Osh, 
which was the only NGO in my sample registered in 2006, encountered the same 
dilemma. They also submitted a number of proposals to donors, none of which were 
accepted. The head of the NGO explained their failure with the fact that she lacked 
time to write proper proposals since she worked at a university. She also suspected 
that donors might be corrupt (Interview, Osh, 4 April 2008).  
Furthermore, there is no adequate capacity-building support for these NGOs 
to develop their organisations. As stated elsewhere donor agencies and INGOs either 
stopped providing or reduced dramatically their institutional support to NGOs. In a 
 155 
few cases, where such support is available, NGOs are supposed to have some 
institutional capacity to be eligible for it. For example, as discussed in chapter 4, NDI 
supports those NGOs which have access to internet or phone in order to be in regular 
contact with them (Interview, Bishkek, 1 November 2007). This means that NGOs 
should be able to afford at least a computer and internet connection. As a result, 
NGOs without these, which are usually non-professional, small, and new, are left 
without any support.   
Local NGOs working on civil society support (CSS) are also unable to 
provide proper capacity-building support to NGOs. An interviewee from one such 
NGO said that they trained new NGOs and helped them get established. However, 
the NGO could not provide the new NGOs with any information on donor grants 
since there were no donor grants for NGOs. Therefore, it has become difficult for 
CSS NGOs to function (Interview, Bishkek, 19 March 2008). Moreover, CSS NGOs 
are struggling to survive themselves because of donor funding reduction in their field 
– capacity-building of civil society. For example, a CSS NGO from Osh said that, in 
the past, their key support to NGOs included provision of consultation on different 
issues. Moreover, they were contracted by NGOs to provide training and to do 
research and evaluation. This was one of their ways to fundraise. However, the 
situation is different now. Since NGOs started receiving limited donor grants, their 
activities have reduced. They cannot afford consultation and training from the CSS 
NGO. Therefore, the CSS NGO is standing idle now as noted by this interviewee: 
 
We used to have a lot of clients before. Now there is almost none. … For example, before, 
we used to have 48-50-60 visits/requests per month. Now it is only 15-16. Even in this case 
they [NGOs] come to get services on project writing and information on grant programmes. 
…we have become a centre, which distributes information about what and where is 
happening in the field of NGOs, where there are grant and training opportunities and others. 
As a result, resource centres are not functioning because there is no demand for information, 
consultation, expertise, … trainings, expert evaluation, and research and so on. Now as there 
is no funding, everything is on halt (Interview, Osh, 1 April 2008).  
 
 
As a result, local CSS NGOs are bound to change their strategies to obtain 
funding for their survival. My research data suggested that they were concentrating 
more on priorities for which donor funding is earmarked, such as advocacy and 
promotion of reforms in state policies rather than civil society support.  
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While the impact of scarce capacity-building support has an evident impact 
on small and new NGOs with weak professional and institutional capacity, according 
to the interview data, it can also have a negative influence on professionally and 
institutionally adequate NGOs. For example, a lawyers’ NGO from Osh, categorised 
as professional, cannot conduct a general meeting because it does not have funds to 
bring together its members, who are located in three countries on Fergana valley. As 
a result, the proper operation and management of the NGO is at risk (Interview, Osh, 
31 March 2008). The interviewee from a Bishkek based CSS NGO, who carries out 
organisational audits in NGOs, shared her experience. According to her, having an 
organisational audit is a new phenomenon for Kyrgyz NGOs. When they just started, 
NGOs considering themselves successful agreed to be audited. The interviewee 
noted that, after auditing these NGOs, they found considerable weaknesses in their 
structure and concluded that it was an outcome of limited investment in institutional 
support of NGOs due to a lack of capacity-building support (Interview, Bishkek, 19 
March 2008). 
 Furthermore, the reduction in donor funding to NGOs is also resulting in the 
lowering of salaries in them. I have stated in the second section that NGO workers 
received a monthly salary of no more than an average one in Kyrgyzstan which is 
$137. This is different from what was before when the NGO sector used to provide 
generous remuneration to its employees (e.g. Aksartova, 2005; Adamson, 2002). As 
a result, there is a problem of staff turnover in NGOs now. The interview data 
revealed that NGO employees, young people among them, were giving up their jobs 
in the NGO sector not only because of salaries but also because of its unstable 
nature. Instead NGO employees started taking up jobs in the public sector, business, 
and international organisations. Some interviewees generally suggested that working 
for an NGO was no longer prestigious; whilst employment with an NGO was 
previously considered enviable (Interview, 12 April 2008, Jalalabat). A number of 
NGO interviewees in my sample also noted that, for young people, the NGO sector 
had become a starting point in their career, where they could acquire new skills and 
gain experience before taking up employment in other sectors. 
To sum up, I have suggested that the changes in donors’ civil society 
promotion have had two key implications for the NGOs sector. The first implication 
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is that an existing competition for donor funding among NGOs has become stronger. 
The second one is that promotion of advocacy is leading the state and NGOs to have 
a closer interaction. These factors, in their turn, are making NGOs to further 
professionalise and formalise. The tougher competition is forcing NGOs to improve 
their professional and institutional capacity in order to secure limited funding. The 
increased interaction with the state is making NGOs acquire necessary knowledge, 
expertise, and skills in their fields to be able to influence the state. However, not all 
NGOs are following this trend. I have showed that only established NGOs, which are 
predominantly professional NGOs, are further building their capacity. In the 
meantime, new and small NGOs are being left out and do not have proper capacity-
building support. A lack of such support is also jeopardising well-being of 
professional NGOs. Further, I have noted that reduced donor funding is making 
salaries of NGO workers lower. This is resulting in the problem of staff turnover in 





In this chapter, I have discussed research findings about how changes in 
donors’ civil society promotion have influenced NGOs in Kyrgyzstan which answers 
the first half of my third research question: what are the implications of the changes 
in civil society activities of donors for Kyrgyz NGOs, the Kyrgyz state, and relations 
between the two?. To do this, first, I have discussed the influence of donors on 
NGOs since the beginning of their interaction. I have suggested that donors have 
shaped the development of NGOs in a professional and formal form through their 
training, grant requirements, and even by being a model of a legitimised 
organisation.  
Consequently, in the second section, I have looked at how many NGOs in my 
sample are professional and formal drawing on the ideal type of the professional and 
formal NGO identified in chapter 3. The ideal type included the following criteria: 
leadership, organisational structure, funding, membership, administrative rules, and 
technical-material basis. Based on these, I have identified that slightly more than the 
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half of NGOs in my sample can be categorised as professional. I have also stated 
that, in the non-professional category, some NGOs resemble professional ones.   
The influence that donors have had on NGOs in Kyrgyzstan through their 
funding requirements can be explained by organisational theories. According to the 
resource mobilisation theory of McCarthy and Zald (1973), when a considerable 
amount of external funding is available, non-profit organisations change their nature 
from voluntary to professional to obtain the funds. As a result, they separate from 
their membership base and hire professional staff to secure funding from external 
sources. In other words, donor funding requirements are bound to make NGOs 
professionalise and formalise. The case of Kyrgyz NGOs illustrates this. As shown 
above, in order to obtain funds from donors, some NGOs had to acquire professional 
and institutional capacity. This has happened in other developing countries too. For 
example, in India in the 1980s-1990s, NGOs underwent professionalisation because 
of the increased availability of foreign funding as well as donor requirements such as 
proper management of funds, reporting, and monitoring (Ebrahim, 2001: 88-89). 
In the third section, I have specifically looked at the influence of recent 
changes in civil society activities of donors on NGOs. My key argument is that 
NGOs are further professionalising and formalising because these changes have been 
prompting them to improve their professional and institutional capacity to overcome 
the increased competition for donor funding and to be able to work with the state 
effectively under advocacy rhetoric and collaborative relations with the state. This is 
congruent with the resource dependence theory of Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) which 
states that organisations are bound to change when their environment changes.  
For example, NGOs in Latin America had to further professionalise 
throughout the 1990s because of a greater donor demand for accountability due to 
concerns about NGOs’ use of funds. Donors toughened their rules and required 
NGOs to show tangible outcomes of their activities. As a result, Latin American 
NGOs had to acquire specific skills and expertise such as designing proposals, 
meeting accounting and evaluation procedures, and dealing with international 
funding. Consequently, NGOs including grassroots organisations in Latin America 
experienced great professionalisation and formalisation (Markowitz and Tice, 2002). 
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In the similar vein, NGOs in Kyrgyzstan are becoming more professional and formal 
because of the changes in donors’ civil society activities.     
Nonetheless, I have pointed out a number of limitations in the trend of further 
NGO professionalisation and formalisation. My argument is that this trend concerns 
professionally and institutional adequate NGOs which predominantly match a 
category of professional NGOs. In the meantime, small and new NGOs, which tend 
to be professionally and institutionally weak, are struggling to survive. This is 
because these NGOs cannot meet grant requirements of donors properly and, 
consequently, are phased out from a circle of grant receivers.  Moreover, they do not 
have capacity-building support from donors since the latter ceased providing it. 
Therefore, it would be logical to assume that if the same NGOs continue to receive 
funding due to their high level of professionalism and formalisation, the NGO sector 
in Kyrgyzstan might become static. As a result, the sector will fail to experience 
growth, diversification, and dynamism.  
I have also noted that a lack of capacity-building support puts professional 
NGOs at stake as well because they fail to carry out their organisational management 
properly. Finally, I have argued that reduced donor funding to NGOs has resulted in 
the decrease of salary rates in them. I have established that, within those NGOs that 
pay their staff salary, the majority is around an average salary in Kyrgyzstan. As a 
result, a problem of staff turnover has emerged in the NGO sector since their 
employees started leaving for the public and private sectors and other development 
organisations whose jobs are considered more stable.  
The reduction in NGO salary and a staff turnover problem in them have 
implications for the literature on civil society in Kyrgyzstan. Some scholars 
(Adamson, 2002; Roy, 2002; Petric, 2005; Aksartova, 2005) argued that NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan provided generous salaries and benefits to their employees, which in its 
turn triggered internal “brain drain” since people from other sectors moved to the 
NGO sector. However, based on the above research findings, I argue that the 
situation regarding this is different now. NGOs are no longer causing the internal 
“brain drain”. In fact, I suggest that the NGO sector is experiencing the “brain drain” 
since its employees are leaving for the public and private sectors.  
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Most importantly, my exploration of NGOs from the organisational 
perspective has filled the gap in the literature that I outlined in chapter 2. The 
literature claimed that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan were professional. However, this claim 
was not based on studies of NGOs’ organisational capacity. My research findings 
have indicated that only the half of my sample can be categorised as professional 
organisations. Therefore, I suggest that the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan cannot be 
generalised as professional. Finally, I would like to point out that this chapter 
answered the first half of my third research question which focuses on the 
implications of changes in donors’ civil society promotion for the NGO sector in 
Kyrgyzstan. The next chapter will answer the second half of my third research 
question which asks what the implications of the changes for the state-NGO relations 


































State-NGO relations   
 
 
Chapter 4 established that the state has returned to development as a key 
actor. Donors are providing the state with capacity-building support and funding. In 
this regard, I suggested that the focus of donors on the state is new, since previously 
they concentrated mainly on civil society promotion as an alternative and antithesis 
to the state. Consequently, in this chapter, I discuss whether changes in donors’ civil 
society promotion have influenced the state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, 
I address my last research question61.  
The review of the relevant literature in chapter 2 revealed that the interaction 
between these actors was unstable. In particular, the state changed its attitude 
towards NGOs frequently from supporting civil society to limiting it. The literature 
review also pointed out that donors played an important role in state-NGO 
interaction (Aksartova, 2005). However, I suggested in chapter 2 that the literature 
did not provide a comprehensive account of NGO-state relations in Kyrgyzstan. 
Most works, especially reports of international organisations such as HRW and the 
US Department of State, preferred to focus on the confrontation between these 
actors. Some authors claimed that there was mistrust between NGOs and the state 
(Tretyakov, 2007). Meanwhile, others asserted that these actors did not intersect at 
all (Roy, 2002).  
I start the chapter by looking at the role of donors in state-NGO relations. In 
the first section I identify to what extent these actors depend on donors to interact 
with each other. I argue that donors are still important because they provide funding 
to projects where the actors interact. In the second section, I discuss how NGOs and 
the state cooperate and work together and conclude that efforts of donors to make 
these actors work jointly are effective. In the third section, I look at the side of the 
state-NGO relations where NGOs counterbalance the state. A particular stress is put 
on how the state reacted to this. In the fourth section, I analyse the state in 
                                                 
61 My third research question is: What are the implications of these changes for Kyrgyz NGOs, the 
Kyrgyz state, and relations between the two? 
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Kyrgyzstan based on its relations with NGOs. The fifth section is a discussion of the 
research findings. Finally, I focus on the government of Bakiev in this chapter 
because I conducted my research during the rule of this government.   
 
 
The continuing centrality of donor funding  
  
My research revealed that donors were still important in the relationships 
between the state and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. This is because they predominantly 
interact with each other within donor funded projects. As has been pointed out 
earlier, NGOs remain heavily dependent on donor funding. Interviews with NGOs 
showed that, in most cases, if there was a donor-funded project, there is a 
relationship between them and the state. “When we have a certain project, we turn to 
them [state institutions]” noted an interviewee from an NGO from working on 
conflict prevention and gave as an example that, when they had to develop a report 
on immigration processes in the south of Kyrgyzstan within their project, they 
worked with a range of state institutions such as committees on migration and labour 
and statistics (Interview, 3 April 2008, Osh).  
This comment demonstrates that NGOs tend to initiate an interaction with the 
state and its institutions when they have activities funded by donors. This is usually 
at least a donor requirement for them. Once the project is over, the relationships 
between actors become weaker. For example, an action plan on the state-NGO 
interaction to fight domestic violence that the women’s NGO from Osh developed 
together with the state institutions worked only for one year. When the donor 
funding stopped, the actors did not continue a plan for the next year (Interview, Osh, 
4 April 2008). This is very typical for the state-NGO relationships within donor 
programmes. Therefore, the state-NGO relationships can be described as desultory 
and very much dependent on the donor funding.  
Donor grants also maintain NGOs as organisations so that they can carry out 
their activities including work with the state. It has been identified elsewhere that 
NGOs with a regular flow of donor funding tend to be professionally and 
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institutionally competent. According to my research, these NGOs interact with the 
state often. Meanwhile, NGOs with no funding tend to have minimum interaction 
with the state. It is also important to note that donor funding enables NGOs to 
interact with state institutions not only within donor projects, but also on their own 
initiative, because it maintains the existence, operation, and development of the NGO 
as an organisation. As a result, the NGO can get involved in activities in addition to 
the projects that are in accordance with their mission.  
An NGO working on the prevention of HIV/AIDS is a good case to explain 
this point. In 2005, when the bill defining prostitution as a criminal act was initiated, 
the NGO worked with the state institutions, including police and parliament 
members, intensively to stop the adoption of the bill. After a 6-month effort the 
NGO managed to get the bill rejected (Interview, 23 November 2007, Bishkek). This 
means that, even though in 2005 sex workers were not the target group of the NGO, 
they still advocated for this issue because it was important for them strategically 
since their future projects would target sex workers. More importantly, they had the 
necessary capacity to do this, as they were maintained by donor grants from their 
other projects.   
Furthermore, my research data suggested that a current donor focus on the 
promotion of effective relationships between NGOs and the state was leading the 
actors to work jointly. In other words, even though NGOs are involved in advocacy 
and have to influence the state; they should do it in a collaborative way because, 
according to donors, these actors are complementary: one can do what the other 
cannot and vice versa. Interviews also seem to suggest that donor projects have 
served as an involuntary incentive for the state to interact with NGOs. Many NGO 
interviewees said that the state interacts with them for the sake of appearance. In 
other words, the state institutions have to interact with NGOs to keep funding from 
donors coming.    
All in all, according to my interviewees, the state institutions expect some 
funding from NGOs. In fact, potential funding is one of the incentives for the state 
institutions to interact with the NGOs. It has been a recurrent statement made by 
local and international NGOs that the state institutions believe that NGOs are 
abundant with donor funding. Consequently, the state institutions engage in 
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collaboration with NGOs in order to benefit from their funds, either in terms of cash 
or equipment, or furniture62. An interviewee from a civil society support NGO with 
wide experience and knowledge of the Kyrgyz NGO sector neatly summed it up: 
 
 
They [the state institutions] collaborate well with those NGOs, which have money and when 
they have projects (Interview, 1 April 2008, Osh).   
 
 
This, in turn, emphasises again the significance of donor funding in the state-NGO 
relationships in Kyrgyzstan. In other words, donors are important in the interaction 
of NGOs and the state institutions because they provide funding for projects where 
these actors can interact. Further, donors are the main funders of NGOs. Therefore, 
they support the existence and operation of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan in the first place. 
Finally, at present, donors are focusing specifically on the promotion of collaborative 
and effective relationships between the state and NGOs. Donor funding and 
strategies have been identified as central in the maintenance of the relationship 
between the state and NGOs since both of the actors do not have funding for their 
joint activities. Since donor funding is unstable, the relations between the state and 
NGOs tend to be unsystematic and irregular.  
 
 
NGOs in a continuum with the state    
 
According to my research, NGOs work together with the state. NGOs tend to 
act either as consultants, training providers, fundraisers, and even event organisers 
when working with the state. Some of them, especially those working at a national 
level in the capital, participate in the development of various legislative documents 
and policies. Based on this, I suggest that, through such activities, the state and 
NGOs tend to work together by sharing the same agenda. To illustrate this as well as 
a general pattern of the state-NGO interaction in Kyrgyzstan, I use below a case of a 
women’s NGO from Osh.  
                                                 
62 For example, interviews with 2 representatives of the INGO in Osh, 2 April 2008, a representative 
of an NGO in Bishkek working on issues of disabled, 19 February 2008 and others.  
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The women’s NGO is a crisis centre which was established in 1998 with an 
aim of preventing violence against women through educating the population in Osh 
province. Up to 2003, the NGO provided different social services to women. 
However, their experience showed that their services had had little effect on the 
solution of women’s problems and they needed to interact with the local authorities 
in order to tackle the problems more effectively. As a result, in 2003, the NGO 
launched its first project aimed at the collaboration with territorial councils which 
were within the local authorities at that time. When carrying out their project, the 
NGO discovered that the territorial councils were not supposed to belong to the local 
authorities and obey the city administration since they were a public institution. 
Consequently, with the effort of the NGO, a decree to revise the status of territorial 
councils and other institutions of local authorities was issued (Interview, Osh, 4 
April 2008). 
The second project of the NGO explicitly focused on the improvement of the 
relationship between the state and NGOs fighting against domestic violence. The 
NGO developed this project because, firstly, the available legislation on violence 
against women was not carried out properly. Secondly, NGOs could not access the 
state institutions to work on this. The NGO received funding for this project from 
one of the donors. As a result, the NGO together with the city administration, the 
internal affairs department, and the social protection department developed an action 
plan for the joint interaction between these institutions and NGOs. The plan was 
published in the local newspaper (Interview, Osh, 4 April 2008). 
This case suggests that through these projects the NGO a) identified the 
weaknesses of the state institutions regarding their structure and legislation, b) 
brought them to the attention of the concerned state institutions, and c) initiated and 
facilitated the actions of the state institutions to improve their weaknesses. This is a 
general pattern of the relationship between the state and most NGOs interviewed 
within my research. There is an issue with either legislation or state policy or any 
other aspect of the state institutions regardless whether it concerns refugees, disabled 
people, young children, elderly people or human rights. NGOs bring the issue to the 
attention of the respective state institutions through different projects such as the 
above, and involve them in solving the issue in question.  
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The actual dialogue between the NGOs and the state institutions takes place 
during round tables, seminars, and meetings. Round tables, in particular, are an 
important and wide-spread means of interaction. They serve as a platform for the 
actors to discuss the problems and negotiate solutions for them. For example, it was 
a series of round tables with the parliament members that enabled a human rights 
NGO from Bishkek to have the law on custody procedures amended. As a result of 
the NGO’s efforts, a lawyer can now meet their own client, the accused, without 
permission from a prosecutor, which was not allowed before. The interviewee from 
this NGO made a particular emphasis on the fact that they could reach this positive 
change through negotiations and cooperation with the parliament rather than open 
confrontation (Interview, Bishkek, 20 February 2008). Based on this, I suggest that 
round tables enable negotiation, sharing of views, and establishing a joint agenda.  
Further, NGOs are a provider of different types of resources to the state. This 
can be demonstrated with an example of an NGO from Bishkek working on the 
issues of disabled people. In December 2007, the Kyrgyz President declared that 
month as a month of additional support to disabled people. Consequently, the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Protection invited the NGO to discuss how they could 
mark this month and what they could do together. The preparation process ended 
with the fact that the Ministry borrowed the NGO’s banner, motto, logo, and videos 
which they prepared for a festival. The Ministry explained this that they did not want 
to spend funding on producing these attributes from scratch. The NGO interviewee 
said that they had not minded sharing their materials because it was for the benefit of 
their constituency (Interview, 19 February 2008, Bishkek). Based on this, it can be 
said that NGOs not only collaborate with state institutions but also act as a source of 
intellectual resource and work materials, meaning they have an influence on the state 
institution’s agenda and activities.    
Furthermore, a number of NGO interviewees said that their relationship with 
the state had improved since 2005 (the research was carried out in 2007-2008). The 
case of a human rights NGO from Osh covers all the aspects of improvements in the 
state-NGO relationships that were discovered by my research. The improvements 
include three specific facts. Firstly, the NGO had been invited by the state committee 
on migration and employment to hold training for their staff for the first time. 
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Secondly, after a round table in Bishkek organised by the NGO, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs invited them to carry out a joint project on border issues. As a result, 
they developed a joint project which is now under the consideration of donors for 
funding. Thirdly, they started signing a memorandum of understanding and 
collaboration with state institutions, namely the frontier services and passport 
departments of three provinces (Interview, 31 March 2008, Osh). This case indicates 
not only the recent improvement in state-NGO relations but also the fact that these 
actors started interacting without direct donor support.  
In other words, for NGOs, the improvements in state-NGO relationships 
imply more collaboration and joint work together. It can be suggested that, by 
signing documents such as a memorandum with NGOs, the state institutions started 
to consider NGOs as partners. Further, NGOs now not only provide expertise and 
organise events but also provide training for the state institutions. My research also 
discovered that a number of NGOs now had donor funded projects aimed at building 
the capacity of state institutions. For example, an NGO from Bishkek focusing on 
conflict prevention is working with local authorities to increase their transparency 
and accountability by looking at their budgeting and engaging local population and 
different groups in the community (Interview, 12 April 2008, Jalalabat). Another 
women’s NGO from Issykata district was invited by local authorities to conduct 
training for their staff which they did on a voluntary basis. This is strategically 
important to this NGO since, as the interviewee noted, they need qualified people in 
local authorities to work with effectively (Interview, 19 March 2008, Bishkek).  
The interview data also revealed that some NGOs intentionally included 
representatives from the state institutions into their governing bodies. For example, a 
civil society support NGO from Osh has representatives of the local state 
administration in its council of stakeholders, which is a strategy-setting and activity-
monitoring body. The interviewee noted that they wanted the state administration to 
be informed about their activities and to get feedback from them because state 
officials know where the gaps are and what are needed (Interview, 1 April 2008, 
Osh). This is another illustration of a common agenda shared between NGOs and the 
state and work between these actors without donor support.  
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Furthermore, many NGO interviewees said that they wanted to have 
relationships with the state that are collaborative, open, constructive, trust based, 
close, transparent, easily accessed and have a dialogue. Here an interviewee from a 
women’s NGO from Bishkek highlighted how she wanted the relationship between 
the state and civil society to be: 
 
 
[I]t should be an open dialogue so that all disputable issues are solved on an equal basis and 
a consensus is sought all the time and [state and civil society] could understand each other. 
There is no need to show the government the most hurtful issues, there is no need to talk 
with populist slogans. Civil society must, if it is promoting something [criticising], justify it 
… and propose something instead (Interview, Bishkek,19 March 2008).  
 
 
Her comment not only underscores the above dominant vision of NGOs on their 
ideal relationships between the state and civil society but also adds that the actors 
should interact on an equal basis with understanding. She condemns NGOs that 
criticise the state which has been a common phenomenon lately in Kyrgyzstan. She 
condemns them for being populist and emphasises that they need not only check on 
the state but also help it by making proposals for change. She believes that there 
should be mutual support and understanding between the actors.   
Further, some NGO interviewees were convinced that civil society was 
meant to assist the government. For them, the state should regard NGOs as a useful 
resource that it can use to interact with the society on the primary level, to help in 
implementing state programmes, to provide quality state service, and to monitor and 
evaluate state programmes. For example, according to the interviewee from the civil 
society support NGO, the President could contract an NGO to assess how the state 
administration is working in Osh province (Interview, 1 April 2008, Osh). Most 
importantly, these NGOs see the state and civil society as one whole. “NGOs are 
part of our civil society and without them the state cannot develop. It is its 
complementary part” declared an interviewee from a lawyers’ NGO (Interview, 31 
March 2008, Osh). In the meantime, another interviewee claimed that the state and 
NGOs should come to agreement over their joint partnership goals (Interview, 1 
April 2008, Osh).  
My research indicated that state institutions were open to the joint work and 
collaboration with NGOs. According to my interview data, they started to initiate 
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partnership with NGOs. For example, the human rights NGO from Bishkek among 
other several NGOs experienced occasions when the government made an initiative 
to collaborate with them.  In 2007, the head of this NGO was invited to take part in a 
working group which was created by the decree of the President to develop a bill on 
juvenile justice (Interview, 20 February 2008, Bishkek). This example reinforces the 
idea of NGOs embracing the role of consultants. The state institutions are involving 
NGOs in order to make use of their expertise, knowledge and experience. Most 
NGOs regard this type of state initiatives as an improvement in their relations, that 
is, their willingness to approach NGOs and initiate a dialogue. Further, the same 
NGOs noted that the state had finally learned what NGOs were and what they did. 
They said that they were approached by the state institutions for consultation and 
were invited to their events.  
The case of one of the few sustainable NGOs from Bishkek working on 
issues of elderly people showed that the state institutions, the Department of Social 
Protection in this case, not only take or expect something from NGOs, as claimed by 
other NGOs, but also contribute to their collaboration. This NGO provides monetary 
support, which is raised from worldwide donations, to lonely and poor elderly 
people. The state institution provides the NGO with access to a database of elderly 
people who need help. It also assists the NGO with the distribution of funds through 
their centres in regions (Interview, 19 February, 2008). Similarly, a number of other 
NGOs said that the state institutions provided their premises and equipment for their 
events for free. NGOs also received help from the state specialists and experts. In 
fact, most NGOs have noted that the state provided them mainly in-kind support. As 
one of the NGO interviewees put it “they provide us political and moral support” 
(Interview, 5 April 2008, Osh).   
Furthermore, the state has made a number of initiatives to strengthen its 
relationship with civil society, in particular with NGOs. In December 2008, the 
President Bakiev signed a decree on the creation of the public chamber which would 
be financed by the state budget. It was meant to: a) coordinate the interaction of 
citizens with the President, state institutions, and local authorities to make sure that 
the needs and interests of citizens are reflected in the development and 
implementation of internal and external politics of the government; b) protect the 
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rights and interests of citizens; and c) carry out control over activities of the state 
institutions and local authorities. Forty five people representing civil society, 
business, and art associations, and an assembly of Kyrgyz people were proposed as 
members (Gorbachev, 2008).  
In June 2008, the law on social contracting (giving out grants to NGOs for 
provision of social services) was adopted (Turdukulova, 2008). However, the 
Minister of Finance at once announced that there were not funds in the state budget 
to award grants to NGOs (Uldasheva, 2008). In the early 2009, the President met 
with a number of NGOs, where he acknowledged that Kyrgyzstan could not create 
strong state institutions without the support of the NGOs, and signed a cooperation 
agreement with them. The document was hailed as “historic” since it encouraged a 
new and positive cooperation between NGOs and the government (www.rferl.org, 
2009c; Karimov, 2009 a). As a result of the meeting, it was decided to create a 
coordinating council of the state institutions and the NGO sector (Karimov, 2009 b).  
To sum up so far, state – NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan have an element of 
joint work and agenda sharing. NGOs serve the state as consultants, training 
providers, fundraisers, and even event organisers. The interaction between NGOs and 
the state institutions mainly takes place during meetings and round table discussions, 
where issues of mutual concern are discussed and an agenda is shared. Some NGOs 
have even involved representatives of state institutions into their governing bodies so 
that their activities address key developmental issues, of which the state institutions 
are more aware of according to NGOs. Furthermore, NGOs want collaborative and 
cooperative relations with the state because, according to them, they share common 
goals with the state and could be a resource for the state to use in its activities. 
Furthermore, the cases showing that the relations between the state and NGOs have 
been taking place without donor support were demonstrated. Based on this, I suggest 
that there is an interaction between the actors without donor intervention. Even if the 
state cannot acquire monetary benefit from NGOs, it still can receive advice, 




NGOs as a counterbalance to the state    
 
According to my research, the state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan also have 
elements of counterbalance. A few NGOs have identified their role as checking on 
the state. These NGOs are usually vocal, human rights NGOs with charismatic, 
experienced leaders. For them, the essence of NGOs is their independence from the 
state. For example, an interviewee from a media NGO described ideal relations 
between the state and NGOs in the following way.  
 
 
In principle, the state should not help NGOs, but if we talk ideally it should not intervene in 
NGOs’ affairs. … If it [NGO] does not need the state to collaborate with it, so it should live on 
its own. Even it will be better for everyone. The state is an army of civil servants. Ideally, we 
should not notice them. They should do their business. We should do our business. They should 
not interfere in our affairs. But we can interfere in their affairs because we choose them. I think 
the relationship should be diplomatic, politically correct, and friendly … in no case one side 




This account is opposite to the one of most NGOs presented earlier where the state 
and NGOs complement each other and work together. Here, on the contrary, the state 
and society are two different, clearly demarcated institutions. They do their 
respective affairs without dominating each other. Civil society is meant to check on 
the state to prevent its dominance over the society. For instance, a couple of NGO 
interviewees, who adhere to this stance, said that they would not accept government 
funding so as not to jeopardise their independence. Obviously, such a vision of the 
state-NGO relations has influenced the practical actions of these NGOs towards the 
state.  
Some of these NGOs have checked on the state by lobbying the interests of 
their constituencies. For example, the interviewee from a Bishkek based NGO 
working on issues of disabled people said that they tried to keep the state institutions, 
which they work with, focused on the functions that they were supposed to do. He 
explained that the state has certain obligations to its citizens. In their case, the state 
has to take into account the needs of disabled people while, for example, building 
accommodation, buildings, roads and others. However, the state did not fulfil its 
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functions properly. Therefore, their NGO reminds the government to reflect the 
needs of their constituency, the disabled, in their policies. The interviewee 
highlighted that it was a difficult job (Interview, 19 February 2008, Bishkek). 
Others, in the meantime, provide a critical assessment of the state’s activities. 
For example, the initiatives of the President on the creation of the public chamber 
and the promotion of the state-NGO cooperation, which was mentioned earlier, have 
been challenged and even rejected by some NGOs. Right after the President signed 
the decree on the formation of the public chamber, a couple of famous NGO leaders 
declared that this institution would be illegitimate and would not be recognised by 
people. Moreover, they argued that the chamber duplicated the jogorku kenesh (the 
parliament) which would have had to be dismissed if the chamber had been 
established (Gorbachev, 2008). Meanwhile, according to the President, the chamber 
would serve as an official mechanism where civil society and the state would come 
together (www.24kg.org).  The same NGO leaders did not attend the meeting of the 
President with NGOs as a protest. They were not happy with the fact that they were 
asked to provide questions to be discussed with the President in advance and were 
prohibited from raising any other issues (Lymar, 2009 b).  
Another vivid example is a campaign of NGOs against the HIPC initiative in 
2006-2007. A number of well-established NGOs and new post-March 2005 NGOs 
set up a movement called “People’s Unity – Rebirth”. They used radical methods for 
their campaign. These included debates, criticism of the progress of the activities of 
the Kyrgyz government and international donors since 1991. They also protested in 
Bishkek using slogans such as “IMF money is death”, “The government is using the 
terrorist methods”, “If you are for HIPC, you are not for Kyrgyzstan”. Protestors also 
organised a symbolic “funeral of HIPC” by burning a stuffed image of the Director 
of the World Bank (Buxton, 2009: 54).   
  In my sample, one of the NGOs from Bishkek with a watch-dog role 
identified its mission as reacting to any changes in the country and letting the 
government and the public know that they know it, see it, and understand it, and 
think that it [this change] should be done in this way’ (Interview, 4 March 2008, 
Bishkek). One of their recent critical statements was in relation to the crackdown of 
media in Kyrgyzstan where the NGO leader stated that state curtailment of media 
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would backfire since the dissatisfaction among people has been growing. In the same 
way, this NGO has made many critical statements concerning the activities of the 
government and parliament. Further, the interviewee from this NGO gave a negative 
assessment to state-NGO relations of that time. According to her, the state did not 
see NGOs as a power. Both actors had a stereotypical opinion about each other. The 
state did not want to work with NGOs because they did not want to ensure 
transparency in its work, which NGOs were demanding (Interview, 4 March 2008, 
Bishkek). 
Furthermore, some of the actions of vocal NGOs have involved overt and 
dynamic methods of advocacy such as conducting demonstrations and protests 
which have been the most popular way to influence decision-making and to voice 
civil needs in Kyrgyzstan for the last five years. An interviewee from a refugees’ 
NGO shared his experience participating in the demonstrations on the constitutional 
reform that took place in autumn 2006. Along with his NGO, at least five more 
NGOs took part in the demonstrations. The interviewee highlighted with excitement 
that they joined the demonstrations because they wanted a new constitution and a 
new life. They managed to have their draft accepted, which stipulated that the 
president would abandon the majority of his power. However, in December, it was 
replaced with a new draft proposed by the President Bakiev because of some 
political nuances (Interview, Bishkek, 29 November 2007). 
 The account of an interviewee from a youth NGO, an active participant of 
demonstrations including the 2005 March revolution, shed more light on how and 
why NGOs protest. When talking about their recent demonstrations against 
outcomes of the 2007 parliamentary elections, he explained that, after observing the 
elections and seeing how votes were forged, they could not keep silent. Therefore, a 
group of his colleagues from different human rights NGOs and youth political 
parties joined to express their discontent. In February 2008, they conducted a 
demonstration called “I do not believe” meaning that they did not believe in the 
results of the elections. Their independent initiative to dispute the outcomes of the 
elections ended with their detention. Nevertheless, the interviewee asserted that at 
least they managed to make the public know that “there are people who care about 
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the results of the elections which were unfair” and let the government know that 
rigged elections will not be tolerated (Interview, Bishkek, 7 March 2008).    
Further, a few NGO leaders joined political parties in opposition to the 
government. Consequently, their NGOs have been in the spotlight, notwithstanding 
the fact that a couple of these leaders stepped down from their offices during their 
election campaign. Colleagues of some of these leaders supported their participation 
in political parties because they believed that their leaders lobbied for the same 
issues in the political party that they did in their NGO (Interviews with 
representatives of two NGOs: a) Osh, 1 April 2008 and b) Bishkek, 4 March 2008).  
 The above clearly shows that a number of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan have been 
trying to provide a check on the state as actors independent from it. I have 
established that NGOs counterbalance the state by criticising it and lobbying 
interests of their constituency. They also engage in demonstrations and protests. It is 
very important to note that only few NGOs in Kyrgyzstan are involved in the latter 
activities. As one of the interviewees noted, these NGOs can be counted on fingers 
(Interview, 28 February 2008, Bishkek). However, it is their activities 
counterbalancing the state are widely known to the public. As a result of their vocal 
and overt methods of interaction with the state, these NGOs have come to be known 
as politicised and allied with opposition. This is particularly obvious in the media. 
The review of different on-line articles on NGOs’ participation in political life 
indicated that they, especially Human Rights organisations, are seen as an ally of an 
opposition or intrinsically an oppositional power and thus there have been many 
interconnections made between NGOs and opposition. 
My research data demonstrated that donors were cautious of funding 
supposedly politicised NGOs. They try to avoid NGOs engaged in more overt forms 
of advocacy, particularly demonstration, excessive criticism of the state, and joining 
political parties. For donors, these NGOs are also politicised because they have come 
to be associated with opposition and involvement in politics and political parties. 
Donors are very critical of NGO leaders and NGOs that join political parties. 
According to them, “[c]ivil society should not access forces that run a parallel 
system to the national democratic accountability mechanism, that is, through 
elections” (Interview, 14 November 2007, Bishkek). Therefore, it is very 
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problematic for donors to support such NGOs. Some NGOs have noted that donors 
were reluctant to fund them because their leaders were a member of a political party 
(e.g. Interview, 4 March 2008, Bishkek). Nonetheless, donors still provide funding to 
these NGOs for their other activities.  
My research discovered that the state could not establish a proper dialogue 
with the vocal NGOs. In fact, it has made attempts to curtail them. As noted in 
chapter 2, Kaipov, the Minister of Justice, made an initiative in 2006. He said that all 
NGOs receiving foreign funding would be investigated due to their potential threat to 
national security and country development. This initiative came as a result of the 
National Security Service’s claim that NGOs might be working in the interest of 
foreign donors. “Government officials later said no NGO investigations would take 
place and it was a misunderstanding attributable to a bad translation” 
(www.state.gov, 2008). Foreign NGOs also came under scrutiny. An investigation 
into the activities of three foreign NGOs was launched: NDI, IRI, IFES. All of them 
have been financed by USAID. 
In the beginning of 2009, Masaliev, who was a parliamentary member and 
represented the communist party, and two of his party fellows initiated a bill to 
amend a law on non-commercial organisations (NCOs). According to the parliament 
members, the bill aimed at updating legislation on NCOs in accordance with 
specifics of the current time and to increase transparency in the interaction of NGOs 
with the state (Uldasheva, 2009). In particular, they proposed to add an article to the 
law which would prohibit NGOs from taking part in political activities and in the 
process of national elections. The parliamentary members also asserted that the 17th 
article of the law on transparency and openness of NGO activities should be 
amended. Their version of the new article gave the Ministry of Justice the right to 
prohibit a branch or a representative office of foreign NGOs from providing funding 
or any other property to certain local grant recipients (Petrov, 2009).         
National security has been highlighted as a key concern that made the above 
parliamentary members initiate the revision bill on the law on NCOs. According to 
them, current internationalisation of relationships and an increase of international 
exchange represent a potential threat to the security in the country. They particularly 
referred to an insertion of religious extremist groups in Batken in 1999 – 2000. 
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Therefore, they believe that clear legislation regulating activities of international 
NGOs should be spelled out which the proposed bill intends to do (Uldasheva, 2009). 
For the same reason, the parliamentarians also put forward an initiative to revise a 
law on state registration of juridical persons. They argue that NGOs with foreign 
involvement, their branches, and representative offices should have a scrutinised 
registration process. According to the amendments that the parliamentary members 
suggested, NGOs should provide information about their activities, funding, and 
property to the state statistics institutions, the Ministry of Justice, and the tax 
department (Uldasheva, 2009).   
The bill on the law concerning NGOs has some pitfalls. The explicit intention 
of the bill to prohibit NGOs from participating in political activities and election 
processes questions their true purpose. As has been mentioned above, according to 
the initiators, the main reason behind the bill was national security. However, one 
can wonder how isolation of NGOs from politics and, especially, from election 
processes will contribute to the enhancement of national security in the country 
where authoritarianism has tended to prevail. Taking into account that the majority 
of politicians want NGOs to deal with social issues (Ubysheva and Pogojev, 2006) 
and the statement of Masaliev highlighting that the revised law would concern only 
those NGOs engaged in politics (Petrov, 2009), it seems that the revised bills are 
intentionally targeted at removing NGOs from political and electoral activities 
because politicians do not approve of their participation in such activities.      
Nonetheless, NGOs in my sample did not report any exceedingly violent 
interventions or harassment from the state. A few watch-dog and human rights 
NGOs mentioned cases when they have faced confrontation from the state. The 
interviewee from a watch-dog NGO in Bishkek said that their former leaders had 
been attacked several times, attacks which according to them were organised by the 
state. One of the leaders was also sued by an unsuccessful candidate running for a 
seat in the parliament. The NGO also received threats from the National Security 
Service. They have also been constantly checked (Interview, 4 March 2008, 
Bishkek). Another interviewee from a human rights NGO in Bishkek stated that they 
had been refused registration until they changed their name which had ‘against 
torture’ in it. The Ministry of Justice refused registration because, according to them, 
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there was no torture in Kyrgyzstan. However, once the NGO changed its name to a 
neutral one, it was registered. Interestingly, the NGO did not give up its initial aim 
and works on torture and political prisoners at present (Interview, 12 March 2008, 
Bishkek). A head of another NGO from Kant said that she was interrogated by the 
City Administration, the National Security Services when she came back from 
observing elections in Israel and Ukraine (Interview, 17 March 2008, Bishkek). 
This section has revealed that there is the second side of the state-NGO 
relations where NGOs counterbalance the state and provide a check on it. To do this, 
they criticise, lobby, demonstrate, and, in extreme cases, join political parties. The 
most vocal NGOs have come to be known as politicised and associated with political 
opposition. It has also been said that some of these vocal NGOs have had difficulty 
obtaining funding from donors. Further, the state could not establish proper relations 
with them. In fact, it tried to crackdown on them under the camouflage of security 
rhetoric.     
 
 
Weak state: Bakiev’s retreat from democracy   
 
The examination of the state-NGO relationships in Kyrgyzstan sheds light on 
the nature of the Kyrgyz state. Interviews with NGOs clearly indicated that the state 
in Kyrgyzstan had had a number of weaknesses. It has lacked funding to fulfil its 
functions properly. To some degree, state institutions have engaged in partnership 
with NGOs to obtain additional funding. As the interviewee from the NGO working 
on issues of disabled people said, how could the state build rehabilitation centres 
when it could not even come up with and afford a banner, a motto, a logo, and others 
[for a festival] (Interview, 19 February 2008, Bishkek)? The fact that the state has 
interacted with NGOs to obtain some funding from them or from donors 
demonstrates that the state remains dependent on external funding.  
Furthermore, my interview data also revealed that human resources had been 
weak in the state institutions. A recurrent statement among NGO interviewees was 
that staff in the state institutions has changed frequently. Every new person has tried 
to start work from scratch. Consequently, NGOs have needed to start their relations 
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with the state institutions from the beginning. Moreover, sometimes a new staff 
member has turned out to be either under qualified for his/her position, making it 
difficult for NGOs to work with them, or hostile to NGOs all together63.        
 According to my research data, the state under Bakiev was afraid of criticism 
coming from any source. As shown above, when criticism came from NGOs, the 
state tried to restrict legislation. One of the key sources of criticism was 
demonstrations. Therefore, the government under Bakiev limited the freedom to 
demonstrate. In December 2007, the Bishkek City Council issued a decree on 
protests, demonstrations, and manifests. It requires anyone wishing to hold a 
demonstration to inform the Bishkek City Administration about their intention ten 
days in advance, with the details such as when the demonstrations will start and end, 
who will participate, and what kind of provisions are made (transport, first aid, food, 
etc). Further, the decree designates three areas in Bishkek where demonstrations can 
be held. It also puts some limitations on what type of materials and equipment can be 
used by demonstrators64.    
The decree served as a basis for the introduction of the amendments and 
additions to the law on the right of citizens to assembly and to freely hold meetings 
and demonstrations without weapons in August 2008 (www.cascfen.net). The bill 
was initiated by Masaliev, the same parliamentary member who proposed to amend 
the law on NCOs. According to him, constant demonstrations in the city center 
disturbed the lives of city dwellers and, more importantly, undermined national 
security by creating a potential threat to stability. The main aspects that were 
amended in and added to the law are similar to the ones in the decree. The revised 
law also requires citizens to inform the state authorities about their perspective 
demonstration in advance and wait for their permission. Otherwise, the 
demonstrations can be regarded as unsanctioned (Safin, 2009). 
Furthermore, a group of Human Rights organisations researched the 
feasibility of conducting a peaceful assembly in late 2008. According to their 
                                                 
63 For example, these ideas were said by the interviewees from an NGO working on children’s issues, 
28 February 2008, Bishkek, an NGO working on civil society support, 1 April 2008, Osh, an NGO 
working on sex workers 5 April 2008, Osh, and others.  
64 Decree of Bishkek City Council on adoption of the rules for organisation of 
demonstrations, protests, meetings, manifests, and rallies in Bishkek city issued on 5 
December, 2007.  
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research, “it is virtually impossible to get permission to hold peaceful meetings, 
especially if the planned meeting is political in nature” (Safin, 2009: www.ipp.kg). 
Moreover, the report stated that it had become risky to conduct peaceful meetings 
because state authorities under Bakiev were ready to suppress any initiative of 
citizens to express their concerns. People involved in such meetings could at best 
pay a fine or at worst undergo criminal prosecution. It was a considerable limitation 
for Kyrgyz people, particularly taking into account that political meetings have been 
widespread practice since 2005. According to the IPP report, “more than two and a 
half thousand political meetings were held in Kyrgyzstan during 2005-2009” (Safin, 
2009: www.ipp.kg). This leads to the conclusion that the new legislation on freedom 
of assembly was used by the previous government to deprive people of a chance to 
voice their needs and concerns for the sake of supposedly insurance of security. 
These show that Bakiev’s governments rolled back from democratic 
commitments. In fact, the constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic changed in 2007, to 
no longer state that Kyrgyz people strived for a democratic civil society65. Moreover, 
in March 2010, Bakiev stated that western democracy based on elections and human 
rights might not be appropriate for Kyrgyzstan. According to him, ‘consultative’ 
democracy, which is “based on consultations between those in power and influential 
social groups in society” (www.asianews.it) with “deep roots in the traditions of 
Kyrgyz people”, could be more beneficial to Kyrgyzstan. Bakiev justified his 
argument with the debates in regards to applicability of western democracy in non-
western countries and by referring to traditions of Kyrgyz society which values 
community and responsibility (Pannier and Heil, 2010: www.rferl.org).  
In conclusion, it is clear that the state under Bakiev’s rule had two different 
policies towards NGOs. It was open to collaboration with those NGOs whose 
activities did not involve any criticism against the state but, on the contrary, shared 
their agenda, provided consultation, training, funding, and other resources. However, 
the state failed to create a proper dialogue with NGOs providing a check on it. 
Conversely, it took a number of initiatives to limit the legislative basis for the proper 
and free operation of NGOs. Bakiev’s government had a very similar attitude to 
NGOs as did Akaev’s one’s. Both of them, first, encouraged civil society to interact 
                                                 
65 Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic amended in 2007.  
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with the government. However, later on, the two governments curtailed NGOs. 
Moreover, Akaev and Bakiev tried to centralise power. However, in comparison 
with Akaev who was committed to democracy, Bakiev openly asserted that 
democracy might not be appropriate for Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, Bakiev’s state 
remained weak. Even though it collaborated with some NGOs, it could not support 
them. It used NGOs to cover its weaknesses.              
 
 
Discussion   
 
My research findings presented in this chapter demonstrate that state-NGO 
relations have had different elements. There have been NGOs which share the same 
agenda with the state and act as a consultant, fundraiser, training provider, and other 
roles. In other words, their relations with the state institutions have been 
collaborative. Based on this, I suggest that my research makes a contribution to the 
literature, which described that the state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan were based on 
suspicions and mistrust (Tretyakov, 2007; Omarov in Garaushenko, 2007). 
According to my findings, however, there has been some level of cooperation and 
reliance between these actors. In fact, NGOs have strategically built trust between 
them and the state institutions as shown in cases of NGOs involving state 
representatives in their board of directors. 
Theoretically, this type of state-NGO relations can be called communitarian. 
My argument is based on Chandhoke’s (2002) discussion of global civil society and 
the role of international NGOs. According to her, the international NGOs gained the 
weighty role by the end of 1990s by being involved in different decision-making 
bodies of multilateral donor organisations such as the World Bank. In this regard, 
Chandhoke questioned whether “we can continue to call agencies that become a part 
of global decision-making structures ‘civil society organisations’ that supposedly 
challenge the workings of the global order?” (2002: 44).  It is worth pointing out that 
Chandhoke’s vision of the state-civil society relationships is liberal where the actors 
counterbalance one another. Therefore, for her, their joint actions bring up the above 
questions. The argument in the thesis uses the same logic. However, it asks a 
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different question of if we can call the state-civil society relationships 
communitarian, when the latter is engaged in law-making and policy development 
and providing training for the former.  
The second section has provided sufficient support to suggest that the state-
NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan can indeed be called communitarian. This is because, 
by being involved in law-making, policy development, and training provision, NGOs 
have been becoming a certain part of the state or at least of a decision-making 
process. They have been an element of no small importance in the distribution of 
power throughout society (Taylor, 2006). Most importantly, with reference to Hegel 
(Jones, 2001), Gramsci (Femia, 2001), and Taylor (2006), NGOs and their ideas 
have found their final destination in the state through participation in law-making 
and policy development. 
The third section has shown that there have been also those NGOs which 
negotiate their agenda with the state by lobbying. They have also engaged in 
criticising state activities, demonstrating and protesting to promote their agenda. In 
other words, these NGOs have counterbalanced the state and have provided a check 
on it. This means that Kyrgyz NGOs are no longer politically inactive as was 
claimed by Roy (2002). On the contrary, according to the cases discussed above, a 
number of NGOs have been a catalyst of political activism. The most notable 
example for this is a demonstration of NGOs against the notorious criminal Rysbek 
who threatened the Prime Minister, Felix Kulov, and demanded his resignation on a 
demonstration in Bishkek. Despite fear and potentially life-threatening implications, 
a watch-dog NGO organised a protest against the criminal (Interview, 4 March 2008, 
Bishkek).  
In other words, NGOs do not estrange themselves from politics and pressing 
issues (Roy, 2002); conversely, they have been bringing these issues to the attention 
of the government and public to deal with them. This is exactly why the NGO sector 
has come to be seen as political power, particularly against the background of weak 
political parties in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the NGO sector has produced a number of 
politicians in Kyrgyzstan. For example, the former chief of staff to the interim 
government was from the NGO sector (www.enews.ferghana.ru). Recent research by 
Paasiaro (2009:71) has made the same claim that “[a]cademics who wrote off NGOs 
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as incapable of affecting the dynamics of state–society relations or challenging the 
status quo (such as Roy 2002, p. 144) may have reached their judgements too soon” 
because the civil society promotion has produced NGO leaders who together with 
their personal goals promoted interests of the wider public.   
Further, my research supports the claim in the literature (Aksartova, 2005) 
that the Kyrgyz state was still dependent on external funding in the same way it used 
to be during the soviet time. However, it has also made a contribution by stating that 
the state institutions and NGOs started interacting out of donor projects. 
Consequently, the role of donors as the key factor in the interaction of the actors is 
changing. Furthermore, my research findings indicated that donors were reluctant to 
provide funding to so called politicised NGOs. This fact has also been revealed by 
the research of the Eurasia Foundation in Central Asia which looked at the state-
NGO relationships in Kyrgyzstan (www.efcentralasia.org). Further, Poolos (2007) 
reported, based on her interview with one of the popular NGO activists that, because 
of his political activism, NDI, their key donor, cut off their NGO from its funding in 
the amount $100,000. NDI explained its decision by stating that this leader had 
become too political by turning from activist to politician. In the meantime, they do 
not want to be viewed as supporting political activities in Kyrgyzstan.  
Despite the importance of donors in the state-NGO relations and the fact that 
the state can have a different attitude to NGOs depending on which issue they work 
with (social or human rights), my data suggest that the relations of an NGO with 
state institutions also depend on its professional and institutional capacity, the 
personality of its leader, its projects, its work experience, and even the qualifications 
and personality of staff in the state institution they work with. For example, a human 
rights NGO from Bishkek has a good relationship with the Parliament and a very 
poor one with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The conflict with the latter is on a 
personal level. One of the consequences of such a tension was that the Ministry did 
not allow a joint research project between different institutions to commence until 
representatives of this NGO were excluded from the list of researchers (Interview, 20 
February 2008, Bishkek).   
Furthermore, the Kyrgyz state and its techniques of working with NGOs, 
especially with the counterbalancing ones, echo some tendencies in the region. The 
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fact that the government of Bakiev used national security as a primary reason for 
restricting NGOs and the civic right to assembly and freedom of speech suggests it, 
as that of Akaev and other states in Central Asia such as Uzbekistan used “war on 
terror” as an instrument for internal politics to sideline other powerful groups and 
civic initiatives (Stevens and Jailobaeva, 2009). It is evident from the above that 
Bakiev’s government tried to exert control over NGOs, as some governments in 
other former Soviet countries did. For example, in Uzbekistan, NGOs have been 
under government pressure since the early 2000s. Stevens (2010) has described nine 
ways in which the Uzbek government cracked down on NGOs, ranging from putting 
constraints on the rights to associate and form NGOs, to harassment, prosecution, 
and deportation of civil society activists. Most importantly, the Uzbek government 
has gained tough control over NGOs’ funding flows. NGOs can have a bank account 
only in two state banks and all their transactions are monitored by a special 
committee including representatives of the security services. Moreover, the Uzbek 
government introduced its own grants to NGOs and established an array of 
governmental NGOs (GONGOs) to coordinate and support civil society.  
In Russia, the government under Putin has taken a number of actions to 
reassert its control over society which has concerned NGOs too. As in Uzbekistan, 
the Russian government has toughened NGO legislation and has sought to gain 
control over funding flows of NGOs. NGOs funded by foreign sources have been 
harshly criticised by the government as promoters of foreign agenda with 
questionable patriotism (Gilbert, 2010). Therefore, the new NGO law in Russia 
requires NGOs to provide the state with a report on their funds coming from foreign 
sources and how they are used. Further, the Russian government has also established 
GONGOs and supported them financially. It has set up a Public Chamber to oversee 
civil society. According to the recent research on the Russian NGOs by Gilbert 
(2010), the activities of the government have crowded out NGOs critical of the 
regime from the public sphere.         
In a broader context, the same has happened in other developing countries. 
For example, in India, the state put legislative restrictions on NGOs working in the 
field of politics in the 1980s when their interaction with foreign funders increased. 
As in Uzbekistan, the bank accounts of Indian NGOs were monitored by the Home 
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Ministry. Moreover, the Indian government tightened tax exemption laws which 
concerned NGOs. Nonetheless, Indian NGOs and foreign funding aimed at 
promoting state objectives on welfare and providing social delivery were welcomed 
by the state (Ebrahim, 2001).         
It is clear that the activities of Bakiev’s government concerning NGOs had 
some parallels with the government activities on NGOs in Uzbekistan, Russia, and 
India. In particular, it seems that the Russian government and its NGO activities 
served as a model for Bakiev’s government. First of all, like Putin, Bakiev initiated 
the creation of the Public Chamber in Kyrgyzstan to coordinate the interaction of the 
state with civil society. Secondly, before Bakiev’s government was ousted, the 
Kyrgyz NGO law was in the process of revision to introduce state control over 
NGOs’ financial flows in a way similar to the Russian law. However, the Kyrgyz 
state’s account for its initiatives differed from that of the Russian state. As stated 
elsewhere, by amending the NGO law, the Bakiev government wanted to prevent any 
threats, especially from terrorist groups, to national security. In other words, “the war 
on terror” was the key rationale for Bakiev’s government rather than NGO as 
promoters of foreign agenda as in the case of Russia. Nonetheless, it should be noted 
that the Russian rhetoric has also been present in Kyrgyzstan to some extent. NGOs 
were seen as promoters of foreign interests (Garaushenko, 2007:28).      
However, the Kyrgyz government under Bakiev did not exert total control 
over NGOs and their funding as has happened in Uzbekistan and Russia. It seems 
that Bakiev’s Kyrgyz government was as selective as the Indian government in its 
interaction with NGOs. As indicated elsewhere, it was open to collaboration with 
those NGOs which shared their development goals concerning social issues. In 
relation to GONGOs, I suggest that their nature and purpose has been different in 
Kyrgyzstan than in Russia and Uzbekistan.  As stated above, in the latter countries, 
the government provides funding to these NGOs, established some of them, and 
promotes pro-governmental agenda through them. However, the governments in 
Kyrgyzstan under Akaev and Bakiev did not provide funding to NGOs. The law on 
social contracting was adopted in 2008; at once it was announced that the state 
budget did not have funds for NGOs. None of the NGOs in my sample has ever 
received state funding.   
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During my fieldwork, I came across only one GONGO. It was established by 
the state children’s center and worked on children’s issues. However, the case of this 
GONGO does not show that the state institution, which created it, has total control 
over it. Based on this case, I suggest that the state institutions in Kyrgyzstan set up an 
NGO to have an access to donor funding and to show their seeming interaction and 
even collaboration with NGOs. I have noted elsewhere that donors require state 
institutions to collaborate with NGOs to meet their funding requirements. By being 
dependent on external funding, the state institutions in Kyrgyzstan have to show 
interaction with NGOs to receive donor funding. Therefore, instead of working with 
an NGO from outside, the state institutions establish their own which would not 
criticise them and whose funding would come directly to its founder (i.e. state 
institution). Moreover, this GONGO is also an interesting case since it initiated 
another NGO of young journalists which have turned into a strong and open media 
NGO with a liberal approach to the interaction with the state. This makes it possible 
to state that the operation of GONGOs like in Russia and Uzbekistan is almost non-
existent in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz NGOs do not receive funding from the state. There 
are no large NGOs like the one called ‘Nashi’ (Ours) in Russia which promotes the 
governmental agenda (Gilbert, 2010). Therefore, GONGOs in Kyrgyzstan are like a 
myth caught between existence and imagination.   
Further, NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, especially politicised ones, under Bakiev still 
had much more freedom than their counterparts in Central Asia and Russia. On the 
whole, the crackdown of Bakiev’s government on NGOs was not as harsh as on 
media and religious organisations in Kyrgyzstan which experienced considerable 
legislative oppression, physical attacks, imprisonment, and even murder. Therefore, 
it is a potential question for future research: why were Kyrgyz NGOs not curtailed as 
harshly as media and religious organisations, despite their political activism and 
constant criticism of the state?  
Taking into account that the government of Bakiev tried to curtail NGOs 
through potential amendments in the legislation, turned more authoritarian, and 
asserted inapplicability of democracy in Kyrgyzstan, one can ask to what extent the 
state-building agenda of donors has been effective in making the Kyrgyz state strong 
and responsive to its people. Based on the above discussion, it can be said that the 
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new donor policies on state-building were empowered by Bakiev’s government, by 
increasing funding to it and enlarging its role in development. This has enabled the 
government to act on its own way. Moreover, it has been noted elsewhere that the 
geopolitical importance of Kyrgyzstan for powers such as the USA and Russia has 
increased.   
In the light of this, it can be suggested that these countries in the interest of 
their own went along with Bakiev’s autocratic policies by ignoring the social, 
economic, and political situation in Kyrgyzstan. A number of statements were made 
after the April 2010 revolt in Kyrgyzstan claiming that, in the name of “the war on 
terror”, the USA ignored the violation of democratic norms and social and economic 
inequalities in Kyrgyzstan which resulted from Bakiev’s autocratic policies. For this 
reason, it has been asserted that the case of Kyrgyzstan is not only the failure of the 
state but also of realpolitik (Huff-Hannon, 2010; Reeves, 2010).  
Furthermore, the above account of the state-NGO relations has shown that 
the state in Kyrgyzstan is still weak in terms of its capacity. A number of NGOs in 
my sample connected the weaknesses of the Kyrgyz state to its Soviet past. The 
further exploration of their accounts has revealed that a top-down approach and an 
urge to please the central government were still prevalent in the state institutions 
under Bakiev’s government. In other words, state officials in Kyrgyzstan still adhere 
to a Soviet way of working, that is, when state members are concerned with their 
positions rather than with technical efficiency of their actions; who rather cheated 
the plan instead of increasing its output (Gellner, 1994: 4-5). Olcott in her recent 
book ‘A new chance for Central Asia’ (2005) said that the change in Central Asian 
countries would come only when politicians from the Soviet era leave the 





In conclusion, in this chapter, I have looked at the state-NGO relationship in 
Kyrgyzstan since the mid 2000s and whether the changes in donors’ civil society 
promotion have influenced them. This is the focus of my last research question. 
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Consequently, I have suggested that the state-NGO relationships in Kyrgyzstan have 
been diversified. There have been elements of cooperation and collaboration. A 
number of NGOs have collaborated with the state and have shared the same agenda 
which they promote on different round tables, meetings, and other events. I have 
described this as communitarian state-NGO relations. There are also a few NGOs in 
my sample which have provided a check on the state and have engaged in activities 
counterbalancing the state. However, it is their activities that have formed the image 
of the NGO sector as politicised and oppositional in front of the public and the state.  
As a result, I have stated that, in comparison with the monolithic account on 
the state-NGO relationships that the literature gave, my research shows that these 
relations have been diverse and also dependent on the professional and institutional 
capacity of the NGO, their projects, and the personality of the NGO leaders. Further, 
I have pointed out that NGOs are not politically neutral any more. On the contrary, I 
argue that some NGOs have been politically active and concentrated on bringing up 
pressing issues to the attention of the state and the public.  
I have also suggested that donor funding has been important for the state-
NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan since it takes place within donor funded projects. 
Therefore, collaboration has happened unsystematically. Nonetheless, I have 
revealed that some NGOs started interacting with the state without donor support 
and intervention. I have also pointed out that politicised NGOs have had difficulties 
in receiving donor funding because of their openly confrontational relationships with 
the state.  
I have also asserted that Bakiev’s government was open to a dialogue when 
NGOs wanted to work jointly. However, the motivation of the state was linked to the 
material incentives, such as additional funds, equipment and others, which the state 
obtains from collaboration with NGOs. In the meantime, the counterbalancing 
relationship of NGOs was not welcomed by the Bakiev government and, as a result, 
it failed to have a proper dialogue with such NGOs. In fact, the government under 
Bakiev made attempts to change legislation to exclude these NGOs from politics and 
by limiting their rights to demonstrate. 
Furthermore, Bakiev’s government learned from its neighbours how to 
suppress NGOs and promote state dominance. However, because of its dependence 
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on funding of donors, it could not totally crackdown on NGOs. Finally, I suggested 
that Bakiev’s government was explicitly taking an authoritarian path of development 
by declaring that western democracy was not appropriate in Kyrgyzstan. I have 
suggested that geopolitics and donors’ state building have overlooked Bakiev’s 
promotion of the authoritarian regime. 
Finally, I have explored the nature of the state in Kyrgyzstan through the 
examination of its relations with NGOs. As a result, I have suggested that the state in 
Kyrgyzstan has been weak institutionally. It has had poor human resources, scarce 
funding, weak mechanisms of policy implementation, and has remained dependent 
on donor funding. 



































Fall or Rise of the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan?   
 
 
The discussion of research findings in chapter 5 has suggested that NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan are professionalising and formalising because of changes in donors’ 
promotion of civil society. It also pointed out that this tendency is limited to those 
NGOs which have already built up some level of professional and institutional 
capacity while the NGOs which lack such capacity are being left out. In this regard, I 
proposed in chapter 5 that if the same NGOs continue to receive funding due to their 
high level of professionalism and formalisation, the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan might 
become static. As a result, it would fail to experience growth, diversification, and 
dynamism. Further, the discussion in chapter 6 indicated that Bakiev’s government 
made efforts to move away from democracy and sought to put some limitations on 
NGOs.   
This chapter aims to explore whether the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan has a 
bleak prospect of being static and limited by the state. It draws not only on research 
data but also my anecdotal observations of social activism during the recent social 
and political developments in Kyrgyzstan. In the first section, I present research 
findings about the diversity of the NGO sector by looking at non-professional NGOs 
and professional NGOs which have a degree of flexibility. In the second section, I 
present cases of NGOs in my sample that exhibit philanthropy, voluntarism, and 
constituency. In the third section, I discuss the recent social and political events in 
Kyrgyzstan and how they can influence the NGO sector and civil society in general. 
Based on this, I suggest directions for further research.       
 
 
NGO diversity: beyond professionalisation  
 
The key argument in this section is that the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan is not 
completely professional. In chapter 5, I categorised slightly over half of the NGOs in 
my sample (24) as professional - based on such criteria as leadership, membership, 
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funding, an organisational structure, administrative and financial rules, staff, and 
their technical-material basis. As far as the remaining 21 NGOs are concerned, I 
subsumed them under a non-professional category. Below I present data on these 
NGOs in accordance to the above mentioned criteria of a professional and formal 
NGO and draw differences and similarities between the professional and non-
professional categories of NGOs. Furthermore, I suggest that professional NGOs still 
have some degree of flexibility notwithstanding their professionalisation and 
formalisation which was discussed in chapter 5. Based on these, I argue that the 
professional image of NGOs promoted in the literature is not adequate since the 
NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan is much more heterogeneous and has organisations of 
different professional and institutional capacity within it.  
 
 
Non-professional NGOs  
 
According to my interview data, all leaders in the non-professional category 
have other jobs from where their main income comes. The majority of them, 
however, receive some payment from their NGO activity when they have a project. 
The rest of the time they work voluntarily and on a part-time basis. For example, the 
main job of a leader of the NGO from Osh working on women’s issues is as a 
department dean in the pedagogical collage. Nonetheless, she considers her NGO 
work important since she wants to help women, especially young and from villages, 
to succeed in life (Interview, Osh, 4 April 2008). This type of NGO leader matches 
the concept of a non-professional staff leader proposed by Staggenburg (1988). 
According to her, such leaders are compensated for their work in the SMO but they 
do not seek to build a career in this field (Staggenburg, 1988:587) which is the case 
with the leader from the women’s NGO.  
A few NGO leaders in the non-professional category said that they worked 
for their NGO only on a voluntary basis. A leader of an NGO from Bishkek working 
on issues of Muslim women is among these. She said she volunteered for her NGO 
almost full-time because she was very passionate about the mission of the NGO. At 
the same time, she has another job where she earns her living (Interview, Bishkek, 17 
March 2008). This type of leaders corresponds to Staggenburg’s (1988) concept of a 
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volunteer leader who does not receive a salary from the SMO but might have 
volunteered for it for a long time.  
More than half of non-professional NGOs are registered as public 
associations which are required to have members in accordance with the law on 
NCOs. My research data showed that almost all of them had members. Furthermore, 
two public foundations have members as well. As a result, 14 NGOs in the non-
professional category have claimed that they have a membership base. Six NGOs 
noted that their membership varied from ten to 30,000 people. Each of these NGOs 
has a certain group of the population in its membership depending on their mission. 
For example, the NGO from Bishkek working on disabled people has 200 disabled 
people in its membership (Interview, 19 February 2008, Bishkek). Two NGOs have 
organisations in their membership. One of them is an association of NGOs working 
on women’s issues from Bishkek with 80 NGOs in its membership (Interview, 16 
May 2008, Bishkek). The remaining six NGOs gave a general answer without any 
numbers as did an NGO from Kant: “the whole region is our membership” 
(Interview, 18 March 2008, Bishkek).  
Most non-professional NGOs receive funding from donors. Almost a third of 
them totally depend on donors and do not have any other sources of funding. 
However, three NGOs in this category have never received funding from donors. 
Each of these three NGOs has indicated different reasons for a lack of donor grants 
in their budget. The interviewee from a Bishkek based NGO working on women’s 
issues said that they did not apply for donor grants since they wanted to experiment 
with the notion of working on a voluntary basis (Interview, Bishkek, 16 May 2008). 
In the meantime, the NGO from Kant working on social issues asserted that they did 
not know how to apply for donor grants (Interview, Bishkek, 18 March 2008). In 
contrast to this NGO, the grant applications of the refugee NGO from Nijne-Chuisk 
village, Issykata district have been turning down so far (Interview, Bishkek, 14 
March 2008).   
As a result, all these three NGOs along with another nine NGOs had other 
sources of funding which included philanthropy, personal contribution, business, and 
social entrepreneurship. They also relied on voluntary labour. Most importantly, 
according to interviews, these non-professional NGOs can carry out their key 
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activities, albeit on a small scale, despite the lack of funding from donors because 
they can draw on other financial sources, voluntary work, and their established target 
group. Donor grants are an addition for some of them and help them to do their 
activities in a better way or to expand them.   
For example, an NGO working on issues of Muslim women uses different 
sources of funding and extensive voluntary labour. They receive funding from 
donors. Nevertheless, according to the interviewee from this NGO, the donor funding 
has never been large.  The staff of the NGO does not receive salary from donor 
grants. In fact, the NGO manager is not paid at all. Moreover, when developing the 
project proposal, they indicate their labour as a contribution of the NGO. The NGO’s 
funding mainly comes from its well-off members who can donate generously for 
NGO activities (Interview, Bishkek, 17 March 2008). 
My research data suggested that the majority of NGOs categorised as non-
professional had poorly functioning and almost nominal structures. Six NGOs could 
not describe their structures clearly. Instead they talked about their staff whose 
number was limited to two and three people. The interviewees from the remaining 
NGOs claimed that they had a structure. However, during the interviews, it became 
clear that the structures of a few of them do not really function. For example, an 
NGO from Kant working on a number of social issues had all the governing bodies 
in its structure according to the law on NCOs when it got registered. However, as 
they started to work, some of their bodies ceased functioning since they did not have 
funding to maintain them. Moreover, by the end of the interview, it was revealed that 
the NGO has not had any activity for the last two years (Interview, Bishkek, 17 
March 2008).     
Another couple of NGOs in the non-professional category claimed to have a 
well-defined structure which functions properly. Each of these NGOs has a board. 
For example, in the case of an NGO from Bishkek working on women’s issues, its 
board meets regularly and plays an active role in the management and operation of 
the NGO (Interview, Bishkek, 17 March 2008). These NGOs share a number of 
similarities with professional NGOs such as a well-established structure, presence of 
some administrative and financial regulations, a moderate technical-material basis, 
and trained staff. However, their funding is not regular. Therefore, their staff, 
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particularly their leaders, do not get paid for their work on a regular basis and have 
other jobs where they earn their living. In fact, some of the leaders do not want any 
payment since they are passionate about the mission of their NGO.  
Other than these NGOs, the rest openly admitted that they lacked 
administrative and financial rules within their organisations. Nonetheless, most of 
them followed financial regulations set out by the state even though they did not 
have proper rules within their organisations. Some NGOs said that they did not have 
an office. A few NGOs asserted that their office was either at their home or they uses 
an office of their main job as an office of their NGO. The offices of those NGOs that 
did have one were at least minimally equipped and furnished. At most, up to ten 
people are involved in non-professional NGOs. The average number of staff is two 
and three. Non-professional NGOs do not have particular recruitment techniques 
since they cannot offer good salaries. Therefore, NGOs involve people who agree 
either to volunteer or to be paid on an irregular basis depending on the availability of 
the project. A few of them even involved family members as in the case of a refugee 
NGO from Alamadin village who said that their coordinator was his brother 
(Interview, 13 March 2008, Bishkek).    
To conclude so far, there are a number of intrinsic differences as well as 
minor similarities between professional and non-professional NGOs. The key 
similarity is that NGOs in both categories financially depend on donors. This was 
revealed by other research as well. The ACSSC survey discovered that 82.9% of 469 
NGOs, which took part in it, received their funding from donors (Ubysheva and 
Pogojev, 2006:39). Meanwhile, the research of the Eurasia Foundation of Central 
Asia on the donor-NGO relationship showed that 73% of 52 NGOs interviewed 
identified the role of donors as a funder (www.efcentralasia.org). Nonetheless, as my 
research revealed, there were still NGOs in both categories which have other funding 
sources.  
One of the main differences is that a number of non-professional NGOs rely 
on voluntary work, other sources of funding, and a moral obligation to their 
constituency. This is not the case in the professional NGOs. Another difference is 
that non-professional NGOs have larger and more focused membership bases, 
particularly made up of individuals, rather than professional ones whose membership 
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base mostly consists of organisations. On the whole, non-professional NGOs are less 
formal, that is, they do not have regular staff and well-established rules, and strong 
infrastructural capacity.  
 
 
Flexibility of professional NGOs 
 
Below I suggest that, despite their professionalisation and formalisation 
stated in chapter 5, professional NGOs still have some degree of flexibility. For 
example, some professional NGOs could develop a structure to carry out their 
activities in a more effective way. According to the law, any other provisions can be 
made in the charter if they do not contradict the law66. For example, public 
foundations can alter the functions of their supervisory council67. Public associations 
can have other governing bodies68. This means that NGOs can have peculiar 
structures, procedures, governing bodies, and other organisational aspects tailored for 
their context/organisation as did a watchdog organisation from Bishkek.  
Its structure has three main bodies. The first body is a general assembly 
which consists of 61 NGOs that are members of the NGO. The meeting of the 
general assembly is conducted once every two years. Since the members of the NGO 
are in regions outside the capital, first, meetings are conducted there where member 
organisations discuss issues on the agenda and, then, select a representative for a 
meeting in the capital. The second body is a board of directors. There are 15 people 
in it. They are elected in the meeting of the representatives of the general assembly 
held in the capital. Eight directors are elected from regional NGOs to represent 
regions. Seven directors are chosen from the public based on their reputation and 
respect. This is done in order to promote the NGO. The third body is a president who 
is nominated by the board of directors. In addition to the president, the NGO also has 
an executive director (Interview, Bishkek, 4 March 2008). 
Several aspects of this NGO’s structure stand out and show its peculiarity. 
The first aspect is the phased conduct of the meeting of the general assembly to 
                                                 
66  Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs as of 1998, Article 10, Chapter I. 
67  Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs as of 1998, Article 28, Chapter III. 
68  Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on NCOs, Article 21, Chapter II.  
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ensure that voices of the members - the regional NGOs - are heard. The second 
aspect is its unique approach to the election of the board of directors. The NGO 
intentionally included people respected in society to its board of directors in order to 
have better opportunities to promote itself and its activities. By having respected 
people on its board, the NGO seeks to prove to the public that it is a serious 
organisation with the support of people whose reputation cannot be disputed. The 
final aspect is how the NGO has managed its heavy work load by creating two 
managerial positions: a president to fulfil a representative role and to take part in 
different commissions, working groups and other events; and an executive director to 
deal with programme activities (Interview, Bishkek, 4 March 2008).  
In contrast to this watchdog organisation, which used flexibility in the law to 
develop a structure to manage its large organisational membership and structure and 
heavy work-load, an NGO from Bishkek working on human rights made their 
structure flexible in such a way that its employees could replace each other easily 
and, most importantly, on a voluntary basis as described below: 
 
 
Within each project we write terms of references - who does what. The system is also 
flexible. At the general meeting, a person [staff member] can say “my duties are this and 
this. But now I have a huge work load” or something like “something is going on in my 
personal life and I cannot take these duties”. In this case, someone can say on a voluntary 
basis “I can do your duties during this time. In this way, duties are assigned” (Interview, 
Bishkek, 28 February 2008). 
 
 
The interviewee’s comment indicates that the operation of their NGO is not 
necessarily dominated by certain rules but rather it is flexible and enables them to 
approach cases individually. Moreover, this NGO does not have written rules. They 
announce their rules on the general meeting which are passed on verbally there and 
then.  
Further, the interviewee from an ecological NGO asserted that NGOs were 
flexible and not bureaucratic because they can take decisions and act quickly. 
Moreover, the interviewee noted that the compactness of NGOs enabled them to 
travel, bring new ideas, and establish new contacts. She continued that NGOs have 
freedom and are not controlled by anybody. As an example, she talked about her own 
NGO where any idea of any staff member is welcome and creativeness is 
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appreciated. The interviewee also said that NGOs were not as hierarchic as state 
institutions (Interview, Bishkek, 27 November 2007).  
A few other NGO interviewees further discussed the same issues, such as 
their activities, decisions-making, and creativeness by comparing them to those of 
the state institutions and claimed that the former are more flexible. For example, two 
representatives from NGOs working on healthcare noted that state institutions work 
in a top-down way where everyone obeys and carries out a decree coming from the 
high bodies in the state system. Meanwhile, according to these interviewees, in 
NGOs, people share their interests, establish different contacts, and work freely 
(Interviews, Bishkek, 5 March 2008 and Osh, 5 April 2008). The head of a youth 
NGO was convinced that the NGO sector encourages creativeness and supports 
ideas; whereas, in the state institutions, any initiative is discouraged (Interview, 
Bishkek, 7 March 2008).  
In conclusion, it is evident that, despite the fact that I have categorised NGOs 
into the professional and non-professional groups, within each category, NGOs differ 
from each other in relation to their development, activities, commitments, and other 
aspects. Therefore, I argue that the nature of Kyrgyz NGOs is not homogenous but 
rather diverse and complex. For example, as shown in chapter 5, within a category of 
professional NGOs, there are urban based NGOs that have paid staff with 
qualification, well equipped and furnished offices, and donor funded projects. Some 
of them were established by donors or as a legacy of a donor funded project. At the 
same time, within the same category, there are NGOs of completely different origins 
and a way of operation as an NGO from Bishkek representing business firms. It does 
not have abundant external funding such as donor grants. Its funding is based on its 
membership fees. Its activities are not usual projects but rather services for its 
members. Moreover, despite evident professionalisation and formalisation, 
interviewees from professional NGOs were convinced that they were flexible. They 
tried to illustrate this mainly by comparing themselves with state institutions which 
were bureaucratic for them.  
The category of non-professional NGOs is similarly complex and diverse. On 
the one hand, there are NGOs such as the one from Bishkek working on women’s 
issues. It is partially formalised by having a structure, office, and regulations within 
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their organisation. However, its staff works on a voluntary basis despite their 
qualification and broad work experience. Most importantly, the NGO has become 
strong enough in representing the interests of their constituency and contributing to 
the sphere of their activities - in this case, women’s issues. In the same category, 
there are also NGOs with no sign of formalisation but which still carry out important 
services for their constituency as in the case of a refugee NGO which provides 
assistance to refugees to obtain citizenship. There are also NGOs which have never 
had a donor grant but have managed to work on social issues on their community 
based on other sources. Based on these, I reiterate my key argument that the NGO 
sector in Kyrgyzstan is much more heterogeneous and diverse than only professional.        
 
 
“Classic principles” in the non-classic Kyrgyz NGO sector  
 
In this section, I challenge statements made in the literature in relation to 
urban characteristic of Kyrgyz NGOs, their failure to establish and represent a 
constituency, and a lack of philanthropy and voluntarism in them (Ruffin, 1999; Roy, 
2002; Aksartova, 2005; Earle, 2005; Petric, 2005). I argue that a number of NGOs, 
particularly non-professional ones, in Kyrgyzstan exhibit elements of philanthropy 
and voluntarism. Further, I suggest that, according to  theories of civil society, NGOs 
are largely urban based institutions since cities have proper conditions for them such 
as social relations based on individual autonomy. Finally, I suggest that some of the 
NGOs have a constituency and seek to represent their interest by finding crossing 
points between needs of their constituency and donor funding opportunities.     
 
Voluntarism and philanthropy 
 
My research findings raise questions about the arguments in the literature that 
have stated that philanthropy and voluntarism are absent in the Kyrgyz NGO sector 
(Ruffin, 1999; Roy, 2002; Petric, 2005). A number of cases of non-professional 
NGOs have indicated that philanthropy and voluntarism are not totally alien to the 
NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan. The central example for this is a Muslim women’s NGO 
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whose staff works predominantly on a voluntary basis and which receive donations 
from rich Muslim women who are members of this NGO. Consequently, I suggest 
that Starr (1999) made an accurate projection that Muslim traditions could be a basis 
for generating elements of civil society as philanthropy. In fact, the case of Muslim 
women’s NGO went beyond it by combining a Muslim tradition of donating and a 
western liberal way of associating and promoting interests of its members. Further, I 
would like to emphasise that, as discussed in the previous section, the whole non-
professional category exists on a voluntary basis because their funding is irregular. 
Moreover, some of their leaders are very passionate about the mission of their NGO 
and constituency, and, therefore, work only on a voluntary basis. As a result, my 
argument is that so called classic principals of NGOs, namely voluntarism, 
philanthropy, and constituency responsiveness (Ruffin, 1999), are not necessarily 
absent in Kyrgyzstan.   
 
 
Constituency responsiveness  
 
The argument in the literature is that Kyrgyz NGOs failed to establish a link 
with the population, particularly the rural poor, by being professional and, therefore, 
that they could not represent them (Roy, 2002; Aksartova, 2005; Earle, 2005; Pertic, 
2005). However, my research findings shed a new light on this claim. Firstly, the 
findings suggest that it is misleading to say that NGOs could not establish a 
constituency at all. The previous section and chapter 5 demonstrated that a number of 
NGOs both in the professional and non-professional categories have an established 
link with their constituencies. In fact, a few of them were created by their 
constituency or members.  
The most salient cases are a professional NGO representing business firms 
with 48 organisations in its membership and several non-professional NGOs working 
on issues of women and refugees with a relatively large membership. These cases 
have illustrated that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan can not only have members but also exist 
on their contributions. Based on them, I suggest that NGOs with a membership and a 
constituency are possible in Kyrgyzstan when there is a particular population group 
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that needs its voice to be heard and interests represented (e.g. disabled, Muslim 
women, business firms, refugees).  
Furthermore, the fact that NGOs failed to establish a link with the rural poor 
because of their urban characteristic (Aksartova, 2005; Earle, 2005) can be 
challenged from the point of civil society theories. In chapter 1, I emphasised that, 
according to Tonnies (2005), civil society is Gesellschaft, a city phenomenon. Social 
relations that take place in Gesellschaft are based on individual autonomy. In cities, 
new types of social relations emerge where individuals are freed from kin and 
community ties that are central features of rural life which Tonnies (2005) called 
Gemeinschaft. In cities, people join different voluntary organisations depending on 
their interests to meet their needs and to be heard. They are small and numerous with 
a constant turnover of members who come and go depending on their interests and 
the aims of a voluntary association (Wirth, 1938; Hall, 1995; Taylor 2006). From this 
theoretical stance, it can be suggested that NGOs as urban based institutions failed 
because there were no preconditions in rural places for voluntary organisations due 
to prevalence of kin, community, and religious institutions. This is particularly 
relevant to Kyrgyzstan where social fabric in rural areas is characterised with dense 
traditional, kin, and solidarity networks (Roy, 2002; Petric, 2005; Radnitz, 2006).   
The literature on Kyrgyz NGOs also argued that, in order to secure funding 
for their organisations, NGOs tend to follow donor priorities rather than local needs 
(Roy 2002; Adamson, 2002; Giffen at el., 2005; Shishkaraeva, 2006). However, I 
suggest that NGOs still have room to address the needs and problems of their 
constituency in their activities; although their methods depend on the strength of 
their personnel and organisation. My overall argument is that NGOs specialise in one 
field and shift their activities within that field depending on donor funding priorities 
rather than between different fields.  
My interviews with some NGOs revealed that they developed their projects 
based either on their research or their strategic plan, or a decision of their board. The 
following three cases demonstrate the versatility of project development methods 
among professional NGOs. When asked a question about their procedure of project 
development, an interviewee from women’s NGO based in Issyk-Ata district 
explained that they did it based on needs assessment. Before starting designing a 
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project, they conduct research using participatory community appraisal (PCA) and 
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods to identify needs of their target group. 
The interviewee also noted that, in addition to this, they conduct their activities based 
on their strategic, middle-term, and annual plans (Interview, Bishkek, 19 March 
2008). I acknowledge that the effectiveness of PCA and PRA in terms of ensuring 
participation of different groups of people has been criticised (Earle, 2005), however 
it is important to underline that NGOs indeed use these methods.   
In the meantime, an environmental NGO from Bishkek starts designing a 
project development with brainstorming on a problem. Then they go to the site, 
where the problem is, and talk to local population, particularly about how this 
problem could be solved. It is evident that their approach does not involve structured 
methods of assessing needs such as PCA or PRA but rather is based on informal 
interaction with population (Interview, Bishkek, 27 November 2007). An NGO from 
Osh working on human rights also starts project development with brainstorming. 
Additionally, it conducts online research, focus groups, interviews, and observations 
(Interview, Osh, 31 March 2008).  
However, not all NGOs can afford to do research. As was pointed out above, 
project development methods depend on the professional and institutional capacity of 
NGOs. The availability of funding seems to be the most significant factor. For 
example, the funding of a refugee NGO from Bishkek includes grants only from one 
donor and a nominal collection of membership fees. It is not sufficient to conduct 
research. Therefore, they usually generate ideas for potential projects from 
complaints and suggestions that their constituency make as described below:  
 
 
[A problem] comes to us, to our office. How does it come? Will you give it or not? Give 
what? Will you give me a passport or not? …. Aksakal [elderly man] came saying this. Will 
you give me citizenship or not? Then you sit and think how you can help him. For example, I 
am not Bakiev [president] to give him a passport. … He is one person but there are many like 
him in a village. An idea comes – making procedures of citizenship acquisition easier … we 
developed this idea. Soros supported our idea and it [procedures] became easier (Interview, 
Bishkek, 22 February 2008).   
 
 
An NGO working on housing issues from Bishkek does not have enough 
funding to conduct research for its perspective projects either. Rather, it identifies 
project priorities based on complaints and questions that their constituency makes 
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and asks on the round tables, seminars, meetings, and other events (Interview, 
Bishkek, 15 February 2008). As a result, I suggest that the more an NGO is strong 
institutionally and professionally, which depends on availability of funding, the more 
it has the capacity to address the needs and interests of its target group. This is 
especially the case if the NGO’s funding is diversified.   
At the same time, my interview data showed that NGOs had a broad mission 
to match funding opportunities easier. The strong financial dependence of NGOs on 
donors has had a direct impact on how NGOs have developed their missions. My 
research showed there was a general tendency among NGOs in both categories to 
have a broad mission. For example, protection and promotion of human rights is the 
mission of a human rights NGO (Interview, Bishkek, 28 February 2008). This 
mission is broad indeed since human rights can encompass a great array of issues and 
no specific focus or target group is indicated. Another NGO working on media issues 
with the involvement of young people has a mission aiming to create an arena for 
young people to pursue their creative undertakings, ideas, and potential, to socialise 
youth into society, and to foster professional skills in the field of television 
(Interview, Bishkek, 26 February 2008). Yet again, it is obvious that this mission is 
broad and can focus on a wide range of themes not only on media but also on any 
aspect of youth development. With reference to McCarthy and Zald (1973), one can 
give an account for why NGOs have broad missions. According to these authors, the 
external provision of funding made SMOs dependent on them rather than on their 
target groups. Consequently, SMOs defined their missions to meet funding priorities. 
Moreover, their missions had enduring issues since it made it easier for SMOs to 
meet donor priorities and acquire funding; while SMOs with a narrow definition had 
limited chances in fundraising (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). 
Nonetheless, my research data revealed that NGOs tried to find a compromise 
between funding opportunities and their missions. An example for this can be an 
organisation working on conflict resolution. It claimed that its activities always 
stayed within their mission. However, during the interview, it was revealed that now 
they were working on building the capacity of local authorities. When asked a 
question whether their current project was out of their mission, the interviewee said 
that they worked with local authorities since they were a main actor in the prevention 
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of conflicts, whose capacity should be strong particularly in terms of transparency 
and accountability to people (Interview, Jalalabad, 12 April 2008). Drawing on other 
research data, this can be seen from another perspective. At present, as noted 
elsewhere, donors are focusing on building the capacity of state institutions. As a 
result, most donor funding is being spent for this purpose in the form of grants to 
NGOs promoting advocacy and reforms in state policies and to the government itself. 
In other words, the NGO is working on the capacity-building of local authorities 
because it could find funding only for this. However, the NGO could link that 
donor's priority to its own mission.  
It was neatly noted by one of the interviewees who said: “We look for these 
moments – crossing of interests. The main thing is that our interests should cross 
with interests of donors” (Interview, Bishkek, 5 March 2008). In brief, NGOs try to 
find a crossing point between their mission, needs of their constituency, and donor 
priorities. Consequently, I argue that NGOs specialise in a certain field and shift their 
activities within this field in accordance with donor priorities and funding rather than 
between different fields. For example, an educational NGO from Bishkek specialises 
in providing training for trainers and teaching methods. The interviewee noted that 
they could apply even for an HIV/AIDS grant if it has a component of training of 
trainers. An NGO working on community development expressed the same opinion 
by noting: “If there is a tender for teaching new types of income-generating 
activities, which is our niche, we write a project” (Interview, Bishkek, 4 March 
2008). In other words, NGOs might shift between different donor 
priorities/programmes as long as there is funding for their niche. Therefore, although 
the missions of NGOs are broad, they still focus on a certain field, e.g. human rights, 
children, and women 
Finally, with reference to the sub-sections on constituency responsiveness 
and urban characteristic, I suggest that donor expectations of and requirements for 
NGOs were unrealistic, contradictory, and, therefore, bound to fail. The great 
disappointment of donors with NGOs has been that the latter could not reach out to 
the rural poor. The above discussion has noted that NGOs cannot do this because, in 
rural locations, there are no proper preconditions for NGOs to exist and operate since 
traditional and kin bonds dominate rural life (Tonnies, 2005). Furthermore, according 
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to McCarthy and Zald (1973), professional NGOs grow apart from their constituency 
(be it the poor or others) because they depend on funders’ priorities and funding for 
their own organisational survival.  
 
 
New research directions  
 
 
 Drawing on the recent political and social changes in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 
and my anecdotal observation of civic and political activism during this period, I 
suggest that there might be a new trend in the NGO sector. It seems that a new wave 
of NGOs in a western form with all the necessary components such as voluntarism, 
philanthropy, and constituency are emerging in Kyrgyzstan. Most importantly, they 
are the outcomes of voluntary, civic initiatives addressing pressing issues. I suggest 
that the emergence of these new NGOs is connected to the increase in the number of 
people, who have studied and lived in western countries, and the rise of new 
information and communication technologies.  
A vivid example for this is the April Relief Fund initiative which came about 
after the social unrest and government overthrow in April 2010. The fund collected 
donations to help victims of the April upraising and the June ethnic conflict in 
southern Kyrgyzstan. It managed to collect $3,552 which was distributed to families 
who lost someone or suffered from the April unrest. The fund also collected $16,954 
to help children in Osh and Jalalabad who have suffered from the ethnic conflict, go 
to school in September (www.aprilrelief.org). What is unique and important in this 
case is that all these activities were done completely on a voluntary basis by young 
people who either studied or are now studying in the West mainly through 
educational programmes of different donors such as Soros, IREX69. Furthermore, 
most of these students participated in a programme called Students Institution for 
Free Enterprise - one of the donor projects in Kyrgyzstan.  
                                                 
69 Personal acquaintance with organisers of this initiative.  
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There have been a number of such initiatives70 in Kyrgyzstan. Such cases 
might have implications for the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan and the civil society 
literature, especially literature focusing on civil society in the non-western countries 
(Hann and Dunn, 1996), since they open up new directions for further research. 
These initiatives suggest that the concept of an NGO might have widened in people’s 
perception in Kyrgyzstan. Creating an NGO is not necessarily considered as potential 
work as in the case of professional NGOs discussed in the thesis. Now it involves 
people with western training who want to do good for the wider community on a 
voluntary basis. New initiatives like the April Relief Fund are capable of collecting 
donations. Moreover, they strive to transparency and accountability by providing 
reports on their websites.   
In the light of this, I suggest two avenues for further research. The first one is 
exploring the experiences of young people who have studied in the west. My 
assumption is that the western training and experience of living in the West change 
the views of young people and influence their social and political activeness. This 
type of research would make a further contribution to the discussion on the impact of 
donors’ promotion of civil society in Kyrgyzstan. For the time being the literature 
has argued that donors have failed to promote civil society in Kyrgyzstan. However, 
the emergence of initiatives such as the April Fund suggests that the investment of 
donors in education might have produced the desired results. For example, IREX 
administrates scholarship programmes of the US government. It has aimed at 
strengthening civil society through promoting education in Kyrgyzstan 
(www.irex.kg). It seems that this programme has had success on producing 
individuals who are capable of engaging in civic initiatives in a liberal sense.       
The second avenue for research is the rise of information and communication 
technologies in Kyrgyzstan. It can be said that the April Relief Fund’s success partly 
resulted from the ability of its members to access and use the Internet and social 
network sites such as Facebook. For example, they have a website and an account on 
                                                 
70 The second similar case is Edinburgh-based initiative on raising funds to support victims of 
southern conflict. A number of activities were conducted to collect more than $4,000. In this case, it is 
important that the collaboration of Kyrgyz diaspora consisted of students studying in Edinburgh 
combined with an initiative group in Kyrgyzstan consisting also of people who studied at a graduate 
level in the west and now work in different development and academic positions in Kyrgyzstan
 
. A 
significant amount of work was done on a voluntary basis. 
 205 
Facebook with many fans both within Kyrgyzstan and abroad. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to research what the methods of the fund’s members were in relation to 
promoting their initiative and raising funds. All in all, the link between the rise of 
civic initiatives in Kyrgyzstan and the use of the Internet can be explored. For 
example, in 2007, Kulikova and Perlmutter asserted that blog ‘Akaevu.net’ served as 
‘a unique and rich source of information not available from other local sources or the 
world press’ during the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 (2007:29). 
Consequently, they claimed that such blogs could bring about and maintain 
democratisation in the Third World countries.            
The third avenue for further research is why the governments of Akaev and 
Bakiev did not curtail NGOs as much as they curtailed media and political 
opposition. Chapter 6 demonstrated that NGOs had more freedom than the two above 
mentioned actors. Such research can reveal further the role and impact of NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan. The last avenue for further research is exploring how the new 
government will shape its relations with NGOs. As stated in the introduction, 
Bakiev’s government was ousted in April 2010. In June 2010, there was a 
referendum where people voted for a new constitution which stipulated that 
governance in Kyrgyzstan would be based on parliamentary democracy. In October 
2010, there were elections for a new party based parliament. Five political parties 
with diverse agendas won the elections. Currently, they are in the process of building 
a coalition.  
The last research direction is to explore emerging donors. In chapter 3, I 
mentioned that, during my fieldwork, I discovered that Kyrgyzstan’s neighbouring 
countries such as Russia, China, and Kazakhstan, were establishing themselves as 
donors in Kyrgyzstan. Based on the case of the NGO, which received funding from 
the Russian embassy, I concluded that the emerging donors might influence the 
future development of the NGO sector. Taken into account the fact that western and 
international donors have reduced funding to NGOs as stated in chapter 4, the 
emerging donors might be a potential source of funding to Kyrgyz NGOs. Moreover, 
Russia’s role has increased for the past couple years in Kyrgyzstan; while the 
position of America has staggered (Marat, 2008a; www.rferl.org, b; Kramer, 2010).  
Consequently, the focus of further research could be studying whether the emerging 
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donors had civil society in their agenda and worked with NGOs and what 
implications the rise of these donors could have on civil society promotion of 




In this chapter, I have argued that the bleak analysis that the NGO sector is 
static and professional with funding limitations and suppression from the state might 
not necessarily be a case. First of all, I have argued that the sector is diverse and 
complex. There are non-professional NGOs. They are more likely to exist despite of 
donor funding shortage based on other financial sources, voluntary work, and moral 
obligation to their members. Secondly, I have questioned some statements in the 
literature in relation to NGOs’ failure to establish a constituency, and lack of 
voluntarism and philanthropy (Ruffin, 1999; Roy, 2002; Aksartova, 2005; Earle, 
2005; Petric, 2005).  
In this regard, I have raised a question if NGOs in Kyrgyzstan had a 
constituency and represented it. The relevant literature suggested that Kyrgyz NGOs 
were not able to do this so far (Roy 2002; Adamson, 2002; Giffen at el., 2005; 
Shishkaraeva, 2006). However, my work has indicated the reverse. Drawing on the 
cases of NGOs working with business firms, women, refugees, disabled, and other 
specific groups of population, I have argued that a number of NGOs could establish a 
link with their constituency. In fact, some of these NGOs were originally established 
by its constituency. This has led me to conclude that membership-based NGOs are 
possible in Kyrgyzstan if there is a group of population with real concerns and 
interests. Moreover, I have suggested that, although NGOs still depend on donor 
priorities because of their dependence on donor funding, they still have some 
flexibility in addressing the needs of their constituency or working on one field.  
 Further, I have stated that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan have not been deprived of 
voluntarism and philanthropy. In fact, the whole non-professional category of NGOs 
work predominantly on a voluntary basis since their payment is irregular. Most 
importantly, the motivation of a number of NGO leaders in the non-professional 
category is not driven with monetary interests but rather with passion to tackle social 
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problems. The unique case of a Muslim NGO also shows a level of philanthropy can 
exist in Kyrgyzstan. There are also NGOs which enable people to pursue their 
interests and meet their needs. In other words, NGOs in Kyrgyzstan display features 
of civil society defined in the beginning of the thesis as voluntarism, availability of 
associations, and enabling individuals to pursue their interests. However, Kyrgyz 
NGOs have been influenced by local specificities while acquiring these features 
(Kaviraj, 2001). The case of the Muslim NGO, which combined a Muslim tradition 
of donating and a liberal form of associating, is a key example for this.        
Further, I have explored the recent civic initiatives of young people in 
Kyrgyzstan in the light of the political and social events in 2010. I have concluded 
that these cases can demonstrate new features of the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan. I 
have identified that, in these initiatives, young people with western training and 
access to the Internet were very active. Therefore, I have suggested researching 
experiences of young people who have studied abroad and their activities back in 
Kyrgyzstan, particularly in relation to their social and political activeness. The 
second avenue for the research is exploring the influence of the new communication 
and information technologies on the rise of civic initiatives. I have also pointed out 
that the relative freedom of NGOs in comparison with media and political opposition 
under Akaev and Bakievs’ rules can also be explored. Further, I have stated that the 
social and political context in Kyrgyzstan has changed with the adoption of the new 
constitution and election of the new party-based government. As a result, another 
field of the research could be to study the policies of the new government towards 
NGOs. Finally, I have suggested researching activities of emerging donors, such as 
Russia, China, and Kazakhstan, and exploring whether they have civil society 
promotion in their agenda.       















The thesis has sought to explore the changes that donors have made in their 
civil society activities in Kyrgyzstan since the mid 2000s with a particular emphasis 
on the reasons behind these changes. The focus of the thesis has been on NGOs 
because they have been identified as the most salient element of civil society that 
donors promoted in Kyrgyzstan throughout the 1990s. Consequently, the thesis has 
studied what influence the changes in civil society activities of donors have had on 
Kyrgyz NGOs and their interaction with the state. Furthermore, the thesis has aimed 
to understand the current donor civil society activities from the perspective of civil 
society theories and to make a contribution to the debate on the development of 
western liberal civil society in the non-Western context.  
 
 
Changes in donor agenda: the return of the state  
 
I argue that, in Kyrgyzstan, civil society has receded into the background in 
donor agendas since the mid 2000s. This is different from civil society activities of 
donors in the 1990s. During the 1990s, donors promoted the development of civil 
society in Kyrgyzstan by encouraging the emergence of NGOs and building their 
capacity. Under the neo-liberal policies of donors, NGOs were a key actor in the 
development and preferred over the state. As stated in chapter 1, NGOs were 
involved in service provision, democracy promotion, and acted as anti-thesis to the 
state on the whole. The significant donor support for civil society promotion in the 
1990s led to a proliferation of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan as shown in chapter 2.  
However, my key research finding shows that this has changed since the mid 
2000s in Kyrgyzstan. I suggest that donors’ focus has shifted from civil society 
promotion to state capacity-building. The case of UNDP, discussed in chapter 3, 
demonstrated that donors provide support to, and work with, all the branches of state: 
a) parliament, b) a public administration reform, and c) local self-governance bodies. 
European bilateral and multilateral donors have also started providing sector budget 
support.   
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In chapter 3, I discussed why donors had moved to state capacity-building. I 
suggested that the shift in donor priorities from civil society to the state in 
Kyrgyzstan is connected to new donor policies. Since the early 2000s, donors have 
adopted global documents on aid effectiveness, such as Paris Declaration and 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, which stress on ownership and identify states as 
focal points in promoting development. This is because donors realised that capacity 
of the states in recipient countries have to be strengthened for development aid to 
work. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of NGOs has been questioned. Their 
accountability, transparency, independence, and democratic representation have been 
debated and harshly criticised. Furthermore, weak states have come to be seen as 
fragile and a potential threat to international security, particularly after 9/11.  
In this regard, I argue that new policies of donors focused on state capacity-
building have shaped their civil society activities in Kyrgyzstan. Donors stopped 
encouraging the emergence of NGOs as they did in the 1990s. In fact, most donors 
no longer provide capacity-building support to NGOs. My key findings are that, first 
of all, donors have reduced their funding to NGOs which has made a competition for 
donor funding among NGOs fiercer. Secondly, they are supporting NGOs mainly in 
an advocacy role to promote reforms and changes in state policies. Thirdly, donors 
are promoting collaborative relations between the state and NGOs.  
Furthermore, I argue that donors are trying to look beyond traditional NGOs 
and have started working with media and political parties in the way they used to 
work with NGOs in the 1990s. In other words, donors are building capacity of media 
and political parties. Moreover, some donors are purposefully making their 
definitions more inclusive. Nonetheless, although I suggest that the overall trend in 
civil society activities of donors is similar, I point out that donors are not completely 
homogenous. There are differences between them. For example, one of the European 
bilateral donors found building capacity of NGOs without any purpose inefficient; 
therefore, they now focus on supporting NGOs working on advocacy. Meanwhile, 
American donors stated that they started promoting advocacy NGOs because the 




Communitarian and liberal trends in the donor agenda   
 
I suggest that the current state oriented policies of donors have theoretical 
implications. The conceptual framework, set out in chapter 1, indicated that the state 
served as one of the key benchmarks in defining civil society; autonomy, boundaries, 
and functions of civil society are defined in relation to the state. In this regard, I 
presented two models of the state–civil society relations. The first model is liberal 
where the state and civil society are separate, independent actors providing a check 
on each other. The second one is communitarian where the above actors are in one 
continuum and mutually connected.  
In the light of this, I argue that the current focus of donors on state capacity-
building and promotion of collaborative relations between the state and civil society 
has elements predominantly of the communitarian model. Meanwhile, donor policies 
in the 1990s were characterised as liberal where civil society was encouraged and the 
state was limited. At present, the strong state is seen as the key precondition for 
development. Donors consider NGOs as assistants to the state rather than 
counterbalance where the common good is a shared agenda. Moreover, NGOs need 
the state and its policies and funding to exist and operate successfully. Therefore, the 
aspects of communitarian model of the state–civil society relations, such as a 
politically organised society where the state guides society (Taylor, 2006), a 
necessity of the state for civil society to prevent it from self-destruction (Walzer, 
1998; Taylor, 2006), dominate in the present aid strategies of donors and their vision 
of the state-civil society relations.               
 
 
The response to new donor strategies: state-NGO relations   
 
I argue that the changes in donor civil society activities are leading NGOs to 
further professionalisation and formalisation. As discussed in chapter 5, because of 
their continuing dependence on donor funding, most NGOs have to raise their 
professional and institutional capacity to obtain donor funding which has been 
reduced resulting in a stronger competition for it among NGOs. Moreover, I suggest 
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that donor promotion of NGOs in advocacy is also requiring NGOs to raise their 
professionalism because effective work with the state demands from NGOs certain 
experience, skills, and expertise. Nonetheless, I point out that professionalisation and 
formalisation have concerned only NGOs which already have a certain level of 
professional and institutional capacity. NGOs, which lack such initial capacity, tend 
to fail to acquire donor funding. These NGOs are usually small and/or new. 
Moreover, there is very limited capacity-building support to these NGOs.       
I suggest that donors’ efforts to promote the state-NGO collaboration have 
had some success.  In chapter 6, I showed that the state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan 
have an element of collaboration. There are NGOs which work with the state by 
sharing a joint agenda. For them, the state is a partner which they assist, work jointly, 
and provide technical support. Moreover, these NGOs regard the state and 
themselves as mutually complementary because they are both working on the same 
goals.  
Nonetheless, I also suggest that there are NGOs which distinctly consider 
themselves as separate and independent from the state. They have their own agenda 
which they seek to carry out independently. Their relations with the state are 
characterised by negotiations with the state institutions, lobbying, making critical 
statements, and sometimes protesting. These NGOs also regard one of their key roles 
as providing a check on the state. Some of these NGOs became politicised due to 
their active role and their leaders’ involvement in political parties. In other words, 
my argument is that the state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan have elements of both 
cooperation and counterbalance.   
 I also suggest that the government under Bakiev failed to establish a proper 
dialogue with the NGOs that sought to counterbalance it. I argue that the previous 
government did not welcome NGOs’ critical evaluation of state activities and 
peaceful demonstrations. Conversely, Bakiev’s government felt threatened by NGOs 
as a potential source of social mobilisation. This is evident from its actions curtailing 
legislation on non-commercial organisations and civic and political freedoms, such 
as freedom of assembly, which demonstrates authoritarian features of Bakiev’s 
government. At the same time, it also shows the political role and weight of NGOs 
engaged in counterbalancing the state.  
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I also argue that the government of Bakiev tried to follow its regional 
neighbours, such as Russia and Uzbekistan, in dealing with NGOs. Bakiev’s 
government attempted to exert control over NGOs’ funding and to establish 
GONGOs as has happened in Russia and Uzbekistan. Neither of these initiatives was 
fully put in practice mainly because the government was overthrown. However, what 
is important to note is that, both under Bakiev and Akaevs’ governments, the nature 
of GONGOs was different in Kyrgyzstan than in Russia and Uzbekistan.  In the latter 
countries, the governments used GONGOs to promote state’s agenda by providing 
funding to them. Meanwhile, the previous Kyrgyz governments could not promote 
GONGOs for such a purpose because they did not provide funding to NGOs. In fact, 
I suggest that, because previous governments in Kyrgyzstan depended on the funding 
of donors, they could not totally crackdown on NGOs.  
Further, Kyrgyz NGOs, especially politicised ones, under Bakiev still had 
much more freedom than their counterparts in Central Asia and Russia. The 
crackdown of Bakiev’s government on NGOs was not as harsh as on media and 
religious organisations which experienced considerable legislative oppression, 
physical attacks, imprisonment, and even murder. Further, in line with the Indian 
government in the 1990s, Bakiev’s government was open to collaboration with those 
NGOs which shared their development goals concerning social issues. 
By looking at the state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan, I identified that the 
government under Bakiev was institutionally and professionally weak and grew 
considerably authoritarian. Moreover, I suggest that its activities towards and 
interaction with NGOs were explicitly and implicitly impacted by different powers 
and global politics.     
 
 
Contributions to the literature and scholarly debates    
 
My thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature and scholarly 
debate on civil society in Central Asia and in development. My work fills one of the 
key gaps in the literature. As noted in chapter 2, NGOs in Kyrgyzstan were 
generalised as professional, that is, with paid, qualified and skilled staff and other 
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elements (Roy, 2002; Aksartova, 2005; Petric, 2005). Contrary to this, a number of 
authors asserted that NGOs were weak professionally and institutionally and lacked 
proper human resources, structure, rules and other organisational mechanisms such 
as accountability and transparency (Minnini, 1998; Kasybekov, 1999; Shishkaraeva 
et al., 2006).  
I pointed out that, firstly, two perspectives on NGOs created a contradictory 
image of NGOs. Secondly, none of the works researched NGOs from an 
organisational perspective undermining the basis of their claim. The contribution of 
my work is that it researched NGOs in Kyrgyzstan from the organisational 
perspective. It identified that the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan cannot be generalised as 
professional since it is very diverse and complex. In fact, I categorised NGOs in my 
sample into professional and non-professional almost evenly. However, there is a 
tendency towards professionalisation and formalisation due to reduction in donor 
funding as shown in chapter 5.  
Most importantly, I believe that I used a unique methodological approach to 
study professionalisation and formalisation of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. I should note 
that works on professionalisation and formalisation of NGOs that I reviewed did not 
provide a clear definition on these (Ebrahim, 2001; Markowitz and Tice, 2002; 
Cumming, 2008). Therefore, I created an ideal type of professional and formal NGO 
drawing on works of McCarthy and Zald (1973) and on my own analysis of over 45 
NGO in Kyrgyzstan.  
Furthermore, another popular argument in the literature on Kyrgyz civil 
society (Ruffin, 1999; Roy, 2002; Petric, 2005) was that the NGO sector was 
deprived of voluntarism, philanthropy, and a link with their constituency. However, I 
argue that this is not necessarily the case. I make this claim based on NGOs in my 
sample categorised as non-professional. As shown in chapter 7, a number of non-
professional NGOs work only on a voluntary basis because of their commitment to 
social issues. Meanwhile, most NGO workers in this category receive payment when 
they have funding (normally from donors). When they do not have funding, they 
work voluntarily.  
I also suggest that a number of NGOs, which include those working on issues 
concerning Muslim women, children, and elderly people, have received 
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philanthropic support from public. This indicates that people in Kyrgyzstan can 
donate for charitable purposes. I identified that philanthropy is particularly well 
developed in the Muslim NGO where well-off members donate generously. As a 
result, I argue that my findings provide empirical support to Starr’s argument (1999) 
that Central Asian people could use their Muslim traditions for philanthropy.  
My work also challenges the argument in the literature which claimed that 
NGOs in Kyrgyzstan had failed to establish a link with people especially the rural 
poor (Adamson, 2002; Aksartova, 2005; Earle, 2005; Petric 2005). I argue that some 
NGOs in Kyrgyzstan could establish a constituency. They work with a specific 
population such as Muslim women, disabled people, refugees, or institutions such as 
business firms to promote, represent, and pursue needs and interests of the group that 
they represent. In relation to this, I assert that NGOs in Kyrgyzstan can have a 
constituency if the latter is a well defined group such as the above with real interests. 
The link between NGOs and constituency is even stronger when an NGO is 
established its constituency/members.     
On the whole, I suggest that donors have had high expectations of NGOs. On 
the one hand, donors have wanted NGOs to represent different groups of people, 
especially the excluded and poor, to provide services, and to influence decision 
making. On the other hand, donors have required NGOs to have proper qualifications 
and skills to deal with their funding, to monitor their own activities, and to report the 
results properly. I argue that these donor expectations of NGOs have been unrealistic 
taking into account their requirements for NGOs and theories of both civil society 
and organisations.  
The civil society theories, discussed in chapter 1, state that voluntary 
associations normally exist in urban areas (Wirth, 1938; Tonnies, 2005) and are with 
a frequently changing voluntary membership base and a variable life expectancy 
depending on the interests and needs of their members (Hall, 1995; Tocqueville, 
2005; Taylor 2006). Based on this, I argue that the difficulty in promoting NGOs in 
rural areas in Kyrgyzstan has been connected to the fact that rural areas lack 
favourable conditions since they are, in Tonnies words (2005), Gemeinschaft and 
guided by folkways and mores.  
 215 
Further, the organisational theory of McCarthy and Zald (1973), set out in 
chapter 3, indicated that, when a considerable amount of external funding is 
available, non-profit organisations change their nature from voluntary to professional 
to obtain funding. As a result, they separate from their membership base and follow 
donor priorities. In other words, donor funding requirements are bound to make 
NGOs professionalise and formalise. Based on this, I argue that the donor 
expectations of, and requirements for NGOs were unrealistic and contradictory, and, 
therefore, bound to fail.  
Furthermore, I suggest that my findings on state-NGO relations in 
Kyrgyzstan challenge a claim in the literature stating that there was no considerable 
interaction between the state and NGOs, and dismissing NGOs as active actors which 
could influence social and political life in Kyrgyzstan (Kasybekov 1999; Roy, 2002; 
Aksartova, 2005; Radnitz, 2006; Tretyakov, 2008). As stated in chapter 6, I argue 
that the state-NGO relations in Kyrgyzstan have elements of both collaboration and 
counterbalance. This means that the state institutions and NGOs indeed interact. In 
fact, their interaction is on the rise due to donor focus on the promotion of 
collaborative relations between the state and NGOs. I also argue that the rise of 
activeness of NGOs in a political domain undermines Roy’s claim (2002) about 
NGOs’ political inactiveness and alienation from addressing the pressing issues in 
the country. Conversely, I demonstrated that a few NGOs have become very active 
politically.     
From a theoretical perspective, I suggest that the state-NGO interaction has 
had conflicting elements of liberal and communitarian models of state-civil society 
relations. The collaborative relations between these actors feature aspects of the 
communitarian model since the actors share the common agenda and, most 
importantly, NGOs consider themselves in a continuum with the state. I 
demonstrated that in cases where the state institutions were even involved in the 
operation and management of NGOs. In other words, NGOs has become an element 
in the distribution of power throughout society (Taylor, 2006). Their ideas have 
found their final destination in the state institution (Walzer, 1998).  
The counterbalancing side of the state-NGO relations has mainly displayed 
characteristics of the liberal model. For these NGOs, they are separate and 
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independent from the state which does not intervene into their affairs. These NGOs 
are also convinced that they should provide a check on the state (Gellner, 1994). 
However, I point out that this does not mean that these NGOs oppose the state. They 
work with the state quite successfully but through negotiation. I also suggest that the 
professional and institutional capacity of NGOs plays an important role in building 
relations with the state. Although NGOs’ interaction with the state is mainly shaped 
by their mission and activities; according to my work, it also depends on professional 
and institutional capacity of the NGO. Finally, I suggest that, although donors are 
still important in bringing together the state and NGOs through their project funding 
(Aksartova, 2005), the state and NGO relations started to take place out of donor 
projects.  
Finally, I would like to suggest that the Kyrgyz NGO sector cannot be 
disregarded totally as donor driven, professional, and alien to local social and 
political life as the argument used to be in the literature. My argument is that the 
NGO sector is much more diverse and complex and displays features such as 
voluntarism, philanthropy, a link with constituency, and interaction with the state. 
Most importantly, these happen within local specificities.  
In conclusion, civil society in Kyrgyzstan has developed considerably since 
the early 1990s. Its emergence and development was significantly influenced by the 
civil society support activities of donors who reduced civil society to NGOs. As 
chapter 2 showed, donors, such as USAID and DFID, invested generously in NGO 
capacity building programmes in the name of civil society promotion. As a result, 
there was proliferation of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan.  However, it was widely stated that, 
while the quantity of NGOs rose, their quality lagged behind. The Kyrgyz NGO 
sector has faced harsh criticism. For the most part, the relevant literature condemned 
NGOs for being professional, donor driven, urban based, and divorced from local 
communities. In particular, the professionalisation of NGOs has been blamed for 
these characteristics notwithstanding the fact that none of the studies explored NGO 
professionalisation specifically. Another criticism suggested that NGOs lacked 
financial transparency and accountability, which raised suspicions about the real 
interests of NGOs.              
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 My research showed that it was inadequate to state that the NGO sector in 
Kyrgyzstan was professional, donor dependent, urban dominated, and without links 
with local communities. I argue in this thesis that the NGO sector, as a key part of 
Kyrgyz civil society, was much more complex and diverse. There are NGOs of 
various missions, structures, capacities, work methods, funding sources, and values. 
While some of them have operated in the form of a liberal, professional NGO; others 
have incorporated local specificities such as Muslim traditions and solidarity. The 
examples of Muslim NGOs, refugee NGOs, and women’s NGOs discussed 
throughout the thesis are vivid evidence of this.  In other words, as a result of civil 
society promotion in Kyrgyzstan of over a decade and half, a much more complex 
civil society emerged rather than just a sector of professional NGOs.      
Furthermore, my research gave insights into the professionalisation of NGOs 
in Kyrgyzstan. As stated earlier, the NGO sector has been depicted as professional in 
the literature and, most importantly, has been criticised for this. For example, Roy 
(2002) and Petric (2005) argued that, as a result, NGOs had failed to promote the 
interests of local communities. However, these studies did not concentrate on the 
exploration of NGO professionalisation specifically. In contrast, based on my 
research findings that focused on professionalisation of NGOs, I argue that the NGO 
sector in Kyrgyzstan is semi-professional.  I categorised slightly more than half of 
my sample as professional. These organisations have full-time paid leaders and staff 
who have built a career in the NGO sector. They also have formal organisational 
attributes. Meanwhile, the remaining half of my sample was categorised as non-
professional. Leaders of these NGOs are either volunteers or paid on an irregular 
basis and, more importantly, they have other jobs to earn a living. Non-professional 
NGOs are not formalised and lack strong infrastructural and organisational capacity. 
So, my characterisation seeks to rectify this mischaracterisation.  
My thesis also showed that the professionalisation of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan 
was not necessarily a negative phenomenon as had been suggested by the existing 
literature. My research illustrated a number of NGOs categorised as professional 
which could establish a good link with local communities, address needs of their 
constituency, and find a crossing point between donor funding priorities and needs of 
local communities. The example of an urban based ecological NGO demonstrated 
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this perfectly. Notwithstanding being a professional NGO in Bishkek, it established a 
connection with rural NGOs and informally assisted them in building their own 
organisational capacity by sharing with experience and information.  
The exploration of the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan in this thesis shows that the 
promotion of the liberal form of NGOs has produced different results. My conceptual 
framework premised conceptualisation of civil society on the liberal and 
communitarian traditions of civil society where the role of the state and individuals 
differ. Despite the fact that donors’ efforts to produce civil society in the liberal 
form, the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan has not taken a form of purely liberal tradition 
of civil society. The sector also displays features of the communitarian tradition of 
civil society. This suggests that the line between “liberal” and “communitarian” 
traditions of civil society is blurred in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the case of Kyrgyzstan 
illustrates, what Kamrava (2001) called, indigenisation of civil society, when the 
meaning and utility of western civil society has encountered a number of changes in 
the local civil society discourse and context.  
Further, referring to the debate outlined in the beginning of the thesis, it was 
stated that there are two positions in regard to development of civil society in the 
non-Western context. The first position asserts that liberal civil society can be 
replicated cross culturally (Gellner, 1994). The second position claims that, in non-
Western countries, civil society needs to conform to the cultural, social, and political 
specificities, which are often incomparable, of each country (Hann and Dunn, 
1996:18). The Kyrgyz case also supports Kaviraj’s statement that “the processes of 
modernity are universal, but these processes are realised through a trajectory of 
historical events which are specific to each society” (2001:323). Therefore, non-
Western countries can learn from western social theory; however, they cannot expect 
it to tell them about their precise future (Kaviraj, 2001). Therefore non-Western 







New directions for further research  
 
I suggest four directions for further research. The first research direction is to 
explore why NGOs were curtailed less than media and political opposition in 
Kyrgyzstan during Bakiev’s rule and what it can say about their role in social and 
political life of Kyrgyzstan. Chapter 6 noted that media and political opposition had 
been suppressed more than NGOs when Bakiev’s government was in power; 
although NGOs became politically active at that time. The second research direction 
is to study the policies of the new government in Kyrgyzstan towards NGOs. As 
stated in chapter 7, Kyrgyzstan has acquired a new form of governance based on 
parliamentary democracy. Moreover, a number of NGO leaders have joined political 
parties. Therefore, one can assume that this is influencing the relations between state 
institutions and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan.  
One more research suggestion is to explore emerging donors such as Russia, 
China, and Kazakhstan. In chapter 3, I noted that Kyrgyzstan’s neighbouring 
countries started providing aid to it. In chapter 6, I demonstrated how Bakiev’s 
government had tended to imitate the governments of countries from the neighboring 
region such as Russia, India in their work with NGOs. Consequently, one can 
conclude that the future of the NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan might also be influenced 
by the rise of the emerging donors. Therefore, I suggest exploring whether these 
donors aim to work with civil society.       
Based on my anecdotal observations, in some cases participant observations, 
of recent voluntary initiatives such as the April Relief Fund, I suggest that the next 
avenue for future research can be exploring what young people do after studying in 
the West through scholarship programmes of donors. The case of the April Relief 
Fund has demonstrated that a group of young people with Western education set up a 
voluntary initiative and sought to ensure transparency and accountability. Most 
importantly, they managed to raise a large amount of funds for their initiative in 
Kyrgyzstan and abroad. This is bound to have influence on further development of 
civil society in Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, my proposition for future research is that 
donor scholarship programmes, which have aimed to build civil society through 
educating young people (Adamson, 2002; the case of IREX), might have had 
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positive outcomes. Such research will further provide empirical support to my 
argument about the NGO sector displaying voluntarism, philanthropy, and 
constituency responsiveness. It will also shed light on how successful donor 
scholarship programmes have been.            
Relatedly, I suggest studying how the rise of new information and 
communication technologies, such as blogs, Facebook, and Twitter, has influenced 
civic and political activeness of people, particularly the young generation, in 
Kyrgyzstan. My observations on social networks suggest that people indeed become 
very active and undertake initiatives using online technologies during unstable 
political and social situations as it happened in April and June 2010. As noted in 
































Appendix 1 – Interview guide for donors   
 
OBJECTIVES  
1. to explore activities of a donor on the promotion of civil society and whether there 
have been any changes in them since the early 2000s; 
2. to explore a definition of civil society within their programmes and whether there 
have been any changes in it since the beginning of their activities;  
3. to explore whether they work with other donors, the state, NGOs, CBOs, traditions 
and the nature of their interaction;     
4. to explore whether there have been any changes in their approach to working with 
local NGOs; 
5. to explore their assessment of the current role of NGOs in the activities of donors;  
6. to explore their general account about civil society in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
SECTIONS:  
1. Activities of a donor on civil society promotion (past and present)  
2. Definition of civil society  
3. Work with donors, int. and loc. NGOs, the state, CBOs, traditions   
4. General account on an NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan  
 
INTERVIEW TERMS  
• Confidentiality  
• Duration of the interview - 1-1.5 hours  
• Permission for recording  
• Researcher-participant relationship – making aware that I have a number of 
questions. I will start with simple questions concerning their organisation. Gradually, 
I will switch to more specific questions.   
 
1. ACTIVITIES (PAST AND PRESENT) 
 
1)   How do you promote civil society at present?   
2) Have you had any changes in your approach to development of / working 
with civil society organisations, particularly NGOs, since the early 2000s?  
3) I heard that donors were reducing aid to CSOs? Is it the case in your 
organisation?  
 
Probing: if yes – why are you reducing aid?  
 
2. DEFINITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY  
 
1) Do you have a particular definition of civil society within your programmes?  
 
Probing: 1) If yes, what is it? 
                   Has it always been like this? Or have you changed it?  
            If yes, what kind of changes did you have?  
Why did you make these changes? 
                  2) If no, how do you understand civil society? 
 




1) How would you describe local NGOs that you work with?  
2) How do you work with NGOs?   
3) What language do you use in your work with NGOs (e.g. applications, 
reports)? 
4) What role do NGOs play in your current activities? 
 
CBOs  
1) Do you work with CBOs?  
 
Probing: If yes 
• When and why did you start working with CBOs?  
• How do you work with them? 
• What language do you use in your work with them? 
• What is the difference between NGOs and CBOs?  
 
Government  
1) Do you work with the Kyrgyz government on the promotion of civil society? 
2) If yes, how do you work with it?  
3) Do you support the government through budget support?  
  
Other donors  
1) Do you work with other donors on the promotion of civil society? 
2) What is different in your approach to civil society promotion from 
approaches of other donors?  
 
4. GENERAL OPINION ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS IN 
KYRGYZSTAN (questions to be asked if there is time) 
1) How would you asses the current role of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan? 
2) What are the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan?  
 
Probing: I got an impression from my previous interviews that NGOs in 
Kyrgyzstan are politicising. What do you think of this?  
  
3) How would you assess a situation on civil society in Kyrgyzstan?  
 
END OF INTERVEW 
1. Thank you notes; 
2. Reassurance of confidentiality;  








Appendix 2 – Follow up interview guide for donors     
 
MAIN AIM is  
1. clarifying if they are prioritising state building and budget support and why?     
2. exploring in details how they work with NGOs/CSOs; 
3. finding out what kind of relations they are promoting between the state and NGOs.  
  
INTERVIEW TERMS  
• Confidentiality  
• Duration of the interview - 1-1.5 hours  
• Permission for recording  
• Researcher-participant relationship – making aware that I have a number of 
questions.   
 
1. Promoting state-building    
Is state capacity-building a priority in your programmes? 
 
- I read that one of your current key priorities is state capacity-building. Could 
you tell me what your organisation is doing on this in Kyrgyzstan? 
- Do you provide budget support?  
If yes, could you explain how it works?   
If no, how do you provide funding to Kyrgyzstan?  
- In the 1990s, did you have the same priority – state capacity-building? 
- How do you usually identify priorities for your activities in Kyrgyzstan?  
 
5. Civil society in their activities  
 
I understood from the previous interview that you involve NGOs to implement 
certain components of your programmes. You have 11 grantees at present.  
- How do you choose NGOs? 
- What kind of tasks do they do?  
- Do you build their capacity?  
- Do you involve NGOs when you develop, monitor, and evaluate your 
projects and programmes?  
- You mentioned last time that you stopped financing a programme on civil 
society development implemented by INTRAC. Why did you stop financing 
it?   
- Do you promote interaction between the state and local NGOs? 
 
 
END OF INTERVEW 
1. Thank you notes 
2. Reassurance of confidentiality  





Appendix 3 – Interview guide for international NGOs  
 
OBJECTIVES  
1. to explore activities of an INGO on the promotion of civil society and whether there 
have been any changes in them since the early 2000; 
2. to explore a definition of civil society and whether there have been any changes in it 
since the beginning of their activities;  
3. to explore whether an NGO works with other INGOs, the state, donors, CBOs, and the 
nature of their interaction;     
4. to explore whether there have been any changes in their interaction with donors; 
5. to explore their assessment of the current role of NGOs in the activities of donors;  
6. to explore their general account about civil society in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
SECTIONS:  
1.Background information about an NGO  
2.Their activities on civil society promotion (past and present)  
3.Definition of civil society  
4.Work with donors, international and local NGOs, the state, CBOs.  
5.General account on an NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan  
 
INTERVIEW TERMS  
a. Confidentiality  
b. Duration of the interview - 1-1.5 hours  
c. Permission for recording  
d. Researcher-participant relationship – making aware that I have a number of questions. I 
will start with simple question concerning your organisation. Gradually, I will switch to 
more specific ones.   
 
1. ACTIVITIES (PAST AND PRESENT)  
1) What do you do to promote civil society?  
2) Have you had any changes in your civil society promotion since the early 2000s?  
3) Where does funding of your NGO come from? 
Probing: If yes, what kind of changes did you have? 
  why did you make these changes? 
               If no, does it mean that everything is the same? 
4) What language do you usually use in your work (activities, reports etc.)?  
 
2. DEFINITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY  
1) What does ‘civil society’ mean within your civil society promotion programmes?  
2) Has the definition of civil society been always like this? Or have you changed it?  
Probing: If yes, what kind of changes did you have? Why did you make these 
changes? 
           
3. RELATIONSHIP WITH DONORS   
1) Do you work with donors on the promotion of civil society? 
2) Have you noticed any changes in the approach of donors to civil society 
promotion since the early 2000?  
3) Have you noticed any changes in the approach of donors to working with NGOs 
since the early 2000? 
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4. WORK WITH OTHER NGOs, THE STATE, and CBOs  
 
NGOs 
1) How do you work with local NGOs?    
2) What language do you use to work with local NGOs (e.g. applications, 
reports)? 
3) What role do NGOs play in your current activities? 
 
Government  
4) Do you work with the Kyrgyz government on the promotion of civil society? 
5) If yes, how do you work with it?  
 
CBOs 
6) Do you work with CBOs?  
Probing: If yes 
1. When and why did you start working with CBOs?  
2. How do you work with them (including language)? 
3. What is the difference between NGOs and CBOs?  
Probing: If no  
4. Do you know about CBOs? 
5. Do you know other NGOs which work with CBOs? 
 
5. GENERAL OPINION ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS IN 
KYRGYZSTAN (questions to be asked if there is time) 
1)   What kind of role do NGOs play in Kyrgyzstan? 
2) What are the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan?  




END OF INTERVIEW 
1. Thank you notes 
2. Reassurance of confidentiality  















Appendix 4 – Interview guide for local NGOs   
 
THREE FOCUSES    
1. State-NGO relationship  
2. Professionalization of NGOs  
3. Politisation of NGOs 
 
INTERVIEW TERMS  
a. Confidentiality  
b. Duration of the interview - 1-1.5 hours  
c. Permission for recording  
d. Researcher-participant relationship – making aware that I have a number of questions. I 
will start with simple question concerning your organisation. Gradually, I will switch to 
more specific ones.  
 
About an organisation  
3. When was your organisation established?  
4. What is a legal status of your organisation?  
5. What is a mission of your organisation?  
6. How many members does you organisation have?  
7. How many volunteers does your organisation have?  
8. What is a geographical coverage of your activities (nation, region, city, 
village)? 
 
Funding   
9. Where does your funding come from?  
 .  If there are several sources of funding, 
  1) What source does most of your funding come from?  
 B. If there are several sources of funding, but there is no the state and the 
private sector among them,  
  1) Have you tried to get funding from the state or the private sector?  
  2) If yes, what was the result? 
 C. If an NGO self-generates funding, how?    
10. Does your organisation have membership fees? 
 If yes, how much is it?  
 
Structure   
11. Could you describe the structure of your NGO? 
12. Do you have a board of directors?  
 If yes, do they hold a meeting? If yes, how often? 
13. Do you write annual reports?  
 If yes, what do you do with them? 
14. Do you have administrative rules and procedures in a written from?  
 
Staff 
15. How many people work for your organisation?  
16. How do you usually hire staff?  
17. Do you have terms of reference for each staff in a written form? 




Activity   
19. How do you usually design projects?  
20. How do you identify problems?   
21. What language do you use in your work (activities, reports, project 
proposals)? 
 
Relationship with the state  
22. Do you work with the state?  
 If yes, how?  
23. What is the main reason of your work with the state? 
24. Who initiates joint work?  
25. Do you get invited by the state to participate in its activities: planning, 
developing policies and documents?   
26. Have your relationship with the state gotten better or worse for the last 3 
years?    
27. How would you assess the relationship between the NGO sector and the 
state on the national level? 
If the relationship is poor, what are the reasons of this?  
28. What is your attitude towards getting funding from the state?  
29. What do you think of NGOs’ involvement in politics?  
30. In your opinion, why have NGOs participated in politics so actively? 
31. In your opinion, should or not NGOs participate in politics? 
 
Donors   
32. What donors have you worked with?  
33. How do you usually work with them?  
34. Do donors involve you in designing their projects, planning, monitoring 
and evaluating their activities?  
35. In your opinion, have donors had any changes in their approach to 
working with NGOs?  
36. What do you like and do not like in your interaction with donors?  
37. In your opinion, is donor aid reducing or not?  
 
Collaboration with other NGOs   
38. Do you collaborate with other NGOs?   
 If yes, how?  
 If no, in your opinion, why is there not any collaboration?  
39. Is your organisation a member of any association, coalition, network?   
 If yes, which association, coalition, network?  
 If no, why are you not in any of these?  
40. Do you know about other NGOs which work in the same field? 
 
Work with target group and population    
41. Which part of population is your target group?  
42. Do you publicise your activities?  
 If yes, how? If no, why do not you publicise your activities?  
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43. How do you attract new members to your NGO?   
44. Do you work with CBOs? If yes, how?  
45. Is it difficult or easy to involve population or your target group to your 
projects? If yes, could you share success stories?  
If no, why?   
 
Leader   
46. How long have you been working for this organisation?  
47. Did anyone work before you? 
48. How a leader is usually recruited in your organisation?  
 
General questions about the Kyrgyz NGO sector (to be asked only of there is 
additional time)   
 
49. What are the strengths and weaknesses of your organisation?  
50. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the NGO sector?  
 
 
END OF INTERVEW 
 
1. Thank you notes; 
2. Reassurance of confidentiality;  
























Appendix 5 – List of interviewed donors and international 
NGOs  
 
No Organisation  Date/Place Time  
1 US Embassy  31 October 2007, Bishkek  
27 November 2007, Bishkek 
14:00–15:00 
14:15 – 14:45 
2 Aga-Khan Foundation 12 November 2007, Bishkek  10:30–12:30  
3 UNDP  13 November 2007, Bishkek 15:00–16:16  
4 Soros Foundation – 
Kyrgyzstan  
14 November 2007, Bishkek  15:00 – 15:40 
5 Delegation of the European 
Commission in the Kyrgyz 
Republic  
14 November 2007, Bishkek 
13 February 2008, Bishkek 
17:10 – 18:00 
15:00 – 16:00 
6 DFID  14 November 2007, Bishkek 
12 February 2008, Bishkek 
10:00 – 10:50 
10:00 – 11:00   
7 UNV  19 November 2007, Bishkek  14:00 – 15:00 
8 World Bank  19 November 2007, Bishkek Written 
interview 
9 OSCE 5 December 2007, Bishkek  10:30 – 11:20 
10 USAID 10 December 2007, Bishkek  
15 February 2008, Bishkek 
16:40 – 18:00 
 
15:30 – 16:40 




No Organisation  Date/Place Time  
1 Mercy Corps-HQ 29 August 2007, Edinburgh 4:00–5:05 
2 INTRAC 21 September 2007, Bishkek 
15 November 2007, Bishkek 
11:00–12:15 
16:20 – 17:10 
3 ICNL 30 October 2007, Bishkek 
12 May 2008, Bishkek 
11:00–11:45 
10:00 – 10:45 
4 NDI 1 November 2007, Bishkek  9:30–10:20 
5 AED  13 November 2007, Bishkek  
21 November 2007, Bishkek 
11:20–12:20 
12:30 – 13:30 
6 IFES 16 November 2007, Bishkek  11:00 – 11:50  
7 Eurasia Foundation of 
Central Asia  
16 November 2007, Bishkek 16:00 – 17:15  
8 IRI  21 November 2007, Bishkek 14:00 – 14:45 
10 American Bar Association  2 April 2008, Osh 
2 people  








Appendix 6 – List of interviewed local NGOs  
 
No Organisation  Location  Date/Place Time  
1 NGO working on civil 
society support  
Bishkek  26 October 2007, 
Bishkek 
and 




14:00 – 14:45 
2 NGO working on civil 
society support 





3 NGO working on AIDS Bishkek  23 November 
2007, Bishkek  
8:00 – 9:20 
4 Research NGO  Bishkek  26 November 
2007, Bishkek 
14:00 – 14:20  
5 NGO working on 
environmental issues  
Bishkek  27 November 
2007, Bishkek  
15:45 – 16:45  
6 NGO working on refugees’ 
issues   




2007, Bishkek  
10:00 – 11:00 
 
15:30 – 16:00 
7 NGO working on civil 
society support  
Bishkek  17 December 2007, 
Bishkek  
10:00 – 11:00 
8 NGO working on home 
owners’ issues  
Bishkek  15 February 2008, 
Bishkek  
10:00 – 11:10  
9 NGO working on issues of 
the disabled  
Bishkek  18 February 2008, 
Bishkek   
10:40 – 11:40  
10 NGO working on elderly 
people  
Bishkek  19 February 2008, 
Bishkek  
9:40 – 11:00  
11 NGO working on the issues 
of the disabled  
Bishkek  19 February 2008, 
Bishkek 
17:15 – 19:00 
12 Human rights NGO Bishkek  20 February 2008, 
Bishkek  
12:40 – 14:30  
13 NGO working on tourist 
firms  
Bishkek  25 February 2008, 
Bishkek 
9:50 – 11:10  
14 NGO working on young 
journalists/children’s 
involvement in media  
Bishkek  25 February 2008, 
Bishkek 
14:00 – 15:00  
15 NGO working with young 
journalists  
Bishkek  25 February 2008, 
Bishkek 
14:00 – 15:30 
16 NGO working with young 
journalists  
Bishkek  26 February 2008, 
Bishkek  
10:00 – 11:00 
17 NGO working on issues of 
children  
Bishkek  28 February 2008, 
Bishkek  
12:30 – 13:30  
18 Youth human rights NGO  Bishkek  28 February 2008, 
Bishkek 
10:10 – 11:50  
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19  NGO working on civic 
education and human rights  
Bishkek  4 March 2008, 
Bishkek  
9:50 – 10:50  
20 NGO working on sustainable 
development  
Bishkek  4 March 2008, 
Bishkek 
11:30 – 12:30  
21 NGO working on HIV/AIDS 
and drugs  
Bishkek  5 March 2008, 
Bishkek  
 
I interview four 
people in these 
organisation  
9:30 – 11:30  
22 NGO working on young 
people and education  
Bishkek  5 March 2008, 
Bishkek  
15:00 – 16:00  
23 Youth NGO  Bishkek  7 March 2008, 
Bishkek  
14:00 – 16:00 
24 Human rights NGO  Bishkek  12 March 2008, 
Bishkek 
12:00 – 12:30  
25 NGO working on art  Bishkek  12 March 2008, 
Bishkek 
13:30 – 14:30  
26 NGO working on refugees   13 March 2008, 
Bishkek  
15:00 – 16:00  
27 NGO working on refugees  14 March 2008, 
Bishkek 
15:00 – 16:00 
28  NGO working on refugees  14 March 2008, 
Bishkek 
15:00 – 16:00 
29 NGO working on women’s 
issues  
Bishkek  17 March 2008, 
Bishkek 
10:16 – 11:00 
30 NGO working on women’s 
issues, social problems, and 
humanitarian aid  
Kant  17 March 2008, 
Bishkek 
13:15 – 14:00 
31 NGO working on women’s 
issues, social problems, and 
humanitarian aid  
Kant 18 March 2008, 
Bishkek  
14:00 – 15:00  
32  Women’s NGO Issyk-Ata  19 March 2008, 
Bishkek  
11:00 – 12:45  
33 Human rights NGO  Osh  31 March 2008, 
Osh  
14:00 – 15:00 
34 Human rights NGO   Osh  31 March 2008, 
Osh  
16:00 – 17:45  
35 Environmental NGO Osh  1 Aril 2008, Osh  15:00 – 15:40  
36 Environmental NGO Osh  1 Aril 2008, Osh 16:00 – 16:40  
37 Environmental NGO Osh  1 Aril 2008, Osh 17:00 – 17:40  
38 NGO working on HIV/AIDS  Osh  2 April 2008, Osh  16:00 – 16:30  
39 Human rights NGO  Osh  3 April 2008, Osh  14:00 – 15:00  
40 NGO working on conflict 
resolution  
Osh  3 April 2008, Osh  16:00 – 17:00  
41 Women’s NGO  Osh  4 April 2008, Osh  14:00 – 15:00 
42   NGO working on women’s Osh  4 April 2008, Osh  15:15 – 16:00 
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issues and environmental 
problems  
43 NGO working on HIV/AIDS 
and sex workers  
Osh  5 April 2008, Osh  10:30 – 11:30  
44 NGO working on civil 
society support  
Osh  1 April 2008, Osh 14:00 – 14:45 
45 NGO working on conflict 
resolution  
Osh  12 April 2008, 
Jalalabat  
 
14:00 – 17:30  
46 NGO working on sustainable 
development in villages  
Bishkek  14 May 2008, 
Bishkek  
15:00 – 15:50 
47 Women’s NGO  Bishkek  16 May 2008, 
Bishkek  





































Appendix 7 – Questionnaire for NGO leaders  
 
Research on NGOs  
Please complete the questionnaire. You are requested to answer questions sincerely 
since validity of results depends on your answers.  All information that you provide 
in this questionnaire will be confidential.  
 
Age (please tick) 
18 – 25   36 – 45  
 
26 – 35   46 +       
 
 
Sex (please tick) 
Male       
 
Female   
 
 
Ethnicity (please tick) 
Kyrgyz   Russian  
 
Uzbek     Other (indicate) _______________________________ 
 
 
Education (please tick) 
Only secondary (school)      
   












Other          
 
(please indicate)__________________________________________________  
 
 
Marital status (please tick) 
 
Married   Single    
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Monthly salary (please tick) 
Note: you can leave this question  
 
Below  5500 soms    
 
5501 – 11000 soms     
 
More than 11001soms    
 




Why did you choose to work for an NGO? 
(please tick all appropriate answers)   
 
Prestigious         
Perspective        
High salary        
This is my specialisation       
It is interesting        
I could not find a job in other places    
To get experience        
To learn something new       





In your opinion, is your job in the NGO secure?  
 
Yes     
No    
I do not know     




Thank you very much! 
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Appendix 8 – Questionnaire for NGO employees   
 
Research on NGOs  
 
Please complete the questionnaire. You are requested to answer questions sincerely 
since validity of results depends on your answers.  All information that you provide 
in this questionnaire will be confidential.  
 
 
1. Age (please tick) 
 
18 – 25   36 – 45  
 
26 – 35   46 +       
 
 
2. Sex (please tick) 
 
Male      Female   
 
 
3. Ethnicity (please tick) 
 
Kyrgyz   Russian  
 
Uzbek     Other (indicate) _________________________ 
 
 
4. Education (please tick) 
 
Only secondary (school)      
   












Other          
 





5. Marital status (please tick) 
 
Married   
 
Single    
 
6. Your position in the organisation _____________________________ 
 
 
7. Monthly salary (please tick) 
Note: you can leave this question 
 
Below 2000 soms        
 
2001 -  5500 soms     
 
5501 – 11000 soms      
 
More than 11001 soms      
 
Additional comments (if any) 
_____________________________________________________________  
 
8. Why did you choose to work for an NGO? 
(please tick all appropriate answers)   
 
Prestigious         
Perspective        
High salary        
This is my specialisation       
It is interesting        
I could not find a job in other places    
To get experience        
To learn something new       




9. How were you hired? 
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Based on call for job applications     
Based on the recommendations of my acquaintance   
Worked as a volunteer actively     
Establishment of an NGO was our joint decision   
Other          
(Please indicate) __________________________________________  
 
10. In your opinion, do you have a prospect for career advancement in this 
NGO?  
Yes     
No    
I do not know     




11. In your opinion, do you have a prospect for career advancement in the NGO 
sector?  
Yes     
No    
I do not know     




12. Does your job in this NGO secure?  
Yes     
No    
I do not know     




13. Did you sign a contract when you started your job in this NGO?  
Yes     
No    
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I do not know     




14. were you familiarised with your terms of reference when you started your 
job here? 
 
Yes     
No    
I do not know     
Other    
(please indicate) 
_______________________________________________________   
 




      

























Appendix 9 – List of interviewed CBO heads and 
representatives of local authorities  
 
 
1 CBO member, former 
village head  
4 April 2008, Tolokon village, 
Tolokon ayil okmotu   
12:30 – 
13:30  
2 Head of Tobo Kurgan 
ayil okmotu  
5 April 2008, Tobo Korgan Village, 
Tobo Kurgan ayil okmotu, Aravan 





Head of Jany Jol village  5 April 2008, Jany Jol Village, 
Tobo Kurgan ayil okmotu, Aravan 
district   
15:30 – 
16:15  
4 Head of Gulistan village  5 April 2008, Gulistan Village, 
Tobo Kurgan ayil okmotu, Aravan 
district   
15:30 – 
16:15  
5 CBO chair 5 April 2008, Jany Jol Village, 
Tobo Kurgan ayil okmotu, Aravan 
district   
15:45 – 
17:15  
6 CBO member 21 April 2008, Kyzyl Jyldyz village, 
Kyzyl Jyldyz AO, Nooken district  
 
7 CBO member 21 April 2008, Kyla village, 
Mombekova AO, Nooken district  
 
8 CBO member 24 April 2008, October village, 
Bagysh AO, Suzak district 
14:00 – 
14:30 
9 CBO member 24 April 2008, Lenin village, Lenin 
AO, Suzak district  
15:00 – 
15:30 
10  CBO member 25 April 2008, Kyrgyzstan village, 





















Appendix 10 – Published papers  
 
Published paper 1
71: Stevens, D. and Jailobaeva, K. (2009) ‘False Choice?: The 
War on Terror and Its Impact on Civil Society in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’ in J. 
Howell and J. Lind (eds) Civil Society under Strain: the War on Terror Regime, Civil 
Society and Aid Post-9/11. Sterling: Kumarian Press. 
 
 
False choice? The war on terror and its impact on state policy towards civil 
society in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
Daniel Stevens and Kanykey Jailobaeva  
 
When reflecting on the impact of the war on terror on civil society, the full 
global consequences must be weighed up. While relatively peripheral to academic 
and popular debate, the countries of Central Asia were central to the operations of the 
war on terror with both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan having grappled with a Taliban 
allied group and then hosted United States military bases in support of the operations 
in Afghanistan. This chapter offers an analysis of how the broader war on terror 
affected these countries’ policies72 towards civil society, first briefly setting the 
context, then analysing each country in turn before concluding on how the 
similarities and differences between these cases contribute to our understanding of 
the impact of the war on terror on the fortunes of civil society internationally.  
9-11 occurred just decade after Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had become 
independent and they were still in the process of adjusting from Soviet republics to 
independent states in the world community. The post-cold war order was not only 
facing new types of security threat but the 1990s also featured a surge of interest in 
the value of civil society in guaranteeing liberal democracy, market reform and 
cohesive societies73. As such the idea of building civil society was a significant 
theme in these countries’ interactions with the international community. In particular 
they were recipients of international aid programmes supporting civil society 
development. 
                                                 
71 Permission from the co-author has been taken. 
72 By state policies we refer to an approximate tendency aggregated from a variety of legislative acts, 
resolutions and practices of different state actors, rather than a single coherent policy document. 
73 In the 1990s ‘civil society’ was described as “the Rome of today’s internationalism; wherever we 
may begin, we will arrive at this debate sooner or later” in Alison Van Rooy, Civil Society and the Aid 
Industry. The Politics and Promise (London: Earthscan, 1998), 1. 
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Exactly what civil society meant, what it looked like, and what its role was to 
be in Central Asia are politically contentious issues74, but broadly speaking Western 
donor organizations perceived a need for these former ‘totalitarian’ societies to 
build/rebuild a plurality of social organizations in order to embed liberal democracy, 
advance economic development and substitute for a retreating state in providing a 
social safety net. A number of organizations, most notably USAID and the Open 
Society Institute, developed programmes for funding and training an emergent 
modern NGO sector, as well as latterly engaging with more traditional community 
structures. Here we adopt a structural definition of civil society: those organizations 
that are neither formally part of the state or the market. It would NGOs, community 
organizations and other cultural and religious groups.  
In the case of Uzbekistan the war on terror had a significant impact on state 
policy towards civil society, which we could broadly categorize as passing through 
two main stages, each subdivided into two phases. The first stage could be termed as 
‘tactical tolerance’, and subdivided into an earlier phase of receiving limited external 
support (up until 2001) and then a second phase from 2002 to 2003 when external 
support rapidly expanded. The pivotal point was the Rose Revolution in Georgia of 
November 200375, and from 2004 a stage of ‘controlled localization’ began in which 
the sector’s independence was severely constrained and foreign funding cut off. The 
years 2004-2005 featured a retrenchment of civil society activity, but from 2006 this 
second stage may be entering a new phase, in which both carefully selected foreign 
funding and increased state funding are available to support an NGO sector seen as 
strategic in maintaining a social contact between state and society76 in which 
individuals trade their freedom to engage in independent organizing in return for the 
state taking responsibility for addressing issues of social concern. These shifts in 
policy largely relate to state regulation of NGOs, and to a lesser extent community 
(mahalla) institutions. The regulation of religious groups, considered a separate 
                                                 
74 An introduction to the debate in this region can be found in Babken Babajanian, Sabine Freizer and 
Daniel Stevens, “Introduction: Civil Society in Central Asia and the Caucasus” Central Asian Survey, 
24, no. 3 (2005): 209-224. 
75 Alisher Ilkhamov, “The thorny path of civil society in Uzbekistan”, Central Asian Survey, 24, no. 3 
(2005), 300. 
76 The idea of a social contract draws from the idea of a social compact between state and individual 
in Uzbekistan as outlined by Deniz Kandiyoti, “Post-Soviet Institutional Design and the Paradoxes of 
the ‘Uzbek Path’”, Central Asian Survey, 26, no. 1 (2007), 33. 
 242 
category of organization, was much more consistent throughout this period, with 
only minor fluctuations around a policy of very strict control. The question we turn 
to now is to what extent the war on terror was a key factor in triggering these shifts 
in state policy towards the NGO sector. 
The initial focus of the war on terror in the theatre of Afghanistan had 
profound implications for Uzbekistan, whose government was initially an 
enthusiastic supporter of the action taken against the Taliban. For Uzbekistan had 
also been dealing with its own Afghanistan based terrorist threat, that of the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Prior to 1999 Uzbekistan had considered itself an 
oasis of stability in a region that had witnessed civil war and rapidly deteriorating 
living standards. However in February of that year a series of car bombings in the 
capital Tashkent raised the spectre of a serious terrorist threat. This threat was 
reinforced in the summers of 1999 and 2000 by incursions into the country’s border 
areas by the IMU77, which in September 2000 was designated by the United States 
State Department as a terrorist group78. 
 The IMU had found an ideological ally and safe harbour with the Taliban, by 
then in control of much of Afghanistan. The Taliban advance of 2000, which at the 
time raised concerns that it might reach the border with Uzbekistan79, only served to 
heighten concerns that the group would be able to project its threat even further into 
the country. 
Fears that the socio-economic disruptions faced by the population might fuel 
increased domestic support for the IMU, and other radical Islamic groups, such as 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, meant that international humanitarian aid was broadly welcomed. 
Even though the concept of foreign funded NGOs was viewed by the government 
with suspicion, if these NGOs could introduce additional resources to help the 
government manage socio-economic problems then they were broadly tolerated and 
even actively welcomed at the regional level80. With the NGO leaders being drawn 
                                                 
77 International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan at Ten: Repression and Instability, (ICG Asia Report 46, 
Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2001), ii. 
78 U.S. State Department website, U.S. Re-designates Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as Terrorist 
Group, 24 September 2004.  
79 Ahmed Rashid, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Incursion Assists the Taliban”, CACI Analyst, 
13th September 2000, available at http://www.cacianalyst.org. 
80 See Daniel Stevens, Conceptual travels along the Silk Road: on civil society aid in Uzbekistan 
(Unpublished, PhD dissertation, University of London, 2004), Section 5.1. 
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from former party figures and the intelligentsia, they were seen as a potential secular 
ally in deterring the population from embracing fundamentalist religious 
ideologies81. Western development aid was also seen as a useful buffer against 
another perceived threat – that of the excessive influence of the former ‘colonial’ 
power Russia82.  
This stage of tactical toleration entered a new phase of increased external 
support after the events of 9-11. For the United States led attack on the Taliban 
bolstered support for the government of Uzbekistan, with a strategic partnership 
signed that elevated Uzbekistan to a position of key ally of the United States and 
promised a significant increase in aid to shore up the economy. President Karimov 
met with President Bush in the Oval office and was reputedly assured that on the 
issue of human rights, the United States was not going ‘to teach you.’83 Exactly what 
signals were given to the Uzbekistan government about a reciprocal commitment to 
political reform is difficult to decode, but with subsequent contacts with President 
Karimov being largely mediated by defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, one can 
surmise that the urgency of the situation and the perceived value of Uzbekistan’s air 
base near the border with Afghanistan meant that the strategic partnership was 
primarily presented as a military one, cemented by a common notion that such 
terrorists needed to be dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly84. 
In the short-term this led to an increase in civil society aid – expanding 
USAID programmes supporting NGOs administered by a growing number of United 
States based NGOs. Democracy support organizations that had previously been 
largely absent, such as the National Democratic Institute, International Republican 
Institute and Freedom House, became increasingly active in the country. The 
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operating environment was still challenging, and suspicions of these activities 
throughout the state system blunted the impact of the programming, but these 
concerns were subordinated to the foreign policy goal of partnership with the United 
States and its assistance in addressing the terrorist threat. As Ilkhamov notes in his 
summary of these developments, it was thus fitting that the international NGOs 
supporting civil society development were registered under and reported to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs85. 
However by the end of 2003 a conflation of factors created a tipping point in 
state policy towards the NGO sector. Operations in Afghanistan had significant 
weakened the IMU (both losing its base and also many of its fighters, including 
reputedly its leader86, in fighting alongside the Taliban) and in 2002 and 2003 there 
were no significant terror incidents in Uzbekistan. The threat of terror seemed to be 
receding but now replaced by a new emerging threat. In short the Uzbekistan ruling 
regime began to perceive the United States not as a guarantor but as a threat to its 
own survival. This may have been partly shaped by growing doubts about the 
motives of the United States in invading Iraq. Initially Uzbekistan was one of the 48 
members of the ‘coalition of the willing’87 and Karimov contrasted the United 
States’s decisive action with the inactivity of Europe88, but eventually decided 
against contributing troops and became less vocal in support of the campaign.  
But it was the November ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia that convinced that 
government that the United States, and more specifically its support for ‘civil 
society’, was a significant threat. There is a debate as to what extent a ‘colour 
revolution’ was perceived as a real threat or as pretext for deepening the regime’s 
control89, but either way it resulted in real change in state policy and a reassessment 
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of the value of the strategic partnership with the United States and therefore the 
tactical toleration of civil society which had existed up until then.  
The period of ‘controlled localization’ between 2004 and 2005 was marked 
by measures to cut off the foreign funding for NGOs in a number of ways90. First all 
international NGOs were required to reregister with the Ministry of Justice and, 
starting with the most political91, were pulled up on operational irregularities, with 
the resulting closure of nearly all of those engaged in grant making to NGOs or 
working in democracy related issues92. A second tactic was to restrict bank transfers 
of grants, with some grant making organizations having nearly all their grant 
transfers returned to them93. What was of particular interest is that while there was a 
readily available and internationally voguish justification for such banking 
restrictions, there was little attempt to justify this using the pretext of combating 
terrorist financing. There have been measures on terrorist financing94 but the thrust of 
the crackdown on NGOs was not on Islamic groups, but Western pro-democracy 
groups. These, according a 2005 Presidential speech, were ‘founded with use of 
sponsors’ funds’ and operating outside their charter and pursuing ‘ordered aims’ and 
as such ‘have no future in Uzbekistan’. President Karimov argued that ‘democracy 
and various so called “open society models” cannot be exported and imported’ and 
that ‘I want to underline once more that we are against any revolutions and 
fundamentalism in any appearance when it comes to reforming and modernisation of 
the country.’95 There were also state supported insinuations that the United States 
was actually now aiding terrorist groups to destabilize the regime96. 
                                                 
90 Ilkhamov, The thorny path of civil society in Uzbekistan, 300-302 
91 The Soros foundation was the first to close, followed by accusations against the U.S. National 
Democratic Institute of International Relations, International Republican Institute and Freedom 
House: Press Service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 73 International, Foreign NGOs 
Registered in Uzbekistan – Justice Minister’, available online at www.press-service.uz.  
92 The National Democratic Institute remained open, and to some extent Human Rights Watch (though 
its most recent appointment of Country Director has been refused accreditation). These are the 
exceptions that prove the rule – widely seen as tokens to demonstrate the government’s commitment 
to dialogue in reaction to the European Union’s biannual reviews of sanctions on the country, 
originally imposed after the Andijan events in 2005.  
93 Authors interviews with international donors, March 2005. 
94 Uzreport.com, Uzbekistan host conference on fighting intl terrorism, 16 January 2009, available via 
subscription at www.uzreport.com. 
95 Uzreport.com, President declares long-term priorities of Uzbekistan’, 31 January 2005, available 
via subscription at www.uzreport.com. 
96 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Message in a courtroom -- the Andijon trial”, Central Asia 
Report, No. 37 (2005) available at www.rferl.org.  
 246 
Now with foreign support and field monitoring cut off a sweeping up 
operation ensued, closing those local NGOs that refused to fall in line with the new 
controlled approach, represented by the newly created National Association of 
NGOs. An estimated 269 were closed down between August 2005 and February 
200797. While difficult to determine exactly, it would seem that the government 
calculated that whatever social contribution these NGOs were making was 
outweighed by the collective threat they posed as potential bases for a ‘colour’ 
revolution. Now that the terrorist threat had receded, the value of the United States as 
an ally had diminished, and by 2005 the United States air base in Khanabad was 
closed down. Who exactly was to blame is the subject of some debate98 but with the 
United States that year joining its voice to the call for an international enquiry into 
the multiple deaths that occurred during a complicated mix of terrorist activities and 
popular protest in the regional city of Andijan in May 2005, the partnership had 
dramatically broken down. 
The seemingly erratic swings in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is a reflection of 
a bifocal United States policy in the region - promoting democracy and fighting 
terror99. The pursuit of the war on terror chimed with the political discourse in 
Uzbekistan, but with the immediacy of the post 9-11 moment passing, voices were 
increasingly heard criticizing the United States’s choice of ally and highlighting the 
human rights record of Uzbekistan. With the state department raising these issues, 
the government of Uzbekistan began to perceive ‘two faces’ of the United States. On 
the one hand the United States supported ruthless action against terrorist threats, but 
on the other hand it seemed to be criticizing Uzbekistan for its own attempts to 
pursue the war on terror - publicly criticizing its human rights record and calling for 
an international enquiry into the Andijan events,. This was perceived as hypocrisy, 
treacherous and during the Uzbekistan parliamentary session when the closure of the 
United States air force was publicly discussed, the Senator for the air base region 
proclaimed that a ‘man with two faces cannot be a friend of Uzbekistan’100  
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As of 2005 the regime promoted the theme that ‘Uzbekistan will not be 
dependent on anyone’, also the name of a Presidential book that spring, and this 
policy was applied to the civil society sector. The notion of ‘civil society’ was not 
rejected, if anything the concept became even more entrenched in the government’s 
public discourse, reiterating a long standing commitment to move from a ‘strong 
state’ to a ‘strong society’101. International links were significantly curtailed and a 
process of localization of civil society began, mirroring the economic policy of 
import substitution and developing local suppliers for Uzbekistan’s manufacturing 
sector. In the place of foreign funding, the government started developing structures 
to not only to regulate NGOs, but also to provide them with funding. A series of 
measures were adopted to implement this, most recently amending the law on NGOs 
which envisages setting up a public foundation and a parliamentary commission on 
supporting NGOs.102 So called GONGOs (government organized NGOs) have 
become increasingly high profile in society.  
Since 2007 there are signs of a softening of the hard line against foreign 
engagement with civil society, but now with the local NGOs negotiating from a 
position of strength. For example Fund Forum, a politically well connected 
foundation, offers political protection for international organizations who want to 
retain programming in the country in various social sectors103. For, just as the 
terrorist threat was perceived to have diminished between 2001 and 2002, so has the 
threat of a colour revolution diminished since 2005, where there have been no more 
large outbreaks of political opposition. In both cases a policy of suppression has been 
successful in the short term, but at the risk of provoking a realignment of opposition 
groups into a broad based opposition in exile that would bring together more radical 
opposition groups and the previously more moderate NGO sector104. Up until now 
opposition groups have been extremely fractious and ineffective in maintaining a 
constituency within the country, but the prospect of a slowdown in growth and 
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economic hardship over the next few years could see repeats of localized popular 
protest on issues such as the freedoms of petty-traders, provision of gas and 
allocation of land. Connections with these prosaic issues and the more abstract 
campaigning on political freedom by exiled groups105 could spell longer term trouble 
for the current regime. As such the regime needs to address the social concerns of the 
population, and the promise of a state controlled civil society is that it could both 
mobilize additional resources and civic engagement in a carefully controlled way.  
Overall the war on terror is best seen as having shaped the nature of the 
external threat, a theme that has been consistent throughout the period of this 
analysis. From colonial Russia, to the IMU, to subversive Western funded NGOs, the 
national building project in Uzbekistan is furthered by maintaining a sense of 
external threat that would unite and mobilize the population behind the regime106. 
But the dramatic shifts around 2003 can be attributed to the ‘two faces’ of the war on 
terror that the government of Uzbekistan perceived107. The marriage of ‘freedom and 
force’ that lay at the heart of the conduct of the war on terror, the expectation that the 
overwhelming use of force and abrogation of international legal norms could 
engender new political systems that would then exercise self-restraint in protecting 
freedom, was rejected as hypocrisy from the perspective of a country like 
Uzbekistan. The proponents of the war on terror were seen having an eagle eye for 
human rights violations perpetrated by the government in its own, albeit ham-fisted, 
war on terror, but then turning a blind eye (and maybe even actively encouraging) the 
same behaviour when it suited the broader war on terror. 
This in turn shaped perceptions of the freedom agenda as it manifested itself 
in the activities of international NGOs engaged in democracy promotion through 
civil society development. The ease in which the government was to frame it within a 
‘great game’ discourse of external powers fighting for control over Central Asia was 
rooted in a popular perception that the 2003 events in Iraq and Georgia were two 
sides of the same coin – an extension of United States influence. NGOs which 
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accepted such support were as such hirelings, a fifth column threatening the 
independence of the country.  
The case of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan’s southern neighbour, echoes some of 
these themes. For at the same time as fighting terrorism, the Kyrgyz government has 
used the war on terror as cover for advancing its own purposes in suppressing both 
civil society in general, particularly its rights for assembly, and religious groups in 
particular.  
As in Uzbekistan civil society in Kyrgyzstan started to develop rapidly after 
independence with the assistance of foreign democratization aid, however at a much 
greater pace as a result of a the relatively more liberal policy of the Kyrgyz 
government led by Askar Akaev. In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was the most liberal 
and reform-orientated country in Central Asia108, embracing the idea of civil society 
and democracy to a greater extent than its neighbours, in part reflecting its greater 
need for the financial and political support of the international community in tackling 
the particularly severe social and economic crisis that emerged after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union109. Therefore, a legislative environment conducive to the 
emergence and operation of civil society was established. For example, the law on 
NGOs adopted in 1996 was called by the International Centre for Non-For-Profit 
Laws as “…one of the most progressive of its kind in the former Soviet Union”110.  
As a result there has been a proliferation of NGOs, whose number has grown 
from 611 in 1993111 to 11,035 in 2008112. Kyrgyzstan has become a country with the 
highest NGO density in Central Asia113 (whereas Uzbekistan, with a population over 
five times greater,114 has never claimed to have more than 5,000 active NGOs). 
Likewise the lifting of the Soviet restrictions on religion has increased religious 
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organizations, with, as of 2008, 2,158 registered Islamic organizations. There are 
also a large number of Christian organizations (primarily Russian Orthodox and 
Protestant) and some Jewish and Buddhist organizations115. 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party) is one of a number of more 
radical Islamic movements. It has been active in Central Asia since the mid 1990s 
pursuing its main aim of establishing an Islamic state governed by Sharia116. In 
Kyrgyzstan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has managed to gain some support among the local 
population, particularly those most affected by the difficult socio-economic 
conditions117. For the time being, the movement has used non-violent methods to 
promote its goal such as distribution of religious literature and others118. The Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), discussed above, and another group named 
Akramiya were mainly focused on Uzbekistan, but have an influence on Kyrgyzstan, 
especially in its southern parts where it shares a long border with Uzbekistan through 
the Ferghana valley119.  
The 1999 and 2000 IMU incursions into Uzbekistan used the south of 
Kyrgyzstan as a transit route and began to emerge as a threat to Kyrgyzstan’s own 
stability, such that the government sought international assistance from both Russia 
and the United States120. After 2000, there were four incidents caused by radical 
Islamists in the south of Kyrgyzstan. For example, in December 2002, IMU members 
carried out a terrorist act in one of the markets of Osh city killing only civilians121. 
Consequently, fighting terrorism and national security became pressing issues 
for the Kyrgyz government, particularly taking into account the poor condition of its 
military power. Their chosen strategy was fighting radical Islamism by banning the 
activities of the radical movements and tightening control over religious 
organizations. Furthermore, the Kyrgyz government allowed the United States 
government to establish an air base on its territory to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan 
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after 9/11. This clearly showed the commitment of the Kyrgyz government to fight 
radical Islamism122.  
The anti-terrorist measures of the Kyrgyz government concerned not only 
religious organizations but also secular parts of civil society, namely NGOs, 
following to some extent the pattern described in Uzbekistan of an increasing 
perception of NGOs, a former ally, as an emerging threat to the incumbent regime. 
The national security issue came to the forefront during the parliamentary elections 
in 2005 as an instrument for the government to repress the political activity of NGOs. 
This accelerated a trend which started in the late 1990s, when Akaev changed his 
vision on the development of the country from a liberal to a more authoritative 
direction. He started centralizing power123 by pushing amendments in the 
constitution to extend presidential authority124.  
Before the parliamentary elections in 2005, there were some signs that Akaev 
still wanted to keep an influence over politics through having a political heir. As in 
Uzbekistan, he had watched with anxiety the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions, 
which resulted in the replacement of the respective government. Therefore, he started 
criticising civil society groups for their intention to cause instability in the country 
when, according to him, it was under potential siege from Islamic radical groups 
such as Hizb-ut-Tahir, a faint echo of the charge in Uzbekistan that Western 
governments and Islamic terrorists were twin threats to national stability. As a result, 
attempts were made to restrict rights of civil society groups to stage 
demonstrations125. 
 This suggests that the government of Akaev sought to use the issue of a 
national security and the war on terror as an instrument to restrain NGOs in order to 
keep the regime in power. Whereas in Uzbekistan the charge of foreign interference 
was more directly made, the restrictions in Kyrgyzstan were justified more in terms 
of the imperatives of the war on terror. Another key distinction is that the crackdown 
on civil society in Kyrgyzstan was not as harsh as in Uzbekistan. It did not include 
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any of civil society curtailment methods of the Uzbek government such as 
controlling funding of NGOs or the mass closure of NGOs and donor agencies 
working on civil society and democracy. In fact, it did not go further than an 
informational war, some restrictions on demonstrations and the intimidation of a 
small number of watch-dog NGOs and human rights activists. For example, the 
Kyrgyz Committee on Human Rights was refused registration and its leader had to 
flee to Europe126 and a few NGOs were subject to checks by the National Security 
Services127. This comparatively soft approach arguably resulted in the removal of 
Akaev during the ‘Tulip revolution’ in March 2005.   
In addition, unlike in Uzbekistan, the profile of radical Islamism has 
continued to grow since 2005. There were six more incidents caused by radical 
Islamic groups in the south of Kyrgyzstan, and their nature became much more 
political. In 2007, the Bishkek Department of Interior Ministry Press Service 
informed that a number of people had been arrested for distributing Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
leaflets, which discouraged citizens from supporting democratic institutions of 
Kyrgyzstan128 in the upcoming elections. Furthermore, in 2008, the National Special 
Service identified 30 units of religious-extremist organizations, revealed 90 facts of 
religious extremism, and found 4,957 copies of religious extremism literature. 
Religious extremism has been declared by the government as the most serious threat 
to the national security of the country129.  
In other words, the post Tulip revolution government continues to see radical 
Islamism as an issue in Kyrgyzstan. However, it has used the war on terror for two 
different purposes just as the previous government did but with tighter control and 
suppression. In 2009, President Bakiev signed a new law on religion. It introduced a 
number of new rules for religious groups such as: 1) the number of people needed to 
officially register a religious organization was increased from 10 people to 200 
people, 2) the involvement of children in religious organizations and proselytizing 
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were banned, 3) the distribution of religious materials in public places, children's 
institutions, schools, and from house to house was prohibited130.  
The government claims that the new law on religion is an anti-terrorism 
measure and will enable police to contain radical Islamism better. Further, it states 
that the new law is necessary to restrain evangelical Christianity which is seen as ‘a 
second social scourge’131. This clearly suggests that, under the war on terror, the 
government suppressed not only radical Islamists, but also all religious groups and, 
most importantly, restrained the people’s right to freedom of religion. The new law 
has been criticised by human rights organizations for not meeting international 
human rights standards132. Furthermore, some experts on religion noted that the 
adoption of such a law did not ensure that the problem of terrorism would be solved. 
Conversely, it might intensify religious activeness of people and even make religious 
organization clandestine, particularly those whose membership is below 200 
people133.      
 Furthermore, the government is also restricting the rights of NGOs to 
diminish their political activeness. The political transition taking place in Kyrgyzstan 
since 2005 has increasingly drawn NGOs into the political domain. Some NGO 
leaders joined political parties. As a result, NGOs has become associated with the 
political opposition. The government sees such a politicisation of NGOs as a threat to 
its power particularly taking into consideration its experience with the revolution. As 
the next presidential elections in 2010 draw closer, it seems that the government is 
starting to use the national security rhetoric to suppress the political activeness of 
NGOs for its own political purposes.  
Demonstrations proved to be one of the most effective ways for civil society 
to express its voice in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the Kyrgyz government restrained this 
ability of civil society by amending the law on freedom of assembly. The new law 
puts strict restrictions on public demonstrations for public safety. ‘According to it, 
citizens cannot protest next to “strategic facilities” including all government 
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buildings. Further, they should also get permission from the government in advance 
to have a demonstration. There are also limitations on the times when protests can be 
held’134. This is a considerable change since before people had only to notify 
authorities about their demonstration in advance135. 
Furthermore, the government has attempted to take NGOs under strict control 
by checking their funding and activities. In 2006, the initiative was made by the 
Ministry of Justice to investigate NGOs functioning in Kyrgyzstan that receive 
foreign funding. He stressed that the investigation should identify NGOs that might 
be a threat to the national security of Kyrgyzstan136. The Minister also emphasized 
that the government should support those NGOs that work on the advancement of 
Kyrgyzstan’s development137. NGOs expressed deep concern in relation to this 
initiative. In response, the Minister said that his proposal was aimed at fighting 
“religious extremism”138. He pointed out that he did not want Kyrgyzstan to face a 
situation that the USA did when the American government found out after 
investigation that it financed some of 9/11 attackers through the NGO sector139. 
However, this initiative has been on hold to this date.       
In comparison with Uzbekistan, where the government is taking the initiative 
to shape and fund civil society, in Kyrgyzstan the government lacks a clear 
programme. In fact, most collaboration between state institutions and the NGO 
sector, regardless of the area and scale of their activities, takes place within projects 
funded by donors. Since donors prefer to fund one-off and short-term projects, the 
government-NGO relationship tends to be temporary and unsustainable. The lack of 
state programme on NGOs has led to a desultory and sometimes discriminatory 
government-NGO relationship. The government and its institutions tend to work 
more with social service NGOs than with civil activist groups since the latter are 
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considered to be more active in advocacy and policy-making processes140. Moreover, 
the Kyrgyz government did not make any effort to localize NGOs as the Uzbek 
government did. Although there is a new law on state contracting as of June 2008 in 
Kyrgyzstan; the prospect of NGOs being financed by the government is very slight141 
since there is no funding in the state budget for this purpose. Kyrgyz NGOs are still 
largely funded by donor organizations142.  
In conclusion, the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan firstly offer up a 
number of common themes about the impact of the war on terror on state policy 
towards civil society in countries where democratic institutions are relatively 
underdeveloped. Second the differences between the two highlight the importance of 
local political context in mediating the relationship between the war on terror and 
state-civil society relations. Thirdly they shed light on some of the dilemmas facing 
the international community as it seeks to hold in tension demands for increased 
security and at the same time greater liberty. 
Firstly the common themes – in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan state policy 
towards civil society organizations has become more restrictive, particularly since 
2004 in Uzbekistan and 2005 in Kyrgyzstan (though the turning point may have 
come earlier in the late 1990s). The fact that the timing in both cases does not neatly 
coincide with the most intensive period of anti-terrorist activity in the region 
(between 1999 and 2002) suggests that the United States led war on terror was not 
the only factor in shaping policy towards civil society, and that it’s impact was 
mediated by other factors. However the ‘warlike’ pursuit of the terrorist threat has 
clearly shaped political dynamics in both countries – where national security is 
elevated to an almost supreme value, where non-government organizations become 
to be perceived as anti-government organizations, where collateral damage on those 
elements of civil society which are not directly contributing to the terrorist threat 
becomes politically acceptable, and where suspicions are raised about external 
funding of civil society. The image of the West in general and United States in 
                                                 
140 Kanykey Jailobaeva, “Enhanced Government Commitment: A Key to An Effective Government-
NGO Relationship in Kyrgyzstan” (2008), available at www.src.auca.kg.  
141 24.kg News Agency, “A law on “State Social Contracting” was Adopted in Kyrgyzstan” (2008) 
available at www.24.kg.  
142 Kanykey Jailobaeva, “All the truth about NGO funding in Kyrgyzstan: Numbers and Facts” 
(2008), available at www.src.auca.kg.  
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particular, has also been a clear casualty in the War on Terror. Signs in early 2009 
that Kyrgyzstan was requesting the closure of the United States air force base 
illustrate the extent to which American room for manoeuvre in the region is severely 
hampered by its reputation as a self-interested and unreliable ally. One of the factors 
pushing Kyrgyzstan to end this cooperation with the United States is the forthcoming 
Presidential elections, and a calculation by the President that being seen to learn 
towards Russia and away from the United States will be politically popular. While 
difficult to quantify given the absence, particularly in Uzbekistan, or robust opinion 
polling, the waves of the anti-Americanism that have swept the world in the post-Iraq 
invasion era have clearly changed the contours of popular opinion in the region. 
However what is particularly instructive in comparing Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan is that despite their common regional location, Soviet heritage, Islamic 
terrorist threat and role in the international war on terror (both hosting United States 
bases to support the campaign in Afghanistan), this chapter has identified significant 
differences in which local political context mediated the impact of the war on terror 
on state policy towards civil society. Kyrgyzstan emerged from the Soviet Union in a 
much weaker position than Uzbekistan – smaller, less resource-rich, more ethnically 
diverse and geographically fragmented. All these factors made Kyrgyzstan more 
vulnerable to a committed band of terrorists able to exploit its weaker military, 
mountainous areas, ethnic and political tensions between the north and south of the 
country and the more serious economic situation in the country. This vulnerability 
led in turn to it being more dependent on external support, both in directly dealing 
with the terrorist threat (calling in United States and Russian assistance where 
Uzbekistan prided itself on dealing with it alone) and also developing the country. 
While the liberal policy partly has roots in the country’s political culture, it was also 
driven by this need to align its development model with those of international 
development agencies and bilateral partners. This has shaped the relatively more 
tolerant and selective approach to civil society regulation – focusing more 
exclusively on religious groups and also restricting civil society activity only in its 
most politically overt forms – demonstrations at times of political flux such as during 
the election year of 2005. It has also meant Kyrgyzstan has refrained from shutting 
the door to international support for civil society groups.  
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With signals that Uzbekistan may also be relaxing its stance towards 
international organizations, there is an opportunity for international organizations to 
continue to shape the evolution of civil society in both countries. Successful 
interventions, however, will need to take into account these changes in state policy 
towards NGOs and address some of the underlying concerns. For the war on terror 
more broadly has shaken the previous image of civil society as some inherently 
positive dynamic143, and increased suspicions about its role and relationship with 
state actors. This is definitely true in the cases of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where 
civil society has been put on the defensive – framed as a fifth column for foreign 
interests in Uzbekistan or in a milder version, as a distraction to the government as it 
seeks to deal with an Islamic fundamentalist threat. Civil society now has to more 
clearly articulate its contribution to national development and stability, and 
international assistance programmes now have to take this into account – focusing 
increasingly on building up the capacity of NGOs not just to run projects but to 
strategically position themselves within the broader political context in ways that 












                                                 
143 Proponents of the concept have been accused of invoking the concept ‘to convey a benign glow 
than to illuminate debate or practice’: Deborah Eade, “Preface”, in Jenny Pearce (introduced by) 
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Executive summary  
 
 The government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Kyrgyzstan 
have achieved positive results in joint collaboration. Nonetheless, they still encounter 
a number of barriers, which hinder them from having a more productive relationship. 
The major problem is that the government does not have a unified and coherent 
policy on cooperation with NGOs. At present, the government-NGO relationship 
develops chaotically and fragmentarily. Donor-funded projects are the main factor 
bringing these actors together. Furthermore, the previous experience of the 
government in developing an NGO support programme suggests that the government 
needs more commitment on and control over the implementation of its initiatives on 
the collaboration with NGOs. Based on these, this policy brief proposes to create a 
State Department on NGO Relations. Its key aim would be to ensure that a proper 
legal basis for the government-NGO relationship is in place and implemented 
accordingly by coordinating the development and implementation of the legal 
documents on the cooperation of the government and its institutions with NGOs.  
 
 
                                                 





 In Kyrgyzstan, the government-NGO relationship is in a nascent stage. 
Although there has been considerable progress in the collaboration between these 
actors, there are still obstacles impeding the development of a more effective 
relationship between them. Based on the recent research145 on the government-NGO 
relationship in Kyrgyzstan, this policy brief discusses the barriers that hold the 
government and its institutions from establishing a successful partnership with 
NGOs.    
 To anticipate, the research has revealed that the government and its various 
institutions at all levels (national, regional, and local) encounter a common problem. 
The problem is that they lack for a clear state policy on the cooperation with NGOs, 
which would provide them with essential principles of how to work with NGOs. Put 
differently, there are no basic rules, which the government institutions regardless of 
the area and scale of their activities could refer to when collaborating with NGOs.   
 Furthermore, the detailed investigation of available legal documents on the 
government-NGO relationship has suggested that a lack of the state policy on NGO 
relations is a half of the problem. It has been revealed that the government already 
attempted to create a state programme on NGO support. However, this initiative 
failed since the government had poor commitment on and control over the 
implementation of the initiative. Therefore, it was concluded that, in addition to a 
bare initiative, the government should have the increased responsibility for its 
implementation accompanied with regular monitoring.  
 To sum up, there are two interconnected problems, which the government and 
its institutions in all areas and at all levels face with. They need the common state 
policy on the collaboration with NGOs, which would offer them the basic rules to 
work with NGOs. Furthermore, the central government needs proper mechanisms to 
                                                 
145
 This policy brief is based on the doctoral research, which has explored the NGO sector and its 
relationship with the government in Kyrgyzstan. The research was conducted from September 2007 to 
May 2008. Around 50 different NGOs from Bishkek, Osh, Issykata and Karakulja regions were 
interviewed. In addition, a number of documental materials on the government-NGO relationship in 
Kyrgyzstan were reviewed.   
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implement its policies and programmes on NGO relations. With reference to this, the 
policy brief suggests creating a State Department on NGO Relations. Its key 
responsibility would be to coordinate the development and implementation of the 
legal documents on the government-NGO relationship such as concepts, decrees, 
programmes, policies, and laws. In this way, the Department would ensure that a 
proper legal basis for the government-NGOs relationship is in place and 
implemented accordingly. It would also provide the different government institutions 
at all levels with information about and consultation on the legal documents on NGO 
relations. 
 In addition to these main functions, to contribute to the development of a 
more effective relationship between the government and NGOs, the State 
Department on NGO Relations would fulfill two additional tasks: a) disseminating 
information about the legal documents on the government-NGO relationship to 
NGOs through representatives of the NGO sector to ensure that NGOs are also aware 
of them and can refer to them when working with government institutions; and b) 
providing all government institutions with information about NGOs through 
maintaining an NGO database to increase their awareness about NGOs and their 
activities.  
 
Problem Statement: Government-NGO Relationship in Kyrgyzstan  
 
               It would not be a mistake if it was claimed that Kyrgyzstan has the most 
advanced relationship between the government and the NGO sector in Central Asia. 
The Kyrgyz government has created conditions conducive enough to the emergence 
and development of NGOs: NGOs can easily register and carry out their activities. 
Furthermore, the government and its institutions have been collaborating with NGOs 
over the last decade. There have been successful cases of the government-NGO 
collaboration on different issues (gender, poverty, environment, and others) and at all 
levels (national, regional, and local) (Berk et al 2007).  
 However, the number of these cases is limited and dispersed all over the 
country. The research has revealed that the reason for this is that the government 
lacks for the complex policy to collaborate with NGOs. According to the research, 
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mostly, the collaboration between the government institutions and the NGO sector 
regardless of the area and scale of their activities takes place within projects funded 
by donors. Since donors prefer to fund one-off and short-term projects, the 
government-NGO relationship tends to be temporary and unsustainable. In justice to 
donors, it should be pointed out that, by requiring NGOs to involve the government 
and its institutions in their projects, donor grants have acted as a massive incentive to 
the establishment of the government-NGO relationship in the first place.     
Furthermore, the research findings have indicated that the government 
institutions at all levels have little guidance to refer to when working with NGOs 
both on policy-making and social service delivery. Therefore, they do not know how 
to work with NGOs more effectively. The research has also suggested that, for the 
most part, the government institutions have a mistrustful attitude to NGOs and are 
not interested in working with them because they are poorly informed about NGOs 
and their activities. All in all, the idea of the collaboration with NGOs has been a 
new phenomenon for the government and its institutions since NGOs emerged only 
after independence. For these reasons, the government needs to develop the clear 
policy on collaboration with NGOs, which would provide the government 
institutions in various areas and at all levels with core principles on how to build 
collaboration with NGOs.    
A lack of the state policy on NGOs has led to the desultory and sometimes 
discriminating government-NGO relationship. The government and its institutions 
tend to work more with social service NGOs rather than with civil activist groups 
since the latter ones are considered to be more active in advocacy and policy-making 
processes. The research has shown that civil activist groups, which criticize the 
government and its activities, especially those infringing rights of citizens, are treated 
differently by the government and its institutions. In comparison to social service 
NGOs, civil activist groups tend to encounter more problems, created by the 
government institutions, such as undermining NGO initiatives, refusal in re-
registration and others. For example, one of the interviewees from a civil activist 
group said that they had been blacklisted for over-criticizing a government institution 
responsible for people in detention and had been refused cooperation.      
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Further, the government and its institutions, especially at the ministerial level, 
involve NGOs in different working groups and committees to make a joint decision. 
However, a process of NGO selection for such committees is unclear. A number of 
NGO interviewees noted that they had participated in different state committees. 
However, they could not explain how and why they were chosen to these 
committees. An absence of clear selection procedures undermines principals of 
democratic decision-making. It also indicates an unfair attitude of the government to 
NGOs since one would expect that NGOs would be selected for these committees on 
the basis of the competition.  
 
Previous Experience: Concept on the Government-NGO Collaboration   
 
The government has made an effort to establish the NGO support programme 
before. In 2004, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic signed the decree on the 
approval of the concept on the government-NGO collaboration (Decree, 2004). The 
main aim of the concept was to improve the government support for NGOs. For this 
purpose, it established a number of objectives: a) improving a  system on the 
government-NGO interaction and collaboration; b) creating conditions conducive to 
growth of civil initiatives; c) funding public oriented programs of NGOs through 
state contracting; d) establishing consultative councils on the government-NGO 
interaction; e) conducting joint government-NGO events (conferences, round tables, 
seminars, trainings on social problems, charities, cultural–massive campaigns and 
others); and f) providing informational support to NGOs (i.e. supporting NGOs in 
publicizing their activities).  
     All in all, the concept has had great potential and could serve as a sound legal 
basis for the effective government-NGO collaboration. However, it has had little 
success since it was partly carried out. The concept has presented too general aims 
and objectives on the improvement of the government support for NGOs, but not 
exact actions. According to the concept, the Cabinet of the Kyrgyz Republic was 
meant to develop the state NGO support programme and an action plan to implement 
it. Unfortunately, it did not happen. A lack of these key documents made the concept 
of a more declarative character. It can be assumed that this happened because the 
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Cabinet, which was responsible for the development of the documents, lacked for 
commitment. Furthermore, no one from the government followed up the 
implementation of the concept.   
 Nevertheless, different government institutions and NGO representatives 
have contributed to the implementation of some objectives of the concept. The 
Ministry of Labor and Social Protection jointly with NGO representatives has been 
lobbying a law on social contracting since 2006 (the third objective of the concept). 
This law is an institutionalized mechanism, which delineates how the state can 
provide funding to NGOs. In June 2008, the law was finally adopted by the Kyrgyz 
Parliament. NGOs have high hopes for it since they consider the state funding as a 
way to financial sustainability.    
 The fifth objective of the concept encourages the government and NGOs to 
have joint activities such as conferences, round tables, and others. According to the 
research, this is exactly the most widespread form of the government-NGO 
interaction in Kyrgyzstan at all levels and in all areas. However, it is difficult to 
claim whether it was an impact of the concept because there are other factors, which 
might have had greater impact. The first factor is donor grants, which encourage 
NGOs to work with the government in order to influence decision-making.  
 The second factor is that NGOs have come to understand that any problem 
can be solved only in close collaboration with the government. Therefore, their 
interaction with the government and political activeness have risen lately. Most NGO 
interviewees said that, no matter how hard they tried to solve problems, they could 
not solve them because they were addressing the consequences of the problems not 
the reasons creating them. On the whole, the main reason of most problems is poor 
legislation or policy. Therefore, the interviewees noted that they concentrated more 
on influencing policy-making processes now. One of the examples for this can be 
demonstrations conducted by civil activist groups throughout 2006 and 2007 
(winter).        
 Besides the above-described concept, there is one more legislative document, 
which slightly covers the government-NGO interaction. It is a law on non-
commercial organizations (NCOs), adopted in October 1999 (Law on NCOs, 1999). 
According to it, the government can support NGOs by providing them with funding 
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to carry out their programmes aimed at public interest and in any other ways, which 
are not prohibited by the legislation (Law on NCOs, article 5, 1999). However, the 
law does not provide any details on how the government should provide funding. In 
other words, it lacks for implementation mechanisms.  
To sum up, the government and NGOs have had quite positive experience in 
collaborating. However, it has been small-scale and short-term in most cases. Up to 
this date, the government-NGO collaboration has mainly occurred within donor-
funded projects. Unfortunately, the government has not had the clear state policy on 
the cooperation with NGOs. Consequently, the relationship between two actors has 
developed unsystematically and disconnectedly.  
The attempt of the government to create the state programme on NGO 
interaction and support failed due to the poor implementation of this initiative. This 
indicates that, in addition to a bare initiative, the state needs the enhanced 
commitment on and control over the implementation of its initiatives. In other words, 
there is need not only for legal documents such as concepts, decrees, laws, and others 
on NGO relations but also for an institutionalized mechanism, which would 
coordinate the development and implementation of these documents.         
 
Recommendation: The More Government Engagement, the Better the 
Government-NGO Relations 
 
 The study of the government-NGO relationship in Kyrgyzstan has suggested 
that a lack of the state policy on the collaboration with NGOs is a major barrier for 
building a more productive collaboration between the government and NGOs. The 
solution of the problem might seem evident. The government needs to develop the 
clear policy for its various institutions at all levels, which would give them basic 
guidance to collaborate with the non-governmental sector on an undiscriminating, 
systematic, and regular basis. However, it is necessary to take into account the 
lessons learned from the previous experience of the government with the concept on 
the government-NGO collaboration.  
 The above overview of the concept and its outcomes indicates that the 
government should be more committed to the implementation of its legal documents 
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on the cooperation with NGOs. Put differently, the government should have not only 
the initiatives, but also the institutionalized mechanism, which would coordinate 
their development and implementation.  
 Based on this, this policy brief suggests creating a State Department on NGO 
Relations.  From an administrative perspective, the Department would belong to the 
government. Its key mission would be ensuring that the proper legal basis for the 
government-NGOs relationship is in place and implemented accordingly. The main 
functions of the Department would be:   
1) to coordinate the development and implementation of the legal documents 
such as laws, concepts, policies, decrees and others on the government-NGO 
collaboration;  
2) to provide the government institutions in all areas and at all levels with 
information about and consultation on the legal documents on the 
government-NGO relationship. 
   
 To contribute to the establishment of a more effective partnership between 
the government and NGOs, the State Department on NGO Relations would also have 
two more subsidiary functions. The first function is to cooperate with representatives 
of the NGO sector (e.g. the Association of Civil Society Support Centres) to 
disseminate information about the legal documents on the government-NGO 
relationship to NGOs so that NGOs are also aware of them and can refer to them 
when collaborating with their government institutions in their field and at their level.  
 The second function is to maintain a database on NGOs and their activities in 
cooperation with representatives of the NGO sector and competent government 
institutions (e.g. National Statistical Committee and Ministry of Justice) to increase 
awareness of all government institutions about NGOs and their activities so that they 
would be properly informed about NGOs and engage in cooperation with them 
easily.   
 
Challenges of the Proposed Initiative   
 
 266 
 Notwithstanding its great potential to improve the government-NGO 
relationship, there are some risks that the proposal for the establishment of the State 
Department on NGO Relations has. The first risk is that the Department might 
promote merely interests of the government and its institutions when developing and 
implementing the legal documents on the government-NGO relationship without 
taking interests of NGOs into account. The second risk is that the government can 
abuse its Department on NGO Relations. It can use it for a different purpose such as 
intervening into and controlling activities of the NGO sector. The third risk is that 
NGOs and their representatives might not want to collaborate with the Department 
because of fear of the potential state control.  
 Despite of these risks, for the time being, the establishment of this department 
is the best option that the government can do to improve the government-NGO 
relationship in Kyrgyzstan. As has been made plain, the problem is that the 
government does not have the overall policy on collaboration with NGOs. Due to it, 
the government institutions tend to work with NGOs without coordination and plan. 
Furthermore, the previous attempt of the government to establish such a policy has 
indicated that there is need for the institutionalized mechanism, which would 
coordinate the development and implementation of legal documents on the 
collaboration with NGOs. The State Department on NGO Relations would serve as 
this mechanism and ensure that the proper legal documents on the government-NGO 
relationship are developed and implemented. Furthermore, it would also disseminate 
information both to all government institutions at all levels and the NGO sectors so 
that both actors are aware of the legal documents. Finally, the Department would 
keep the government institutions informed about NGOs and their activities by 
collecting information for its NGO database and disseminating it to government 




 In conclusion, the government and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan have made some 
positive steps towards an effective collaboration over the last decade. Nevertheless, 
there are some barriers, which hinder the development of a more productive 
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government-NGO relationship. The key problem is that the government does not 
have the unified and coherent policy on NGO collaboration, which would provide the 
government institutions in all areas and at all levels with basic principals on NGO 
collaboration. Currently, the relationship between these actors happens mostly within 
donor projects. All in all, the state-NGO relationship can be characterized as 
selective, chaotic, and fragmented.  
 The government tried to create the NGO support programme in past. 
However, it came to nothing due to a lack of the government’s commitment on and 
control over the implementation of its initiative. Taking all these into account, this 
policy brief has suggested creating the State Department on NGO Relations. The 
main aim of this institution would be to ensure that the legal basis for the 
government-NGOs relationship is in place and implemented accordingly. It would 
coordinate the development and implementation of the legal documents such as laws, 
concepts, policies, decrees on the government-NGO collaboration and provide the 
government institutions in all areas and at all levels with information about and 
consultation on the above-listed legal documents.  
  To contribute to the establishment of a more successful cooperation between 
the government and NGOs, the State Department on NGO Relations would also 
inform NGOs about the legal documents on the government-NGO relationship so 
that they can refer to them too when collaborating with the government institutions. 
It would also provide information about NGOs to all government institutions through 
maintaining the NGO database to keep them informed and open for the collaboration 
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 268 
Notes and references:  
 
1.Berk, S., Musalimova, T., Mamasalieva, G., Abdieva, B., and Sulaimanova, F. 
(2007) The Experience of Kyrgyzstan in Developing Partnership between the State 
and Civil Society Organizations, Bishkek: Altyn tamga. 
2.Informational bulletin No 1 and 2 of Counterpart-Sheriktesh (November 2007) on 
Strengthening Sustainable and Effective Collaboration between Government 
Institutions and Civil Society Organizations in Kyrgyzstan. 
3.Overview of the NGO regulation in Kyrgyzstan, available from Internet 
[http://www.legislationline.org/ru/?tid=3&jid=29&less=false], accessed on 3 May, 
2008. 




»), available from Internet 
[http://legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=2&lid=1230&less=false], accessed on 
3 May, 2008.  
5.The Decree of the State of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Approval of the Decree on 
the Collaboration between Public Associations, Public Foundation (NGOs) and the 





















 )   #
  
 
 )  
6.The Law on Social Contracting (a draft project) (  «' 
#
 
»), available from Internet 
[http://www.acssc.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=714&Itemid
=124], accessed on 5 May, 2008.   
7.The Law on Social Partnership (  «' 













Abazov, R. 1999. ‘Policy of Economic Transition in Kyrgyzstan.’ Central Asian 
Survey. 18 (2): 197–223. 
 
Abazov, R. 2003. ‘Freedom House Country Report: Kyrgyzstan 2003.’ Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=224&year=2003   
 
Abazov, R. 2004. ‘Freedom House Country Report: Kyrgyzstan 2004.’ Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=336&year=2004 
 
Abdraev, A. and Dubanaev, S. 2003. Reference Book of a Rural Citizen of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Bishkek: Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic.    
  
Adamson, F. 2002. ‘International Democracy Assistance in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan: Building Civil Society from the Outside?’ S. Mendelson and J.K Glenn. 
(eds.). The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in 
Eastern Europe and Eurasia. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
‘ADB: Kyrgyz Republic’ (www.adb.org). Asian Development Bank. Accessed on 25 
November 2010.  
 
‘AED: Kyrgyzstan’ (www.aed.org). Academy for Educational Development. 
Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
Akcali, P. 2005. ‘Democracy and Political Stability in Kyrgyzstan.’ B.N. Schlyter. 
(ed.). Prospects for Democracy in Central Asia. Sweden: Swedish Research Institute 
in Istanbul: 41-58.   
 
Akimova, M., Tokonova, A., and Kalpanazarova, R. 2008. ‘Controversy Over 
Kyrgyz Protest Sentences: Sentences Of Up To 20 Years Seen As Warning To Other 
Protesters, Rather Than Justice.’ Available at: 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=348494&apc_state=henh 
 
‘All Leaders of Social Democratic Party in KR Said that They are Harassed’ 
(http://kg.akipress.org). Akipress News Agency. Accessed on 25 November 2010.  
 
‘AKDN in Kyrgyzstan’ (www.akdn.org). Aga-Khan Development Network. 
Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
Aksartova, S. 2005. Civil Society from Abroad: U.S. Donors in the Former Soviet 
Union. PhD thesis. Princeton University. 
 
Aksartova, S. 2006. ‘Why NGOs?: How American Donors Embraced Civil Society 
After the Cold War.’ International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law. 8 (3): 16-21. 
 
 270 
‘Analysis of the Donor-NGO Relationships in the Kyrgyz Republic and Its Effect on 
Civil Society Development’ (www.efcentralasia.org). Eurasia Foundation of Central 
Asia. Accessed on 8 February, 2008.   
 
Anderson, J. 1997. The international Politics of Central Asia. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press.  
 
Anderson, J. 1999. Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia’s island of democracy? Amsterdam: 
Overseas Publishers Association. 
 
Anderson, J. 2000. ‘Creating a Framework for Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan.’ Europe-
Asia Studies. 52 (1): 77-93.     
 
Andersen, M. 2010. ‘Revolution Gone Wrong’. Available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRmq4Kx4maM  
 
‘Annual Reports of Soros Foundation – Kyrgyzstan’ (www.soros.kg). Soros 
Foundation – Kyrgyzstan. Accessed on 07 December 2009.  
 
Association of Civil Society Support Centres. 2007. Report on the National NGO 
Forum in 2007. Bishkek: ACSSC.  
 
‘Association of Civil Society Support Centres: Partnership, Development, 
Prosperity’ (www.acssc.kg). Association of Civil Society Support Centres. Accessed 
on 3 December 2010.  
 
‘April Relief Fund’ (www.aprilrelief.org). April Relief Fund. Accessed on 3 
December 2010.   
 
Azpuru, D., Finkel, S.E, Perez-Linan, A. and Seligson, M.A. 2008. ‘Trends in 
Democracy Assistance: What Has the United States Been Doing?’ Journal of 
Democracy. 19 (2):150-159. 
 
Babajanian, B.V. 2009. ‘Promoting Good Governance in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: 
The Village Investment Project.’ Research Report under the Non-Governmental 
Public Action Programme for the UK Economic and Social Research Council 
(Unpublished).  
 
‘Bakiev, NGOs Sign Cooperation Agreement’ (www.rferl.org, c). Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty. 6 May 2009.   
 
Barataliev, O. et al. (2010). Geography of Kyrgyzstan. Ministry of Education of the 
Kyrgyz Republic: Bishkek.  
  
Batley, R. 2002. ‘The Changing Role of the State in Development.’ V. Desai and 




Beshimov, E. 2004. ‘Kyrgyzstan’s Akayev: The Revolution Stops Here.’ Available 
at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav122204.shtml 
 
Blaikie, N. 2000. Designing Social Research. Malden: Polity Press. 
 




Bryant, C. 1993. ‘Social Self-Organisation, Civility and Sociology: A Comment on 
Kumar’s “Civil Society”.’ British Journal of Sociology. 44 (3): 397–401. 
 
Bryant, C. 1995.  ‘Civic nation, Civil Society, Civic Religion.’ J. Hall. (ed.). Civil 
Society: Theory, History, and Comparison. Oxford: Polity Press. 
 
Bryman, A. 2004. Social Research Methods. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
 
‘Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2004’ (www.state.gov). US 
Department of State. 28 February, 2005. 
 
‘Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2005’ (www.state.gov). US 
Department of State. 8 March, 2006. 
 
‘Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006’ (www.state.gov). US 
Department of State. 6 March, 2007. 
 
‘Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2007’ (www.state.gov). US 
Department of State. 11 March, 2008. 
 
Buxton, C. 2009. ‘NGO Networks in Central Asia and Global Civil Society: 
Potentials and Limitations.’ Central Asia Survey. 28 (1): 43 – 58.    
 
Carothers, T. 1997. ‘Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy’. 
Democratization. 4 (3): 109-132.  
 
Carothers, T. 2002. ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm.’ Journal of Democracy. 13 
(1): 5–21. 
 
Carothers, T. 2007. ‘How Democracies Emerge: The “Sequencing” Fallacy.’ Journal 
of Democracy. 18 (1): 12-27. 
  
Chandhoke, N. 2002. ‘The Limits of Global Civil Society.’ M. Glasius, M. Kaldor 
and H. Anheier. (eds.). Global Civil Society. Oxford: University Press: 35-52. 
 
Chatterjee, P. 2001. ‘On Civil and Political Society in Post-Colonial Democracies.’ 
S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani. (eds.). Civil Society: History and Possibilities. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 272 
‘Civil Society’ (www.dfid.gov.uk, a). Department for International Development. 17 
March 2009.   
 
Cohen, J. and Arato, A. 1995. Civil Society and Political Theory. USA: MIT Press.    
 
Collins, K. 2002. ‘Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia.’ Journal of Democracy. 
13 (3): 137-152. 
 
‘Common Cause: Holding Power Accountable’ (www.commoncuase.org). Common 
Cause. Accessed on 3 December 2010.   
 
Corley, F. 2009. ‘Kyrgyzstan: President’s Signing of Restrictive Religion Law 
Condemned.’ Available at: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1240 
 
Counterpart Sheriktesh. 2007. Informational Bulletin. Counterpart Sheriktesh. 
Bishkek.  
 
‘Countries at the Crossroad 2006: Country Report – Kyrgyzstan’ 
(www.freedomhouse.org). Freedom House. Accessed on 26 November 2010. 
 
‘Country Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic’ (http://webapps01.un.org).   
The United Nations. Accessed on 24 November, 2009. 
 
‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessment’ (http://web.worldbank.org, a). The 
World Bank. Accessed on 24 November, 2009. 
  
‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labour 1999’ (www.state.gov). US Department of State. 23 February, 2000.    
 
‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labour 2000’ (www.state.gov). US Department of State. 23 February, 2001. 
 
‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labour 2001’ (www.state.gov). US Department of State. 4 March, 2002. 
 
‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labour 2002’ (www.state.gov). US Department of State. 31 March, 2003. 
 
‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labour 2003’ (www.state.gov). US Department of State. 25 February, 2004. 
 
‘CPIA Structural Policies Cluster Average’ (http://data.worldbank.org). The World 
Bank. Accessed on 24 November 2009.    
 
Crotty, M. 1998. Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the 
Research Process. London: SAGE. 
 
Cumming, G.D. 2008. ‘French NGOs in the Global Era: Professionalisation 
 273 
‘‘Without Borders’’?’ Voluntas. 19: 372-394.  
 
Cummings, S. N. and Nørgaard, O. 2004. ‘Conceptualising State Capacity: 
Comparing Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.’ Political Studies. 52 (4):685-708.  
 
Cummings, S. N. 2008. ‘Introduction: ‘Revolution’ not Revolution.’ Central Asia 
Survey. 27 (3-7): 223 – 228.   
 
Dale, I. 2010. ‘Logic Behind The Kyrgyz Chaos.’ Available at: 
http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2622 
 
‘DFID: Kyrgyzstan (former website)’ 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/k
yrgyzstan.asp. Department for International Development. 19 April 2007.  
 
 ‘DFID: Kyrgyzstan’ (www.dfid.gov.uk, b). Department for International 
Development. Accessed on 25 November 2010.  
 
‘Donors.kg: Information Resource on Donors Activities in the Kyrgyz Republic’ 
(www.donors.kg, a). Donor Agencies. Accessed 25 November 2010. 
 
DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. 1983. ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.’ American 
Sociological Review. 48 (2): 147-160.  
 
Dunn, J. 2001. ‘The Contemporary Political Significance of John Locke’s 
Conception of Civil Society.’ S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani. (eds.). Civil Society: 
History and Possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Earle, L. 2005. ‘Community Development, ‘Tradition’ and the Civil Society 
Strengthening Agenda in Central Asia.’ Central Asian Survey, 24 (3): 245–260.  
 
Ebrahim, A. 2001. ‘NGO Behavior and Development Discourse: Cases 
From Western India.’ Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations.  12 (2): 79-101.  
 
‘EBRD: Kyrgyz Republic’ (www.ebrd.com). European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
Edwards, M. 2004. Civil society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
‘Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor’ 
(www.dfid.gov.uk, c). Department for International Development. Accessed on 11 
September, 2008.  
‘Eurasia Foundation Grant Database’ (www.eurasia.org). Eurasia Foundation.  
Accessed on 07 December 2009.  
 274 
‘Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia’ (www.ef-ca.org). Eurasia Foundation of 
Central Asia. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
  
‘European Commission External Corporation Programmes: Kyrgyzstan’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu). European Commission. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
European Community. 2007a. The Institution Building Partnership Programme. 
Office Delegation of the European Commission in the Kyrgyz Republic. Bishkek. 
 
European Community. 2007b. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights. Office Delegation of the European Commission in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Bishkek.  
 
Femia, J. 2001. ‘Civil society and the Marxist tradition.’ S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani. 
(eds.). Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press  
 
‘Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries’ (http://web.worldbank.org, b). The World 
Bank. Accessed on 24 November, 2009.   
 
Fritz, V. and Menocal, A. 2006. ‘(Re)building Developmental States: From Theory 
to Practice’. Available at:   
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1568.pdf  
 
Froelich, K.A. 1999. ‘Diversification of Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource 
Dependence in Nonprofit Organizations.’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly.  
28. (3): 246-268. 
  
Fukuyama, F. 2004. ‘The Imperative of State-Building.’ Journal of Democracy. 15 
(2): 17-31.  
 
Garaushenko, L. 2007. Contemporary Tendencies and Perspectives of the 
Development of the NGO Sector in Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek: Soros-Kyrgyzstan 
Foundation and Social Research Center of AUCA.   
 
Garbutt, A. and Heap, S. 2002. ‘Growing Civil Society in Central Asia’ 
(www.intrac.org). International NGO Training and Research Center. Occasional 
Papers Series no. 39. Accessed on 28 May 2007.   
  
Gellner, E. 1994, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. London: 
Penguin Group.   
 
‘George Soros: Founder and Chairman, Open Society Foundations’ 
(www.soros.org). Open Society Foundations. Accessed on 25 November 2010.    
 
Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 275 
Ghani, A., Lockhart, C., and Carnahan, M. 2006. ‘An Agenda for State-Building in 
the Twenty-First Century.’ The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 30 (1):101-123. 
 
Giddens, A. 2006. Sociology (5th edition). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Giffen, J., Earle.L., and Buxton, C. 2005. The Development of Civil Society in 
Central Asia. UK: INTRAC. 
 
Gilbert, L. 2010. Redesigning Society:  The Fate of Independent Social 
Organisations in Putin’s Russia. Unpublished paper presented at the Annual World 
Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York.   
  
Gleason, G. 1997. The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence. Colorado: 
Westview Press, Division of HarperCollins Publishers.  
 
‘Good Governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction: From Better Theory to 
Better Practice’ (www.odi.org.uk). Chr. Michelsen Institute and Overseas 
Development Institute. Final Synthesis Report. Accessed on 11 May, 2009.  
 
Gorbachev, I. 2008. ‘Human Rights Activists are Against the Formation of the Public 
Chamber in Kyrgyzstan.’ Available at: 
http://www.24.kg/community/2008/12/10/100385.html 
 
‘GTZ in Kyrgyzstan’ (www.gtz.de). German Government-Owned Corporation for 
International Cooperation with Worldwide Operations. Accessed on 25 November 
2010. 
 
Guest, G., Bunce, A., and Johnson, L. 2006. ‘How Many Interviews Are Enough?: 
An Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability.’ Field Methods. 18 (1): 59-82. 
 
Hall, J. 1995. ‘In Search of Civil Society.’ J. Hall. (ed.). Civil Society: Theory, 
History, and Comparison. Oxford: Polity press. 
 
Hawthorn, G. 2001. ‘The Promise of ‘Civil Society’ in the South.’ S. Kaviraj and S.  
Khilnani. (eds.). Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Hann, C. and Dunn, E. 1996. Civil Society: Challenging Western Models. London: 
Routledge.  
 
Hall, J. and Trentmann, F. 2005. Civil society: A Reader in History, Theory and 
Global Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Horton, S. and Kazakina, A. 1999. ‘The Legal Regulation of NGO: Central Asia at  
Crossroads.’ H. Ruffin and D. Waugh. (eds.). Civil Society in Central Asia. US: 
Centre for Civil Society International. 
 
 276 
Howell, J. 2000. ‘Making Civil Society from the Outside: Challenges for Donors.’ 
European Journal of Development Research. 12 (1): 3-22. 
 
Howell, J. and Pearce, J. 2002. Civil Society and Development: A Critical 
Exploration. US: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Huff-Hannon, J. 2010. ‘Blowback in Kyrgyzstan: The Turmoil in a Small Central 




Human Rights Watch. 1990. World Report 1990. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1990/WR90/  
 
Human Rights Watch. 1992. World Report 1992. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1992/WR92/  
 
Human Rights Watch. 1999. World Report 1999. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/ 
 
Human Rights Watch. 2001. World Report 2001: Events of 2000. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/contents.html 
 
Human Rights Watch. 2002. World Report 2002: Events of 2001. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k2/ 
 
Human Rights Watch. 2006. World Report 2006: Events of 2005. USA: HRW.  
 
Human Rights Watch. 2007. World Report 2007: Events of 2006. USA: HRW. 
Human Rights Watch. 2008. World Report 2008: Events of 2007. USA: HRW. 
Huskey, E. 1997a. ‘Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demographic and Economic 
Frustration.’ I. Bremmer and R. Taras. (eds.). New State, New Politics: Building the 
Post-Soviet Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 655:684.   
Huskey, E. 1997b. ‘Kyrgyzstan: The Fate of Political Liberalisation.’ K. Dawisha 
and B. Parrott. (eds.). Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 242-276.    
Huskey, E. 2005. ‘Freedom House Country Report: Kyrgyzstan 2005’. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=370&year=2005 
‘International Foundation for Electoral System: Kyrgyzstan’ (www.ifes.org). 
International Foundation for Electoral System. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
 277 
‘International Organisation for Migration: Mission in the Kyrgyz Republic’ 
(www.iom.elcat.kg). International Organisation for Migration. Accessed on 25 
November 2010. 
 
‘Internews:Kyrgyzstan’ (www.internews.kg). Internews. Accessed on 25 November 
2010. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
‘In Partnership with Kyrgyzstan’ (http://centralasia.usaid.gov). United States Agency 
for International Development’s Regional Website for Central Asia. Accessed on 17 
November 2009. 
 
‘IREX: Kyrgyzstan’ (www.irex.kg). International Research and Exchanges Board. 
Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
‘IRI in the Kyrgyz Republic’ (www.iri.kg). International Republican Institute. 
Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
Jailobaeva, K. 2005. Civil Society in the Context of Scotland and Kyrgyzstan. MSc 
dissertation. University of Edinburgh  
 
Jenkins, R. 2001. ‘Mistaking ‘Governance’ for ‘Politics’: Foreign Aid, Democracy, 
and the Construction of Civil Society.’ S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani. (eds.). Civil 
Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
‘JICA Kyrgyz Republic Office’ (www.jica.go.jp). Japan International Cooperation 
Agency. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
Jones, G. 2001. ‘Hegel and the Economics of Civil Society.’ S. Kaviraj and S.  
Khilnani. (eds.). Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 




Kaipov, M. 2008. ‘What is the Image of NGOs in Kyrgyzstan Like?’ Available at:  
http://www.open.kg/ru/theme/blitz/?theme_id=51&id=430 
 
Kamrava, M. 2001. ‘The Civil Society Discourse in Iran.’ British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies. 28 (2): 165-185. 
 
Karimov, D. 2008. ‘Kyrgyzstan’s Average Wage Rates Second to Last in CIS.’ 
Available at: http://eng.24.kg/cis/2008/07/31/5732.html     
 
Karimov, D 2009a. ‘Kyrgyzstan Can Not Create Strong Power Institutions Without 
NGOs’ Support.’ Available at: http://eng.24.kg/community/2009/05/05/7935.html  
 
 278 
Karimov, D. 2009b. ‘A Coordinating Council for the State and NGOs will be 
Created in Kyrgyzstan.’ Available at: 
http://www.24.kg/community/2009/05/05/113198.html 
 
Kasybekov, E. 1999. ‘Government and Non Profit Sector Relations in the Kyrgyz 
Republic.’ H. Ruffin and D. Waugh. (eds.). Civil Society in Central Asia. US: Centre 
for Civil Society International. 
 
Kaviraj, S. 2001. ‘In Search of Civil Society.’ S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani. (eds.). 
Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Kaviraj, S. and Khilnani, S. 2001. Civil Society: History and Possibilities. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Khilnani, S. 2001 ‘The Development of Civil Society.’ S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani. 
(eds.). Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Kramer, A.E. 2010. ‘Before Kyrgyz Uprising, Dose of Russian Soft Power.’ 
Available at:  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/world/asia/19kyrgyz.html  
 
Krastev, N. 2010. ‘Report: Democratic Decline Continues Across Former Soviet 




Kumar, K. 1993. ‘Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of a Historical 
Term.’ British Journal of Sociology. 44 (3): 375-395. 
 
Kulikova, V. and Perlmutter, D.D. 2007. ‘Blogging Down the Dictator? The Kyrgyz 
Revolution and Samizdat Websites.’ International Communication Gazette. 69 (1): 
29-50.  
 
‘Kyrgyz Interim Leaders Try To Impose Order After Unrest’ (www.rferl.org). Radio 
Free Europe – Radio Liberty. 20 April, 2010.   
 
‘Kyrgyz Opposition Leader Arrested’ (www.iht.com). International Herald Tribute. 3 
September 2009. 
  
‘Kyrgyzstan Adopts Progressive New NGO Laws’ (www.icnl.org). International 
Center for Non-for-Profit Law. 16 November 1999.   
 
‘Kyrgyzstan: Edil Baisalov to Head the Office of Otunbaeva’ 
(www.enews.fergana.ru). Fergana.ru Information Agency. Accessed on 25 
November 2010. 
 
‘Kyrgyzstan Enacts Law Restricting Religious Activities’ (www.rferl.org, a). Radio 
Free Europe – Radio Liberty. 13 January, 2009. 
 279 
 
‘Kyrgyzstan: Local Government Initiative (LGI) Phase II’ (www2.urban.org). Urban 
Institute. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
‘Kyrgyzstan Turns Away From West, Towards Russia’ (www.rferl.org, b). Radio 
Free Europe – Radio Liberty. 6 February, 2009.  
 
Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Non-Commercial Organisations. 1999. Available at: 
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/4952 
 
Levy, C.J. 2010a. ‘Upheaval in Kyrgyzstan Could Imperil Key U.S. Base.’ Available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/world/asia/08bishkek.html 
 
Levy, C.J. 2010b. ‘Kyrgyzstan President Says He Will Not Step Down.’ Available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/world/asia/09bishkek.html 
 
Lymar, A. 2008. ‘Kyrgyzstan Keeps Falling Down in the World Corruption Rating 
by Getting the 166th place’. Available at: 
http://www.24.kg/community/2008/09/24/93243.html   
 
Lymar, A. 2009a. ‘The Washington Post: Kyrgyzstan is Playing a Multi-Faceted 
Game Raising a Price for Itself.’ Available at: 
http://www.24.kg/politic/2009/02/04/105321.html 
 
Lymar, A. 2009b. ‘President to meet with NGO leaders.’ Available at: 
http://eng.24.kg/community/2009/05/05/7932.html  
 
Mansfield, E.D. and Snyder, J. 1995. ‘Democratisation and the Danger of War.’ 
International Security. 20 (1): 5-38.    
 
Marat, E. 2005. ‘Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan Before, During, and After the March 24 
Revolution.’ Helsinki Monitor. 16 (4): 267 – 277. 
 
Marat, E. 2008a. ‘Russia Drums Up Support for Its Airbase in Kyrgyzstan.’ Eurasia 




Marat, E.  2008b. ‘March and After: What Has Changed? What Has Stayed the 
Same?’ Central Asian Survey, 27 (3-4): 229–240. 
 
Marat, E. 2008c.  ‘Freedom House Country Report: Kyrgyzstan 2008’. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=458&year=2008  
 




Marat, E. 2010. ‘Kyrgyz Regime Suspected in Journalist’s Death.’ Eurasia Daily 




Markowitz, L. and Tice, K.W. 2002. ‘Paradoxes of Professionalisation: Parallel 
Dilemmas in Women's Organisations in the Americas.’ Gender and Society. 16 (6): 
941-958. 
 
Mayer, J. and Lerner, M. 1996. Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America. New 
York: Harper and Row.   
 
McCarthy, J. D., and Zald, M. N. 1973. The Trend of Social Movements in America: 
Professionalisation and Resource Mobilisation. Morristown: General Learning Press.  
 
Mendelson, S.E. and Glenn J.K 2002. The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical 
Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Mercer, C. 2002. ‘NGOs, Civil Society and Democratisation: A Critical Review of 
the Literature.’ Progress in Development Studies. 2 (1): 5-22. 
 
‘Mercy Corps: Kyrgyzstan’ (www.mercycorps.org). Mercy Corps. Accessed on 25 
November 2010. 
 
‘Millennium Challenge Corporation: United State of America’ (www.mcc.gov). 
Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
  
‘Millennium Development Goals’ (www.un.org). The United Nations. 24 November, 
2009.  
 
Mininni, M. 1998. ‘Making a difference: Making interventions at the grassroots.’ 
Give and Take: A Journal on Civil Society in Eurasia. 1 (1): 7-9 and Available at: 
http://www.isar.org/pubs/GT/GT1-1.pdf 
 
Morris, R. 1998. ‘Civil Society and the Nature of Urbanism: Britain, 1750 – 1850.’ 
Urban History. 25 (3): 287-301.  
 
Morton, G. 1998. ‘Civil Society, Municipal Government and the State: 
Enshrinement, Empowerment and Legitimacy, Scotland, 1800-1929’. Urban History. 
25 (3): 348-367.  
 
Neuman, L. 2003. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
 




‘NGOs and Civil Society’ (http://web.worldbank.org, c). World Bank. Accessed on 
24 November 2009.  
 
Olcott, M.B. 1996. Central Asia’d New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and 
Regional Security. USA: United States Institute of Peace.  
 
Olcott, M.B. 2005. The Second Chance of Central Asia. Washington, DC.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.   
 
Osmonov, D. 2008. History of Kyrgyzstan: Since Ancient Times to Present. Bishkek.    
 
Ottaway, M. 2005. ‘Civil Society.’ P. Burnell and V. Randall. (eds.). Politics in the 
Developing World. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
‘OSCE Centre in Bishkek’ (www.osce.org). Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. Accessed on 25 November 2010.  
 
‘Our activities in Central Asia’ (www.intrac.org). International NGO Research and 
Training Centre. Accessed on 25 November 2010.  
 
‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, 
Results, and Mutual Accountability’ (www.worldbank.org). The World Bank. 
Accessed on 22 February, 2010.  
Pannier, B. 2006. ‘Freedom House Country Report: Kyrgyzstan 2006’. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=385&year=2006  
 
Pannier, B. 2007. ‘Freedom House Country Report: Kyrgyzstan 2007’. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=426&year=2007 
 
Pannier, B. and Heil, A. 2010. ‘Kyrgyz President Poohs-Poohs Western-Style 




Paasiaro, A. 2009. ‘Home-Grown Strategies for Greater Agency: Reassessing the 
Outcome of Civil Society Strengthening in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.’ Central Asian 
Survey. 28 (1): 59-77.  
 
Petric, B. 2005. ‘Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan or the Birth of a Globalised Protectorate.’ 
Central Asian Survey. 24 (3): 319–332. 
 
Petrov, A. 2009. ‘NGOs of Kyrgyzstan are Coming out to the Warpath.’ Available 
at: http://www.24.kg/community/2009/02/26/107555.html 
 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. 2003. External Control of Organisations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper and Row. 
 
 282 
Pincus, S. 1995. ‘“Coffee Politicians Does Create”: Coffeehouses and Restoration 
Political Culture.’ The Journal of Modern History. 67 (4): 807:834.  
 
Poolos, A. 2007. ‘Base Politics.’ Available at: 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=12560.  
 
‘Poverty Threatens Kyrgyzstan?’ (www.for.kg). News Portal of Kyrgyzstan. 5 
August, 2008. 
 
Pratt, B. 2006. ‘Aid Harmonisation: Challenges for Civil Society.’ The Newsletter of 
the International NGO Training and Research Centre ‘Ontrac’. 33:1-2.   
 
‘President Signed a Decree on the Formation of the Public Chamber’ 
(www.24kg.org). 24.kg News Agency. 23 December, 2008.   
  
‘President of Kyrgyzstan Signs the Law on Assembly’ (www.cascfen.net). Central 
Asian and Southern Caucasian Freedom of Expression Network. 9 August, 2008.  
 
‘Programme on Civil Advocacy for Reforms and Stability’ (www.pact.kg). Pact. 
Accessed on May 2010.  
 
‘Programs by Location: Newly Independent States’ (www.icnl.org). International 
Centre for Non-for-Profit Law. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
Radnitz, S. 2005. ‘Networks, Localism and Mobilisation.’ Central Asian Survey. 24 
(4): 405–424. 
 
Radnitz, S. 2006. ‘What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?’ Journal of Democracy. 17 
(2): 132-146. 
 
Rakner, L., Menocal, A., and Fritz, V. 2007. ‘Democratisation’s Third Wave and the 
Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy 








‘Report on the Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan: February-March 2000’ 
(www.osce.org, a). Organisation for Security and Corporation in Europe. Accessed 
on 25 November 2010.  
 
Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. 2003. Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social 
Science Students and Researchers. London: SAGE. 
 
 283 
Robbins, S.P. 1990. Organisation theory: Structure, Design, and Applications. New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Roy, O. 2000. The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. London: I.B Tauris. 
 
Roy, O. 2002. ‘Soviet Legacies and Western Aid Imperatives in the New Central 
Asia.’ A. Sajoo. (ed.) Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary 
Perspectives. London: I.B. Tauris: 123–148. 
 
Ruffin, H. 1999. ‘Introduction.’ H. Ruffin and D. Waugh. (eds.). Civil Society in 
Central Asia. US: Centre for Civil Society International.  
 
Saidazimova, G. 2005. ‘“ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty”: Kyrgyzstan: For 
President, Parliamentary Elections a Family Affair’. Available at: 
http://gazeta.kg/article/2005-01-20/10367 
 
Safin R 2009. ‘The Right of Kyrgyz Citizens to Peaceful Assembly: Recent 
Decisions by the Authorities and the Response of the Society.’ Available at: 
http://www.ipp.kg/en/analysis/767/ 
 
Satarov, N. 2005. Counterpart International, Inc. in the Kyrgyz Republic: Civil 
Society Support Centres. [email attachment] (Email Communication, 18 May 2005).  
 
Seligman, A. 1992. The idea of civil society. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Shishkaraena, E., Alenkina, N., Alymbaeva, A., Alymkulova, A., Satarov, N., 
Stakeeva, B., Dronov, E. 2006. Review of History of Establishment and Development 
of the NGO sector in the Kyrgyz Republic. Bishkek: Aga-Khan Foundation.  
  
Singh, A. 2003. Contemporary Kyrgyzstan: An overview. Bishkek: Bishkek 
Observer. 
 
Sodupe, K. and Benito, E. 1998. ‘The Evolution of the European Union's Tacis 
Programme, 1991-96’. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 14 (4): 
51-68. 
 
‘Soros Foundation – Kyrgyzstan’ (www.soros.kg). Soros Foundation. Accessed on 
25 November 2010.  
 
Staggenborg, S. 1988. ‘The Consequences of Professionalisation and Formalisation 
in the Pro-Choice Movement.’ American Sociological Review. 53 (4): 585-605. 
 
Starr, F. 1999. ‘Civil Society in Central Asia.’ H. Ruffin and D. Waugh. (eds.). Civil 
Society in Central Asia. US: Centre for Civil Society International. 
 
Stevens, D. and Jailobaeva, K. 2009. ‘False Choice?: The War on Terror and Its 
Impact on Civil Society in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.’ J. Howell and J. Lind. (eds.). 
Civil Society under Strain: the War on Terror Regime, Civil Society and Aid Post-
 284 
9/11. Sterling (USA): Kumarian Press. 
 
Stevens, D. 2010. ‘Osama or the Georges: Shifting Threats and State Policy towards 
Civil Society in Uzbekistan.’ Development and Change. 40 (2): 355-374.    
 
Taylor, C. 2006. ‘Invoking Civil Society.’ R.E. Gooding and P. Pettit. (eds.). 
Contemporary Political Philosophy. UK: Blackwell Publishing.  
 
Tchoroev, T. 2002. ‘Historiography of Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.’ International 
Journal Middle East Studies. 34: 351 – 374.  
Temirov, U. 2010. ‘Kyrgyzstan: Bishkek Fire Erases Government Records.’ 
Available at: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav041810.shtml  
‘The Joint Country Support Strategy (2007–2010)’ (www.donors.kg, b). Donor 
agencies in Kyrgyzstan. Accessed on 25 November 2010.  
 
‘The Kyrgyz Republic Constitutional Referendum: 2 February 2003’ (www.osce.org, 
b). Organisation for Security and Corporation in Europe. Accessed on 25 November 
2010. 
 
‘The Kyrgyz Republic Parliamentary Elections: 27 February – 13 March 
2005’. (www.osce.org, c). Organisation for Security and Corporation in 
Europe. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report. 
Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
The US Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic: Democracy Commission Small Grants 
Program’ (http://russian.bishkek.usembassy.gov). The US Embassy in the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Accessed on 24 November, 2009. 
 
Tiulegenov, M. 2008. ‘Social Capital or Whether NGOs Are the Place for Collective 
Action?’ J. Couper. (ed.). Kyrgyzstan Today: Policy Briefs on Civil Society, Migration, 
Islam, Corruption. Bishkek: Social Research Center of the American University-Central 
Asia. 
 
Tocqueville, A. 2005. ‘Democracy in America.’ J.A. Hall and F.Trentmann. (eds.). 
Civil Society: a Reader in History, Theory and Global Politics. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan:106–116. 
 
Tonnies, F. 2005. ‘Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.’J.A. Hall and F.Trentmann. 
(eds.). Civil Society: a Reader in History, Theory and Global Politics. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan: 154-164. 
 
Tretyakov, A. 2007. ‘The Place and Role of Civic Institutions in the Society: An 
Attempt to Analyse’. L. Garaushenko. (ed.). Contemporary Tendencies and 
Perspectives of the Development of the NGO Sector in Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek: Soros-
Kyrgyzstan Foundation and Social Research Center of AUCA.     
 285 
 
Turdukulova, T. (2008) ‘On the 5th of June 2008 the Bill on State Social Contracting 
Was Adopted on the Session of the Jogorku Kenesh.’ Available at: 
http://www.ekois.net/wp/?p=3178   
 
 
Ubysheva, E. and Pogojev, R. 2006. NGO Sector in Figures and Facts. Bishkek: 
Soros Foundation and Association of Civil Society Support Centers.  
 
Uldasheva, N. 2008. ‘In Kyrgyzstan the Law on ‘Social Contracting’ Has Been 
Adopted.’ Available at: http://www.24.kg/parliament/2008/06/05/86689.html 
 
Uldasheva, N. 2009. ‘In Kyrgyzstan It Is Proposed to Make the Requirements of the 
Law on Non-Commercial Organisations Tougher.’ Available at: 
http://www.24.kg/parliament/2009/02/24/107227.html 
 
‘UNCIEF Kyrgyzstan’ (www.unicef.org). United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
‘UNFPA Kyrgyzstan’ (http://kyrgyzstan.unfpa.org/) . United Nations Family 
Planning Association. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
‘UNHCR Kyrgyzstan’ (http://www.unhcr.org). The UN Refugee Agency. Accessed 
on 25 November 2010. 
 
‘United Nations Development Programme in Kyrgyz Republic’ (www.undp.kg). 
United Nations Development Programme. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
‘USAID: Kyrgyzstan’ (www.usaid.gov). United States Agency for International 
Development. Accessed on 25 November 2010.  
 
US Department of State and USAID. (2007). ‘Strategic Plan of the US Department 
of State and the US Agency for International Development for Fiscal Years 2007 – 
2012.’ Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf 
 
Van Rooy, A. and Robinson, M. 1998. ‘Out of the Ivory Tower: Civil Society and 
the Aid System.’ A. Van Rooy. (ed.). Civil Society and the Aid Industry. London: 
Earthscan Publications: 31-70.  
  
Van Rooy, A. 2002. ‘Strengthening Civil Society in Developing Countries.’ V. Desai 
and R.B. Potter. (eds.). The Companion to Development Studies. New York: Hodder 
Arnold Publication: 520-524.  
 
Vollmer, H.M. and Mills, D.L. 1966. Professionalisation. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.  
 
Wall, C. and Overton, J. 2006. ‘Unethical Ethics?: Applying Research Ethics in 
Uzbekistan.’ Development in Practice. 16 (1): 63 – 67.   
 
 286 
Walzer, M. 1998. Toward a Global Civil Society. US: Berghahn Books. 
 
Weigle, A. and Butterfield, J. 1992. ‘Civil Society in Reforming Communist 
Regimes: the Logic of Emergence.’ Comparative Politics. 25 (1): 1-23.  
‘Western-Style Democracy not Suitable for Kyrgyzstan’ (www.asianews.it). 
AsiaNews.it. Accessed on 3 December 2010.  
‘What the Obama Administration Can Learn from Kyrgyzstan’ 
(www.washingtonpost.com). The Washington Post. 17 April, 2010.  
Williamson, T., Agha, Z.K., Bjornstad. L., Twijukye, G., Mahwago, Y., and 
Kabelwa, G. 2008. ‘Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?  
The Effectiveness of New Approaches to Aid Delivery at the Sector Level.’ 
Available at: http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=1526&title=building-
blocks-stumbling-blocks-effectiveness-approaches-aid-delivery-at-sector-level  
Wimpelmann, T. 2006. ‘The Aid Agencies and the Fragile States Agenda.’ Available 
at: http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2542=the-aid-agencies-and-the-
fragile-states-agenda   
Wirth, L. 1938. ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life.’ The American Journal of Sociology.  
44 (1): 1-24. 
 
‘World Health Organisation: Kyrgyzstan’ (www.who.int). World Health 
Organisation. Accessed on 25 November 2010. 
 
Yarshater, E. 1983. The Cambridge history of Iran: The Seleucid, Parthian and 
Sasanian. Cambridge: Cambridge Press.   
 
Yusuf, S., Deaton, A., Ito, T., and Stiglitz, J.E. 2009. Development Economics 
through the Decades: A Critical Look at 30 Years of the World Development Report. 
Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The 
World Bank.  
 
Zaidi, A. 1999. ‘NGO Failure and the Need to Bring Back the State.’ Journal of 
International Development. 11: 259-271.  
 
Zakaria, F. 1997. ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracies.’ Foreign Affairs. 76 (6): 22 – 
43. 
 
 
 
